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(Princeton  C^eofogicdf  ^eminat]^ 


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MAR  14  19: 

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CAREFUL  and  STRICT 


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INQUIRY 

INTO 

The  modern  prevailing  Notions 

OF       THAT 

F  R  E  E  D  0  M  of  JF  I  L  L^ 

Which  is  fuppofed  to  be  elTential 

T  o 

Moral  Agency,  Vii^tue  and  Vice, 
Reward  and  Punishment,  Praise 
and  B  L  A  m  e. 


By  the  late  Reverend  and  Learned 

JONATHAN    EDWARDS,   A.   M. 

Prefident  of  the  College  of  NeiM-Jerfey. 


Roin.'ix.  1 6.  //  is  not  of  him  that  willeth^ 


The   FOURTH   EDITION. 
t 


WILMINGTON,  {Delawuare) 
printed  and  Sold  by  James  Adams,  in  High-fireet^ 


M,DCC,XC, 


ill 


..km  'm  #'#■#" ^  4  4  m  m  m  m  'm'm'm "*'#'#' m  m  A. 


1"    H    E 

PREFACE. 

^^^)§C  ^  N  ^  ^-""^  much  Fault  with  the  calling  profefling 
^  ivf  /^  Chriftians,  that  differ  one  from  another  in  fome 
^  ^  Matters  of  Opinion,  by  diftinft  A^wawj- ,•  efpecially 

w'^3g'W  calling  them  by  the  Names  of  particular  Men,  who 
J^stt.  JR/rf*  j^jjy^  diilinguifl-ied  tliemfelves  as  Maintainers  and 
Promoters  of  thofe  Opinions :  as  the  calling  fome  profeiring 
Chriftians  Armimans ,  from  Armidius  ;  others  Avians ,  from  A- 
vius  ;  others  Socinians,  from  Socinks,  and  the  like.  They  think 
it  unjuft  in  itfelf ;  as  it  feems  to  fuppofe  and  fiiggefl-,  that  the 
Perfons  mark'd  out  by  thefe  Names,  received  thofe  Doftrines 
which  they  entertain,  out  of  Regard  lo,  and  Reliance  on  thofe 
Men  after  whom  they  are  named  ;  as  tho'  they  made  them  their 
Rule:  in  the  fame  Manner,  as  the  Followers  of  Christ  arc 
called  Chrijiians,  after  his  Name,  whom  they  regard  and  de- 
pend upon,  as  their  great  Head  and  Rule,  Whereas,  this  is  an 
unjuft  and  groundlels  Imputation  on  thofe  that  go  under  the 
foremeation'd  Denominations.  Thus  (fay  they)  there  is  not 
the  leaft  Ground  to  fuppofe,  that  the  chief  Divines,  who  em- 
brace the  Scheme  of  Doctrine  which  is  by  many  called  Armmi- 
anifm^  believe  it  the  more  becaufe  Ar?ninius  believed  it :  and 
that  there  is  no  Reafon  to  think  any  other,  than  that  they  fin- 
ccrely  and  impartially  ftudy  the  holy  Scriptures,  and  inquire 
after  the  Mind  of  Chrift,  with  as  much  Judgment  and  Sincerity, 
a.5  any  of  thofe  that  call  them  by  thefe  Names ;  that  they  feek 
atrer  Truth,  and  are  not  careful  whether  they  think  exaftly  as 
Arminha  ^\^\  yea,  that  in  fome  Things  they  aflually  differ 
from  liim.  This  Praftice  is  alfo  efteeraed  aftually  injurious  on 
this  Account,  that  it  is  fuppofcd  naturally  to  lead  the  Multi- 

-tude 


iv  The  PREFACE. 

tude  to  imagine  the  DifFerence  between  Perfons  thrs  nair.td  an<J 
others,  to  be  greater  than  it  is ;  yea,  as  tho'  it  were  fo  great, 
that  they  muit  be  as  it  were  another  Species  of  Beings.  And 
they  objcvt  againft  it  as  arifing  from  an  uncharitable,  narrow, 
contraded  Spirit;  which,  they  fay,  commonly  inclines  Ferfons 
to  confine  all  that  ia  good  to  themfeh  es  and  thsir  own  Party, 
and  to  make  a  wide  diftindtion  between  themfelves  and  others, 
and  ftigmatize  thofe  that  differ  from  them  with  odious  Names. 
They  i'ay  moreover,  that  the  keeping  up  fuch  a  Dillindion  of 
Names  has  a  dired  Tendency  to  uphold  Dillance  and  Difatfec- 
tion,  and  keep  alive  mutual  Hatred  among  Chriftians,  who 
ouglit  all  to  be  united  in  Friendfhip  and  Charity,  however  they 
can't  in  all  Things  think  alike. 

I  confeA,  thefe  Things  are  very  plaufible.  And  I  will  not 
cleny,  that  there  are  fome  unhappy  Confequences  of  this  DilHnc- 
tion  of  Names,  and  that  Men's  Infirmities  and  evil  Difpofitions 
often  make  an  ill  Improvement  of  it.  But  yet  1  humbly  con- 
ceive, thefe  Objedlions  are  carried  far  beyond  Reafon.  The 
Generality  of  Mankind  are  difpofed  enough,  and  a  great  Deal 
too  much,  to  Uncliaritablenefs,  and  to  be  cenforious  and  bitter 
towards  thofe  that  difter  from  them  in  religious  Opinions  : 
which  evil  Temper  of  Mind  will  take  Occafion  to  exert  itfelf, 
from  many  Things  in  themfelves  innocent,  ufeful  and  neccffary : 
Eut  yet  there  is  no  Necefiity  to  fuppofe,  that  the  thus  diftin- 
guilhing  Perfons  of  different  Opinions  by  different  Names, 
arifes  mainly  from  an  uncharitable  Spirit.  It  may  arife  from 
the  Difpofition  there  is  in  Mankind  (whom  God  has  diftin- 
guiihed  vvith  an  Ability  and  Inclination  for  Speech)  to  improve 
the  Benefit  of  Language,  in  the  proper  Ufe  and  Defign  of 
l\^ames,  given  to  Things  which  they  have  often  Occafion  to 
f|jeak  of,  or  fignify  their  Minds  about ;  which  is  to  enable 
them  to  exprefs  their  Ideas  with  Eafe  and  Expedition,  without 
being  incumber'd  v/ith  an  obfcurc  and  difficult  Circumlocution. 
And  the  thus  diftinguifhing  Perfons  of  different  Opinions,  in  re- 
ligious Matters,  may  not  imply  nor  infer  any  more  than  that 
there  is  a  DifFerence,  and  that  the  DifFerence  is  fuch  as  we  find 
we  have  often  Occafion  to  take  Notice  of,  and  make  Mention  of. 
That  which  we  have  frequent  Occafion  to  fpeak  of,  (whatever 
at  be,  that  gives  the  Occafion)  this  wants  a  Name :  and  'tis 
always  a  Defeft  in  Language,  in  fuch  Cafes,  to  be  obliged  to 
make  ufe  of  a  Defcription,  infl:ead  of  a  Name.  Thus  we  have 
often  Occafion  to  fpeak  of  thofe  who  are  the  Defccndants  of 
the  ancient  Inhabitants  of  Francf,  who  were  Subjcfts  or 
Llcads  of  the  Government  of  that  Land,  and  fpake  the  Lan- 
guage peculiar  to  it;   in  Diiliinflion  from  the  Defccndants  of 

the 


The  PREFACE.  v 

the  Inhabitants  of  .S//?///,' who  belonging  to  that  Community, 
and  fpake  the  Language  of  that  Country.  .  And  therefore  v/c 
find  the  great  Need  of  dillinft  Names  to  fignify  thcfe  different 
Sorts  of  People,  and  the  great  Convenience  of  thofc  diftinguifh- 
ing  Words,  Fnnch,  zn<ii  Spaniards ;  by  which  the  Signification 
of  our  Minds  is  quick  and  eafy,  and  our  Speech  is  delivered 
from  the  Burden  of  a  continual  Reiteration  of  diffufe  Defcrip- 
tions,  with  which  it  muft  othcrwife  be  embarraffed. 

That  the  Difference  of  the  Opinions  of  thofe,  who  in  their 
general  Scheme  of  Divinity  agree  with  thefe  two  noted  Men, 
'Cah'ifiy  and  Aimlnius,  is  a  Thing  there  is  often  Occafion  to 
fpeak  of,  is  what  the  Praftice  of  the  latter,  itfelf  confefTes ; 
who  arc  often,  in  their  Difcourfes  and  Writings,  taking  No- 
tice of  the  fuppofed  abfurd  and  pernicious  Opinions  of  the  for- 
mer'Sort.  And  therefore  the  making  Ufe  of  different  Names 
in  this  Cafe  can't  reafonably  be  objedcd  againft,  or  condemn- 
ed, as  a  Thing  which  muft  come  from  fo  bad  a  Caufe  as-they 
aiTign.  It  is  eafy  to  be  accounted  for,  without  fuppofmg  it  to 
arife  from  any  other  Source,  than  the  Exigence  and  natural 
Tendency  of  the  State  of  Tilings ;  confidering  the  Faculty  and 
Difpofition  God  has  given  Mankind,  to  expvefs  Things  which 
they  have  frequent  Occafion  to  mention,  by  certain  diflinguifli- 
ino-  Names.  It  is  an  EfTedl  that  is  limilar  to  what  we  fee 
arife,  in  innumerable  Cafes  which  arc  parellel,  where  the  Cauf® 
is  not  at  all  blame-worthy, 

Nevcrtlielefs,  at  lirft  I  had  Thoughts  of  carefully  avoiding 
the  Ufe  of  the  Appellation,  Armmian,  in  this  Treatife.  But  I 
foon  found  I  {hould  be  put  to  great  Difficulty  by  it;  and  that 
my  Difcourfe  would  be  fo  incumbered  with  ?,n  often  re- 
peated Circumlocution,  inftead  of  a  Name,  which  would  ex- 
prefs  the  Thing  intended,  as  well  and  better,  thA  I  altered  my 
Purpofe.  And  therefore  I  muil  all:  the  Excufe  of  fuch  as  are 
apt  to  be  offended  with  Things  of  this  Nature,  that  I  have  fo 
fieely  ufed  the  Term  Arminian  in  the  following  Difcourfe.  I 
profefs  it  to  be  without  any  Deiign,  to  ft igmaiize  Perfons  of 
any  Sort  with  a  Name  of  Reproach,  or  at  all  to  make  them 
appear  more  odious.  If,  when  I  had  Occafion  to  fpeak  of  thofe 
Divines  who  are  commonly  called  by  this  Name,  I  had,  in- 
ftead of  ftyling  them  Arminians,  called  them  thefe  Men,  at 
Dr.  V/hithy  does  Calnjinijiic  Divines  ;  it  probably  would  not 
have  been  taken  any  better,  or  thought  to  fhcw  a  better  Tem- 
per, or  more  good  Manners.  I  have  done  as  I  would  be  dontr 
by,  in  this  Matter.  However,  the  Term  Cahhiiji  is  in  thefe 
Days,   among  moft,   a  Term  of  greater  Reproach  than  the 

Term 


vi  Tlic  P  R  E  F  A  C  E. 

Term  Arminian;  yet  I  {hould  not  iake  it 'at  all  amlfi,  to  i>c 
called  a  Cal'viniji,  for  DilHnftion's  Sake  :  tho'  I  utterl)'  dif- 
claim  a  Dependance  on  Calvin,  or  believing  the  Dodtrines 
which  I  hold,  becaufe  he  believed  and  taught  them ;  and 
cannot  juftly  be  charged  with  believing  in  every  Thing  juft  as 
lie  taught. 

But  left  I  Ihould  really  be  an  Occafion  of  Injury  to  fomc 
Perfons,  1  would  here  give  Notice,  that  tho'  I  generally  fpeak 
of  that  Doftrine,  concerning  Free-will  and  moral  Agency, 
which  I  oppole,  as  an  Arminian  Dodtrine ;  yet  I  would  net  be 
underftood,  that  CA^ery  Divine  or  Author  whom  I  have  Occa- 
Hon  to  mention  as  maintaining  that  Doftrine,  was  properly  an 
Arminiaiz,  or  one  of  that  Sort  which  is  commonly  called  by 
that  Name,,  Some  of  them  went  far  beyond  the  Arminians  : 
And  I  would  by  no  Means  charge  Arminians  in  general  with  all 
the  corrupt  Doftrine,  v/hich  thefe  maintained.  Thus,  for  In- 
flance,  it  would  be  very  injurious,  if  I  (hould  rank  Arminian 
Divines  in  general,  with  fuch  Authors  as  Mr.  Chuhh.  I  doubt 
not,  many  of  them  have  fome  of  his  Dodlrincs  in  Abhorrence ; 
tho'  he  agrees,  for  the  moft  Fart,  with  Arminians,  in  his  No- 
tion of  the  Freedom  of  the  Will.  And  on  the  other  Hand, 
tho'  I  fuppofe  this  Notion  to  be  a  leading  Arficle  in  the  Armi- 
nian  Scheme,  that  v/hich,  if  purfued  in  its  Confequences,  will 
truly  infer,  or  naturally  lead  to  all  the  reft  ;  yet  I  don't  charge 
all  that  have  this  Doctrine,  v;ith  beiiig  Arminians.  For  what- 
ever may  be  the  Confequences  of  the  Doftrine  really,  yet  fume 
that  hold  this  Dcftrine,  may  not  own  nor  fee  thcfe  Confe- 
quences ;  and  it  would  be  unjaft,  in  many  Inftances,  to  charge 
every  Author  with  believing  and  maintaining  all  the  real  Con- 
fequences of  his  avowed  Doftrines.  And  I  defirc  it  may  l^ 
particularly  .noted,  that  tho'  I  have  Occafion  in  the  following 
Difcourfe,  often  to  mention  the  Author  of  the  Book  entitled. 
An  EJfay  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  in  God  and  the  Creature , 
as  holding  that  Notion  of  Freedom  of  the  Will,  which  I 
oppofe  ;  yet  I  don't  mean  to  call  him  an  Arminian :  however 
iin  that  Dodrine  he  agrees  with  Ar?ninians,  and  departs  from 
the  current  and  general  Opinion  of  Caluinifis.  It  the  Author 
of  that  Effay  be  the  fame  as  it  is  commonly  afcribed  to,  he 
doubtlefs  was  not  one  that  ought  to  bear  that  Name.  But  how- 
ever good  a  Divine  he  was  in  many  Refpefts,  yet  that  particu- 
lar Arminian  Doftrine  which  he  maintained,  is  never  the  better 
for  being  held  by  fuch  an  One  :  nor  is  there  lefs  Need  of  oppof- 
ing  it  on  that  Account ;  but  rather  is  there  the  more  Need  of  it; 
as  it  will  be  likely  to  have  the  more  pernicious  Influence,  for 
being  taught  by  a  Divine  of  his  Name  and  Charader  j  fuppof- 

jng 


The  P  R  E  F  A  C  E.  vii 

ing  the  Doflrine  to  be  wrong,  and  in  itfelf  to  be  of  an  ill 
Tendency. 

I  have  Nothing  further  to  fay  by  Way  of  Preface  ;  but  only 
to  bcfpcak  the  Reader's  Candour,  and  calm  Attention  to  what 
I  have  written.  The  Subjedl  is  of  fuch  Importance,  as  to  de~ 
ma}id  Attention,  and  the  moft  thorough  Confideration.  Of  all 
Kinds  of  Knowledge  that  we  can  ever  obtain,  the  Knowledge 
of  God,  and  the  Knowledge  of  ourfelves  are  the  moft  important. 
As  Religion  is  the  great  Bufin?fs,  for  which  we  are  created, 
and  on  which  our  Happinefs  depends;,  and  as  Religion  confifta 
in  an  Intcreourfe  between  ourfelves  and  our  Maker ;  and  fo  has 
its  Foundation  in  God's  Nature  and  our's,  and  in  the  Relation 
that  God  and  we  ftand  in  to  each  other;  therefore  a  true 
Knowledge  of  both  muft  be  needful  in  Order  to  true  Relif^ion. 
But  the  Knowledge  of  ourfelves  confifts  chiefly  in  right  Appre- 
henlions  concerning  thofe  two  chief  Faculties  of  our  Nature, 
the  Underjiandwg  and  W ill.  Both  are  very  important :  yet  the 
Science  of  the  latter  muft  be  confefled  to  be  of  greateft  Moment; 
in  as  much  as  all  Virtue  and  Religion  have  their  Seat  more  im- 
mediately in  the  Will,  confiiHng  more  cfpecially  in  right 
Afts  and  Habits  of  this  Faculty.  And  the  grand  Queftion 
about  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  is  the  main  Point  that  belcno-s 
to  the  Science  of  the  Will.  Therefore,  I  fay,  the  L-nportance 
of  this  Subjeft  greatly  demands  the  Attention  of  Chrifrians,  and 
efpecially  of  Divines.  But  as  to  my  Manner  of  handlino- the 
Subjeft,  I  will  be  far  from  prefuming  to  fay,  that  it  is  fuch  as 
demands  the  Attention  of  the  Reader  to  what  I  have  written^ 
I  am  ready  to  own,  that  in  this  Matter  I  depend  on  the  Rea- 
der's Courtefj.  But  only  thus  far  I  may  have  fome  Colour  for 
putting  in  a  Claim;  that  if  the  Reader  be  difpofed  to  pafs  hia 
Cenfure  on  what  I  have  written,  I  may  be  fully  and  patiently- 
heard,  and  well  attended  to,  before  I  am  condemned.  How- 
ever, this  is  \That  I  would  humbly  afi  of  my  Readers ;  toge- 
ther with  the  Prayers  of  all  fincere  Lovers  of  Truth,  that  I  may- 
have  much  of  that  Spirit  which  Chrift  promifed  his  Difciples„ 
which  guides  into  all  Truth  ;  and  that  the  bleffed  and  powerful 
Influences  of  this  Spirit  would  make  Truth  viftorious  in  the 
World. 


AGc 


[     viii     ] 

^W^W^w^v    K    ^^      ^      '^      ''M      ^      )^      U 

^K^^J^^^  ^  ^  n  ^  n  u  n 

y^^  X  n  M  u  M  n  n  M  K  ^  M 

A 
General     TABLE 

OF        THE 

C  O  ■  N  T  E  N  T  S. 

PART        L 

Wherein  are  explained  various  Terms  and  Things 
belonging  to  the  Subje6l  of  the  enfuing  Dif-> 
courfe. 

SECT.  I.  Concerning  the  Nature  of  the  ?r/7/.  Pag.  i,  l^c. 
SECT.    II.    Concerning    the  Determination  of  the  Will. 

Pag.    J. 

SECT.  III.  Concerning  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms  'NecfJJltj, 

ImpoJJihility ,  Inability,  Sec.   and  o{  Conti»£/rncf.  P^g.    13. 

SECT.  IV.   Of  the  Diftinftion  of  natural  and  moral  Necef- 

fity  and  Inabilit}'.  Pag.   20, 

SECT.  V.  Concerning  the  Notion  of  i/^fr/)',  and  of -wor/?/ 

Age7icy.  Pag.  27. 

PART        IL    • 

^Vherein  it  is  coniidered.  Whether  there  is,  or 
can  be  any  fuch  Sort  of  Freedom  of  Will,  as 
that  wherein  Arminians  place  the  Eflenceofthe 
Liberty  of  all  moral  Agents;  and  whether  any 
fuch  Thing  ever  was^  or  can  he  conceived  of. 

SECT.  I.  Shewing  the  manifcft  Inconfiftence  of  the  /<rw- 
nian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will,  confifting  in  the  Will's 

/tlf-determinini  tovjtu  ^^%'  3'* 

v>£CT« 


2-^>^    C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S.  ix 

SECT.  II.  Se\eral  fuppofed  Ways  of  evading  the  foregoing 
!R-eafoning  confuleied.  Pag-  35- 

SECT.  III.  Whi-ther  any  Event  whatfoever,  and  Volition 
in  particular,  tan  come  to  pafs  'voithout  a  Caufe  of  its  Exiftence. 

Pag.  41. 
-  SECT.  IV.  Whether  Volition  can  arife  without  a  Caufc, 
thro'  the  Aaivity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul.  Pag.  47. 

SECT.  V,  Shev.ing  that  if  the  Things  afierted  in  thefe 
Evafions  (hould'  be  fuppofed  to  be  true,  they  are  altogether 
impertinent,  and  can't  help  the  Caufe  of  Armi7iiafi  Liberty ; 
and  how,  this  being  the  State  of  the  Cafe,  Arminiati  Writers  are 

obliged  to  talk  ?>tc///5/?^»i'/)''  ^^S'*   S^' 

SECT.  VI.  Concerning  the  Will's  determining  in  Ihings 
-.vhich  are  ^rit&\y^it2differe?!t,  in  the  View  of  the  JSIind.  Pag.  5^. 

SECT.  VII.  Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liberty  ot  Will 
confuting  in  IndiJ,  r^jice.  Pag.   63. 

SECT.  VIII.  Concerning  the  fuppofed  Liberty  of  the  Will, 
as  oppofite  to  all  Ntctj/ity.  Pag.  73. 

SECT.  IX.  Of  the  Connexion  of  the  Ads  of  the  ??V// with 
the  Diftates  of  the  fyWc-r/^aW/V/^.  Pag.  76. 

SECT.  X,  Volition  neceflJArily  connefled  witli  the  Influence 
o(  Mofi-t'es  :  With  particular  Obfervations  on  the  great  Inccn^ 
fiftence  of  Mr.  Chubh's  Affertions  and  Reafonings,  about  the 
Freedom  of  the  Will.  Pag.  84. 

SECT.  XI.  The  E-videtice  of  God's  certain  Forchnoivlcdge 
of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  P'^g-  9^'» 

■  SECT.  Xil.  God's  ceri(7ir2  Forebia-jjlcdge  ef  the  future  Vo- 
litions of  moral  Agents,  inconfifienl  with  futh  a  CojUingence  of 
thofe  Volitions,  as  is  without  all  Neceffity.  Pag.   117. 

And  infers  a  Neceflity  of  Volition,  as  much  as  an  abfclute 
Decree.  Pag.    12  2. 

SECT.  XIII.  Whether  we  fuppofe  the  Volitions  of  moral 
Agents  to  be  connected  with  any  Thing  antecedent,  or  not, 
yet  they  nnift  be  neceiJary^  in  fuch  a  Senfe,  as  to  overthrow 
Arminian  Liberty.  Pag.   131, 

PART        III. 

Wherein  is  inquired.  Whether  any  fuch  Liberty 
of  Will,  as  Arminians  hold,  be  neceffary  to  moral 
Agency,  Virtue  and  Vice,  Praife  and  Dif- 
praife,   &c, 

SECT.  I.  God's  moral  Excellency  necejfary,  yet  <virtuo:is  and 
Praife-nvortby.  Pap-.    13^. 

SECT.  II,  The  Aas  of  the  Will  of  the  human  Soul  of 
B  Jesus 


^A  ■    r/&^  C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S. 

Jesus  Christ  necejfarilj  holy,   yet  •virtuous,   fraife-'wortfy,/ 
r^ivardable,  &c.  Pa?.    1 39. 

SECT.  III.  The  Cafe  of  fuch  as  zxt  gii-en  ?ip  of  God  to  Sin, 
and  of  fallen  Man  in  general,  proves  moral  NeaJ/ttj  and  hia- 
bility  to  be  confiftent  with  Blavte-ivorthinejs.  Pag.   153. 

SECT.  IV,  Command,  and  Obligation  to  Obedience,  wa- 
Jiftent  with  moral  Inability  to  obey.  Pag.    159. 

SECT.  V,  That  Sincerity  of  Defires  and  Endeavours,  which 
is  fuppofed  to  excufe  in  the  Non- performance  of  Tlungs  in 
themfelves  good,  particularly  confidered.  Pag.  170. 

SECT.  VI,  Liberty  of  Indijfercjice ,  not  only  not  neceffary  to 
Virtue,  but  utterly  iiiconfijlent  with  it:  and  all,  either  virtu- 
ous, or  vicious  Habits  and  Inclinations,  inconfiftent  with  Armi- 
»/<7«  Notions  of  Liberty,  and  moral  Agency.  Pag.   178. 

SECT.  VII.  Arminian  Notions  of  moral  Agency  inconf.ft- 
ent  with  all  Influence  of  Motii'c  and  Inducemefit,  in  either  vir- 
tuous ox  vicious  Adions,  Pag.   185. 

PART        IV. 

Wherein  th^  chief  Grounds  of  the  Reafonings  of 
Arminiiws,  in  Support  and  Defence  of  their  No- 
tions of  Liberty,  moral  Agency,  &c.  and  againfi: 
the  oppofite  Dodlrine,  are  confidered. 

SECT.  I.  The  EJcjice  of  the  Virtue  and  Vice  of  the  Difpo- 
fitions  of  the  Heart,  and  Ads  of  the  Will,  lies  not  in  their 
Caufc,  h-aXthtix  Nature,  Pag.   igz. 

SECT.  II.  The  Faljenefs  and  Inconjijlence  of  that  metaphy- 
fical  Notion  of  ASiion  and  Agency,  which  feems  to  be  generally 
entertained  by  the  Defenders  of  the  forementioned  N  otions  of 
Liberty,  moral  Agency,  is^c.  Pag.   198. 

SECT.  III.  The  Reafons  v/hy  fome  think  it  contrary  to 
common  Sev/e,  to  fuppofe  Things  which  are  neceffary,  to  be 
worthy  of  either  PrcZ/d"  or  5/r7"/^.  Pag.  206. 

SECT.  IV.  It  is  agreeable  to  cominon  Senfe,  and  the  natural 
Notions  of  Mankind,  to  fuppofe  moral  Neceflity  to  be  confiftent 
with  Praife  and  Blame,  Reward  and  Punifhment.       Pag.  212. 

SECT.  V.  Concerning  thofe  Ohjeaions,  That  this  Scheme 
©f  Neceflity  renders  all  Mentis  and  Endeavours  for  the  avoid- 
ing of  Sin,  or  the  obtaining  Virtue  and  Holincfs,  'vain  and  to 
no  Purpofe  :  And  that  it  makes  Men  no  more  than  mere  Ma^ 
chines,  in  Afiairs  of  Morality  and  Religion.  Pag.  220. 

SECT.  VI.  Concerning  that  Qb'jeBion  againft  the  Dodrim? ^ 
which  has  been  maintained.  That  it  agrees  with  the  Stoical 
IkidriRe  of  Fate,,  and  the  Opinion  of  Mr,  Hobbs^      Pag.  227. 
-  *  SECT, 


the 

di-jine 

Pag, 

■    230. 

tlie 

moral 

o 

•  239- 

The  C  O  "N  T  E  NTS. 

SECT.    VII.     Concerning    the    NeceJJiiy   of 
Will. 

SECT.  VIII.    Some    further  Qhjeaions  againft 
NeceJJity  of  God's  Volitions,  confidered. 

SECT.  IX.  Concerning  that  Objediion  againil  the  Dcftrin-j; 
which  has  been  maintained.  That  it  makes  God  the  Author  of 
Sin.  Pag.   252. 

SECT.  X.  Concerning  Sins  firft  Entrraice  into  the  V/oiId. 

Pag.  z68. 

SECT.  XI.  Of  a  fuppofed  Incoitjtftence  of  thefe  Principles 
iNXth-Gau's  mora!  Charader.  P^^g-  2 TO. 

SECT.  XII.  Of  a  fuppofed  Tendency  of  thefe  Principles 
•  to  Atheifm,  and  Licentionfnefs,  Pag.   274. 

SECT.  XIIL  Concerning  that  OhjeBion  againft  the  Rea- 
soning by  which  the  Cal'vinifiic  Doftnne  is  fupported,  That  it 
'■^  metaphyjical  zxA  abjiruju  Pag,  z/S,. 

the  CONCLUSION. 

WHAT  Treatment  this  Difcourfc  may  probably  meet 
with,  from  fome  Pcrfons.  Pag.  285^ 

Confequences  concerning  feveral  Cal'vinijiic  Do6lrines  ;  fuch  as 
an  jcni'verfal,  decijive  Providence.  P^g*   286. 

The  total  Deprauity  and  Corruptioti  of  Man's  Nature.  Pa?.  287. 

Efficacious  Grace,  P^g,   28S. 

An  univerfal  and  abfolute  Decree;  and  abfolute,  eternal, 
perfonal  Eledion.  Pao-.  289. 

Particular  Redemption.  Pa"-.   200. 

Perfcverance  of  Saints,  '  ?<ig'  291. 

Concerning  the  Treatment  which  Caluinijiic  Writers  and 
Divines  have  met  with.  Pag.  292. 

Tlie  Unhappinefs  of  the  Change  lately  in  many  Proieftaut 
Countries,  Pag.  293. 

The  Boldnefs  of  fome  Writers.  Ibid^ 

The  excellent  Wifdom  appearing  in  the  holy  Scriptures,  P.  uk. 


^r?%^^ 


B  2  PARTI. 


[  I  ] 


'  PARTI. 

Wherein  are  explained  and  ftated 
various  Terms  and  ThtJjgs  belong- 
ing to  the  Subjed  of  the  enfuing 
Difcoiirfe. 

Section    I. 

Concerning  the  Nature  of  the  Will. 

F^^^JC^  T  may  poffibl)^  be  thought,  that  there  is  no  great 
^  J  ^  Need  of  going  about  to  define  or  defcribethe  Will; 
^  ^  this  Word  being    generally   as    well    underftood 

\.  W^  m?  as  any  other  Words  we  can  life  to  explain  it ; 
^^^-^-^  And  fo  perhaps  it  would  be.  had  not  Philcfo- 
phers,  Metaphyficians  and  Folemic  Divines  brought  the 
Matter  into  Obfcurity  by  the  Things  they  have  faid  of  it. 
But  iince  it  is  fo,  1  think  it  may  be  of  fonie  Ufe,  and 
■will  tend  to  the  greater  Clearnefs  in  the  following  Difcourfe, 
to  fay  a  few  Things  concerning  it. 

And  therefore  I  obferve,  that  the  Will  (without  any  meta- 
phyfical  Refining)  is  plainly.  That  hy  'which  the  Mir.d  chiifcs  any 
Thing.  The  Faculty  of  the  V/ill  is  that  Faculty  or  Power 
or  Principle  of  Mind  by  which  it  is  capable  o{  chijing.  An  Aft 
of  the  Will  is  the  fame  as  an  Aft  of  Chufivp  or  Choice. 

If 


2  7'h(:  Nature  of  the  Will.  Part  I. 

If  any  think  'tis  a  more  perfeft  Definition  of  the  Will,  to 
fay,  that  it  is  that  by  which  the  Soul  either  cJ:ufcs  or  refufes ; 
I  ain  content  with  it :  tho'  I  think  that  'tis  enougii  to  fay.  It's 
that  by  which  the  Soul  chufes :  For  in  every  Ad  of  Will 
whatfoever,  the  Mind  chufes  one  Thing  rather  than  another  ; 
it  chufes  fomething  rather  than  the  Contrary,  or  rather  than 
the  Want  or  Non-exiltence  of  that  Thing.  So  in  every  Aft 
of  Refufal,  the  Mind  chufes  the  Abfence  of  the  Thing  re- 
fufed  ;  The  Politive  and  the  Negative  are  fet  before  the  Mind 
for  its  Choice,  and  it  chufes  the  Negative  ;  and  the  Mind's 
making  its  Choice  in  that  Cafe  is  properly  the  Aft  of  the 
Will ;  The  Will's  determining  between  the  two  is  a  volun- 
tary determining ;  but  that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  making  a 
Clioice.  So  that  whatever  Names  we  call  the  A6i  of  the  Will 
by,  Chujlng,  Refujing,  Appro'ving,  Difnppro'ving,  Litiing,  Dijlik- 
ifig.  Embracing,  Rejeiling,  Determining,  Diretiing,  Command- 
ing, Forbidding,  Inclining  ox  being  averfe,  a  being  pleafed  ox. 
difplcajed  --with  ,•  all  may  be  reduced  to  this  of  Ctoujlng.  For 
the  Soul  to  act  "jcluntarily ,  is  evermore  to  aft  eledi^rlj. 

Mr.  Locke'^  fays,  *■*  The  Will  fignifies  Nothing  but  a  Power 
"  or  Ability  to  prefer  or  chufe."  And  in  the  foregoing  Page 
fays,  •'  The  Word  Prrferring  feems  beft  to  exprefs  the  Aft  of 
**  Volition :"  But  adds,  that  "  it  does  it  notprecifely ;  For,  (fays 
he)  "  tho'  a  Man  would  prefer  Flying  to  Walking,  yet  who 
"  can  fay  he  ever  wills  it?"  But  the  Inftance  he  raentions 
don't  prove  that  there  is  any  Thing  elfe  in  Willing,  but  merely 
Preferring :  For  it  fhould  be  confidered  what  is  the  next  and 
immediate  Objeft  of  the  Will,  with  refpeft  to  a  Man's 
Walking,  or  any  other  external  Aftion  ;  which  is  not  his  be- 
ing removed  from  one  Place  to  another,  on  the  Earth,  or 
thro'  the  Air ;  thefe  are  remoter  Objefts  ot  Preference  ;  but 
fuch  or  fuch  an  immediate  Exertion  of  himfelf.  The  Thing 
nextly  chofen  or  prefer'd  when  a  Man  wills  to  walk,  is  not  his 
being  removed  to  fuch  a  Place  where  he  would  be,  but  fuch 
an  Exertion  and  Motion  of  his  Legs  and  Feet,  Sec.  in  order  to 
it.  And  his  willing  fuch  an  Alteration  in  his  Body  in  the  prc- 
fent  Moment,  is  nothing  elfe  but  his  chufing  or  preferring 
fuch  an  Alteration  in  his  Body  at  fuch  a  Moment,  or  his  lik- 
ing it  better  than  the  Forbearance  of  it.  And  God  has  fo 
made  and  eftabliflied  the  human  Nature,  the  Soul  being  united 
to  a  Body  in  proper  State,  that  the  Soul  preferring  or  chufing 
fuch  an  immediate  Exertion  or  Alteration  of  the  Body,  fuch 
an  Alteration  inftantaneoufly  follows.     There  is  nothing  elfe 

in 

*  Human  Underilanding,  Edit,  7,  Vol,  I.  P.  197. 


Seft.  I.         The  Nature  of  the  Will.  3 

in  the  Aflings  of  my  Mind,  that  I  am  confcioiis  of  while  I 
walk,  but  only  my  preferring  or  chuiing,  thro'  fucceffivc  Mo- 
ments, that  there  fhould  be  fuch  Alterations  of  my  external 
Senfations  and  Motions ;  together  with  a  concurring  habitual 
Expedation  that  it  will  be  fo  ;  having  ever  found  by  Experi- 
ence, that  on  fuch  an  immediate  Preference,  fuch  Senfations 
and  Motions  do  aftually  inftantaneoufly,  and  conftantly  arife. 
But  it  is  not  fo  in  the  Cafe  of  Flying :  Tho'  a  Man  may  be  faid 
remotely  to  chufe  or  prefer  Flying  ;  yet  he  don't  chufe  or  pre- 
fer, incline  to  or  delire,  under  Cicumftances  in  View,  any 
immediate  Exertion  of  the  Members  of  his  Body  in  order  to 
it ;  becaufe  he  has  no  Expeftation  that  he  fhould  obtain  the 
defired  End  by  any  fuch  Exertion  ;  and  he  don't  prefer  or  in- 
cline to  any  bodily  Exertion  or  Effort  under  this  apprehended 
Circumflance,  of  its  being  wholly  in  vain.  So  that  if  we  care- 
fully diftinguifh  the  proper  Objefts  of  the  feveral  Ads  of  the 
Will,  it  will  not  appear  by  this,  and  fuch-like  Initances,  that 
there  is  any  Difference  between  Volition  and  Preference  ;  or  that 
a  Man's  chufing,  liking  befl,  or  being  belt  pleafed  with  a 
Thing,  are  not  the  fame  with  his  willing  that  'Thing  ;  as  they 
feem  to  be  according  to  thofe  general  and  more  natural  Noti- 
ons of  Men,  according  to  which  Language  is  formed.  Thus 
an  Aft  of  the  Will  is  commonly  exprefs'd  by  iis  pleajing  a  Mau 
to  do  thus  or  thus  ;  and  a  Man's  doing  as  he  'vj'ills,  and  doing 
as  he  pleafesy  are  the  fame  Thing  in  common  Speech, 

Mr.  Locke  fays,  +  "  The  Will  is  perfeftly  diflinguifh'd  from 
"  Defire ;  which  in  the  very  fame  Adlion  may  have  a  quite 
**  contrary  Tendency  from  that  which  our  Wills  fet  us  upon. 
"  A  Man,  (fays  he)  whom  I  cannot  deny,  may  oblige  me  to 
"  ufe  Perfuafions  to  another,  which,  at  the  fame  Time  I  am 
"  fpeaking,  I  may  wifh  may  not  prevail  on  him.  In  this 
**  Cafe  'tis  plain  the  Will  and  Defire  run  counter."  I  don't 
fuppofe,  that  ^/// and  Z)^A-^  are  Words  of  precifely  the  fame 
Signification  ;  Will  feems  to  be  a  Word  of  a  more  general  Sig- 
nification, extending  to  Things  prefent  and  abfent.  Dejire  re- 
fpefts  fomething  abfent.  I  may  prefer  my  prefent  Situation 
and  Poflure,  fuppofe  fitting  Itiil,  or  having  ray  Eyes  open, 
and  fo  may  will  it.  But  yet  I  can't  think  they  are  fo 
entirely  diflinft,  that  they  can  ever  be  properly  faid  to  run 
counter.  A  Man  never,  in  any  Inllance,  wills  any  Thing 
contrary  to  his  Defires,  or  defires  any  Thing  contrary  to  his 
Will.  The  foremention'd  Inftance,  which  Mr.  Locke  pro- 
duces, don't  prove  that  he  ever  does.  He  may,  onfome  Con- 
fideration  or  other,  will  to  utter  Speeches  which  have  a  Ten- 
dency 

T  Hum,  Und.  Vol,  I,  P.  20J,  204. 


4  The  Nature  of  the  Will.  Part  I. 

dency  to  perfuade  another,  and  ftill  may  defire  that  they  may 
not  perfuade  him  :  Eat  yet  his  Will  and  defire  don't  run' 
counter  to  all :  The  Thing  which  he  wills,  the  very  fame  he 
defires ;  and  he  don't  will  a  Thing,  and  delire  the  contrary 
in  any  Particular.  In  this  Inftance,  it  is  not  carefully  obferv- 
ed,  what  is  the  Thing  will'd,  and  what  is  the  Thing  defired  : 
If  it  were,  it  would  be  found  tliat  Will  and  Defire  don't  clafh' 
in  the  leaft.  The  Thing  will'd  on*  feme  Coniideration,  is  to 
utter  fuch  W'ords ;  and  certainly,  the  fame  Confideration  fo 
influences  him,  that  he  don't  defire  the  contrary  ;  all  Things 
confidered,  he  chufes  to  utter  fuch  Words,  and  don't  defire 
not  to  uner  them.  And  fo  as  to  the  Thing  which  Mr.  Locke 
fpeaks  of  as  delired,  niiz,  that  the  Words,  the'  They  tend  to 
perfuade,  fhould  not  be  effedlual  to  that  End,  his  Will  is 
not  contrary  to  this  ;  he  don't  will  that  they  fhould  be  effedu- 
al,  but  rather  wills  that  they  ihoald  not,  as  he  defires.  In 
order  to  prove  that  the  Will  and  Defire  may  run  counter,  it 
Ihould  be  fhown  that  they  may  be  contrary  one  to  the  other 
in  the  fame  Thing,  or  with  refpeft  to  the  very  fame  Objeft  of 
V/ill  or  Defire :  But  here  the  Objefts  are  two ;  and  in  each, 
taken  by  themfelves,  the  Will  and  Defire  agree.  And  'ris  no 
Wonder  that  they  fhould  not  agree  in  different  Things,  how- 
ever little  diftinguifhed  they  ?.re  in  their  Nature.  The  Will 
may  not  agree  v^ith  the  Will,  nor  Defire  agree  with  Defire,  in 
different  Things.  As  in  this  very  Inftance  Vv-hich  Mr.  Locke 
mentions,  a  Perfon  may,  on  fome  confideration,.  defire  to  ufe 
Perfuafions,  and  at  the  fame  Time  may  defire  they  may 
not  prevail':  But  yet  no  Body  will  fay,  that  Defire  runs  coun- 
ter to  Defire ;  or  that  this  proves  that  Defire  is  perfedly  a- 
diftinft  Thing  from  Defire. — The  like  might  be  obferved  of 
the  other  Inflance  Mr.  Locke  produces,  of  a  Man's  defiring  to- 
be  cafed  of  Pain,  &c. 

But  not  to  dwell  any  longer  on  this,  whether  Defire  and 
Will,  and  whether  Preference  and  Volition  be  precifely  the  fame 
Things  or  no ;  yet,  I  truft  it  will  be  allowed  by  all,  that  in 
every  Aft  of  Will  there  is  an  Aft  of  Choice;  that  in 
every  Volition  there  is  a  Preference,  or  a  prevailing  Inclination 
of  the  Soul,  whereby  the  Soul,  at  that  Inftant,  is  out  of  a 
State  of  perfeft  Indifference,  with  refpeft  to  the  direft  Objeft 
of  the  Volition.  So  that  in  every  Aft,  or  going  forth  of  the 
Will,  there  is  fome  Preponderation  of  the  Mind  or  Inclination, 
one  Way  rather  than  another ;  and  the  Soul  had  rather  hame 
or  do  one  Thing  than  another,  or  than  not  to  have  or  do  that 
Thing ;  and  that  there,  where  there  is  abfolutely  no  preferring- 
or  chufing,  but  a  perfeft  continuing  Equilibrium,  there  is  nor 
Volition* 

Section  II, 


Sed:.  II.    Gf  the  Determinsition  of  f he  Will.         5 

i^cccoaoco9oeoee«C9eoDaoocoococccoeoccocoo<»*ioccgo(!oiraocaoococcooeocaoccecccoc«cooec>B« 

Section     II. 

Concemmg  the  Determination  cf  the  IVill. 

By  detcrynzning  the  Will,  if  the  Phrafe  be  ufed  with  any  Mean- 
^ing,  muft  be  intended,  cdufittg  that  the  Ad  of  the  l^  ill  or 
Choice  Jbonld  be  thus,  and  not  othernuije  :  And  the  Will  is  faid 
to  be  determined,  when,  in  Confequence  of  fome  A«ftion,  or 
Influence,  its  Choice  is  direfted  to,  and  fixed  upon  a  particular 
Objeft.  As  when  we  fpeak  of  the  Determination  ot  Motion, 
we  mean  caufmg  the  Motion  of  the  Body  to  be  fuch  a  Way, 
or  in  fuch  a  Direction,  rather  than  another. 

To  talk  of  the  Determination  of  the  Will,  fuppofes  an 
EfFeft,  which  muft  have  a  Caufe.  If  the  Will  be  determined, 
there  is  a  Determiner.  This  muft  be  fuppofed  to  be  intend- 
ed even  by  them  that  fay,  the  Will  determines  itfelf.  If  it  be 
fo,  the  Will  is  both  Determiner  and  determined  ;  it  is  a  Caufe 
that  afts  and  produces  EfFefts  upon  itfelf,  and  is  the  Objecl  oi 
its  own  Influence  and  Aftion. 

With  refpedl  to  that  grand  Inquiry,  PFhat  determines  the 
Will,  it  would  be  very  tedious  and  unneceffary  at  prcfcnt  to 
enumerate  and  examine  all  the  various  Opinions,  which  have 
been  advanced  concerning  this  Matter ;  nor  is  it  needful  that 
I  fliould  enter  into  a  particular  Difquifuion  of  all  Points  deba- 
ted in  Difputes  on  that  Queftion,  Whether  the  Hill  alnjoays  fol- 
lotvs  the  lajl  diiiate  of  the  Underflanding.  It  is  fufficient  to  my 
prefent  Purpofe  to  fay, — //  is  that  Moti-ve,  nx'hich,  as  it  (lands 
in  the  Vieiv  of  the  Mind,  isthejlrongejl,  that  determines  the  Will. 
— But  it  may  be  neceffary  that  I  (hould  a  little  explain  my 
Meaning  in  this. 

By  Motive,  I  mean  the  Whole  of  that  which  moves,  excites 
or  invites  the  Mind  to  Volition,  whether  that  be  one  Thing 
ilngly,  or  many  Things  conjunftly.  Many  particular  Things- 
may  concur  and  unite  their  Strength  to  induce  the  Mind  ; 
and  when  it  is  fo,  all  together  are  as  it  were  one  complex 
Motive.  And  when  I  fpeak  of  the  ftrongeji  Moti-ve,  I  h^ve 
Refpeft  to  the  Strength  of  the  Whole  that  operates  to  induce 
to  a  particular  Aft  of  Volition,  whether  that  be  the  Strength 
of  one  Thing  alone,  or  of  many  together^ 

What- 


6  ll'ljat  determines  the  Will.         Part  I. 

Whatever  is-a, Motive,  in  this  Senfe,  muft  be  fomething  that 
is  extant  in  the  Fienxj  or  Apprehenjion  of  tht  Underjlatiditig,  or  per* 
ceiving  Faculty.  Nothing  can  induce  or  invite  the  Mind  to 
will  or  aft  any  Thing,  any  further  than  it  is  perceived,^  or  is 
fome  Way  or  other  in  the  Mind's  View ;  for  what  is  wholly 
unperceived,  and  perfedly  out  of  the  Mind's  View,  can't  affeft 
the  Mind  at  all.  'Tis  moft  evident,  that  nothing  is  in  the 
Mind,  or  reaches  it,  or  takes  any  Hold  of  it,  any  otherwife 
than  as  it  is  perceived  or  thought  of. 

And  I  think  it  muft  alfo  he  allowed  by  all,  that  every  Thing 
that  is  properly  called  a  Motive,  Excitement  or  Inducement 
to  a  perceiving  willing  Agent,  has  feme  Sort  and  Degrse  of 
Tendency,  or  /Idnjafiiage  to  move  or  excite  the  'Will,  previous  to 
the  Effeft,  or  to  the  Aft  of  the  Will  excited.  This  previous 
Tendency  of  the  Motive  is  what  I  call  the  Strength  of  the  Mo- 
tme.  That  Motive  which  has  a  lefs  Degree  of  previous  Ad- 
vantage or  Tendency  to  move  the  Will,  or  that  appears  lefs 
inviting,  as  it  ftands  in  the  View  of  the  Mind,  is  what  I  call 
a  nfieaker  Moti've.  On  the  contrary,  that  which  appears  moft 
inviting,  and  has,  by  what  appears  concerning  it  to  the  Un- 
derftanding  or  Apprehenfion,  the  greateft  Degree  of  previous 
Tendency  to  excite  and  induce  the  Choice,  is  what  I  call  the 
Jirongeji  Moti've.  And  in  this  Senfe,  I  fappofe  the  Will  is  al- 
ways determined  by  the  ftrongeft  Motive. 

Things  that  exift  in  the  View  of   the  Mind,   have    their 
Strength,  Tendency  or  Advantage  to  move  or  excite  its  Will, 
from    many   Things    appertaining   to   the   Nature    and   Cir- 
cumftances  of  the  Thing  vie-ai'd,  the  Nature  and  Circumftances 
of  the  Mind  that  ■uienvs,  and  the  Degree  and  Manner  of  its  ^/>t!;,' 
v/hich  it  would  perhaps  be  hard  to  make  a  perfeft  Enumeration 
of.     But  fo  much  I  think  may  be  determined  in  general,  with- 
out Room   for  Controverfy,  that  whatever  is  perceived  or  ap- 
prehended by  an  intelligent  and  voluntary  Agent,  which  has  the 
Nature  and  Influence   of  a  Motive  to  Volition  or  Choice,  is 
confidered  or  view'd  as  good;  nor  has  it  any  Tendency  to  in- 
vite or  engage    the  Eleftion  of. the  Soul  in  any  further  Degree 
than  it  appears  fuch.     For  to  fay  otherwife,  would  be  to  fay, 
that  Things  that  appear  have  a  Tendency  by  the  Appearance 
they  make,    to  engage  the  Mind  to   eleft  them,  fome  other 
V/ay  than   by  their  appearing  eligible  to  it ;    which  is  ab- 
furd.     And  therefore  it  muft  be  true,  in  fome  Senfe,  that  the  ' 
Will  aliunys  is  as  the  greateji apparent  Good  is.    But  only,  for  the 
right  underftanding  of  tRjs,  two  Things  muft  be  well  and 
dHlinftly  obferved, 

c  1.  U 


^3:.  H.         PFbaf  determines  the  U-'ill.  7 

1 .  It  muft  be  obfeived  in  what  Senfe  I  ufe  the  Term  Good;^ 
r.amely,  as  of  the  fame  Import  v;ith  Agreeable.  To  appear 
good  to  the  Mind,  as  I  ufc  the  Phrrfe,  is  the  fame  as  to  appear 
agrscablcy  or  feem  phr^fi?ig\.o  the  Mind.  Certainlv,  aothing  ap- 
pears inviting  and  eligible  to  t^e  Mind,  or  tending  to  engage 
its  Inclination  and  Choice,  cc-nfidered  as  evil  or  difagreeable; 
Mor  indeed,  2is  indifferent,  and  neither  agreeable  nor  difagreea- 
ble.  But  if  it  tends  to  draw  the  Inclination,  and  move  the 
Will,  it  muft  be  under  the  Notion  of  that  which  fuits  the 
Mind.  And  therefore  that  mud  have  the  greateft  Tendency 
to  attraft  and  engage  it,  which,  as  it  ftands  in  the  Mind's 
View,  fuits  it  belt,  and  pleafes  it  moft  ;  and  in  that  Senfe,  ia 
the  greateft  apparent  Good :  to  fay  otherwife,  is  little,  if  any 
Thing,  fiiort  of  a  direft  and  plain  Contradiftion. 

The  Word  Good,  in  this  Senfe,  includes  in  its  Signification, 
the  Removal  or  Avoiding  of  Evil,  or  of  that  which  is  difa- 
greeable  and  uraafy.  'Tis  agreeable  and  pleafmg,  to  avoid  what 
is  difagreeabJe  and  difpleafing,  and  to  have  Uneafinefs  remo- 
ved. So  that  here  is  included  what  Mr.  Locke  fuppofes  deter- 
mines the  Will.  For  when  he  fpeaks  of  uneafinefs  as  de- 
termining the  Will,  he  muit  be  underftood  as  fuppofing  that 
the  End  or  Aim  which  governs  the  Volition  or  Aft  of  Prefe- 
rence, is  the  Avoiding  or  Removal  of  that  Uneafinefs ;  and 
that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  chufing  and  feeking  what  is  more 
cafy  and  agreeable. 

2.  Wheti  I  fsy,  the  Will  is  as  the  greateft  apparent  Good 
i'Sj  or  (af.  I  have  explained  it)  that  Volition  has  always  for  it3 
Objefl  the  Thing  which  appears  moft  agreeable  ;  it  muft  be 
carefully  obferved,  to  avoid  Confufion  and  needlefs  Objection, 
that  I  fpeak  of  the  dire/il  and  immediate  Objeft  of  the  Aft  of 
Volition ;  and  not  fome  Objeft  that  the  Aft  of  Will  has  not 
an  immediate,  but  only  an  indireft  and  remote  Refpeft  to. 
.Many  Afts  of  Volition  have  fome  remote  Relation  to  an  Ob- 
jeft, that  is  different  from  the  Thing  moft  immediately  will'd 
and  chofen.  Thus,  when  a  Drunkard  has  his  Liquor  before 
him,  and  he  has  to  chufe  whether  to  drink  it,  or  no  ;  the  proper 
;and  immediate  Objefts,  about  which  his  prefent  Volition  is 
converfant,  and  between  which  his  Choice  now  decides,  are 
his  own  Afts,  in  drinking  the  Liquor,  or  letting  it  alone;  and 
this  will  certainly  be  done  according  to  what,  in  the  prefent 
View  of  his  Mind,  taken  in* the  Whole  of  it,  is  moft  agreeable 
to  him.  If  he  chufes  or  v/ills  to  drink  it,  and  not  to  let  it 
alone ;  then  this  Aftion,  as  it  ftands  in  the  View  of  his 
Mind,  with  all  that  belongs  to  its  Appearance  there,  is  more 
agreeable  and  pleafmg  than  letting  it  alone. 

But 


^  Wfjat  determines  the  Will.         Part  Ic 

But  the  Objc<5ls  to  which  this  Aft  of  Volition  may  rel-ate 
more  remotely,  and  between  v/hich  his  Choice  may  determine 
more  indireftly,  are  the  prefcnt  Pleafure  the  Man  expefts  by 
drinking,  and  the  future  Mifery  which  he  judges  will  be  the 
Confequence  of  it:  He  may  judge  that  this  future  Mifery, 
when  it  comes,  will  be  moie  difagrecable  and  unnleafant,  than 
refraining  from  drinking  now  would  be.  But  thefe  two 
Things  are  not  the  proper  Objefts  that  the  Aft  of  Volition  fpo- 
ken  of  is  nextly  converfant  about.  For  the  Aft  of  Will  fpo- 
ken  of  is  concerning  prefent  Drinking  or  Forbearing  to  drink. 
If  he  wills  to  drink,  then  Drinking  is  the  proper  Objeft  of  the 
Aft  of  his  Wi-11 ;  acd  drinking,  on  fome  Account  or  other,  now 
appears  moft  agreeable  to  him,  andfuits  him  beft.  If  he  chufes 
X.O  refrain,  then  Refraining  is  the  immediate  Objeft  of  his 
V/ill,'  and  is  moft  plcafing  to  him.  If  in  tlie  Choice  he 
makes  in  the  Cafe,  he  prefers  z.  prefent  Pleafure  to  a  future 
Advantage,  which  he  judges  will  be  greater  when  it  comes ; 
then  a  lelfer  prefent  Pkafure  appears  more  agreeable  to  him 
tlian  a  greater  Advantage  at  a  Diftance.  If  on  the  contrary  a 
future  Advantage  is  prefer'd,  then  that  appears  molt  agreeable, 
and  fuits  him  beft.  And  fo  ftiil  the  prefent  Volition  is  as 
the  greateft  apparent  Good  at  preftnt  is. 

I  have  rather  chofen  to  exprefs  myfelf  thus,  that  the  Wdl 
airways  is  as  the  greateft  apparent  Good,  or  as  'what  appears  mop  a- 
greeable,  is,  than  to  fay  that  the  Will  is  determined  by  the  greateft 
apparent  Good,  or  by  what  feems  moft  agreeable ;  becaufe 
an  appearing-  moft  agreeable  or  pieafing  t©  the  Mind,  and  the 
Mind's  preferring  and  chuung,  feem  hardly  to  be  properly 
and  perfeftly  diftinft.  If  ilrift  Propriety  in  Speech  be  infifted 
on,  it  may  more  pr«perly  be  faid,  that  the  voluntary 
Atlion  which  is  the  immediate  Confequence  and  Fruit  of 
the  Mind's  Volition  or  Ciioice,  is  determined  by  that  which 
appears  moft  agreeable,  than  the  Preference  or  Choice  itfelf ; 
but  that  the  Aft  of  Volition  itfelf  is  always  determined  by 
that  in  or  abbut  the  Mind's  View  of  the  Objeft,  which  ca'ijes 
it  to  appear  moft  agreeable.  I  fay,  /»  or  about  the  Mind's  Vienjj 
of  the  Objeft,  becaufe  what  has  Influence  to  render  an  Objeft 
in  View  agreeabie,  is  not  only  what  r.pptars  in  the  Objeft 
viewed,  but  alfo  the  Manner  of  the  View,  and  the  State  and 
Circu7nftanccs  of  the  Mind  that  viev/s. — Particularly  to  enume- 
jate  all  Things  pertaining  to  the  Mind's  View  of  the  Objefts  of 
Volition,  which  have  Influence  m  their  appearing  agreeable  to 
the  Mind,  would  be  a  Matter  of  no  fmall  Difficulty,  and 
might  require  a  Treatife  by  itfelf,  and  is  not  necelTary  to  my 
prefent  Purpofe,  I  ihall  therefore  only  mention  fpme  Things 
in  general,  C  2  J>  Oae 


Sed.  n.  What  determines  ihe  Will.  9 

I.  One  Thing  that  makes  an  Objeft  prcpofed  to  Choice 
agreeable,  is  the  apparetit  Nature  and  Circumjiances  cf  the  Objci'i. 
And  there  are  various  Things  of  this  Sort,  that  have  an  liand 
in  rendering  the  Object  more  of  iefs  agreeable  ;  as, 

1.  That  which  appears  in  the  Objeft,  which  renders  it 
'beautiful  and  pkafant,  or  deformed  and  irkfcme  to  the  Mind  ; 
viewing  it  as  it  is  in  itjeif. 

2.  "^Ihe  apparent  Degree  of  Pleafure  or  Trouble  ntiendivg 
the  Objeft,  or  the  Confequence  of  it.  Such  Concomitants  and 
Confequents  being  viewed  as  Circumftances  of  the  Ohjcd,  are 
to  be  confidered  as  belonging  to  it,  and  as  it  were  Parts  of  it  ; 
as  it  Hands  in  the  Mind's  View,  as  a  propoied  Objed  of 
Choice. 

3.  T'he  apparent  State  of  the  Pleafure  or  Trouble  that  ap- 
pears, with  Refpeft  to  Difance  of  Tir.u  ;  being  either  nearer 
or  farther  off.  'Tis  a  Thing  in  itfeif  agreeable  to  the  Mind, 
to  have  Pleafure  fpeedily  j  and  difagreeable,  to  have  it  delayed  : ' 
So  that  if  there  be  two  equal  Degrees  of  Pleafure  fet  in  the 
Mind's  View,  and  all  other  Things  are  equal,  but  only  one 
is  beheld  as  near,  and  the  other  far  off ;  the  nearer  will  ap- 
pear mcft  agreCfible,  and  fo  will  be  chofen.  Becaufe,  tho'  the 
Agreeablenefs  of  the  Objetfts  be  exaftly  equal,  as  view'd  iii 
Tiiemfelves,  yet  riot  as  view'd  in  their  Circumfiances  ;  one 
of  them  having  the  additional  Agreeablenefs  of  the  Circum- 
ftance  of  Nearnefs. 

II.  Another  Thing  that  contributes  to  the  Agreeablenefs  of 
an  Objed  of  Choice,  as  it  ftands  jn  the  Mind's  View,  is  the 
Man?!er  cf  the  View.  If  the  Objeft  be  fomething  which  ap- 
pears connefted  with  future  Pleafure,  not  only  will  the  Degree 
o,f  apparent  Pleafure  have  Influence,  but  aiib  the  Manner  of 
the  View,  efpecially  in  two  Refpefts. 

1.  With  refpeifl  to  the  Degree  o^  Judgment,  or  Firmnefs 
of  AJfent,  with  which  the  Mind  judges  th?  Pleafure  to  be  fu- 
ture. Becaufe  it  is  more  agreeable  to  have  a  certain  Happinefs, 
than  an  uncertain  one ;  and  a  Pleafure  viewed  as  more  proba- 
ble, all  other  Thiiigs  being  equal,  is  more  agreeable  to  the 
Mind,  than  that  which  is  view'd  as  Iefs  probable. 

2.  With  refpeft  to  the  Degree  of  the  Idea  of  the  future 
Pleafure.  With  Regard  to  Things  which  are  the  Subjeft  of 
our  Thoughts,  either  part,  prefent  or  future,  we  have  much 
more  of  an  Idea  or  Apprehenfion  of  fome  Things  than  others  ; 
that  is,  our  Idea  is  much  more  clear,  lively  and  ftrong. 
Thus,  the  Ideas  we  have  of  fenfible  Things  by  immediate 
Senfation,  are  ufuaily  much  more  lively  than  thofe  we  have 
by  mere  Imagination,  or  by  Contemplation  of  them  when  ab- 

fent. 


lo  fVhat  determines  the  Will.  Part  I. 

fent.  My  -Idea  of  the  Sun,  when  I  look  upon  it,  is  more 
vivid,  than  when  I  ojnly  think  of  it.  Our  Idea  of  the  fweet 
KeJifli  of  a  delicious  Fruit  is  ufually  ftronger  when  we  talte  it, 
than  when  we  only  imagine  it.  And  foraetimes,  the  Ideas  we 
have  of  Things  by  Contemplation,  are  much  ftronger  and  clear- 
er, than  at  other  Times„  Thus,  a  Man  at  one  Time  has  a 
much  ftronger  Idea,  of  the  Pleafure  which  is  to  be  enjoyed  ia 
eating  forae  Sort  of  Food  that  he  loves,  than  at  another.  Now 
the  Degree,  or  Strength  of  the  Idea  or  Senfe  that  Men  have 
of  future  Good  or  Evil,  is  one  Thing  that  has  great  Influ- 
ence on  their  Minds  to  excite  Choice  or  Volition.  When  of 
two  Kinds  of  future  Pleafure,  which  the  Mind  confiders  of, 
and  are  prefented  for  Choice,  both  are  fuppofed  exactly  equal 
by  the  judgment,  and  both  equally  certain,  and  all  other 
Things  are  equal,  but  only  one  of  them  is  what  the  Mind 
has  a  far  more  lively  Senfe  of,  than  of  the  other ;  this  has  the- 
greateft  Advantage  by  far  to  afFed;  and  attra'ft  the  Mind,  and 
move  the  Will.  'Tis  now  more  agreeable  to  the  Mind,  to  take 
the  Pleafure  it  has  a  ftrong  and  lively  Senfe  of,  than  that 
which  it  has  only  a  faint  Idea  of.  The  View  of  the  former 
is  attended  v/ith  the  ftrongeft  Appetite,  and  the  greateft  Unea- 
linefs  attends  the  Want  of  it ;  and  'tis  agreeable  to  the  Mind, 
to  have  Uncafinefs  removed,  and  its  Appetite  gratified.  And 
if  feveral  future  Enjoyments  are  prefented  together,  as  Com- 
petitors for  the  Choice  of  the  Mind,  fome  of  them  judged  to 
be  greater,  and  otiiers  lefs ;  the  Mind  alfo  having  a  greater 
Senfe  and  more  lively  Idea  of  the  Good  of  fomc  of  them,  and 
of  others  a  lefs ;  and  fome  are  viewed  as  of  greater  Certainty 
or  Probability  than  others  ;  and  thofe  Enjoj-ments  that  appear 
moft  agreeable  in  one  of  thefe  Refpeds,  appears  leaft  fo  in 
others:  In  this  Cafe,  all*  other  Things  being  equal,  the  A- 
greeablenefs  of  a  propofed  Objeft  of  Choice  will  be  in  a  De- 
gree fome  Way  compounded  cf  the  Degree  of  Good  fuppofed 
by  the  Judgment,  the  Degree  of  apparent  Probability  or  Cer- 
tainty of  that  Good,  and  the  Degree  of  the  View  or  Senfe,  or 
Livelinefs  of  the  Idea  the  Mind  has,  of  that  Good  ;  becaufe 
all  together  concur  to  conftitute  the  Degree  in  which  the  Ob- 
jeft  appears  at  prefent  agreeable;  and  accordingly  Volition  will 
be  determined. 

I  might  further  obferve,  the  State  of  the  Mind  that 
views  a  propofed  Objeft  cf  Choice,  is  another  Thing  that 
contributes  to  the  Agreeablenefs  or  Difagreeablenefs  of  that 
Objed ;  the  particular  Temper  which  the  Mind  has  by  Na- 
ture, or  that  has  been  introduced  and  eftabhihed  by  Educa- 
tion, Example  J  Cuftom,  or  fome  other  Means  ;  or  the  Fr^me 

or 


Scd.  II.         What  determines  7/&f  Will.  i\ 

or  State  that  the  Mind  is  in  on  a  particular  Occafion. 
That  Objeft  which  appears  agreeable  to  Otie,  does  not  fo  to 
another.  And  the  fame  Objeft  don't  always  appear  alike  agree- 
able to  the  fame  Perfon,  at  different  Times.  It  is  molt  a- 
greeable  to  fome  Men,  to  follow  their  Reafon  ;  and  to  others^ 
to  follow  their  Appetites :  To  fome  Men,  it  is  more  agreeable 
to  deny  a  vicious  Inclination,  than  to  gratify  it ;  Others  it 
fuits  bell  to  gratify  the  vileft  Appetites.  'Tis  more  difagreea- 
ble  to  fome  Men  than  others,  to  counter-aft  a  former  Refo- 
lution.  In  thefe  Refpefts,  and  many  others  which  might  be 
mentioned,  different  Things  will  be  molt  agreeable  to  ditferent 
Perfons  ;  and  not  only  fo,  but  to  the  fame  Perfons  at  different 
Times. 

But  poffibly  'tis  needlcfs  and  improper,  to  mention  the 
Frame  and  State  of  the  Mind,  as  a  diltinft  Ground  of  the 
Agrceablenefs  of  Objefts  from  the  other  two  mentioned  be- 
fore ;  njtz.  The  apparent  Nature  and  Circumftances  of  the 
Objefts  viewed,  and  the  Manner  of  the  View  :  Perhaps  if 
we  ftriftly  confider  the  Matter,  the  different  Temper  an€ 
State  of  the  Mind  makes  no  Alteration  as  to  the  Agrceable- 
nefs of  Objefts,  any  other  Way,  than  as  it  makes  the  Ob- 
jefts themfelves  appear  differently  beautiful  or  deformed, 
having  apparent  PLeafure  or  Pain  attending  them  :  And  as  it 
occafions  the  Manner  of  the  View  to  be  different,  caufes  the 
Idea  of  Beauty  or  Deformity,  Pleafure  or  Uneafinefs,  to  be 
rrjore  or  lefs  lively. 

However,  I  think  fo  much  is  certain,  that  Volition,  in  no 
one  Inftance  that  can  be  mentioned,  is  otherwife  than  the 
gneateft  apparent  Good  is,  in  the  Manner  which  has  been 
explained.  The  Choice  of  the  Mind  never  departs  from  that 
which,  at  that  Time,  and  with  Refpeft  to  the  direft  and 
immediate  Objefts  of  that  Decilion  of  the  Mind,  appears 
moft  agreeable  and  pleafing,  all  Things  confidered.  If  the  im- 
mediate Objefts  of  the  Will  are  a  Man's  ov/n  Aftions,  then 
thofe  Aftions  which  appear  moft  agreeable  to  him  he  wills.  If 
it  be  now  molt  agreeable  to  him,  all  Things  confidered,  to  walk, 
then  he  now  wills  to  walk.  If  it  be  now,  upon  the  Whole  of 
what  at  prefent  appears  to  him,  moft  agreeable  to  fpeak,  then  he 
choofes  to  fpeak  :  If  it  fuits  him  beft  to  keep  Silence,  then 
he  choofes  to  keep  Silence.  There  is  fcarcely  a  plainer  ' 
and  more  univerfal  DIftate  of  theSenfe  and  Experience  of 
Mankind,  than  that,  when  Men  aft  voluntarily,  and  do  what 
they  plcafe,  then  they  do  what  fuits  them  beft,  or  what  is 
jnoft  mgreeahU  to  them.    To  fay,  that  they  do  what  they  pleafe, 

or 


i'i  IVfjat  determines  the  Will.  Part  I. 

or  what  pleafes  them,  but  yet  don't  do  what  is  agreeable  to 
them,  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  {^y,  they  do  what  they  pleafc> 
l>at  don't  aft  their  Pleafure ;  and  that  is  to  fay,  that  they 
do  what  they  pleafe,  and  yet  don't  do  what  they  pleafe. 

It  appears  from  thefe  Things,  that  in  fome  Scnfe,  the  Will 
alnuaysfolloivs  the  loft  Dilate  of  the  Underjianding.  But  then  the 
Vnderjianding  muft  be  taken  in  a  large  Senfe,  as  including  the 
whole  Faculty  of  Perception  or  Apprehenfiort,  and  not  merely 
what  is  called  Reafon  or  Judgment.  If  by  the  Didatc  of  the 
Underftanding  is  meant  what  Reafon  declares  to  be  befl  or 
mofl:  for  the  Perfon's  Happinefs,  taking  in  the  Whole  of  his 
Duration,  it  is  not  true,  that  the  Will  always  follows  the  laft 
Didate  of  the  Underftanding.  Such  a  Diftate  of  Reafon  is 
quite  a  different  Matter  from  Things  appearing  now  moft 
agreeable ;  all  Things  being  put  together  which  pertain  to 
the  Mind's  prefent  Perceptions,  Apprehenfions  or  Ideas,  in 
any  Refpeft.  Altho'  that  Didate  of  Reafon,  when  it  takes 
Place,  is  one  Thing  that  is  put  into  the  Scales,  and  is  to  be 
eoafidered  as  a  Thing  that  has  Concern  in  the  compound  In- 
fluence which  moves  and  induces  the  Will  j  and  is  one  Thing 
that  is  to  be  confidered  in  eftimating  the  Degree  of  that  Ap- 
pearance of  Good  which  the  Will  always  follows ;  either  as 
having  its  Influence  added  to  other  Things,  or  fubdufted 
fiom  them.  When  it  concurs  with  other  Things,  tlien  its 
Weight  is  added  to  them,  as  put  into  the  fame  Scale ;  but 
when  it  is  againft  them,  it  is  as  a  Weight  in  the  oppofitc 
Scale,  where  it  refifts  the  Influence  of  other  Things  :  yet 
its  Refiftance  is  often  overcome  by  their  greater  Weight,  and 
fo  the  Adl  ot  the  Will  is  determined  in  Oppofitioa  to  it. 

The  Things  which  I  have  faid  may,  I  hope,  ferve,  in  fomc 
Meafure,  to  illuftrate  and  confirm  the  Pofition  I  laid  down 
in  the  Beginning  of  this  Sedion,  'viz.  That  the  Will  is  airways 
determined  by  the  ftrtngeji  Moti've,  or  \>^  that  View  of  the  Mind 
which  has  the  greateft  Degree  oi  pre'vious  Tendency  to  ex- 
cite Volition.  But  whether!  have  been  fo  happy  as  rightly 
to  explain  the  Thing  wherein  confifts  the  Strength  of  Motives, 
or  not,  yet  my  failing  in  this  will  not  overthrow  the  Pofition 
itfelf;  which  carries  much  of  its  own  Evidence  with  it,  and 
is  the  Thing  of  chief  Importance  to  the  Purpofe  of  the  cn- 
fuing  Dilcourfe :  And  the  Truth  of  it,  I  hope,  will  appear 
with  greater  Clean^fs,  before  I  have  finilhed  what  I  have  to 
fay  on  the  Subje(Jt  of  human  Liberty^ 

SECT, 


Sed.Ul.         The  Nature  of  NecefTity.  rj 

ij&G«eoaeceeoco«ooe8oeo900eoocGsoocaooooooo«M>ioooeoooMdDosoooooo<MeoaooooMoooooaeoo^ 

Section     III. 

Concerning  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms  Necefiity, 
Impollibiliry,  Inability,  &c ;  and  cf  Contin- 
gence. 

TH  E  Words  Neceffaty,  Impoffihle,  &c.  are  abundantly  ufed 
in  Controveriies  about  Free-will  and  moral  Agency ; 
and  therefore  the  Senie  in  which  they  are  ufed,  fhould  be 
clearly  underltood. 

Here  I  might  fay,  that  a  Thing  is  then  faid  to  be  neceffan, 
when  it  mult  be,  and  cannot  be  otherwife.  But  this  would 
not  properly  be  a  Definition  of  Neceffity,  or  an  Explana- 
tion of  the  Word,  any  more  than  if  I  explained  the  Word 
muji,  by  there  being  a  Neceffity.  The  Words  muji,  can, 
and  cannot,  need  Explication  as  much  as  the  Words  ncceffary, 
and  impojjible;  excepting  that  the  former  are  Words  that 
Children  commonly  ufe,  and  know  fomething  of  the  Meaning 
cf  earlier  than  the  latter. 

The  Word  neceffary,  as  ufed  in  common  Speech,  is  a  rela- 
tive Term ;  and  relates  to  fome  fuppofed  Oppofition  made 
to  the  Exiftcnce  of  the  Thing  fpoken  of,  which  is  overcome, 
or  proves  in  vain  to  hinder  or  alter  it.  That  is  neceffary,  in 
the  original  and  proper  Senfe  of  the  Word,  which  is,  or  will 
be,  notwithftanding  all  fuppofabic  Oppofition.  To  fay,  that 
a  Thing  is  neceffary,  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  that  it  is 
impoffible  it  ftiould  not  be  :  But  the  Word  impojjible  is  mani- 
feftly  a  relative  Term,  and  has  Reference  to  fuppofed  Power 
exerted  to  bring  a  Thing  to  pafs,  which  is  infufficient  for  the 
EfFcft ;  As  the  Word  unable  is  relative,  and  has  Relation  to 
Ability  or  Endeavour  which  is  infufficient ;  and  as  the 
Word  Irrejijlable  is  relative,  and  has  always  Reference  to 
Refiftance  which  is  made,  or  may  be  made  to  fome  Force 
or  Power  tending  taan  Effeft,  and  is  infufficient  to  withftand 
the  Power,  or  hinder  the  EfFeft.  The  common  Notion  of 
Kcceffity  and  Impeffibjlity  impUss  i^ffi^thing  that  fruftrates 
Endeavowr  Ql  Defire, 

Here 


Part  I.  The  Nocture  of  Neceffity.  14 

Here  feveral  Things  are  to  be  noted. 

I.  Things  are  faid  to  be  neceffary  \\\  general,  which  are  or 
will  be  noiv/ithlt ending  any  fuppofable  Oppofitioii  from  us  or 
others,  or  trom  vvharever  Quarter.  But  Things  are  faid  to  be 
necefl'ary  io  us,  which  are  or  will  be  notwithftanding  all  Op- 
poiition  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe  from  us.  The  fame  may  be 
bbferved  of  the  Word  impujpble,  and  other  fuch  like  Terms. 

2-  Thefe  Terms  neceffary,  impoffihle,  irrefjlahle,  &c.  do 
efpecially  belong  to  the  Controversy  about  Liberty  and  moral 
Agency,  as  ufed  in  the  latter  of  the  two  Senfes  now  mentioned, 
iv~.  2s  neceffary  or  impoffible  to  us,  and  with  Relation  to  any 
fuppofable  Gppcfition  or  Endeavour  of  ours, 

3,  As  the  Word  NeceJ/ity,  in  its  vulgar  and  common  Ufe* 
is  relative,  and  has  always  Reference  to  fome  fuppofable  in- 
fufficient  Oppofition  ;  fo  when  we  fpeak  of  any  Thing  as  ne- 
ceifary  to  us,  it  is  with  kelation  to  fome  fuppofable  Oppofition 
oi'  our  Wil/s,  or  fome  voluntary  Exertion  or  Effort  of  ours  to 
the  contrary.  For  v/e  don't  properly  make  Oppofition  to 
an  Event,  any  otherwife  than  as  we  'voluntarily  oppofe  it. 
Things  are  faid  to  be  what  muji  be,  or  neceffarily  are,  as  to  usy 
when  they  are,  or  will  be,  tho'  we  defire  or  endeavour  the 
contrary,  or  try  to  prevent  or  remove  their  Exiftence :  But 
fuch  Oppofition  of  ours  always  cither  confifts  in,  or  implies 
Oppofition  of  our  Wills. 

'Tis  manifeft  that  all  fuch  like  Words  and  Phrafes,  as  vulgarly 
ufed,  are  ufed  and  accepted  in  this  Manner.  A  Thing  is 
faid  to  be  necejTary,  when  we  can't  help  it,  let  us  do  what  we 
will.  So  any  Thing  is  faid  to  be  imp^JJible  to  us,  when  we 
would  do  it,  or  would  have  it  brought  to  pafs,  and  endea- 
vour it ;  or  at  leaft  may  be  fuppofed  to  defire  and  feek  it ; 
but  all  our  Defires  and  Endeavours  are,  or  would  be  vain. 
And  that  is  faid  to  be  irrefijiable ,  which  overcomes  all  our 
Oppofition,  Refinance,  2nd  Endeavour  to  the  contrary.  And 
we  are  to  be  faid  iJnable  to  do  a  Thing,  when  our  fuppofable 
Defires  and  Endeavours  to  do  it  are  infufficient. 

We  are  accuftomed,  in  the  common  Ufc  of  Language,  to 
apply  and  underftand  thefe  Phrafes  in  this  Senfe  :  We  grow  up 
with  fuch  a  Habit ;  which  by  the  daily  Ufe  of  thefe  Terms, 
in  fuch  a  Senfe,  from  our  Childhood,  becomes  fix'd  and 
fettled ;  fo  that  the  Idea  of  a  Relation  to  a  fuppofed  Will, 
Defire  and  Endeavour  of  ours,  '\%  ftrengly  conneded  with 
D  thefe 


t^  The  Nature  of  Neceflity.  Part  L 

■ihefe  Terms,  ani  naturally  excited  in  our  Minds,  whenever 
we  hear  the  Words  ufcd.  v^uch  ideas,  and  thefe  Words,  are 
ib  united  and  affociated,  that  they  unavoidably  go  together  ; 
one  fuggefts  the  other,  and  carries  the  other  with  it,  and  ne- 
ver can  be  fep^rated  as  long  as  we  live.  And  if  we  ufe  the 
Words,  as  Terms  of  Art,  in-  another  Senfe,  yet,  unlefs  we 
are  exceeding  Circumfped  and  wary,  we  fhall  infenfibly  Aide 
into  the  vulgar  Ufe  of  them,  and  fo  apply  the  Words  in  a  very 
inconlifl:ent  Manner :  :his  habitual  Connection  of  Ideas  will 
deceive  and  confound  us  in  our  Reafonings  and-Difcourfes, 
wherein  we  pretend  to  ufe  thefe  Terms  in  that  Manner,  as 
Terms  of  Art. 

4.  It  follows  from  what  has  been  obferveJ,  that  when  thefe 

Terms  veccjj'ary,  bnprijfible,  irrcJiJUble ,  unable.  Sec.  are  ufed  in 
Cafes  wherein  no  Oppofition,  or  infufficient  Will  or  Endea- 
vour, is  fuppofed,  or  can  be  fuppofed,  but  the  very  Nature  of 
tlie  furpofed  Cafe  itfelf  excludes  and  denies  any  fuch  Oppofi- 
tion, Will  or  Endeavour ;  thefe  Terms  are  then  not  ufed  in  their 
proper  Sigr.ification,  but  quite  befide  their  Ufe  in  common 
Speech.  The  Reafon  is  manileft ;  namely,  that  in  fuch 
Cafes,  we  can't  ufe  the  Words  with  Reference  to  a  fuppofa- 
ble  Oppofition,  \ViH  or  Endeavour.  And  therefore  if  any 
Man  ufes  thefe  Terms  irt  fuch  Cafes,  he  cither  ufes  thenr 
honfenfically,  or  in  fcitie  new  Senfe,  diverfe  from  their  ori- 
ginal and  proper  M-eaning.  As  for  Inftance  ;  If  a  Man  fhould 
affirm  after  this  Manner,  That  it  is  neceifary  for  a  Man,  and 
what  muil  be,  that  a  Man  fhould  chufe  Virtue  rather  than 
Vice,  during  the  Time  that  he  prefers  Virtue  to  Vice  ;  and 
that  it  is  a  Thing  impodible  and  irrefiftible,  that  it  (hould  be 
otherwife  than  that  he  ihouldhave  his  Choice,  fo  long  as  this 
Choice  continue? ;  fuch  a  Man  would  ufe  thefe  Terms  muji, 
irrefifiihJe,  Sec.  v/ith  perfctft  lufigniticance  and  Nonfenfe,  or  in 
feme  nevv'  Senfe,  diverfe  from  their  common  Uife  ;  which  is 
with  Reference,  as  has  been  obferved,  to  fuppofable  Oppo- 
fition, UnwilHngnefs  and  Refiftance ;  whereas,  hcfc,  the  very 
Snppoiition  exclude?  and  denies  any  fuch  Thing :  for  the 
£afe  fuppofed  is  that  of  being  wi'Uing,  and  chufmg. 

5.  It  appears  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  thefe  Terms 
■frecelfary ,  impojjlhle,  &c.  aTe  often  ufed  by  Philofophers  and  Me- 
taphyficians  in  a  Senfe  quite  diverfe  from  their  common  Ufe 
and  original  Signification:  For  they  apply  them  to  many 
Cafes  in  which  no  Oppofition  is  fuppofed  or  fuppofable.  Thus 
i!hey  ufe  them  with  Refpeft  to  God's  Exiftence  before  the 
Creation-  of  the  Worlds  when  there  v/as  no  other  Being  bus 
^      .  -  .  He: 


Sed.  III.  The  Nature  of  Neceffity.  i6 

He  :  To  with  regard  to  many  of  the  Difpofitions  and  Ads  of 
the  divine  Being,  fuch  as  his  loving  Hirafelf,  his  loving 
Righteoufnefs,  hating  Sin,  &c.  So  they  apply  thefe  Terms  to 
many  Cafes  of  the  Inclinations  and  Adions  of  cre^ed  intel- 
ligent Beings,  Angels  and  Men  ;  wherein  all  Oppoiition  of 
the  Will  is  fhut'  out  and  denied,  in  the  very  Suppofiticn  c^' 
the  Cafe. 

Metaphyfical  or  Phihfophical  NcceiTity  is  nothing  diuerent 
from  their  Certainty.  I  fpeak  not  now  of  the  Certainty  of 
Knowledge,  but  the  Certainty  that  is  in  Things  thernfelves, 
which  is  the  Foundation  of  the  Certainty  of  the  Knowledge  of 
them  ;  or  that  wherein  lies  the  Ground  of  the  Infallibility  of 
the  Proportion  which  affirms  them. 

What  is  fornetimes  given  as  the  Definition  of  Philofophical 
Neceffity,  namely.  That  by  nvhich  a  Thing  cafUi-ot  but  be,  or  'ivhere- 
ij  it  camiot  be  otheruuije,  fails  of  being  a  proper  Explanation  of  it, 
on  two  Accounts :  Firji,  the  Words  Can,  or  Cannot,  need 
Explanation  as  much  as  the  Word  NecpJJlty ,-  and  the  former 
may  as  well  be  explained  by  the  latter,  as  the  latter  by  the 
former.  Thus,  if  any  one  aiked  us  what  we  mean,  when  we 
fay,  a  Thing  cannot  bid  be,  we  might  explain  ourfelves  by  fay^^ 
ing,  we  mean,  it  muft  necefiarily  be  fo  ;  as  well  as  explain 
Neceffity,  by  faving,  it  is  that  by  vv'hich  a  Thing  cannot  but  be. 
And  Secondly,  this  Definition  is  liable  to  the  fore-mentioned 
great  Inconvenience  :  The  Words  cannot,  or  unable,  arc  pro- 
perly relative,  and  have  Relation  to  Power  exerted,  or  that 
may  be  exerted,  in  order  to  the  Thing  fpoken  of;  to  which,  as 
I  have  now  obferved,  the  Word  Isecsjjity,  as  ufed  by  Philofo- 
phers,  has  no  Reference, 

Philofophical  Neceffity  Is  really  Ni^.lhing  elfe  than  ihe  full 
and  fix'd  Conneftion  between  the  Things  figniiied  b)^  the 
Subjeft  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofitlon,  which  affirms  Some- 
thing to  be  true.  When  there  is  fuch  a  Connc<ftion,  then  the 
Thing  affirmed  in  the  Propofstion  is  necellHry,  in  a  Philofophi- 
cal Senfe  ;  whether  anyOppofition,  or  contrary  Effort  be  fup- 
pofed,  or  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe,  or  no.  When  the  Subjed 
and  Predicate  of  the  Propofition,  which  affirms  the  Exiftence 
of  any  Thing,  either  Subftance,  Quality,  Aft  or  Circumftance, 
have  a  full  and  certain  Connection,  then  the  Exiftence  or 
Being  of  that  Thing  is  faid  to  be  neceffary  in  a  metaphyfical 
Senfe.  And  in  this  Senfe  I  ufe  the  Word  Necffity,  in  the  fol- 
lowing Difcourfe,  when  I  endeavour  to  prove  that  Neceffity  is 
not  inconjijient  luith  Liberty. 

D   3  Th« 


17  The  Nature  of  Neeeffity.  Part  L 

The  Subjeft  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofiticn,  which  affirn-.s 
Exiftence  of  Soinething,  may  have  a  full,  fix*d,  and  certaia 
Connexion  fevcral  Ways. 

(i.)  They  may  have  a  full  and  perfeft  Connexion /«  «»^ 
of  themfel-ves;  becaufe  it  may  imply  a  Contradiftion,  or  grofs 
Abfurdity,  to  fuppofe  them  not  connefted.  Thus  many 
Things  are  necefTary  in  their  own  Nature.  So  th^  eternal 
Exiftence  of  Beiing  generally  confidered,  is  neceflary  in  itjelf : 
becaufe  it  would  be  in  itfelf  the  greateft  Abfurdity,  to  deny 
the  Exiftence  of  Being  in  general,  or  to  fay  there  was  abfo- 
lute  and  univerfal  Nothing ;  and  is  as  it  were  the  Sum  of  all 
Contradiftions ;  as  might  be  fhewn,  if  this  were  a  proper 
Place  for  it.  So  God's  Infinity,  and  other  Attributes  are 
neceflary.  So  it  is  neceflary  in  its  onjctt  Nature,  that  two  and 
two  fhould  be  four ;  and  it  is  neceffary,  that  all  right  Lines 
drawn  from  the  Center  of  a  Circle  to  the  Circumference 
iliould  be  equal.  It  is  neceflary,  fit  and  fuitable,  that  Men 
ihoiild  do  to  others,  as  they  would  that  they  ftiould  do  to 
them.  So  innumerable  Metaphyfical  and  Mathematical  I'ruths 
are  neceflary  in  Themfehes ;  The  Subject  and  Predicate  of 
the  Propofition  which  affirms  them,  are  perfectly  conneded  of 
themfel-ves.  " 

(2.)  The  Connexion  of  the  Subjeft  and  Predicate  of  a 
Propofition,  which  affirms  the  Exiftence  of  Something,  may 
be  fix'd  and  made  certain,  becaufe  the  Exiftence  of  that 
Thing  is  already  come  to  pafs ;  and  either  now  is,  or  has 
been ;  and  fo  has  as  it  were  made  fure  of  Exiftence.  And 
therefore,  the  Propofition  which  affirms  prefent  and  paft  Ex- 
iftence of  it,  may  by  this  Means  be  made  certain,  and  ne- 
ceflTarily  and  unalterably  true  ;  the  paft  Event  has  fix'd  and 
decided  the  Matter,  as  to  its  Exiftence ;  and  has  made  it 
impofiible  but  that  Exiftence  ftiould  be  truly  Predicated  of  it. 
Thus  the  Exiftence  of  whatever  is  already  come  to  pafs,  is 
now  become  neceflTary  ;  'tis  become  impofiible  it  ftiould  be 
otherwife  than  true,  that  fuch  a  Thing  has  been. 

(3.)  The  Subjed  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition  which 
affirms  Something  to  be,  may  have  a  real  and  certain  Cnn- 
jieftion  cotfequentially;  and  fo  the  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  may 
be  confcquentially  nccefl"ary  ;  as  it  may  be  furely  and  firmly 
connefted  with  fomething  elfe,  that  is  necefl!ary  in  one  of 
the  former  Refpeds.  As  it  is  either  fully  and  thoroughly 
connedfed  with  that  which  is  abfolutely  neceflTary  in  its  own 

Nature, 


Sed.  III.        "T'be  Nature  of  Ncccflity.  1 8 

Nature,  or  with  fomething  which  has  already  received  and 
made  fure  of  Exiftence.  This  Neceffity  lies  in,  or  may  be 
explained  by  the  Connexion  of  two  or  rnoie  Propofitions  one 
with  another.  Things  which  are  perfeftly  connecfted  with 
other  Things  that  are  necelliry,  are  neceflary  themfelves,  by 
a  Ncceffity  of  Confequence. 

And  here  it  may  be  obferved,  that  all  Things  which  are 
future,  or  which  will  hereafter  begin  to  be,  which  can  be 
faid  to  be  necefiary,  are  neceffary  only  in  this  lafl:  Way.  Their 
Exiftence  is  not  necefiary  in  itfelt;  for  if  fo,  they  always 
would  have  exifted.  Nor  is  their  Exiftence  become  ne- 
cefiary by  being  made  fure,  by  being  already  come  to  pafs. 
Therefore,  the  only  Vv^ay  that  any  1  hing  that  is  to  come  to 
pafs  hereafter,  is  or  can  be  necefiary,  is  by  a  Connection 
with  fomething  that  is  necefiary  in  its  own  Nature,  or  fon-.e- 
thing  that  already  is,  or  has  been ;  fo  that  the  one  being 
fuppofed,  the  other  certainly  follows.  And  this  alfo  is  the 
only  Way  that  all  Things  paft,  excepting  thofe  which  were 
from  Eternity,  could  be  neceffary  before  they  came  to  pnfs,  or 
could  come  to  pafs  neceflfarily ;  and  therefore  the  only  Way 
in  which  any  Eneft  or  Event,  or  any  Thing  whatfoever  that 
ever  has  had,  or  will  have  a  Beginning,  has  come  into  Being 
recefiarily,  or  will  hereafter  nsceflfarily  exift.  °  And  therefore 
ihis  is  the  Neceffity  which  efpecially  belongs  to  Controverlies 
about  the  Ads  of  the  Will. 

It  may  be  of  fome  Ufe  in  thefe  Controverlies,  further  to 
obferve  concerning  metaphyfical  Neeeffity,  that  (agreeable  to  the 
Diftinftion  before  obferved  of  Neeeffity,  as  vulgarly  under- 
fxood)  Thijvgs  that  exift  may  be  faid  to  be  neceffary,  either 
VN'ith  a  general  or  particular  Neeeffity.  The  Exiftence  of  a 
Thing  may  be  {kid  to  be  n^eccflTary  with  a  general  Neeeffity, 
v.-hen  all  Things  v/hatfoever  being  confidered,  there  is  a 
Foundation  for  Certainty  of  their  Ex'ftence  ;  or  when  in 
the  moft  general  and  univerfal  View  cf  Things,  the  Subjeft 
and  Predicate  of  the  Propofition,  which  affirms  its  Exiftence, 
would  appear  with  an  infallible  Connexion. 

An  Event,  or  the  Exiftence  of  a  Thing,  may  be  faid  to  be. 
geceffary  with  2i  particular  Neeeffity,  or  with  Regard  to  a  par- 
ticular Perfon,  Thing  or  Time,  when  Nothing  that  can  be 
taken  into  Confideration,  in  or  about  that  Perfon,  Thing 
or  Time,  alters  the  Cafe  at  all,  as  to  the  Certainty  of  that 
Event,  or  the  Exiftence  of  that  Thing ;  or  can  be  of  any 

Account 


1 9        ,       The  Nature  of  Neceffity.  Part  L 

Accocnt  at  all,  in  determining  the  Intallibility  of  the  Con- 
jnedion  of  the  Subjeft  and  Predicate  in  the  Propofition  which 
affirms  the  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  ;  fo  that  it  is  all  one,  as 
to  that  Perfgn,  or  Thing,  at  leali:,  at  that  Time,  as  if  the 
Exillence  were  neceffary  with  a  Neceffity  that  is  moft  tfJii- 
•verjal  and  abfolute.  Thus  there  are  many  Things  that  hap- 
pen to  particular  Perfons,  which  they  have  no  Hand  in,  and 
in  the  Exiitence  of  which  no  Will  of  theirs  has  any  Concern, 
at  leaft,  at  that  Time ;  which,  whether  they  arc  ne- 
ceiTary  or  not,  with  Regard  to  Things  in  general,  yet  are  ne- 
ceflary  to  them,  and  with  Regard  to  any  Volition  of  theirs 
at  that  Time;  as  they  prevent  all  AiSls  of  the  Will  about 
the  Affair. — I  fhall  have  Occafion  to  apply  this  Obferva- 
tlon  to  particular  Inftances  in  the  following  Difcourfe. — Whe- 
ther the  fame  Things  that  are  neceffary  with  a  particular  Isle's 
ceffity,  be  not  alfo  neceffary  with  a  general  Necefiity,  may  be 
a  Matter  of  future  Confideration.  Let  that  be  as  it  will,  it  al- 
ters not  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  Ufe  of  this  Diitinttion  of  the 
Kinds  of  Neceffity. 

Thcfe  Things  may  be  fufficient  for  the  explaining  of  the 
Terms  Necejfarj  and  NeceJJlty,  as  Tersris  of  Art,  and  as  often 
iifcdby  Meraphyficians,  and  controverfial  Writers  in  Divinity, 
in  a  Senfe  divcrfe  from,  and  more  extenfive  than  their  origi- 
laal  Meaning,  in  common  Language,  which  was  before  ex- 
plained. 

What  has  been  faid  to  ihew  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms 
NeceJJarj!  and  'Neceffity,  may  be  fufficient  for  the  Explaining  of 
the  oppofite  Terms,  Impojjihle  and  Impoffibility.  For  there  is 
no  Difference,  but  only  that  the  latter  are  negative,  and  the 
former  pofitive.  Impoffibility  is  the  fame  as  negati've  hiccffity, 
or  a  Neceffity  that  a  Thing  ftiould  not  be.  And  it  is  ufed  as 
3  Term  of  Art  in  a  like  Diverlity  from  the  original  and  vulgar 
Meaning,  with  N-ecefSty. 

The  fame  may  be  obferved  concerning  the  Words  UnaJjlcy 
zr\A  Inability.  It  has  been  obferved,  that  thefe  Terms,  in  their 
original  and  common  Ufe,  have  Relation  to  Will  and  En- 
deavour, as  fuppofablc  in  the  Cafe,  and  as  infnfficient  for 
the  bringing  to  pafs  the  Thing  will'd  and  endeavoured.  But 
a«  thefe  Terms  are  often  ufed  by  Philofophers  and  Divines, 
efpecially  Writers  on  Controverfies  about  Free-Will,  they 
are  ufed  in  a  quite  different,  and  far  more  extenfive  Senfe ; 
and  are  applied  to  many  Cafes  wherein  no  Will  or  Endea-- 

vour 


Std:.  III.     Gf  natural  and  moral  NecefliJy.     20' 

voar  for  the  bringing  of  the  Thing  to  pafs,  is  or  can  be  fup- 
pofed,  but  is  aiitually  denied  and  excluded  in  the  Nature  of 


tlie 


Cafe. 


As  the  Words  Ttecnjfary ,inip-)fjihle ,  vnahle,  &c.  are  ufed  by 
polemic  Writers,  in  a  Scnfe  diverfe  from  their  common  Signi- 
fication, the  like  has  happened  to  the  Term  Contingent.  Any 
Thing  is  faid  to  be  contingent,  or  to  come  to  pafs  by  Chance 
or  Accident,  in  the  original  Meaning  of  fuch  Words,  whent 
its  Connection-  with  its  Caufes  or  Antecedents,  according  to- 
the  cRablifhed  Courfe  of  Things,  is  not  difcerned  ;  and  fo' 
is  what  we  have  no  Means  of  the  Forefight  et".  And  efpe- 
cially  is  any  Thing  faid  to  be  contingent  or  accidental  with- 
regard  to  us,  when  any  Thing  comes  to  pafs  that  wc  are  con- 
cerned in,  as  Occafions-  or  Subjefts,  without  our  Foreknow- 
ledge, and  befide  our  Defign  ?.nd  Scope. 

But  the  Word  Coy.t'mgent  is  abundantly  ufed  in  a  very  diffe- 
rent Senfe  ;■  not  for  1  hat  whofe  Connexion  with  the  Series  of 
Things  we  can't  difcern,  fo  as  to  forefee  the  Everrt;  but  for 
fomething  which  has  abfolutely  no  previous  Ground  or  Rea- 
fon,  with  which  its  Exiftence  has  any  fix'd  and  certain  Con- 
neftion. 


•KJ.o«oo.M.ao9»'^c30D<J%  aceo.&  0900  (S^ 


Section   IV. 

Of  the  Difim5lion  of  natural  and  moral  Neceflityj, 
and  Inability. 

THAT  Necefllty  which  has  been  cxplain'd,  confifting  iit 
an  infallible  Conhedion  of  the  Things  fignified  by  the 
Subjedl  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition,  as  intelligent  Beings 
are  the  Subjefts  of  it,  is  diltinguilh'd  into  moral  -dnd  natural 
NeccfTity. 

I  (hall  not  now  {land  to  inquire  whether  this  Diftindion  be 
a  proper  and  perfeft  Diftinftion  ;  but  fhall  only  explain  how 
thefe  two  Sorts  of  Neceffity  areunderftood,  as  the  Terms  are 
fometimes  ufed,  and  as  they  arc  ufed  in  the  following  Dif- 
courfe. 

The- 


2 1  Of  natural  and  moral  Ncceflity.     Part  li 

The  Phrafe,  moral  NeceJ/ity,  is  ufed  varioufly :  fometimes  'tis 
ufed  for  a  Neceffity  of  moral  Obligation,  So  we  fay,  a  Man 
is  under  Necelfity,  when  he  is  linder  Bends  of  Duty  and  Con- 
Jcience,  which  he  can't  be  difcharged  from.  So  the  Word 
Neceffity  is  often  ufed  for  great  Obligation  in  Point  of  Intcreil. 
Sometimes  by  moral  Neceflity  is  meant  that  apparent  Con- 
hedicn  of  Things,  which  is  the  Ground  o{  mtral  E'vidmce ; 
and  fo  is  diftinguiflied  from  ahfdute  'Necejjr.ty,  or  that  fure  Con- 
nexion of  Things,  that  is  a  Foundation  for  infalUhle  Ceria'mty. 
In  this  Senfe,  moral  Neceffity  fignifies  much  the  fame  as  that 
high  Degree  of  Probability,  v/hich  is  ordinarily  fuflicient  to 
fatisfy,  arid  be  relied  upon  by  Mankind,  in  their  Conduct  and 
Behaviour  in  the  World,  as  they  would  confult  their  own 
Safety  and  Intercft,  and  treat  others  properly  as  Members  of 
Society.  And  fometimes  by  moral  Neceffity  is  meant  that 
Neceffity  of  Conne^Sion  and  Confequence,  which  arifes  from 
fuch  moral  Can/es,  as  the  Strength  of  Inclination,  or  Motives, 
and  the  Connexion  which  there  is  in  many  Cafes  between  thefe, 
and  fuch  certain  Volitions  and  Adions.  And  it  is  in  this 
Senfe,  that  I  ufe  the  Phrafe,  moral  NecfJJify,  in  the  following 
Difcourfe. 

By  natur:l  NeceJJzfy,  as  applied  to  Men,  I  mean  fuch  Ne- 
ceffity as  Men  are  under  through  the  Force  of  natural  Caufes ; 
as  diftinguilhed  from  what  are  called  moral  Caufes,  fuch  as 
Habits  iand  Difpofitions  of  the  Heart,  and  moral  Motives  and 
Inducements.  Thus  Men  placed  in  certain  Circumftances, 
are  the  Subjects  of  particular  Senfations  by  Neceffity  :  They 
feel  Pain  when  their  Bodies  are  wounded ;  they  fee  the  Ob- 
jefts  prefented  before  them  in  a  clear  Light,  when  their  Eyes 
are  open'd  :  fo  they  affent  to  the  Truth  of  certain  Propofi- 
tions,  as  foon  as  the  Terms  are  underftood  ;  as  that  two  and 
two  make  four,  that  black  is  not  white,  that  two  parallel 
Lines  can  never  crofs  one  another :  fo  by  a  natural  Neceffity 
Men's  Bodies  move  downwards,  when  there  is  nothing  to  fup- 
port  them. 

But  here  feveral  Things  may  be  noted  concerning  thefe  twcJ 
Kinds  of  Neceffity. 

I.  Moral  Neceffity  may  be  as  abfolute,  as  natural  Neceffity. 
That  is,  the  Efteft  may  be  as  perfectly  conneded  with  its  mo- 
ral Caufe,  as  a  naturally  neceffary  Effed  is  with  its  natural 
Caufe.  Whether  the  Will  in  every  Cafe  is  neceffarily  deter- 
mined by  the  ftrongeft  Motive,  or  whether  the  Will  ever 
makes  any  Refiftance  to  fuch  a  Motive,  or  can  ever  oppofe 
the  ftrongeft  prefent  Inclination,  or  not ;  if  that  Matter  fhould 
be  controTcrted,  yet  I  fuppofc  none  will  deny,  but  that,  in 

fom3 


Se61:.  IV.    Of  natural  and  moral  NecefTity,       22 

fome  Cafes,  a  previous  Bias  and  Inclination,  or  the  Motivr 
prefcnted,  may  be  fo  powerful,  that  the  Ad  of  the  Will  may 
be  certainly  and  indiffolubly  conneded  therewith.  When 
Motives  or  previous  Eias  are  very  ftrong,  all  v/ill  allow  that 
there  is  fome  Difficulty  in  going  againft  them.  And  if  they 
were  yet  ftronger,  the  Difficulty  would  be  fcill  greater  :  And 
therefore,  if  more  were  ftill  added  to  their  Strength,  to  a  cer- 
tain Degree,  it  would  make  the  Difficulty  fo  great,  that  it 
Would  be  wholly  imprjJpMe  to  furmount  it ;  for  this  plain  Rea- 
fon,  becaufe  whatever  Power  Men  may  be  fuppofed  to  have 
to  furmount  Difficulties,  yet  that  Power  is  not  infinite  ;  and  fo 
goes  not  beyond  certain  Limits,  If  a  Man  can  furmount  ten 
Degrees  of  Difficulty  of  this  Kind,  with  twenty  Degrees  of 
Strength,  becaufe  the  Degrees  of  Strength  are  beyond  the  De- 
grees of  Difficulty;  yet  if  the  Difficulty  be  increafed  to  thirty, 
or  an  hundred,  or  a  thoufand  Degrees,  and  his  Strength  not 
alfo  increafed,  his  Strength  will  be  wholly  infufficient  to  fur- 
mount the  Difficulty.  As  therefore  it  mufl  be  allowed,  that 
there  may  be  fuch  a  Thing  as  a  Jure  and  perfed  Connexion 
between  m.oral  Caufes  and  EfFefts  5  fo  this  only  is  what  I  call 
by  the  Name  of  moral  Ncceffity-, 

2.  When  I  ufe  this  Diflinftion  of  moral  and  7tatural  Ne- 
'cejjity,  I  would  not  be  underftood  to  fuppofe,  that  if  any 
Thing  comes  to  pafs  by  the  former  Kind  of  Neceffity,  the 
Nature  of  Things  is  not  concerned  in  it,  as  well  as  in  the 
latter.  I  don't  mean  to  determine,  that  when  a  moral  Habit 
or  Motive  is  fo  ftrong,  that  the  Aft  of  the  Will  infallibly  fol- 
lows, this  is  not  owing  to  the  Nature  of  Things  :  But  thefe  are 
the  Names  that  thefe  two  Kinds  of  Neceffity  have  ufually  been 
called  by  ;  and  they  muft  be  diftinguitlicd  by  fome  Names  or 
<)ther  ;  for  there  is  a  Diltinftion  or  Difference  between  them, 
that  is  very  important  in  its  Confequences.  Which  Diffe- 
rence does  not  lie  fo  much  in  the  Nature  of  the  CotineBion,  as 
in  the  two  Terms  co?tne8ed.  The  Caufe  with  which  the  Effeft 
is  connected,  is  of  a  particular  Kind ;  njix.  that  which  is  of  a 
moral  Nature  ;  cither  forne  previous  habitual  Difpofition,  or 
fome  Motive  exhibited  to  the  Underftanding.  And  the  Effedt 
isalfo  of  a  particular  Kind  ;  being  likewife  of  amoral  Nature; 
confiding  in  fome  Inclination  or  Volition  of  the  Soul,  or  vo- 
luntary Aftion, 

I  fuppofe,  that  Neceffity  which  is  called  natural,  in  Diflinc- 
■tion  from  moral  Neceffity,  is  fo  called,  htczyx^Q  mere  Nature ,  as 
-the  Word  is  vulgarly  ufed,  is  concerned,  without  sny  Thing 

E  of 


2;5       Q/  natural  and  moral  Neceflity.       Part  t 

of  Choice.  The  Word  Nature  is  often  ufed  in  Oppofition  ta 
Choice;  not  becaufe  Nature  has  indeed  never  any  Hand  in  our 
Choice;,  but  this  probably  comes  to  pafs  by  Means  thaC 
we  firft  get  our  Notion  of  Nature  from-  that  difcernable  and 
obvious  Courfe.  of  Events,  which  we  obferve  in  many  Things 
that  o'lr  Choice  has  no  Concern  in;  and  efpecially  in  the 
material  World  ;  which,  in  very  many  Parts  of  it,  we  eafily 
percei\'e  to  be  in  a  fettled  Courfe;  the  ftated  Order  and  Man- 
ner of  Succeflion  being  very  apparent.  But  where  we  don't 
readily  difcern  the  Rule  and  Connexion,  (tho'  there  be  a 
Connexion,  according  to  an  eftablilhed  Law,  truly  taking 
Place)  we  ligiiify  the  Manner  of  Event  by  fome  other  Name. 
Even  in  many  Things  which  are  feen  in  the  material  and  ina- 
nimate World,  which  don't  difcernably  and  obvioufly  come  to 
pafs  according  to  any  fettled  Courfe,  Men  don't  call  the  Man- 
ner cf  the  Event  by  the  Name  o{  Nature,  but  by  fuch  Names 
as  Accidi?/t,  Chance,  Contitigaice ,  Sec.  So  Men  make  a  Diftinc- 
tion  between  Nature  and  Choice  ;  ^s  tho'  they  were  compleat- 
ly  and  univerfally  dinftinft.  V/hereas,.  I  fuppofe  none  will  de- 
ny but  that  Choice,  in  many  Cafes,  arifes  from  Nature,  as  truly 
as  other  Events.  But  the  Dependance  and  Connexion  between 
Afts  of  Volition  or  Choice,  and  their  Caufes,  according  to 
eftablifhed  Laws,  is  not  fo  fenfible  and  obvious.  And  we  ob- 
ferve that  Choice  is  as  it  were  a  new  Principle  of  Motion  and 
Aftion,  different  from  that  eftablifhed  Law  and  Order  of  Things 
which  \%  moft  obvious,  that  is  feen  efpecially  in  corporeal  and 
fenfible  Thing 5  :  And  alfo  that  Choice  often  interpofes,  inter- 
rupts and  alters  the  Cha^in  of  Events  in  thefe  external  Objefts, 
and  caufes  them  to  proceed  othsrwife  than  they  would  do,  if 
let  alone,  and  left  to  go  en  according  to  the  Laws  of  Motion 
among  themfelves.  Hence  it  is  fpoken  of,  as  if  it  were  a 
Principle  of  Motion  entirely  diftindt  from  Nature,  and  pro- 
perly fet  in  Oppofition  to  it.  Names  being  commonly  given 
to  Things,  according  to  what  is  moft  obvious,  and  is  fuggefted 
by  what  appears  to  the  Senfes  without  Reflection  and  Refearch. 

3.  It  rnuft  be  cbferved,  that  in  what  has  been  explain'd,  as 
fignified  by  the  Name  of  Moral  NecfJJtty,  the  Word  Necejfity  is 
not  ufed  according  to  the  original  Defign  and  Meaning  of  the 
Word  I  For,  as  was  obferved  before,  fuch  Terms  necejfary,  irn- 
fnjjihle,  irrejijiihle,  &c.  in  common  Speech,  and  their  molt  pro- 
per Scnfe,  are  always  relative;  having  Reference  to  fome  fup- 
pofable  voluntary  Oppofition  or  Endeavour,  that  is  infufficient. 
£ut  no  fuch  Oppofition,  or  contrary  Will  and  Endeavour,  is 
fuppofabk  in  the  Cafe  of  moral  Neccflity  j  which  is  a  Cer- 
tainty 


Scd.  IV.  Of  moral  Inability.  24 

tainty  of  the  Inclination  and  Will  itfelf ;  which  does  not 
admit  of  the  Suppofition  of  a  V/iil  to  oppofe  and  reliil  it. 
For  'tis  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  the  fame  individual  Will  to  oppofe 
itfelf,  in  its  prefent  Aft ;  or  the  prefent  Choice  to  be  oppo- 
fite  to,  and  ref.fting  prefent  Choice  :  as  abfurd  as  it  is  to  talk  of 
two  contrary  Motions,  in  the  fame  moving  Body,  at  the  famf^ 
Time.  And  therefore  the  very  Cafe  fuppofed  never  admits  of 
any  Trial,  whether  an  oppofing  or  refiiiing  Will  can  overcome 
ihis  Neceifity. 

What  has  been  faid  of  natural  and  moral  Necelllty,  may 
ferve  to  explain  what  is  intended  by  natural  and  moral  inabi- 
lity. We  are  faid  to  be  naturally  unable  to  do  a  Thing,  when 
we  can't  do  it  if  we  will,  becaufe  what  is  Kioft  commonly 
called  Nature  don't  allow  of  it,  or  becaufe  of  fome  impeding 
Defeft  or  Obftacle  that  is  extrinlic  to  the  Will ;  either  ia 
the  Faculty  of  Ufiderftanding,  Conftitutlon  of  Bod)',  or  ex- 
ternal Objects.  Moral  Inability  confifts  not  in  any  of  thefe 
Things ;  but  either  in  the  Want  of  Inclination  ;  or  the  Strength 
of  a  contrary  Inclination ;  or  the  Want  of  fufficient  Motives  in 
View,  to  induce  and  excite  the  Act  of  the  Will,  or  the  Strength 
of  apparent  Motives  to  the  contrary.  Or  both  thefe  may  be 
fefolved  into  one  ;  and  it  may  be  faid  in  one  Word,  that  mo- 
ral Inability  confifts  in  the  Oppofition  or  Want  of  Inclination, 
For  when  a  Perfon  is  unable  to  will  or  chufe  fuch  a  Thingj 
through  a  Defect  of  Motives,  or  Prevalence  of  contrary  Mo- 
tives, 'tis  the  fame  Thing  as  his  being  unable  through  the 
Want  of  an  Inclination,  or  the  Prevalence  of  a  contrary  Incli- 
nation, in  fuch  Circumftances,  and  under  the  Influence  of  fuch 
Views. 

To  giye  forae  Inftances  of  this  vioral  Inability, — A  V/omara 
of  great  Honour  and  Chaftity  may  have  a  moral  Inability  to 
proititute  herfelf  to  her  Slave.  A  Child  of  great  Love  and 
Duty  to  his  Parents,  may  be  upable  to  be  willing  to  kill  his 
Father.  A  very  lafcivious  Man,  in  Cafe  of  certain  Opportu- 
nities and  Temptations,  and  in  the  Abi^nce  of  fuch  and  fuch 
Reftraints,  rjaay  be  uriable  to  forbear  gratifying  his  Luft.  -  A 
Drunkard,  undei  fuch  and  fuch  Circumftances,  may  be  una- 
ble to  forbear  taking  of  firong  Drink.  A  very  malicious 
Man  may  be  unable  to  exert  benevolent  Acts  to  an  Enemy,  or 
to  defire  his  Profperity  :  Yea,  fome  may  be  fo  under  the  Pow- 
er of  a  vile  Difpofitisn,  that  they  may  be  unable  to  love  thofc 
who  are  moft  worthy  of  their  Efteem  and  Affection.  A  llrong 
Habit  of  Virtue  and  great  Degree  of  Holinefs  may  caufe  a 
ptoral  Inability  to  love  "Wickednefs  jn  general,  may  render  4 

E3         ■  Mao 


25  Of  rnoral  Inability.  Part  I^ 

Man  unable  to  take  Complacence  in  wicked  Perfons  or  Things; 
or  to  chufe,  a  wicked  Ltfe,  and  prefer  it  to  ;i  virtuous  Life, 
And  on  the  other  Hand,  a  great  Degree  of  habitual  Wicked- 
nefs  mty  lay  a  Man  under  an  Inability  to  love  and  chufe  Ho- 
lincfs  ;  and  render  him  utterly  unable  to  love  an  infinitely  holy 
Being,  or  to  chufe  and  cleave  to  him  as  his  chief  Good. 

Here  it  may  be  of  Ufe  to  obferve  this  Diftin<ftion  of  moral 
Inability,  ivz.  of  that  which  is  general  and  habitual,  and  that 
which  is  particular  and  occajional.  By  a  general  and  habitual  mo- 
ral Inability,  I  mean  an  Inability  in  the  Heart  to  all  Exercifes 
or  Adts  of  Will  of  that  Nature  or  Kind,  through  a  fix'd  and 
habitual  Inclination,  or  an  habitual  and  Itated  Dcfed, 
or  Want  of  a  certain  Kind  of  Inclination.  Thus  a  very' 
ill-natur'd  Man  may  be  unable  to  exert  fuch  A6ts  of 
Benevolence,  as  another,  who  is  full  of  good  Nature,  tom- 
monly  exerts ;  and  a  Man,  whofe  Heart  is  habitually  void  of 
Gratitude,  may  be  unable  to  exert  fuch  and  fuch  grateful  Ads, 
through  that  ftated  Defeft  of  a  grateful  Inclination.  By  parti- 
cular and  occajtonal  moral  Inability,  I  mean  an  Inability  of  the 
Will  or  Heart  to  a  particular  Aft,  thro'  the  Strength  or  Defed 
of  prefent  Motives,  or  of  Inducements  prefented  to  the  View 

of  theUnderftanding,  on  thisOccaf.on,— If  it  be  fo,  that  the. 

Will  is  always  determined  by  the  llrongeft  Motive,  then  it 
mull  always  have  an  Inability,  in  this  latter  Senfe,  to  Aft  other- 
wife  than  it  does;  it  not  being  poffible,  in  any  Cafe,  that  the 
Will  fhould,  at  prefent,  go  againft  the  Motives  which  has  now,' 
all  Things  confidered,  the  greateft  Strength  and  Advantage  to 
excite  and  induce  it. — The  former  of  thefe  Kinds  of  moral  Ina- 
bility, confifting  in  that  which  is  flated  habitual  and  general, 
is  moil  commonly  called  by  the  Name  of  Inability ;  becaufe 
the  Word  Inability,  in  its  molt  proper  and  original  Significa- 
tion, has  Refpeft  to  fome  Jiated  Defeil,     And  this  efpecially 

obtains  the  Name  qI  Inability  alfo  upon  another  Account : 

1  before  obferved,  that  the  Word  Inability  in  its  original  and 
moft  common  Ufe,  is  a  relative  Term  ;  and  has  Refpeft  to 
Will  and  Endeavour,  as  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe,  and  as  in- 
iufficient  to  bring  to  pafs  the  Thing  defired  and  endeavoured. 
Now  there  may  be  more  of  an  Appearance  and  Shadow  of  this, 
with  Refpeft  to  the  Afts  which  arife  from  a  fix'd  and  ftrong 
Habit,  than  others  that  arife  only  from  tranfient  Occafions  and 
Caufes.  Indeed  Will  and  Endeavour  againft,  or  diverfe  from 
prefent  Afts  of  the  Will,  are  in  no  Cafe  fappOfable,  whe^ther 
thofe  Afts  be  occafional  or  habitual ;  for  that  would  be  to 
fuppofe  the  Will,  at  prefent,  to  be  otherwife  than,  at  prefent. 


gcd,  IV.  Of  moral  Inability.  26 

it  is.  But  yet  there  may  be  Will  and  Endeavour  agalml  future 
AOs  of  the  Will,  or  Volitions  that  are  likely  to  take  Place,  jvs 
view'd  at  a  Diilance.  'Tis  no  Contradidion,  to  fuppofe  that 
the  Afts  of  the  Will  at  one  Time,  may  be  againft  the  Ads 
cf  the  Will  at  another  Time ;  aad  there  may  be  Defires  and 
Endeavours  to  prevent  or  excite  future  Ads  of  the  WI^  ;  but 
fach  Defires  and  Endeavours  are,  in  many  Cafes,  rendered 
infufficient  and  vain,  thro'  Fixednefs  of  Habit :  When  the  Oc- 
cafion  returns,  the  Strength  of  Habit  overcomes,  and  baffles 
all  fuch  Oppofition.  In  this  Refped,  a  Man  may  be  in  mife- 
rable  Slavery  and  Bondage  to  a  ftrong  Habit.  But  it  may  be 
comparatively  eafy  to  make  an  Alteration  v/ith  Refpeft  to  fuch 
future  Ads,  as  are  only  occafional  and  tranfient;  becaufe  the 
Occafion  or  tranfient  Caufe,  if  forefeen,  may  often  eafily  be 
prevented  or  avoided.  On  this  Account,  the  moral  Inability 
that  attends  fix'd  Habits,  efpecially  obtains  the  Name  of  Ina^ 
hllity.  And  then,  as  the  Will  may  remotely  and  Indireftly  re- 
|ift  itfelf,  and  do  it  in  vain,  in  the  Cafe  of  ftrong  Habits ;  fo 
Reafon  may  refill  prefent  Ads  of  the  Will,  and  its  Refiftance 
be  infufficient ;  and  this  is  more  commonly  the  Cafe  alfo, 
when  the  Ads  arife  from  ftrong  Habit. 

But  it  muft  be  obferved  concerning  moral  Inability,  in  each 
Kind  of  it,  that  the  Word  Inability  is  ufed  in  a  Senfe  very  di- 
V'jrfe  from  its  original  Import.  The  Word  ftgnifies  only  a 
natural  Inability,  in  the  proper  Ufe  of  it ;  and  is  applied  to 
fuch  Cafes  only  wherein  a  prefent  Will  or  Inclination  to  the 
Thing,  with  Refped  to  which  a  Perfon  is  {aid  to  be  unable, 
is  fuppofable.  It  can't  be  truly  faid,  according  to  the  ordi- 
nary Ule  of  Language,  that  a  malicious  Man,  let  him  be 
never  fo  malicious,  can't  hold  his  Hand  from  ftriking,  or  that 
he  is  not  able  to  ftiew  his  Neighbour  Kindnefs;  or  that  a 
Drunkard,  let  his  Appetite  be  never  fo  ftrong,  can't  keep  the 
Cup  from  his  Mouth.  In  the  ftrideft  Propriety  of  Speech,  a 
Mati  has  a  Thing  in  his  Power,  if  he  has  it.  in  his  Choice, 
or  at  his  Eledion  :  And  a  Man  can't  be  truly  faid  to  be  una- 
ble to  do  a  Thing,  when  he  can  do  it  if  he  will.  *T^s  im- 
properly faid,  that  a  Perfon  can't  perform  thofe  external  Ac- 
tions, which  are  dependent  on  the  Ad  of  the  Will,  and  which 
Would  be  eafily  performed,  if  the  Ad  of  the  Will  were  pre- 
fent. And  ri  it  be  improperly  faid,  that  he  cannot  perform 
thofe  external  voluntary  Adions,  which  depend  on  the  Will, 
*iis  in  feme  Refped  more  improperly  faid,  that  he  is  unable  to 
exert  the  Acts  of  the  Will  themfelves;  becaufe  it  is  more  evi- 
dently falfe,  with  Refped  to  thefe,  that  he  cap't  if  he  will : 

For 


5i7        Of  Liberty  and  moral  Agency.      Part  I. 

fi'or  to  fay  fo,  is  a  down- right  Contradiction  :  It  is  to  fay,  he 
can't  will,  if  he  does  will.  And  in  this  Cafe,  not  only  is  it 
true,  that  it  is  eafy  for  a  Man  to  do  the  Thing  if  he  will, 
but  the  very  willing  is  the  doiiig ;  when  once  he  has  will'd, 
the  Thing  is  performed;  and  nothing  elfe  remains  to  be 
done.  Therefore,  in  thefe  Things  to  afcribe  a  Non-perfor- 
mance to  tiie  Want  of  Power  or  Ability,  is  not  juft ;  becaufe  the 
Thing  wanting  is  not  a  being  able,  but  a  being  njoillivg.  There 
are  Faculties  of  Mind,  and  Capacity  of  Nature,  and  every 
Thing  elfe,  fufficient,  but  a  Difpofition  :  Nothing  is  wanting 
but  a  Will. 

•igi>a0eeapeeooaoaseB9oee<]ooeaescaoseoo9ease<<S«a0ooa6eeMooo9ooaooM«e(>e«osooooMeoweo<& 

Section     V. 

Concerning   the   Notion   of  Liberty,  and  of  moral 
Agency. 

TH  E  plain  and  obvious  Meaning  of  the  Words  Freedom 
and  Liberty,  in  common  Speech,  is  Ponver,  Oppor- 
tunity, or  Ad'vantage ,  that  any  one  has,  to  do  as  he  pleafes.  Or  in 
pther  Words,  his  being  free  from  Hindrance  or  Impediment 
jn  the  Way  of  doing,  or  conducing  in  any  Refpeft,  as  h^ 
iwills.  *  And  the  contrary  to  Liberty,  whatever  Name  wc 
call  that  by,  is  a  Perfon's  being  hinder'd  or  unable  to  con- 
duct as  he  will,  or  being  neceffitated  to  do  othcrwife. 

If  this  which  I  liave  mentioned  be  the  Meaning  of  the 
Word  Liberty,  in  the  ordinary  Ufe  of  Language ;  as  I  truft 
that  none  that  has  ever  learn 'd  to  talk,  and  is  unprejudiced, 
will  deny ;  then  it  will  follow,  that  in  propriety  of  Speech, 
neither  Liberty,  nor  its  contrary,  can  properly  be  afcribed  to 
^ny  Being  or  Thing,  but  that  which  has  fuch  a  Faculty, 
Power  or  Property,  ^s  is  called  Will.  For  that  which  is 
poffefTed  of  no  fuch  Thing  as  Will,  can't  have  any  Poiver  or 
Opportunity  of  doing  according  to  its  Will,  nor  be  neceffitated 
to  aft  contrary  to  its  Will,  nor  be  reftrained  irom  afting  agreca- 
jbly  to  it.  And  therefore  to  talk  of  Liberty,  or  the  contrary, 
as  belonging  to  the  'very  Will  it/elf,  is  not  to  fpeak  good  Senfe  ; 
Jf  we  judge  of  Senfe,  and  Nonfenfe,  by  the  original  and  proper 
Signification  of  Words.  For  the  Will  it/elf  is  not  an  Agent 
that  has  a  Will :  The  Power  of  chufing,   itklf,  has    not  a 

Powef 

*  I  fay  not  only  doing,  but  conduEling  ;  becaufe  a  voluntary  forbearing 
to  do,  fitting  ftill,  keeping  Silence,  &c.  are  Inftances  of  Perfons  ConduSl,  a« 
\>out  which  Liberty  is  cxercjfed  j  tho' they  are  not  fo  properly  called  ^w>»|^. 


Sedl.  V.  '7he  Notion  o/'Liberty  ^«c/ moral  Agency.   2 8 

Power  of  chufing.  That  which  has  the  Power  of 
Volition  or  Choice  is  the  Man  or  Soul,  and  not 
the  Power  of  Volijjon  itfelf.  And  he  that  has  the  Li- 
berty of  doing  according  to  his  Will,  is  the  Agent  or  Doer 
who  is  poffeffed  of  the  Will ;  and  not  the  Will  which  he  is 
polTefled  of.  We  fay  with  propriety,  that  a  Bird  let  loofe  has 
Power  and  Liberty  to  fly  ;  but  not  that  the  Bird's  Power  of 
flying  has  a  Power  and  Liberty  of  flying.  To  be  free  is  the 
Property  of  an  Agent,  who  is  poffefled  of  Powers  and  Facul- 
ties, as  much  as  to  be  cunning,  valiant,  bountiful,  or  zea- 
lous. But  thefe  Qualities  are  tlie  Properties  pf  Men  or  Per- 
fons ;  and  not  the  Properties  of  Properties. 

There  are  two  Things  that  are  contrary  to  this  which  is 
called  Liberty  in  common  Speech.  One  is  Conjiraint;  the  fame 
is  otherwife  called  i^arf^-,  Comfuljion,  and  Coafiian;  which  is  a 
Perfon's  being  neceffitated  to  do  a  Thing  contrary  to  his  Will. 
The  other  is  Rejiraint;  which  is  his  being  hindred,  and  aot 
having   Power  to  do  according  to  his  Will.     But  that  which 

has   no  Will,    can't   be  the  Subjeft  of  thefe  Things.- 1 

need  fay  the  lefs  on  this  Head,  Mr.  Locke  having  fet  the  fame 
Thing  forth,  with  fo  great  Clearnefs,  in  his  Ejjay  on  the  human 
Unde  rjiatidifig. 

But  one  Thing  more  I  would  obferve  concerning  what  is 
vulgarly  called  Liberty;  namely,  that  Power  and  Opportunity 
for  one  to  do  and  condud  as  he  will,  or  according  to  his 
Choice,  is  all  that  is  meant  by  it ;  without  taking  into  the 
Meaning  of  the  Word,  any  Thing  pf  the  Caufe  or  Original 
of  that  Choice ;  or  at  all  confidering  how  the  Perfon  came 
to  have  fuch  a  Volition ;  whether  it  was  caufed  by  fome  ex- 
ternal Motive^  or  internal  habitual  Bias ;  whether  it  was  de- 
termin'd  by  fome  internal  antecedent  Volition,  or  whether  it 
happen'd  without  a  Caufe  ;  whether  it  was  necefiarily  con- 
neded  with  Something  foregoing,  or  uot  connected.  Let  the 
Perfon  come  by  his  Volition  or  Choice  how  he  will,  yet,  if 
he  is  able,  and  there  is  Nothing  in  the  Way  to  hinder  his  pur- 
fuing  and  executing  his  Will,  the  Man  is  fully  and  perfectly 
free,  according  to  the  primary  and  common  Notion  of  Free- 
dom. 

What  has  been  faid  may  be  fufKcient  to  fhew  what  is 
meant  by  Liberty,  according  to  the  common  Notions  of  Man- 
kind, and  in  the  ufual  and  primary  Acceptation  of  the  Word  : 
But  the  Word,  as  ufed  hy  Arminians ,  Pelagians  and  others,  who 
o\>^o{e  ths.  Cal'vinijtsy  has  an  entirely  different  Signification. — • 
Thefe  fevcral  Tiii»gs  belong  to    their  Notion  of  Liberty. 

u  That 


2^9  ^be  Not  ion  of  Liberty  and  moral  Agency .  Part  L 

I'.  That  it  confifts  in  a  Self-determining  Poiuer  in  the  Willi  or 
a  certain  Sovereignty  the  Will  has  over  itfelf,  and  its  own 
Ads,  whereby  it  determines  its  own  Volitions ;  fo  as  not  to 
be  dependent  in  its  Determinations,  on  any  Caufe  v/ithout 
itfelf,  nor  determined  by  any  Thing  prior  to  its  own  Afts. 
2.  Indifference  belongs  to  Liberty  in  their  Notion  of  it,  or  that 
the  Mind,  previoas  to  the  Art  of  Volition  be,  in  ejui2ibric'^ 
a.  Contingence  is  another  Thing  that  belongs  and  is  effential 
to  it ;  not  in  the  common  Acceptation  of  the  Word,  as  that 
has  been  already  explain'd,  but  as  oppofed  to  all  Neceffity, 
dr  any  fixed  and  certain  Connexion  with  fome  previous  Ground 
or  Reafon  of  its  Exiftence.  They  fuppofe  the  Effence  of  Li- 
berty fo  much  to  confift  in  thefe  Things,  that  unlefs  the 
Will  of  Man  be  free  in  this  Senfe,  he  has  no  real  Free- 
dom, how  much  foever  he  may  be  at  Liberty  to  Aft  ac- 
cording to  his  Will. 

A  moral  Agent  is  a  Being  that  is  capable  of  thofe  Aftions 
that  have  a  moral  Quality,  and  which  can  properly  be  de- 
nominated good  or  evil  in  a  moral  Senfe,  virtuous  or  vici- 
ous, commendable  or  faulty.  To  morai  Agency  belongs  a 
moral  Faculty,  or  Senfe  of  moral  Good  and  Evil,  or  of  fuch  a 
Thing  as  Defert  or  V/orthinefs  of  Praife  or  Elame,  Re- 
ward or  Punlftiment ;  and  a  Capacity  which  an  Agent  has 
of  being  influenced  in  his  Aftions  by  moral  Inducements  or 
Motives,  exhibited  to  the  View  of  Underftanding  and  Rea- 
fon,  to  engage  to  a  Conduft  agreeable  to  the  moral  Faculty. 

The  Son  ij  very  excellent  and  beneficial  in  its  Artioh  and 
Influehce  on  the  Earth,  in  warming  it,  and  caufing  it  toi 
bring  forth  its  Fruits;  but  it  is  not  a  moral  Agent:  Its 
Aftion,  tho'  good,  is  not  virtuous  or  meritorious.  Fire 
that  breaks  out  in  a  City,  and  confumcs  great  Part  of  it,  is 
very  mifchievous  in  its  Operation  ;  but  is  not  a  moral  A- 
gent ;  what  it  does  is  not  faulty  or  fmful,  or  deferving  of 
any  Punifhment.  The  brute  Creatures  are  not  moral  Agents  : 
the  Aftions  of  fome  of  them  are  very  profitable  and  pleafant ; 
others  are  very  hurtful :  yet,  feeing  they  have  no  moral  Fa- 
culty, or  Senfe  of  Defert,  and  don't  Aft  from  Choice  guided 
by  Underftanding,  or  with  a  Capacity  of  reafoning  and  re- 
flefting,  but  only  from  Inftinft,  and  are  not  capable  of  being 
influenced  by  moral  Inducements,  their  Aftions  arc  not  proper- 
ly finful  or  virtuous;  nor  are  they  properly  the  Sub- 
jefts  of  any  fuch  moral  Treatment  for  what  they  do,  as  mo- 
ral Agents  are  for  their  Faults  or  good  Deeds, 

Here 


Sedt.  V.  0;^  moral  Agency.  30 

Here  it  maybe  noted,  that  there  is  a  circumftantial  diffe- 
rence between  the  moral  Agency  of  a  Ruler  and  a  SubjeS.. 
I  call  it  drcumflantial,  becaufe  it  lies  only  in  the  Difference 
of  moral  Inducements  they  are  capable  of  being  influen- 
ced by,  arifing  from  the  Diiierence  of  Circuwjtanccs.  A 
R-'4er  ading  in  that  Capacity  only,  is  not  capable  of  being 
inihienced  by  a  moral  Law,  and  its  bansftions  of  Threat- 
nings  and  Proniifes,  Rewards,  and  Punilhtments,  as  the  SubjeB 
is ;  tho'  both  may  be  influenced  by  a  Knowledge  of  moral 
Good  and  Evil  :'  A.nd  therefore  the  moral  Agency  of  the 
Supreme  Being,  who  afls  only  in  the  Capacity  of  a  Ruler  to- 
wards his  Creatures,  and  never  as  a  SubjeB,  differs  in  that 
Refpeft  from  the  moral  Agency  of  created  intelligent  Be- 
ings. God's  Aifiions,  and  particularly  thofe  which  he  ex- 
erts as  a  moral  Goverhour,  have  moral  Qualifications,  are 
morally  good  in  the  higheft  Degree,  They  are  moft  per- 
fedUy  holy  and  righteous ;  and  we  mufl  conceive  of  Him  as 
influenced  in  the  higheft  Degree,  by  that  which,  above  all 
ethers,  is  properly  a  moral  Inducement ;  'nix,.  the  moral  Good 
which  He  fees  in  fuch  and  fuch  Things  :  And  therefore  He 
is,  in  the  moft  proper-  Senfe,  a  m.oral  Agent,  the  Source  of  all 
ihoral  Ability  and  Agency,  the  Fountain  and  Rule  of  all  Vir- 
tue and  moral  Good ;  tho'  by  Reafon  of  his  being  Supreme 
over  all,  'tis  not  pofTible  He  fhould  be  under  the  Influence  of 
Law  or  Command,  Promifes,  or  Threatnings,  P.ewards,  orPu- 
liifhments,  Counfels  or  Warnings.  The  eflential  Qualities  of 
a  moral  Agent  are  in  God,  in  the  greateft  poffible  Perfedtion  ; 
fuch  as  Undcrftanding,  to  perceive  the  Difference  between  mo- 
ral Good  and  Evil ;  a  Capacity  of  difcernihg  that  moral  Wor- 
thinefs  and  Demerit,  by  which  fome  Things  are  Praife-wor- 
thv,  others  deferving  of  Blame  and  Punifhment ;  and  alfo 
a  Capacity  of  Choice,  and  Choice  guided  by  Underftanding, 
and  a  Power  of  ading  according  to  his  Choice  or  Pleafure,  and 
being  capable  of  doing  thofe  Things  which  are  in  the  higheft 
Senfe  Praifc-worthy.  And  herein  does  very  much  confift  that 
Image  of  God  wherein  he  made  Man,  (which  we  read  of  Cen. 
i.  26,  27.  and  Chap.  ix.  6.)  by  which  God  diftinguiflied  Man 
from  the  Eeafts,  wz.  in  thofe  Faculties  and  Principles  of  Na- 
ture, whereby  He  is  capable  of  moral  Agency.  Herein  ver)/- 
much  confifts  the  natural  Image  of  God  ;  as  his  fpiritual  and 
moral  Image,  wherein  Man  was  made  at  firft,  conflfted  in  that 
moral  Excellency,  that  he  was  endowed  with. 


(    3t     ) 

e^>  ^--^  <>  ^-^  ^  >,ir-^  O  r  "^  O  ^"^  ^  i  >^'^ 

PART     II. 

Wherein  it  is  confidered  whether 
there  is  or  can  be  any  fuch  Sort  of 
Freedom  of  Will,  as  that  wherein 
Ar7ninia7is  place  the  Effence  of 
the  Liberty  of  all  moral  Agents; 
and  whether  any  fuch  Thing  ever 
was  or  can  be  conceived  of. 


Section     I. 

^Shewing  the  riravifeft  Incovfiftence  of  the  Arminian 
l>Jotmn  of  Liberty  of  Will,  mi/ljling  in  the  IVill'^^ 
felf-determinino;  Power. 

#  ^%.%%%%%  *  A  V I N  G  taken  Notice  of  thefe  Things  which 
S      ^-^      *    "^'^■^  ^^  neceflary  to  be  obferved,  concerning 

#  ^  M  %  ^^  Meaning  of  the  principal  Terms  and 
3i^  uV  ^  v^  Phrafes  made  ufe  of  in  Controverfiesconcern- 
%:      "^^      %   ^"S  human  Liberty,  and  particularly  obferved 

#  ,.  ,. #   what  Liberty  is,   according  to  the  common 

#  ##*%*¥•...•  *  Language,  and  general  Apprehenfion  of  Man- 
kind, and  what  it  is  as  underftood  and  maintained  by  Arminians  ; 
I  proceed  to  confider  the  Arminian  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of  the 
Will,  and  the  fuppofed  Neceflity  of  it  in  Order  to  moral  Agen- 
cy, or  in  Order  to  any  One's  being  capable  of  Virtue  or  Vice, 

and 


Sedl.  I.  The  Inconfijiencey  &c.  32 

and  properly  the  Subjeft  of  Command  or  Counfel,  Praife  or 
Blame,  Promifes  or  Threatnings,  Rewards  or  Pnnifhmer.ts  j 
or  whether  that  which  has  been  defcribed,  as  the  Thing  meant 
by  Liberty  in  common  Speech,  be  not  fufficient,  and  the  on!y 
Liberty,  which  makes,  or  can  make  any  one  a  moral  Agent, 
and  fo  properly  the  Subjeft  of  thefe  Things-  In  this  Fart,  I 
(hall  coniider  whether  any  fuch  Thing  be  pofilbic  or  conceiva- 
ble, as  that  Freedom  of  Will  which  Arminians  infift  on  \  and 
Ihall  inquire  whether  any  fuch  Sort  of  Liberty  be  necefl'ary  to 
moral  Agency,  ^c.  in  the  next  Part. 

And  Firll  of  all,  I  fhall  confider  the  Notion  of  a  Self- 
dftermining  Fonver  in  the  Will  :  wherein,  according  to  the 
Arminians,  does  moft  eflentially  confift  the  Will's  Freedom  ; 
and  {hall  particularly  inquire,  whether  it  be  not  plainly  ab- 
furd,  and  a  manifelt  Inconfiftence,  to  fuppofe  that  the  H'  ill  it- 
f elf  determines  all  the  free  Ads  of  the  Will. 

Here  I  fhall  not  infift  on  the  great  Impropriety  of  fuch 
Phrafes,  and  Ways  of  fpeaking,  as  the  Will's  determining  it- 
felfi  becaufe  Aftions  are  to  be  afcribcd  to  Agents,  and  not 
properly  to  the  Powers  of  Agents ;  which  improper  Way  o^ 
fpeaking  leads  to  many  Miftakes,  and  much  Confufion,  a^ 
Mr.  Locke  obferves.  But  I  fhall  fuppofe  that  the  Arminianj^ 
when  they  fpeak  of  the  Will's  determining  itfelf,  do  by  the 
Will  mfinx\\t  Soul  ^illifig,  I  {hall  take  it  for  granted,  that 
when  they  fpeak  of  the  Will,  as  the  Determiner,  they  mean 
the  Soul  in  the  Exercife  of  a  Poujer  of  Willing,  cr  aftijig  volun- 
tarily. I  fhall  fuppofe  this  to  be  their  meaning,  becaufe  No- 
thing elfe  can  be  meant,  without  the  groffefl  and  plainefl:  Ab- 
furdity.  In  all  Cafes,  when  we  fpeak  of  the  Powers  or  Prin- 
ciples of  Ading,  as  doing  fuch  Things,  we  mean  that  the  A- 
gents  which  have  thefe  Powers  of  afting,  do  them,  in  the 
Exercife  of  thofe  Powers.  So  when  we  fay.  Valour  fights 
courageoufly,  we  mean,  the  Man  who  is  under  the  Influ- 
ence of  Valour  fights  ccurageouOy.  When  we  fay.  Love 
feeks  the  Objeft  loved,  we  mean,  the  Perfon  loving  feeks  that 
Objeft.  When  we  fay,  'the  Underflanding  difcerns,  we  mean 
the  Soul  in  the  Exercife  of  that  Faculty.  So  when  it  is  faid, 
the  Will  decides  or  determines,  the  Meaning  mufl  be,  that 
the  Perfon  in  the  Exercife  of  a  Power  of  Willing  and  Chufmgj 
i)r  the  Soul  afting  voluntarily,  determines. 

F  3  Therefor© 


53  "^^^^  Inconjijfence  of  Part  IL 

Therefore,  if  the  Will  determines  all  its  o-.vn  free  Ads, 
the  Soul  determines  all  the  free  Afh  of  the  "V^'ill  in  the  Ex- 
ercife  of  a  Power  of  Willing  and  Chufing ;  or,  which  is  the 
fame  Thing,  it  determines  them  of  Choice;  it  determines 
its  own  Atts  by  chufing  its  own  Afls.  If  the  Will  deter- 
liiines  the  WiD,  then  Choice  orders  and  determines  the 
Choice :  and  AQls,  of  Choice  are  fubjeft  to  the  Decificn, 
and  follow  the  ConduCl  of  other  Ads  of  Choice.  And 
therefore  if  the  Will  determines  all  its  own  free  Ads,  then 
every  free  Ad  of  Choice  is  determined  by  a  preceding  Ad 
of  Choice,  chufing  that  Ad.  And  if  that  preceding  Ad  of 
the  Will  or  Choice  be  a!fo  a  free  Ad,  then  by  thefe'  Princi- 
ples, in  this  Ad  too,  the  Will  is  Self-determined ;  that  is, 
this,  in  like  Manner,  is  an  Ad  that  the  Soul  voluntarily  chu- 
fes ;  or  which  is  \h&  fame  Thing,  it  is  an  Ad  determined  ftill 
by  a  preceding  Ad  of  the  Will,  chufing  that.  And  the  like 
may  again  be  obferved  of  the  laft  mentioned  Ad.  Which' 
brings  us  diredly  to  a  Contradiction  :  for  it  fuppofes  an  Act  of 
the  Will  preceding  the  firft  Act  in  the  wl:o!e  Train,  directing 
and  determining  the  reft  ;  or  a  free  Act  of  the  Will,  before 
tbe  firft  free  Act  of  the  Will.  Or  elfe  we  muit  come  at  laft 
to  an  Act  of  the  V7ill,  determining  the  confequent  Acts,  wherein 
the  Will  is  not  felf-determined,  and  fo  is  not  a  free  Act,  in' 
this  Notion  of  Freedom  :  But  if  the  firft  Act  in  the  Train,  de- 
termining and  fixing  the  reft,  be  not  free,  none  of  them  all 
can  be  free  ;  as  is  manifeft  at  firft  View,  but  fhall  be  demon- 
Urated  prefently. 

If  the  Will,  which  we  find  governs  the  Members  of  the 
Body,  and  determines  and  commands  their  Motions  and 
Adions,  docs  alfo  govern  itfelf,  and  determine  its  own  Mo- 
tions and  Acts,  it  doubtlefs  determines  them  the  fame  Way, 
even  by  antecedent  Volitions.  The  Will  determines  which 
Way  the  Hands  and  Feet  fhall  move,  by  an  Act  of  Volition 
or  Choice  :  and  there  is  no  other  Way  of  the  Will's  deter- 
mining, directing  or  commanding  any  Thing  at  all.  Whatfo- 
ever  the  Will  commands,  it  commands  by  an  Act  of  the  Will. 
And  if  it  has  itfelf  under  its  command,  and  determines  it- 
felf in  its  own  Actions,  it  doubtlefs  does  it  the  fame  Way  that 
3t  determines  other  Things  which  are  under  its  Command. 
So  that  if  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  confifts  in  this,  that  it 
has  itfelf  and  its  Own  Actions  under  its  Command  and 
I)irectiori,  and  its  own  Volitions  are  determined  by  itfelf, 
3t  will  follow,  that  every  free  Volition  arifes  from  another  an- 
tecedent Volition,  directing  and  commanding   that :    And  if 

that 


Sect.  I.  Self'deterfnining  Power.  34 

that  dire^li'g  Volition  be  alfo  free,  in  that  alfo  the  Will  Is  de- 
termined ;  that  is  to  fay,  that  directing  Volition  is  deter- 
mined by  another  going  before  that ;  and  fo  on,  'till  we 
come  to  the  firft  Volition  in  the  whole  Series :  And  if  that 
ifirft  Volition  be  free,  and  the  Will  felf-determined  in  it,  then 
that  is  determined  by  another  VoHtion  preceding  that ; 
which  is  a  Contradiction  :  becaufe  by  the  Suppofition,  it  can 
have  none  before  it,  to  direct  or  determine  it,  being  the  firft  in 
the  Train.  But  if  that  firlt  Volition  is  not  determined  by  any 
preceding  Act  of  the  Vv'ill,  then  that  Act  is  not  determined 
by  the  Will,  and  fo  is  not  free  in  the  Arminian  Notion  of 
Freedom,  which  confifts  in  the  Will's  Self-determination. 
And  if  that  firft  Act  of  the  Will,  which  determines  and 
fixes  the  fubfequent  Acts,    be  not  free,    none  of  the  following 

Acts,    which   are  determined  by   itj  can  be   free. If  wd 

fuppofe  there  are  five  Acts  in  the  Train,  the  fifth  and  laft  de- 
termined by  the  fourth,  and  the  fourth  by  the  third,  the  third 
by  the  fecond,  and  the  fecond  by  the  firft  ;  If  the  firft  is  not 
determined  by  the  Will,  and  fo  not  free,  then  none  of  them 
are  truly  determined  by  the  Will  :  that  is,  that  each  of  them 
are  as  they  are,  and  not  othcrwife,  is  not  firft  owing  to  the  Will, 
but  to  the  Determination  of  the  firft  in  the  Series,  which  is  not 
dependent  on  the  Will,  and  is  that  which  the  Will  has  no 
Kand  in  the  Determination  of.  And  this  being  that  which 
decides  what  the  reft  fhall  be,  and  determines  their  Exift- 
ence ;  therefore  the  firft  Determinrttion  of  their  Exiftencc 
is  not  from  the  Will.  The  Cafe  is  juft  the  fame,  if,  inftead 
of  a  Chain  of  five  A(fts  of  the  Will,  we  ftiould  fuppofe  a 
^ucceffion  of  Ten,  or  an  Hundred,  or  ten  Thoufard.  If 
the  firft  Act  be  not  free,  being  determined  by  fomethlnp-  out 
of  the  Will,  and  this  determines  the  next  to  be  agreeable  to 
itfelf,  and  that  the  next,  and  fo  on;  They  are  none  of  them 
free,  but  all  originally  depend  on,  and  are  determind  by 
fome  Caafe  out  of  tlie  Will :  and  fo  all  Freedom  in  the  Cafe 
is  excluded,  and  no  Aft  of  the  Vv'ill  can  be  free,  accordinp- 
to  this  Notion  of  Freedom.  If  we  ftiould  fuppofe  a  long' 
Chain,  often  Thoufand  Links,  fo  conneJxed,  that  if  the  firlt 
Link  moves,  it  will  move  the  next,  and  that  the  next  ;  and  fo 
the  whole  Chain  muft  be  determined  te  Motion,  and  in  the 
Direction  of  its  Motion,  by  the  Motion  of  the  firft  Link  ; 
and  that  is  moved  by  fomething  dfc :  In  this  Cafe,  tho'  all 
the  Links,  but  one,  are  moved  by  other  Parts  ot  the  fame 
Chain ;  yet  it  appears  that  the  Motion  of  no  One,  nor  the 
DiVedion  of  its  Motion,  is  from  any  Self-moving  or  Self- 
determining   Power  in  the  Chain,    any  more   than  if  every 

Link 


35  -^^^^^  Evafions  confidered.  Part  IL 

Link  were  immediately  moved  by  fomething  that  did  not  be- 
long to  the  Chain. If  the  Will  be  not  free  in  the  firft  Aft, 

which  caufes  the  next,  then  neither  is  it  free  in  the  next, 
which  is  caufed  by  that  firft  Aft :  for  tho'  indeed  the  Will 
caufed  it,  yet  it  did  not  caufe  it  freely  ;  becaufe  the  preceding 
Aft,  by  which  it  was  caufed,  was  not  free.  And  again,  if  the 
Will  be  not  free  in  the  fecond  Aft,  fo  neither  can  it  be  in  the 
third,  which  is  caufed  by  that;  becaufe,  in  like  Manner,  that 
third  was  determined  by  an  Aft  of  the  Will  that  was  not  free. 
And  fo  we  may  go  on  to  the  next  Aft,  and  from  that  to  the 
next :  And  how  long  foever  the  Succeffion  of  Afts  is,  it  is  all 
one ;  if  the  firft  on  which  the  whole  Chain  depends,  and 
which  determines  all  the  reft,  be  not  a  free  Aft,  the  Will  is 
not  free  in  caufing  or  determining  any  one  of  thofe  Afts ; 
becaufe  the  Aft  by  which  it  determines  them  all,  is  not  a  free 
Aft ;  and  therefore  the  Will  is  no  more  free  in  determining 

them,  tlian  if  it  did  not  caufe  them  at  all. Thus,  this  Ar- 

minian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  the  Will,  confifiing  in  the  Will's 
Self-deter minatioti,  is  repugnant  to  itfelf,  and  (huts  itfelf  whol- 
ly out  of  the  World. 


Section     II. 

Several  Jup-pojed  Ways    of   evading  the  foregoing 
Reafoning^  confidered. 


I 


F  to  evade  the  Force  of  what  has  been  obferved,  it  fhould 
be  faid,  that  when  the  Arminiaits  fpeak  of  the  Will's  deter- 
mining its  own  Afts,  they  don't  mean  that  the  Will  de- 
termines its  Acts  by  any  preceding  Act,  or  that  one  Act  of 
the  Will  determines  another ;  but  only  that  the  Faculty  or 
Power  of  Will,  or  the  Soul  in  the  Ufe  of  that  Power,  de- 
termines its  own  Volitions ;  and  that  it  does  it  without  any 
Act  going  before  the  Act  determined ;  fuch  an  Evafion  would 

be  full  of  the  moft  grofs  Abfurdity. 1  confefs,  it  is  an  Eva- 

iion  of  my  own  inventing ;  and  I  don't  know  but  I  fhould 
wrong  the  Arminians,  in  fuppofing  that  any  of  them  would 
make  ufe  of  it.  But  it  being  as  good  a  one  as  I  can  invent,  I 
would  obferve  upon  it  a  fev/  Things. 


Seel.  IL         Suppofed  Evafions  confidered.  36 

Firji,  If  the  Faculty  or  Power  of  the  Will  determines  an 
Act  of  Volition,  or  the  Soul  in  the  Ufe  or  Exerci/e  of  that 
Power,  determines  it,  that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  for  the  Soul 
to  determine  Volition  by  an  AB  of  Will.  For  an  Exercife  of 
the  Power  of  Will,  and  an  Aa  of  that  Power,  are  the  fame 
Thing.  Therefore  to  fav,  that  the  Power  of  Will,  or  the 
Soul  in  the  Ufe  or  Exercfe  of  that  Power,  determines  Voli- 
tion, without  an  ^(^  of  Will  preceding  the  Volition  deter- 
mined, is  a  Contradiction. 

Secondly,  If  a  Power  of  Will  determines  the  Act  of  the  Will, 
then  a  Power  of  Chufing  determines  it.  For,  as  was  before 
obfcrved,  in  every  Act  of  Will,  there  is  Choice,  and  a  Power 
of  Willing  is  a  Power  ofChufmg.  But  if  a  Power  of  Chufing. 
determines  the  Act  of  Volition,  it  determines  it  by  Chufing  lU 
For  'tis  raoft  abfurd  to  fay,  that  a  Power  of  Chufing  deter- 
mines one  Thing  rather  than  another,  without  chufing  any 
Thing.  But  if  a  Power  of  Chufing  determines  Volition  by 
chufing  it,  then  here  is  the  Act  of  Volition  determined  by  an 
antecedent  Choice,  chufing  that  Volition. 

Thirdly,  To  fay,  the  Faculty,  or  the  Soul,  determines  its- 
own  Volition,  but  not  by  any  Act,  is  a  Contradiction.  Be- 
caufe  for  the  Soul  to  direH,  decide,  or  determijie  any  Things 
is  to  act ;  and  this  is  fuppofed ;  for  the  Soul  is  here  fpoken 
of  as  being  a  Caufe  in  this  Afi"air,  bringing  fomething  to 
pafs,  or  doing  fomething  ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  ex- 
erting itfelf  in  order  to  an  Eifect.  which  Effect  is  the  Deter- 
mination of  Volition,  or  the  particular  Kind  and  Manner  of 
an  Act  of  Will.  But  certainly,  this  Exertion  or  Action  is 
not  the  fame  with  the  Effect,  in  order  to  the  Production  of 
which  it  is  exerted  ;  but  mull  be  fomething  prior  to  it. 

Again,  The  Advocates  for  this  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of 
the  Will,  fpeak  cf  a  certain  Sovereignty  in  the  W'ill,  whereby 
it  has  Power  to  determine  its  own  Volitions.  And  there- 
fore the  Determination  of  Volition  muft  itfelf  be  an  Act  of  the 
Will ;  for  otherwife  it  can  be  no  Exercife  of  that  fuppofed 
Power  and  Sovereignty. 

Again,  If  the  Will  determines  itfelf,  then  either  the  Wil! 
\%  a£iLve  in  determining  its  Volitions,  or  it  is  not.  If  it  be 
active  in  it,  then  the  Determination  is  an  A£l  of  the  Will  ; 
and  fo  there  is  one  Act  of  the  Will  determining  another. 
But  if  the  Will  is  not  aQ'we  in  the  Determination,  then  liow 

doea 


37  Suppofed  Evafioiis  confidered.         Part  II; 

does  it  exercife  any  Liberty  in  it  ?  Thefe  Gentlemen  fiippofe 
that  the  Thing  wherein  tlic  Will  exerci/es  Liberty,  is  in 
its  determining  its  own  Afts.  But  how  can  this  be,  if 
it  be  not  atiinje  in  determining  ?  Certainly  the  Will,  or 
the  Soul,  can't  exercife  any  Liberty  in  that  wherein  it  don't 
ailf  or  wherein  it  don't  exercijt  itfelf.  So  that  if  either  Fart 
of  this  Dilemma  be  taken,  this  Scheme  of  Liberty,  confiR- 
ing  in  Self-determining  Power,  is  overthrown.  If  there  be 
an  Ail  cf  the  Will  in  determining  all  its  own  free  Ads, 
then  one  free  Aft  of  the  Will  is  determined  by  another  ;  and 
fo  we  have  the  Abfurdity  of  every  free  Aft,  even  the  very 
firft,  determined  by  a  foregoing  free  Aft.  But  if  there  be 
no  Aft  or  Exercife  of  the  Will  in  determining  its  own  Afts, 
then  no  Liberty  is  exercifed  in  determining  them.  From 
•whence  it  follows,  that  no  Liberty  confifts  in  the  W^ill's  Pov.er 
to  determine  its  own  Afti :  Or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing, 
that  there  is  no  fach  Thing  as  Liberty  confiding  in  a  Sdf-de- 
tcrmihing  Power  of  the  Will. 

If  it  (hould  be  faid.  That  altho"  it  be  t-rue,  if  the  Soul  de- 
termines its  own  Volitions,  it  mult  be  attive  in  fo  doing, 
and  the  Determination  itfelf  muft  be  an  Aft ;  yet  there  is 
no  Need  of  fuppofing  this  Aft  to  be  prior  to  the  Volition  de- 
termined ;  But  the  Will  or  Soul  determines  the  Aft  of  the 
"V^Wl  in  W illing ;  It  determines  its  own  Volition,  in  the  very 
Aft  of  Volition ;  It  direfts  and  limits  the  Aft.  of  the  Will, 
caufing  it  to  be  fo  and  not  otherwife,  in  exerting  the  Aft, 
without  any  preceding  Aft  to  exert  that.  If  any  Ihould  fay 
after  this  Manner,  they  muil  mean  one  of  thefe  three  Things : 
Either,  (i.)  That  the  determining  Aft,  tho'  it  be  before  the 
Aft  determined  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  yet  is  not  before  it 
in  the  Order  of  Time.  Or  (2.)  That  the  determining  Aft  is 
not  before  the  Aft  determined,  either  in  the  Order  of  Time 
or  Nature,  nor  is  truly  diftinft  from  it ;  But  that  the  Soul's 
determining  the  Aft  of  Volition  is  the  fame  Thing  with  its 
exerting  the  Aft  of  Volition  :  The  Mind's  exerting  fuch  a 
particular  Aft,  is  its  caufing  and  determining  the  Aft.  Or, 
(3.)  That  Volition  has  no  Caufe,  and  is  no  EfFeft  ;  but 
comes  into  Exiftence,  with  fuch  a  particular  Determination, 
without  any  Ground  or  Reafon  of  its  Exiftence  and  Determi- 
nation.  1  fliall  confidcr  thefe  diilinftly. 

( I.)  If  all  that  is  meant,  be,  that  the  determining  Aft  is 
not  before  the  Aft  determined  in  Order  of  Time,  it  will  not 
help  the  Cafe  at  all,  tho'  it  ftiould  be  aliovvcd.     If  it  be  be- 
fore 


Sect.  IL       Suppofed  Evafions  con/Idered.  38 

fore  the  determin'd  Aft  in.  the  Order  of  Nature,  being  tha 
Caufe  or  Ground  of  ivs  Exiftence,  this  as  much  proves  it  to 
lie  dillin>ft  from  it,  and  independent  on  it,  as  if  it  were  be- 
fore in  the  Order  of  Time.  As  the  Caufe  of  the  particular 
Motion  of  a  natural  Body  ia  a  certain  Diredlion,  may  have 
no  Dillance  as  to  Time,  yet  can't  be  the  fame  with  the  Mo- 
tion effefted  by  it,  but  muft  be  as  diftin<fl  from  it,  as  any 
other  Caufe,  that  is  before  its  EfFeft  in  the  Order  of  Time : 
as  the  ArchitecT:  is  diftinft  from  the  Houfe  which  he  builds, 
or  the  Father  diftlnft  from  the  Son  which  he  begets.  And  if 
the  Ad  ef  the  Will  determining  be  diftinft  from  the  Acl  de- 
tcrrhined,  and  before  it  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  then  we  can 
go  back  from  one  to  another,  'till  we  come  to  the  firft  in  the 
teries,  which  has  no  Act  of  the  Will  before  it,  in  the  Order 
ol  Nature,  determining  it ;  and  confequeiilly  is  an  A<X  noC 
deterrnined  by  the  Will,  and  fo  not  a  free  Ad,  in  this  Notion 
of  Freedom.  And  tliis  being  the  Act  which  determines  all 
the  reft,  none  of  them  are  htt  Acts.  As  when  there  is  a 
Chain  of  many  Links,  the  lirft  of  whi-ch  only  it  taken  hold 
of  and  drawn  by  Hand  ;  all  the  reft  may  follow  and  be  mov- 
ed at  the  fame  Inftant,  without  any  Difxance  of  Time;  but 
vet  the  Motion  of  one  Link  is  before  that  of  another  in  the" 
Order  of  Nature ;  the  laft  is  moved  by  the  next,  and  that 
by  the  next,  and  fo  "till  wc  come  to  the  firft ;  which  not 
being  moved  by  any  other,  but  by  fomething  diftinct  from 
the  whole  Chain,  this  as  much  proves  that  no  Part  is  moved 
by  any  Scif-moving  Power  in  the  Chain,  as  it  the  Motion 
cf  one  Link  followed  that  of  another  in  the  Order  of  Time. 

(2.}  If  any  ftiould  fay,  that  the  determining  Act  is  not  be- 
fore the  determined  Act,  either  in  the  Order  of  Time,  or  of 
Nature,  nor  is  diftinct  from  it;  but  that  the  £;c^r//aK  of  the 
Act  is  the  Determinatrjn  of  the  Act;  That  for  the  Soul  to 
exert  a  particular  Volition,  is  for  it  to  caufe  and  determine 
that  Act  of  Volition :  I  would  on  this  obferve,  that  the 
Thing  in  Qaeftion  feems  to  be  forgotten,  or  kept  out  of 
Sight,  in  a  Darknefs  and  Unintelligiblenefs  of  Speech;  un- 
leis  fuch  an  Objector  would  mean  to  contradict  hirrifelf.  The 
very  Act  of  Volition  itfelf  is  doubtlefs  a  Determination  of 
Mind  ;  i.  e.  it  is  the  Mind's  drawing  up  a  Conclafion,  or 
coming  to  a  Choice  between  two  Things,  or  more,  propofed 
to  it.  But  determining  among  external  Ohje£is  of  Choice,  is 
not  the  fame  with  determining  the  Ad  of  Choice  itfelf,  among 
Various  poffible  Acts  of  Choice.  The  Queftion  is,  V/hat 
influences,  directs,  or  determines  the  Mind  or  \Vill  to  coir.e 

G  |o 


5^         Suppofed  tvafions  cmftdered-  Part  !!„ 

*fe'  fuch  a  Conclufion  or  Choice  as  it  does  ?  or  v/hat  is  the 
Caufe,  Ground  or  Pvcafon,  why  it  concludes  thus,  and  not 
qtherwiie  ?  Now  it  muft  be  anfwered,  according  to  the  Armivian 
Notion  of  Freed()m,  that  the  Will,  influences,  orders  and 
<Jetermines  itielf  thus  to  A£t.  And  if  it  does,  I  fay,  it  muft 
lie  by  fome  antecedent  Ac'l,  To  fay,  it  is  caufsd,  influenced 
and  determined  by  foraething,  and  yet  not  determined  by  any 
Thing  antecedent,  either  in  Order  of  Time  or  Nature,  is  a 
Contradiction.  For  that  is  what  is  meant  by  a  Thing's  be- 
ing prior  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  that  it  is  fome  Way  the 
Caufe  or  Reafon  of  the  Thing,,  with  Refpeft  to  which  it  is 
llid  to  be  prior. 

If  the  particular  KfX  or  Exertion'  of  Will,  vvhich  comes ' 
into  Exifience,  be  any  Thing  properly  determined  at  all,  then  it 
Bas  fome  Canfe  of  its  exiiting,  and  of  its  exifting  in  fueh  a 
particular  determinate  Manner,  and  not  another;  fome 
Caufe,  whofe  Influence  decides  the  Matter:  which  Caufe  is 
diftinft  from  the  EfFeft,  and  prior  to  it.  But  to  fay,  that  the 
Will  or  Mind  orders,  influences  and  determines  itfelfto  ex- 
ert fuch  an  Afl  a?  it  does,  by  the  very  Exertion  itfelf,  is  to 
make  the  Exertion  both  Caufe  and  EflTeft ;  or  the  exerting  fuch 
an  Adt,  to  be  a  Caufe  of  the  Exertion  of  fuch  an  Aft.  For 
the  Queftion  is.  What  is  theCaufe  and  Reafon  of  the  Soul's 
exerting  fuch  an- Act?  To  which  the  Anfwer  is,  the  Soul  ex- 
erts fuch  an  Act,  and  that  is  the  Caufe  of  it.  And  fo,  by  this, 
the  Exertion  mcfl:  be  prior  in  the  Order  of  Nature  to  itfelf, 
aad  diftinct  from  itfelf 

(5,)  If  the  Meaning  be,  that  the  Soul^s  Exertion  of  fuch 
a- particular  Act  of  will,  is  a  Thing  that  comes  to  pafs  of  it- 
felf, without  any  Caufe;  and  that  there  is  abfolutely  no 
Ground  or  Reafon  of 'the  Soul's  being  determined  to  exert 
fuch  a  Volition,  aiid  make  fuch  a  Choice,  rather  than  ano- 
ther; I  f^v,  if  this  be  the  Meaning  of  Arminians,  when  they 
contend  fo  earneftly  foe  the  Will's  determining  its  own  ActS;. 
and  for  Liberty  of -Will  confifting  in  Self-deterraining  Power  y 
they  do  nothing  but  confound  Themfelves  and  others  with 
Words  without  a  Meaning..  In  the  Q«eftion,  What- determines 
the  Will?  and  in  their  Anfwer,  .  that  the  Will  determines  itfelf^- 
and  in  all  the  Difpute  about  it,  it  feems  to  be  taken  for  grant- 
ed, that  foniething  determines  the' Will ;  and  the  Controverfy: 
on  this  head  is  not,  whether  any  Thing  at  all  determines  it^ 
or  whether  its  Determination  has  any  Caufe  or  Foundatiorx. 
aJ^all;  but  where- the  Foundation  of  it  is,    whether  in  the 

Will- 


Seel.  11.       Suppofed  Evafions  confidered.  ^ 

Will  itfelf,  or  fomewhere  elfe.  But  if  the  Thing  intended 
be  what  is  above  mention'd,  then  all  comes  to  this,  that  No-. 
•thing  at  al!  determines  the  Will ;  Volition  having  abfolutely 
no  Caufe  or  Foundation  of  its  Exiftencc,  either  within,  or  with- 
out. There  is  a  great  Noife  made  about  Self-determining 
Fewer,  as  the  Source  of  all  free  Acts  of  the  Will :  But  when, 
the  Matter  comes  to  be  explained,  the  Meaning  is,  that  no 
Power  at  all  is  the  Source  of  thefe  Acts,  neither  Self-deter- 
mining Power,  nor  any  other,  but  they  arife  from  Nothing  3 
no  Caufe,  no  Povi^er,  no  Influence^  being  at  iili  concern'd  in 
•the  Matter. 

However,  this  very  Thing,  even  that  th;  ^free  Acte  of  the 
Will  are  Events  which  come  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe,  is  cer- 
•tainly  implied  in  tlie  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will ;  thd' 
it  be  very  inconfiftent  with  many  other  Things  in  their 
Scheme,  and  repugnant  to  fome  Things  implied  in  their  No- 
tion of  Liberty.  Their  Opinion  implies,  that  the  particular 
Determination  of  Volition  is  without  any  Caufe  j  becaufe 
they  hold  the  free  Acts  of  the  Vv^ill  to  be  Cantingerj  Events ; 
and  Contingence  is  effential  to  Freedom  in  their  Notion  of  it. 
■But  certainly,  thofe  Things  which  have  a  prior  Ground  and 
Reafon  ot  their  particular  Exigence,  a  Caufe  whicli  antece- 
dently determines  them  to  be,  and  determines  them  to  be  juit 
as  they  are,  don't  happen  contingently.  If  fomething  forego- 
ing, by  a  caufal  Influence  and  Connection,  determines  and- 
fixes  precisely  their  coming  to  pafs,  and  the  Manner  of  it,  thea 
it  don't  reraaiu , a  contingent  Thing  whether  they  fball  come  ta> 
pafs  or  no. 

And  becaufe  it  is  a  Queftion,  in  mfiny  Refpects,  very  im- 
portant in  this  Controverfy  about  the  Freedom  of  Will^ 
Whether  the  free  AJIs  of  the  Will  are  E'vents  ^which  come  to  pafs 
nxiithout  a  Caife?  I  ftall  be  parti,:;uiar  v^  exaroining  this  Paint 
in  the  two  following  Sectiona, 


.4„|..f4....f.4..H-4--f-H"4-i--f-i-4-4-f-r4-fT'^ 


$8TT101l 


4l  ^0  Event  without  a  Cauje.         Part  II. 

^»oo#a9Si#3S8o||aooe#oooo^o3oe^o»op^MOo||^-oooo^l^oo||,:3iooo^o»(»s;4o3o,-^jooo^i 

Section     III. 

Whether  any   Eveitt  wbatfjcvery    and  VolitioA    in, 
■  particular^  can  come  to  paj's  without  a  Caufe  of- 
its  Exifience:  ■ 

BEFORE,!  enter  on  an  Argument  on  tins  Subject,  I 
would  explain  how  I  would  be  underftood,  when  I 
life  the  Word  Caufe  in  this  Difcourfe  :  fince,  for  want  of  a. 
better  Word,  I  fflall  have  Occafion  to  ufe  it  In  a  Senfe  which' 
is  more  extenfive,  than  that  in  y/hich  it  is  Sometimes  ufed. 
The  Word  is  often  ufed  in  fo  reflrained  a  Senfe  as  to  fignify' 
only  that  which  has  a  pojiti'v?  Efficienry'ox  Influence  to  produce 
a  Thing,  or  bring  it  to  pafs.  But  there  are  many  Things 
which  have  no  fuch  pofitive  productive  Inanence;  which  yet 
are  Caufes  in  that  Refpect,  that  they  have  truly  the  Nature 
of  a  pround  or  Reafoh  why  fome  Things  are,  rather  than 
others ;  or  why  they  are  as  they  are,  rather  than  othervvife. 
Thus  the  Abfence  of  the  Sun  in  the  Night,  is  not  the  Caufe 
of  the  failing  of  the  Dew  at  that  Time,  in  the  fame  Manner 
as  its  Beams  are  the  Caufe  of  the  Afcending  of  the  Vapours 
in  the  Day-time ;  and  its  Withdrawment  in  the  Winter,  ia 
3iot  in  the  fame  Manner  the  Caufe  of  the  Freezing  of  the' 
Waters,  as  its  Approach  in  the  Spring  is  the  Caufe  of  their' 
Thawing  :  But  yet  the  Withdrawment  or  Abfence  of  the 
Sun  is  an  Antecedent,  with  which  thefe  Effects  in  the  Night 
and  Winter  are  connected,  and  on  which  they  depend  ;  and 
is  one  Thing  that  belongs  to  the  Ground  and  Reafon  why 
they  come  to  pafs  at  that  Time,  rather  than  at  other  Times  ; 
tho'  the  Abfence  of  the  Sun  is  Nothing  pofitive,  nor  has 
any  pofitive  Influence. 

tt  may  be  further  obferved,  that  when  I  fpeak  of  CnitneHion 
of  Carfes  and  Effe^s,  I  have  Refpect  to  moral  Caufes,  as  well 
ar,  thofe  that  arc  called  natural  in  DiHinction  ficni  them. 
Moral  Caufes  may  be  Caufes  in  as  proper  a  Senfe,  as  any 
Caufes  whatfocver ;  may  have  as  real  an  Influence,  and  may 
as  truly  be  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of  an  Event's  coming  tp 
pafs. 

Therefore  I  fometimes  ufc  the  Word  Caufe,  in  this  Inquiry, 
to  fignify  any  Antecedent,  either  natural  or  moral,  pofitive  or 

negative. 


§e'5:.  III.         No  Event  without  a  Caufe.  42 

negntive,  on  v.-hich  an  Event,  either  a  Thing,  or  the  Mariner 
and  Circumftance  of  a  Thing,  fo  depends,  that  it  is  the 
Ground  and  Reafon,  either  in  Whole,  or  in  Part,  why  it  is, 
rather  than  not ;  or  why  it  is  as  it  is,  rather  than  otherwife : 
Or,  in  other  Words,  any  Antecedent  ^vith  which  a  confequent 
Ei^ent  is  fo  connefted,  that  it  truly  belongs  to  the  Reafon 
why  the  Propofition  which  affirms  that  Event,  is  true ;  whe- 
ther it  has  any  pofitive  Influence,  or  not.  And  In  an  Agreca- 
blenefs  to  this,  I  fometimes  ufe  the  Word  Effeil,  for  the 
Confequence  of  another  Thing,  which  is  perhaps  rather  an 
Occafion  than  a  Caufe,  moft  properly  fpcaking. 

I  am  the  more  careful  thus  to  explain  my  Meaning,  that  I 
^ay  cut  off  Occafion,  from  any  that  might  feek  Occafion  to 
cavfl  and  objed  againft  fome  Things  which  I  may  fay  con- 
cerning the  Dependance  of  all  Things  which  come  to  pafs, 
on  fome  Caufe,  and  their  Connedlicn  M'ith  their  Caufe. 

Having  thus  exphin'd  what  I  mean  by  Caufe,  I  affert,  that 
Nothing  ever  comes  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe.  What  is  Self- 
exif!ent  mufl  be  from  Eternity,  and  mufl  be  unchangeable : 
But  as  to  all  Things  that  begin  to  be,  they  are  not  bclf-ex- 
ritent,  and  therefore  mufl  have  fome  Foundation  of  their  Ex- 
i■ft;^!nce  without  themfelves. — That  v/hatfoever  begins  to  be, 
ivhich  before  was  not,  mufl  have  a  Caufe  why  it  then  begins  to' 
exift,  feems  to  be  the  firft  Didlate'of  the  common  and  natural 
vSenfe  which  God  hath  implanted  in  the  Minds  of  all 
Mankind,  and  the  main  Foundation  of  all  our  Reafonino-s 
about  the  Exiflence  of  Things,  pafl,  prefent,  or  to  come. 

And  this  Dictate  of  common  Senfe  equally  refpccts  Sub- 
ftances  and  Modes,  or  Things  and  the  Manner  and  Circum- 
liances  of  Things.  Thus,  if  we  fee  a  Body  which  has  hither- 
to been  at  Refl,  ftart  out  of  a  State  of  Refl,  and  begin 
to  move,  v/e  do  as  naturally  and  neceffarily  fuppofe  there  is 
fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  this  new  Mode  of  Exiflence,  as 
of  the  Exiflence  of  a  Body  itfelf  which  had  hitherto  not 
exifled.  And  fo  if  a  Body,  which  had  hitherto  moved  in  a 
certain  Direction,  fhould  fuddenly  change  the  Direction  of 
its  Motion;  or  if  it  fliculd  put  off  its  old  Figure,  and  take 
a  new  one  ;  or  change  its  Colour ;  the  Beginning  of  thefe 
new  Modes  is  a  new  Event,  and  the  Mind  of  Mankind 
seceflTarily  fuppofes  that  there  is  fome  Caufe  or  Reafon 
of  them.  • 


43  ^'^0  Event  without  a  Cauje.  Part  IL 

If  this  grand  Principle  of  common  Senfe  be  taken  away,  aU 
Arguing  from  Effects  to  Caufes  ceafethj  and  fo  all  Knowledge  of 
any  Exiltence,  bef.des  what  we  have  by  the  moft  direct  and 
immediate  Intuition.  Particularly  all  our  Proof  of  the  Being 
of  God  ceafes :  We  argue  his  Being  from  our  own  Being, 
and  the  Being  of  other  Things,  which  we  are  fenfible  once 
were  not,  but  have  begun  to  be  ;  and  from  the  Being  of  the 
World,  with  all  its  conftituent  Parts,  and  the  Manner  of 
their  Exiftence ;  all  which  we  fee  plainly  are  not  necefTary  ia 
their  own  Nature,  and  fo  not  Self-exiltent,  and  therefore 
muft  have  a  Caufe.  But  if  Things,  not  in  themfeh^es  ne- 
cefl'ary,  may  begin  to  be  without  a  Caufe,  all  this  arguing  is 
vain.. 

Indeed,  I  will  not  affirm,  that  there  is  in  the  Nature  of 
*rhings  no  Foundation  for  the  Knowledge  of  the  Being  of 
God  without  any  Evidence  of  it  from  his  Works.  I  do  fup- 
pofe  there  is  a  great  Abfurdity,  in  the  Nature  of  Things  {im- 
ply confidered,  in  fuppofing  that  there  thould  be  no  God, 
or  in  denying  Being  in  general,  and  fuppofing  an  eternal^ 
abfolute,  univerfal  Nothing  :  And  therefore  that  here  would 
be  Foundation  of  intuitive  Evidence  that  it  cannot  be,  and 
that  eternal  infinite  moft  perfect  Being  muft  be  ;  if  wc  had 
Strength  and  Comprehenfion  of  Mind  fufficient,  to  have  » 
clear  Idea  of  general  and  univerfal  Being,  or,  which  ie 
the  fame  Thing,  of  the  infinite,  eternal,  moft  perfect  di- 
vine Nature  and  EfTence.  But  then  we  (hould  not  properly 
come  to  the  Knowledge  of  the  Being  of  God  by  arguing  ; 
but  our  Evidence  would  be  intuitive  :  W^e  fhould  f(*e  it,  as 
■we  fee  other  Things  that  are  necefTary  in  themfeives,  the 
Contraries  of  which  are  in  their  own  Nature  abfurd  and  con- 
tradictory ;  as  we  fee  that  twice  two  is  four ;  and  as  wc  fee 
that  a  Circle  has  no  Angles.  If  we  had  as  clear  an  Idea  of 
aniverfal  infinite  Entity,  as  we  have  of  thefe  other  Things,  I 
fuppofe  we  fhould  moft  intuitively  fee  the  Abfurdity  of  fuppof- 
ing fuch  Being  not  to  be  ;  fhould  immediately  fee  there 
is  no  Room  for  tlie ,  Queftion,  whether  it  is  poifible  -that 
Eeing,  in  the  moft  general  abftrafted  Notion  of  it,  fhould 
not  be.  But  we  have  not  that  Strength  and  Extent  of  Mind, 
to  know  this  certainly  in  this  intuitive  independent  Man- 
ner :  But  the  Way  that  Mankind  come  to  tbe  Knowledge  of 
the  Being  of  God,  is  that  which  the  Apoftle  fpeaks  of,  Rom, 
i.  2Q-  The  in'vijible  Things  of  Him,  from  the  Creation  of  the  Worlds 
are  clearly  ft  en;  being  underfiood  by  the  Things  that  are  made;  even, 
itii  eternal  Power  atfd  Godhead,     We  firji  afcend,  and  prove  a 

Po^erisri^ 


Sedt.  III.        Mb  Even!  witBout  a  Caufe.  ^^ 

Pojieriori,  or  from  EfFeds,  that  there  muft  be  an  eternal- 
Caufe  J  and  t\ie.n  /tcondly,  prove  by  Argumentation,  not  In- 
tuition, that  this  Being  muft  be  neceflarily  exiftent ;  and 
then  thirdly y  from  the  proved  Neceflity  of  his  Exiftence^  wG 
may  dejcend,   and  prove  many  of  his  Perfeftions  a  Priori. 

But  if  once  this  grand  Principle  of  common  Senfe  be  given 
up,  \S\2X  mokat  is  not  neceffary  171  itfelf,  Tnuji  ha'ue  a  Caufe  ;  and 
we  begin  to  maintain,  that  Things  may  come  into  Exiitence, 
and  begin  to  be,' which  heretofore  have  not  been,  of  them- 
fclves,  without  any  Caiife ;  all  our  Means  of  afcending  in 
our  arguing  from  the  Creature  to  the  Creator,  and  all  our- 
Evidence  of  the  Being  of  God,  is  cut  off  at  one  Blow.  In 
this  Cafe,  we  can't  prove  that  there  is  a  God,  either  from 
the  Being  of  the  World,  and  the  Creatures  in  it,  or  from  the 
Manner  of  their  Being,  their  Order,  Beauty  and  Ufe.  For 
if  Things  may  come  into  Exiftence  without  any  Caufe  at  all^ 
then  they  doubtlefs  may  without  any  Caufe  anfwerable  to  the 
Effect.  Our  Minds  do  alike  naturall}-  fuppofe  and  determine 
both  thefe  Things ;  namely,  that  what  begins  to  be  has  a 
Caufe,  and  aifo  that  it  has  a  Caufe  proportionable  and 
agreeable  to  the  Effedt.  The  fame  Principle  which  leads  us  to 
dietermine,  that  there  cannot  be  an.y  Thing  coming  to  par<» 
without  a  Caufe,  leads  us  to  determine  that  there  cannot  be 
more  in  the  Effeft  than  in  the  Caufe. 

Yea,  if  once  it  fhould  be  allowed,  that  Things  may  come 
to  pafs  without  a  Caufe,  we  ihould  not  only  have  no  Proof 
of  the  Being  of  God,  but  we  fhould  be  without  Evidence  of 
the  Exiftence  of  any  Thing  whatfoever,  but  our  own  imme- 
diately prefent  Ideas  and  Confcioufnefs^  For  we  have  no 
Way  to  prove  any  Thing  elfe,  but  by  arguing,  from  Effefts 
to  Caufes :  from  the  Ideas  now  immediately  in  View,  we  ar- 
gue other  Things  not  immediately  in  View  :  from  SenfationS 
now  excited  in  us,  we  infer  the  Exiftence  of  Things  without: 
lis,  as  the  Caufes  of  thcfe  Senfations :  And  from  the  Ex- 
iftence of  thefe  Things,  we  argue  other  Things,  which  they 
depend  on,  as  Effefis  on  Caufes.  We  infer  the  pafl:  Exift- 
ence of  our  Selves,  or  any  Thing  elfe,  by  Memory ;  only 
as  we  argue,  that  the  Ideas,  which  are  now  in  our  Minds,. 
are  the  Confequcnces  of  paft  Ideas  and  Senfations,  We  im- 
mediately perceive  nothing  elfe  but  the  Ideas  which  are  this 
Moment  extant  in  our  Minds.  We  perceive  or  knov/  other 
Things  only  by  Means  of  tlwfe,,  as  xieceffarily  conne(5led  with' 

others. 


45  ■A'o  Event  without  a  Cauje,  Part  1.1, 

others,  and  dependent  on  them.  But  if  Things  may  be 
without  Caufes,  all  this,  necefiary  Connexion  and  Depen- 
dence is  diflblved,  and  fo  all  Means  of  our  Knowledge  is 
gone.  If  there  be  no  Abfurdity  or  Difficulty  in  fuppofing 
one  Thing  to  ft'art  out  of  Non-Exiftence,  into  Being,  of  it- 
feH"  without  a  Caufe  ;  then  there  is  no  Abfurdity  or  Difficulty  ' 
in  fuppofing  the  fame  of  Millions  of  Millions.  For  Nothing, 
oi"  no  Difficulty  Multiplied,  ftill  is  Nothing,  or  no  Difficulty  : 
Nothing  multiplied  by  Nothing  don't  increafe  ths  Sum. 

And  indeed,  according  to  the  Hypothecs  I  am  oppoling, 
of  the  Acts  of  the  Will  coming  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe,  it 
is  the  Cafe  in  Fact,  that  Millions  of  Millions  of  Events  are 
continually  coming  into  Exiftence  Cojitingently,  without  any 
Caufe  or  Reafon  why  they  do  fo,  all  over  the  World,  every 
Day  and  Hoiir,  thro'  all  Ages.  So  it  is  in  a  coattant  Suc- 
cefSon,  in  every  niorai  Agent.'  This  .Contingency,  this 
efficient  Nothing,  this  efFedual  No-Caufe,  is  always  ready 
at  Hand,  to  produce  this  Sort  of  Effeds,  as  long  as  the 
Agent  exifts,  and  as  often  as  \\t  has  Cccafion. 

If  it  were  fo,  that  Things  only  of  one  Kind,  f/z.  Ads  of 
the  Will,  feem'd  to  come  to  pafs  of  Themfelves  ;  but  thofe 
of  this  Sort  in  general  came  into  Being  thus ;  and  it  were 
an  Event  that  was  continual,  and  that  happen'd  in  a  Cburfe, 
wherever  were  capable  Subjefiis  of  fuch  Events ;  this  very 
Thing  would  demonitrate  that  there  was  fome  Caufe  of  them, 
which  made  fuch  a  Difference  between  this  Event  and  others, 
and  that  they  did  not  really  happen  contingently.  For  Con- 
tingence  is  blind,  and  does  not  pick  and  choofe  for  a  particu- 
lar Sort  of  Events.  Nothing  has  no  Choice.  This  No-Caufe, 
which  caufes  no  Exiftence,  can't  caufe  the  Exiftence  which 
comes  to  pafs,  to  be  of  one  particular  Sort  only,  dlftinguifh'd 
from  all  others.  Thus,  that  only  one  Sort  of  Matter  drops 
out  of  the  Heavens,  even  Water,  and  that  this  comes  fo 
often,  fo  conftantly  and  plentifully,  all  over  the  World,  in  all 
Ages,  fhows  that  there  is  fome  Caufe  or  R-eafon  of  the  falling 
of  Water  out  of  the  Heavens ;  and  that  fomething  befides 
mere  Contingence  has  a  Hand  in  the  Matter. 

■  If  wc  Ihould  fuppofe  Non-entity  to  be  about  to  bring  forth; 
and  Things  were  coming  into  Exiftence,  without  any  Caufe 
or  Antecedent,  on  which  the  Exiftence,  or  Kind  or  Manner 
of  Exifter;cc  depends ;  or  which  could  at  all  determine  whe- 
ther the  Things  fnould  be.    Stones,   or  Stars,   or  Beafts,    or 

Angels, 


Scci.  III.     Voiicicii  arifes  not  without  a  Capfe.     46 

Ancrels,  or  human  Bodies,  or  Souls,  or  only  feme  ne;v/  Mo- 
tion or  Figure  iii  natural  Bodies,  or  feme  nev/  Senfations  iri 
Animals,  or  new  Ideas  in  the  human  Underftaning,  or  new 
Voiitioos  in  the  Will ;  or  any  Thing  elfe  of  all  the  infinite 
Number  of  Poffibies  ;  then  certainly  it  would  not  be  expect- 
ed, altho'  many  Millions  of  Millions  of  Things  are 
coming  into. Exiitence  in  this  Manner^  all  ov^r  the  Face  of 
the  Earth,  that  they  fhould  all  be  only  of  one  particular 
Kind,  and  that  it  fhould  be  thus  in  all  Ages,  .and  that  this 
Sort  of  Exiftences  Ibould  never  fail  to  come  10  pafs  where 
there  is  Room  for  them,  or  a  Subjeft  capable  of  them,  and 
that  conftantly,  whenever  there  is  Occafion  for  them. 

if  any  (hould  imagine,  there  is  fomething  in  the  Sort  of 
Event  that  renders  it  poffible  for  it  to  come  into  Exiftence 
without  a  Caufe  ;  and  fhould  fay,  that  the  free  Afls  of  the 
Will  are  Exiiiences  of  an  exceeding  different  Nature  from 
other  Thing;; ;  by  Reafcn  of  which  they  may  come  into  Ex- 
iftence without  any  previous  Ground  or  Reafon  of  it,  tho* 
other  Things  cannot ;  If  they  make  this  Objedxion  in  good 
Earneft,  it  would  be  an  Evidence  of  their  itrangeiy  forget- 
ting themfelves :  For  they  would  be  giving  an  Account  of 
fome  Ground  of  the  Exifter.ce  of  a  Thing,  when  at  the  fame 
Time  they  ■yvould  maintain  there  is  no  Ground  of  its  Exift- 
ence. Therefore  I  would  obferve,  that  the  particular  Nature 
pf  Exiftence,  be  it  never  fo  diverfe  from  others,  tan  lay  no 
Foundation  for  that  Thing's  coming  into  Exiftence  without  a 
Caufe;  becaafe  to  fuppofe  this,  would  be  to  fuppofe  the 
particular  Nature  oi  Exigence  to  be  a  Thing  prior  to  the 
Exiftence ;  and  fo  a  Thing  ^yhich  makfes  V^ay  for  Exift- 
ence, with  fuch  a  Circumftance,  namely  va:hout  a  Caufe  or 
Reafori  of  Exiftence.  But  that  which  in  any  RefpecTt  makes 
Way  for  a  Thing's  coming  into  Being,  or  for  any  Manner 
pr  Circumftance  of  its  tirft  Exiftence,  muft  be  prior  to  the 
Exiftence.  The  diftinguifh'd  Nature  of  the  ElFeft,  which 
is  fomething  belonging  to  the  Effed,  can't  have  Influence 
backward,  to  aft  before  it  is.  The  peculiar  Nature  of  thac 
Thing  called  Volition,  can  do  Nothmg,  can  have  no  Influ- 
ence, while  it  is  not.  And  afterwards  it  is  too  late  for  its 
Influence :  for  then  the  Thing  has  made  furc  of  Exiftence 
already,   without  its  Help. 

So  that  it  is  indeed  as  repugnant  to  Reafon,  to  fuppofe 
that  an  Aft  of  the  Will  fnould  come  into  Exiftence  withoi^t 
a  Caufe,    ?.s  to  fuppofe  the  human  Soul,    or  an  Angel,    qr 

H  tlie 


4^'      ^'olition-arifes  not  without  a  Cauje.     "j^art  M- 

rtie  Globe  of  the  Earth,  or  the  whole  Univerfe,  fhould  come 
into  Exiftence  without  a  Caufe;  And  if  once  we  allow,  that 
fuch  a  Sort  of  Effect  as  a  Volition  rhay  come  to  pafs  without 
a  Caufe,' how  do  we  know  but  that  many  other  Sorts  of 
Effefts  may  do  fo  too  ?  'Tis  not  the  particular  Kind  of  Effect 
that  makes  the  Abfurdify  of  fuppofmg  it  has  Being  without  a 
Caufe,  bui:  fomething  which  is  common  to  all  Things  that  ever 
begin  to  be,  n^iz.  that  they  are  not  Self-exiftent,  or  neceffary 
in  tha  Nature  of  ThingSo 

-.^osoo(»occioce(»eoocooaocoo<50Poooeoooi!oooo«S«Pecasoto9oeoooeoeecoo«ro3a«o9oco3ocaeoe«& 


Section     IV. 

Whether  Volition  can  arife  without  a  Caufcy  through 
the  Adlivity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul. 

'HE  Author  of  the  Effay  on  the  Freedom  cf  the  Will  in 
God  mid  the  Creatures,  in  Anfwer  to  that  Objeftion 
againll  his  DoClHne  of  a  Self-determining  Power  in  thcr 
will,  (P.  68, 69.)  ^hai  Nothing  is,  or  comes  to pnfs,  njjithoiit afiiffici' 
eni  Rep/on  nxhy  it  is,  and  tvhy  it  is  in  this  Manner  rather  tha-.i 
another,  allows  that  it  is  thus  in  corporeal  Things,  nvhich  are 
ffoperly  and  fhilofofhically  fpeaJang  pajf,n)e  Beings ;  but  denies 
That  it  is  thus  in  iS^/rJ/j,  nxihich  are  Beings  of  an  nSi've  Nature, 
njoho  ha-ve  the  Sprin';^  of  AH  ion  'Vjiihin  themjel'ves,  end  can  deter- 
mine themj'el-ucs.  By  which  it  is  plainly  fiippoftd,  that  fuch  an 
Event  as  an  Afl  of  the  Will,  may  come  to  pafs  in  a  Spirit,  with- 
out a  fufficient  Reafon  why  it  comes  to  pafs,  or  why  it  is  after 
this  Manner,  rather  than  another ;  by  Reafon  of  the  Adtivitr 

of  the  Nature  of  a  Spirit. But  certainly  this  Author,  in 

this' Matter,  mufl:  be  ■very  unwary  and  inadvertent.     For, 

■''  i.'Tfie  Objeiftion  or  DifEctilty  propofed  by  this  Author, 
leems  to  be  forgotten  in  his  Anfwer  or  Solution.  The  very 
5)ifficulty,  as  he  himfelf  propofes  it,  is  this ;  How  an  Eveni 
Can  come  to  pafs  ^without  afjifficient  Reafon  n.vhy  it  is,  or  nvhy  it 
is  in  this  Manner  rather  than  another?  Inftead  of  folving  this 
pifficulty,  or  anfwering  this  Queftion  with  Regard  to  Voli- 
tion, as  he  propofes,  he  forgets  himfelf,  and  anfwers  ano- 
ther Qucflion  quite  diverfc,  and  wholly  inconfiftent  witii 
^hisr,  'v/s;.  What  is  a  fufficient  Rep-fon  why  it  is,  and  why  it  h 

in- 


Se6t.  IV.      Volition  not  "jcithout  a  Caiifcy  Scc      4-8 

in  this  Manner  rather  than  another?  And  he  afligns  the 
Aflive  Being's  own  Determination  as  the  Caufe,  and  a 
Caufe  fufficient  for  the  Eftefi:;  and  leaves  all  the  Difficulty 
ynrefolved,  and  the  Quefticn  unanrwered,  which  yet  returns, 
even.  How  the  Soul's  own  Determination,  which  he  fpeaks 
of,  cara2  to  exift,  and  to  be  what  it  was  without  a  Caufe  ? 
The  Activity  of  the  Soul  may  enable  it  to  be  the  Caufe  of 
EfFefts;  but  it  don't  at  all  enable  or  help  it  to  be  the  Sub- 
jeft  of  EfFefts  which  have  no  Caufe ;  which  is  the  Thiijg 
this  Author  fuppofes  concerning  Ads  of  the  Will.  Aftiviiy 
of  Nature  will  no  more  enable  a  Being  to  produce  Efiefts, 
and  determine  the  Manner  of  their  Exigence,  n.':itki?i  itfelf, 
without  a  Caufe,  than  mt  of  itfelf,  in  fome  other  Being. 
But  if  an  adtive  Being  Ihould,  through  its  Aftivity,  produce 
and  determine  an  EfFeft  in  fome  external  Objeft,  how  abfurd 
would  it  be  to  fay,  that  the  EfFed  was.produced  withgut  a  Caufe  \ 

2.  The  Queftion  is  not  fo  much.  How  a  Spirit  endowed 
-vith  Aiftivity  comes  to  aft:,  as  why  it  exerts  fuch  an  Aft, 
and  not  another ;  or  why  it  afls  with  fuch  a  particular  De- 
termination ?  If  Adlivity  of  Nature  be  the  Caufe  why  a  Spirit 
(the  Soul  of  Man  for  Infcance)  afts,  and  don't  lie  ftill ;  yet 
that  alone  is  not  the  Caufe  why  its  Aftion  is  thus  and  thus 
limited,  directed  and  determined.  Aftii^e  Nalure  is  a  _^^»("ra/ 
Thing;  'tis  an  Ability  or  Tendency  of  Nature  to  AfHon, , 
generally  taken;  which  may  be  a  Caufe  why  the  Soul 
ads  as  Occafion  or  Reafon  is  given  ;  but  this  alone  can't 
be  a  fufficient  Caufe  why  the  Scul  exerts  fu.ch  a  partkvlar 
Aft,  at  fuch  a  Time,  r-ather  than  others.  In  order  to  this, 
there  muft  be  fomething  befides  a  genrral  Tendency  to  Aftion  ; 
there  muft   alfo  be  a  particular  Tendency  to  that  individual 

Aftion. If  it  fliould  be  afked,  why  the  Soul  of  Man  ufes 

its  Aftivity  in  fuch  a  Manner  as  it  does ;  and  it  fhould  be  an- 
fwered,  that  the  Soul  ufes  its  Aftivity  thus,  rather  than  other- 
wife,  becaufe  it  has  Aftivity  ;  would  fuch  an  Anfwer  fatisfy  a 
rational  Man  ?  Would  it  not  rather  be  Icoigsid  upon  as  a  ve- 
ry impertinent  one  I 

3.  An  aftive  Being  can  bring  no  Eirefts  to  pafs  by  his 
Aflivity,  but  what  are  confequent  upon  his  afting:  He  pro- 
duces Nothing  by  his  Aftivity,  any  other  Way  than  by  the 
Exercife  of  his  Aftivity,  and  {o  Nothing  but  tlie  Fruits  of 
JLs  Exercife :  He  brings  Nothing  to  pafs  by  a  dormant 
Aftivity.     But  the  Exercife  of  his  Aftivity  is  Aftion  ;  and  fo 

'Jtiie  Aftion,  or  Exercife  of  his  Aftivity,  muft  be  prior  to  the 

H  3  ESefts 


49  Volition  a^/  without  a  Cauje,  Part  II. 

SfFeiSs  of  his  Activity,  if  an  aftive  Eein?  prodaces  an 
Efeft  in  another  Being,  about  which  his  Adivity  is  conver- 
faint,  the  Effeft  being  the  Fruit  of  his  Activity,  his  Adi- 
vity  rnuft  be  firft  exercifed  or  exerted,  and  the  Efteft  of  it 
mufi:  follow.  So  it  maft  be,  with  equal  Reafon,  if  the 
active  Being  is  his  own  Object,  and  his' Activity  is  confver- 
fant  about  Himfelf,  to  produce  and  determine  feme  Effect 
:n  himfelf;  ftill  the  Exercife  of  his  Activity  mult  go  before 
the  Effect,  which  he  brirrgs  to  pais  and  determines  by  it. 
And  therefore  his  Activity  can't  be  the  Caufe  of  the  Deter- 
inination  of  the  firft  A.cticn,  ox'  Exercife  of"  Activity  itfelf^ 
whence  the  Effects  of  Activity  arife ;  for  that  would  imply 
a  Contradiction  ;  It  would  be  to  fay,  the  firft  Exercife  of  Activi- 
ty is  before  the  firft  Exercife  of  Activity,  and  is  the  Caufe  of  it. 

4.  That  the  Soul,  tho'  an  active  Subftance,  can't  divtrffy 
its  own  Acts,  but  by  firft  actmg  ;  or  be  a  determining' 
Caufe  of  different  Acts,  or  any  different  Effects,  fometimes 
of  one  Kind,  and  fometimes  of  anothe'',  any  other  Way 
than  in  Confequence  of  its  own  diverfe  Acts,  is  manifeft  by 
this  ;  That  if  fo;  then  the  fame  Caufe,  the  Jam/'  oaufal 
Power,  Force  or  Influence,'  'without  VdriatioTi  172  any  Rejped, 
would  produce  different  Effects  at  different  Times.  For  the 
fame  Subftance  of  the  Soul  before  it  acts",  and  the  fame 
active  Nature  of  the  Soul  before  it  is  exerted  (i-  e.  before  in" 
the  Order  of  Nature)  would  be  the  Caufe  of  different 
Effects,  n;iz.  different  Volitions  at  different  Times.  But  the 
Subftance  of  the  Soul  before  it  acts,  and  its  active  Nature- 
before  it  is  exerted,  are  the  fame  without  Variation.  For 'tis- 
feme  Act  that  makes  the  firft  Variation  in  the  Caufe,  as  to  any 
caufal  Exertion,  Force  or  Influence.  But  if  it  b^  fo,  that 
the  Soul  has  no  different  Caufality,  or  diverfe  caufal  Force 
or  Influence,  in  producing  thefe  diverfe  Effects ;  then  'tis 
evident,  that  the  Scul  has  no  Influence,  no  Hand  in  the 
diverfity  of  the  Effect;  and  that  the  Difference  of  the  Effect 
can't  be  owing  to  any  Thing  in  the  Soul ;  or  which  is  the 
fame  Thing,  the  Soul  don't  determine  the  Diverfity  of  the 

Effect;   which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition. 'Tis  true, 

the  Subftance  of  the  Soul' before  it  acts,  and  before  there  is 
anv  Difference  in  that  Refpect,  may  be  in  a  different  State 
and  Circumftances :  But  thofe  whom  I  oppofe,  will  not 
allow  the  different  Circumftances  of  the  Soul  to  be  the  de- 
termining Caufes  of  the  Acts  of  the  Will  ;  as  being  con- 
trary to  their  Notion.of  Self-determination  and  Self-ipoticn. 
?      ,    :  ■    '     .  5.  Let 


Seel.  IV.  thro'  the  Soul's  Adivity,  ^q 

c.  Let  us  fuppofe,  as  thefe  Divines  do,  that  there  are  no, 
A(5ts  of  the  Soal,  ftriftly  fpeaking,  but  free  Volitions'; 
Then  it  will  follow,  that  the  Soul  is  an  aftive  Being  in 
Nothing  further  than  rt  is  a  voluntary  or  eleftive  Being  | 
and  whenever  it  produces  Effefts  aftively,  it  produces  Effects 
voluntarily  and  eleiiively.  But  to  produce  EfFefts  thus,  is 
the  fame  Thing  as  to  produce  Eifefts  in  Ccnfequence  of,  and 
according  to  its  own  Choice.  And  if  fo,  'then  furely  the 
Soul  don't  by  its  Activity  produce  all  its  own  Afts  of  Will 
or  Choice  themfelves :  For  this,  by  the  Suppofition,  is  to 
produce  all  its  free  Adls  of  Choice  voluntarily  and  eledive-' 
iy,  or  in  Confequence  of  Its  own  free  A<$\s  of  Choice,  which 
brings  the  Matter  ^ireftly  to  the  fore-mentioned  Contra- 
didipn,  of  a  free  Aft  of  Choice  before  the  firft  free  Aft  o^ 

Choice.- According  to  thefe  Gentlemen's  own  Notion  of 

Aftion,  if  there  arifes  in  the  Mind  a  Volition  without  a  free 
Act  of  the  Will  or  Choice  to  determine  and  produce  it, 
the  Mind  is  not  tiie  aftive  voluntary  Caufe  of  that  Voli- 
tion;  becaufe  it  don't  arife  from,  nor  is  regulated  by  Choice 
or  Defign  :  And  therefore  it  can't  be^  that  the  Mind  (hould 
be  the  aftive,  voluntary,  determining  Caufi;  of  the  firft  and 

hading  Volition   that  relates    to  the  Affair. The  Mind's 

being  a  dejigniiig  Caufe,  only  enables  it  to  produce  Eifefts  in 
Confequer.ee  of  its  Def,gn;  it  will  not  enable  it  to  be  the 
deligning  Caufe  of  all  its  own  Defigns.  The  Mind's  being 
an  eleilive  Caufe,  will  only  enable  it  to  produce  EfFefts  in 
Confequence  of  its  Ele8io?2,  and  according  to  them ;  but 
can't  enable  it  to  be  the  eleftive  Caufe  of  all  its  own  Elec- 
tions ;  becaufe  that  fuppofes  an  Eleftion  before  the  firft  E- 
leftion.  So  the  Mind's  being  an  aBi-ve  Caufe  enables  it  to 
produce  Effefts  in  Confequence  of  its  own  Ails,  but  can't 
enable  it  to  be  the  determining  Caufe  of  all  its  own  Afts ; 
for  that  is  ftili  in  the  fame  Manner  a  Contradiftion ;  as  it 
fuppofes  a  determining  Act  converfant  about  the  firft  Act, 
and  prior  to  it,  having  a  caufal  Influence  cu  its  Exiftence,  an4 
Manner  of  Exiftence.  '  , 

I  can  conceive  of  Nothing  elfe  thr.t  can  be  meant  by  the 
Soul's  having  Power  to  caufe  and  determine  its  own  Voli- 
tions, as  a  Being  to  whom  God  has  given  a  Power  of 
Action,  but  this;  that  God  has  given  Power  to  the  Soul, 
fometim^s  at  leaft,  to  excite  Volitions  at  its  Fleafure,  or 
according  as  it  chufes.  And  this  certainly  fuppofes,  in  all 
fuch  Ca/e?,,  a  Clipice  preceding  all  Volitions  vvhich  are 
'  ■         '  :-     ■       ..  thus 


-^€  Tbe/"^  Ez'o/Iom  impertincm.  Part:!!., 

tlius  caufed,    even   the  very  firft  of  them  :    Which  runs  into 
<'he  fore- mentioned  great  Abfurdity. 

Therefore  the  Aftivity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul  affords 
r.o  Jlelief  from  tiae  Difficulties  which  the  Notion  of  a  Seif- 
idetermining  Power  in  the  Will  is  attended  v/ith,  nor  will  it 
help,  in  the  leaft,  its  Abfurdities  and  Inconfiftences. 

Section     V. 

lihewingy  thai  if  the  Things  ajferted  in  thefe  E'va^ 
fions  fhould  he  Jnppojed  to  be  true,  they  are  al- 
together impertinent^  and  cant  help  the  Caufe  of 
ArminiaB  Liberty,-  And  how  (this  being  the 
State  of  the  Cafe)  Arminian,  IFriters  are  obliged 
to  talk  inconfifientJy, 

WHAT  was  laft  Obferved  in  the  preceding  Seftion 
may  fhew,  not  only  that  the  aftive  Nature  of 
the  Soul  can't  be  a  Reafon  why  any  Act  of  the  Will  is,  or 
why  it  is  in  this  Manner,  rather  than  another ;  but  alfo 
•that  if  it  could  be  fo,  and  it  could  be  proved  that  Volitions 
are  contingent  Events,  in  that  Senfe,  that  their  Being  and 
Manner  of  Being  is  not  fix'd  or  determined  by  any  Caufe, 
or  any  Thing  antecedent;  it  would  not  at  all  ferve  the  Pur- 
pofe  of  Arminians,  to  ellablifh  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  ac- 
cording to  their  Notion  of  its  Freedom,  as  ccnfifting  in  the 
Will's  Determination  of  its  Self;  which  fuppofes-  every  free 
Act  of  the  Will  to  be  determined  by  fome  Act  of  the  Will 
going  before  to  determine  it ;  in  as  much  as  for  t\\c  Will  to 
determine  a  Thing,  is  the  fame  as  for  the  Soul  to  determine 
a  Thing  by  Witling  ;  and  there  is  no  Way,  that  the  Will  can 
.determine  an  Act  of  the  Will,  tTian  by  ^willing  that  Act  of 
she  Will,  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  chufng  it.  So  that 
jhere  muft  be  two  Acts  of  the  Will  in  the  Cafe,  one  going 
?:^efore  another,  one  converfant  about  the  other,  and  the  lat- 
•yf;r   the  Object   of  the   former,    and  chofen  by  the  former. 

If 


Sed:.  V.  Thefe  Evafwns  impertinent.  ^i' 

If  the  Will  don't  caufe  and'  determine  the  Act  by  Choice, 
it  don't  caufe  or  determine  it  at  all ;  for  that  which  is  noe 
determined  by  Choice,  is  not  determined  voluntarily  or 
<-jcilUngly  :  And  to  fay,  that  the  Will  determines  fomething 
which  the  Soul  don't  determine  willingly,  is  as  much  as  to^- 
fay,  that  fomething  is  done  by  the  Will,  which  the  Soul^ 
don't  do  with  its  Will. 

So  that  if  Arminian  Liberty  of  Will,  ccnlifting  in  the: 
Will's  determining  its  own  Acts,  be  maintained,  the  old 
Abfurdity  and  contradiction  muft  be  maintained,  that  every 
ftee  Act  of  Will  is  caufed  and  determined  by  a  forej^oing  free 
A.ct  of  W^ill  :  Which  don't  conlift  with  the  free  Act's  arifmg 
without  any  Caule,  and  being  fo  contingent,  as  not  to  be  fix'd 
by  any  Thing  foregoing.  So  that  this  Evafion  muft  be  given 
up,  as  not  at  all  relieving,  and  as  that  which,  inftead  of  fup- 
porting  this  Sort  of  Liberty,  directly  dettroys  it. 

And  if  it  Ihould  be  fuppofed,  that  the  Soul  determines  its 
own  Acts  of  Will  fome  other  Way,  than  by  a  foregoing-. 
Act  of  Will ;  ftill  it  will  not  help  the  Caufe  of  their  Liberty 
of  Will.  If  it  determines  them  by  an  Act  of  the  Undcr- 
ftanding,  or  fome  other  Pov/er,  then  the  V/ill  don't  deter-- 
•  mine  itfelf ;  and  fo  the  Self-determining  Power  of  the  Will  is 
giverv  up.  And  what  Lib'^rty  is  there  exercifed,-  according  tc- 
their  own  Opinion  of  Liberty,  by  the  Soul's  being  deter- 
mined by  fomething  bef:des  its  oivn  -  Choice  ?  The  Acts  o£" 
the  Will,  it  is  true,  may  be  directed,  and  effecruaiiy  deter- 
mined and  fix'd ;  but  it  is  not  done  by  the  Soul's  own  Will 
and  Pleafure  :  There  is  no  Exercife  at  all  of  Choice  or  Will- 
in  producing,  the  Effect :  And  if  fp^ill  and  Choice  are  nor 
exercifed  in  it,  ho'A^  is  the  Ldbertj  of  the  WiU  exercifed  in  it  I 

So  that  let  Armiraans  tarn  which  Way  they  pleafe  -with  their 
Notion  of  Liberty,  confiding  in  the  Will's  determining  its 
own  Ads,  their  Notion  deftroys  itfelf.  If  they  hold  every 
free  Act  of  Will  to  be  determined  by  the  Soul's  own  free- 
Choice,-  or  foregoing  free  Act  of  Will;  foregoing,'  either  in- 
the  Order  of  Time,  or  Nature  ;  it  implies  that  grofs  Contra- 
diction, that  the  firft  free  Act  belonging  to  the  Affair,  is  de- 
termined by  a  free  Act  which  is  before  it.  Or  if  they  fay- 
that  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  are  determined  by  fome  other 
Act  of  the  Soul,  and  not  an  Act  of  Will  or  Choice,  Thia 
alfo  deftroys  their  Notion  of  Libert)^,  confifting  in  the  Acts 
of  th«   Will    being    determined     by    the  Will   itfelf:    Or 

if 


53         Arminians  talk  inconiiiiently.         Part  IL 

if  ihe^  hold  that  the  Afts  of  the  Will  are  determined  by 
Nothing  at  all  that  is  pricr  to  them,  but  that  they  are  contin- 
gent in  that  Senfe,  .that  they  are  determined  and  fixed  by  no 
Caufe  at  all ;  this  alfc  deftroys  their  Notion  of  Lit^erty,  con- 
fifting  in  the  Will's  determining  its  cwn  Acts. 

This  being  the  true  ftate  of  the  Arrzinia-t  Notion  of  Li- 
berty, it  hence  comes  to  pafs,  that  the  Writers  that  defend 
it  are  forced  into  grofs  Inconfifter.ces,  in  what  they  fay  upon 
this  Subjeft.  To  inftance  in  Dr.  Whitby  ;  he  in  his  Difcourfe 
on  the  Freedom  of.  the  V7ill,  *  oppcfes  the  Opicicn  of  the 
Calvinifts,  who  place  Man's  Liberty  cnh  in  a  Poiver  cf  dditig 
ivhat  He  nuilly  as  that  wherein  they  plainly  agree  with  Mr. 
Hobbes.  And  yet'he  himfelf  mentions  the  very  fame  Notion 
of  Liberty,  as  the  Dictate  of  the  Serfe  a-^id  cormnon  R'eafon  of 
Mankind,  and  a  Rule  laid  doivn  by  the  Light  of  Nature  ;  viz.  That 
Liberty  is  a  Po'vjerof  Atlingfrom  our  Sel'ves ,  or  DOING  WHAT" 
WE  WILL.i  This  is  indeed,  as  he  fays,  a  Thing  agreeable 
toiheSenfe  and  co.mmon  Reajon  of  Mankind;  and  therefore  'tis 
not  fo  much  to  be  wondered  at,  that  he  unawares  acicnow- 
ledges  it  againR  himfelf:  For  if  Liberty  don't  confifl  in  this, 
what  elfe  can  be  devifed  that  it  fhould  confift  in  ?  If  it  be 
faid,  as  Dr.  Whitby  elfewere  infifts.  That  it  don't  only  con- 
fift in  Liberty  of  dnng  ivhat  lue  ivill,  but  alfo  a  Liberty  of 
willing  without  Neceifity  ;  ftill  the  Queftion  returns,  What 
does  that  Liberty  bf  willing  without  Neceffity  confift  in,  but 
in  a  Power  of  willing  as  nxje  plea/e,  without  being  impeded  by 
a  contrary  Neceffity  ?  or  in  other  Words,  A  Liberty  for  the 
Soul  in  its  willing  to  adl:  according  to  its  otvn  Choice  ? _  Yea, 
this  A'ery  Thing  the  fame  Author  feems  to  allow,  and  fap- 
pofe  again  and  again,  in  the  Ufe  he  makes  of  Sayings  of  the 
Fathers,  whom  he  quotes  as  his  Vouchers.  Thus  he  cites 
thefe  Words  of  Origen,  which  he  produces  as  a  Teftimony 
on  his  Side  ;  |t  The  Soul  aas  By  HER  OWN  CHOICE,  and 
it  is  free  for  her  to  incline  to  'whate'uer  Part  S  HE  W I L  L,  And 
thofe  Words  of  Juftin;  \  The  DoSirine  of  the  Chrijiians 
is  this.  That  Nothing  is  done  or  fuffered according  to  Fate,  but  thai 
every  Man  doth  Good  or  E<vil  ACCORDING  TO  HIS  OWN 
FREE    CHOICE.     And   from  Eu/ebius,   thefe  Words  ;   §   If 

Fate  be  efablifh'd,  Philofophy  andSiety  are  cverthronun. All 

thefe  Things  depending  upon  the  Neceffity  introduced  by  the  Stars^ 

and 

*  In  his  Book  on  the  five  Points,  2d  Edit..  P.  350,  351,  352. 
+  Bid.  P.  325,  3a6.  U  Ibid.  P.  3^i.  %  Ibid.  P.  360.  §  Ibid. 
?.  363. 


S"cct.  V.       Atminians  talk  iticonliftently.  54 

end  not  upon  Mjditation  avd  Exerd/e  PROCEEDING  FROM 
OUR  OI'FN  FREE  CHOICE.  And  again,  the  Words  of 
Macarius  ;  ||  God,  to  pre/ewe  the  Liberty  of  Man's  Will,  fjiffered 
their  Bodies  to  die,  that  it  might  be  IN  THEIR  CHOICE  to  turit. 

io  Good  or  E'vil. 1  hey  <-u;ho  are  aded  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  are 

not  held  under  any  N'cjjly,  but  have  Liberty  to  turn  themjelvcs ^ 
and  DO  WHAT  THEf  //  ILL  in  this  Life. 

Thus,  the  Defter  in  EfFeft  comes  into  that  vtxj  No- 
tion of  liberty,  which  tJ-ic  Cal\>i?iifi.s  have ;  which  he  at 
llie  fame  Time  conuemns,  as  agreeing  with  the  Opinion  of 
Ivir.  Hobhes,  namely,  the  Soul's  Ailing  iy  its  o'Uin  Chnice,  Men's 
doing  Good  or  Eiiil  according  to  their  oivn  free  Choice,  '■I  heir  being 
in  that  Exercije  nx'hich  proceeds  from  their  o'wn  free  Choice,  Halving 
it  in  their  Choice  to  turn  to  Good  or  E'vil,  and  doing  ivhat  they  ov///. 
So  that  if  Men  exercife  this  Liberty  in  the  Ads  of  the  Will 
themfelves,  it  miift  be  in  exerting  Aits  ot"  Will  as  they  will, 
o.r  accordit/g  to  their  on.vn  free  Choice;  or  exerting  Afts  of  Will 
that  proceed fro7n  their  Choice.  And  if  it  be  fo,  then  iet  every 
one  judge  whether  this  don't  fuppofe  a  free  Choice  going  be- 
fore the  free  Act  of  Will,  or  whether  an  Ad  of  Choice  don't 
go  before  that  Ad  of  the  Will  -wYiich.  proceeds  from  it.  And 
if  it  be  thus  v>ith  ail  free  Ads  of  the  Will,  then  let  every- 
one judge,  v/hether  it  won't  follow  that  there  is  a  free 
Choice  or  Will  going  before  the  firft  free  Ad  of  the  Will 
exerted  in  the  Cafe.  And  then  let  every  one  judge,  whether 
this  be  not  a  Contradidion.  And  finally,  let  every  one 
judge  v/hether  in  the  Scheme  of  thefe  Winters  there  be  any 
PoJibility  of  avoiding  thefe  Abfurdities. 

If  Liberty  Confiftg,  as  Dr.  Whitby  himfelf  fays,  in  a  Man's 
^oing  nvhat  He  njoill ;  and  a  Man  exercifes  this  Liberty,  not 
only  in  external  Adions,  but  in  the  Ads  of  the  Will  them- 
felves ;  then  fo  far  as  Liberty  is  'e::ercifed  in  the  latter,  it 
Qoniilts  in  'voilling  <what  he  iv/lls :  And  if  any  fay  io,  one  of 
thefe  two  Things  muit  be  meant,  either  i.  That  a  Man  has 
Power  to  Will,  as  he  does  will ;  becaufe  what  he  wills,  he 
wills  ;  and  therefore  has  Power  to  will  what  he  has  Power 
to  will.  If  this  be  their  Meaning,  then  all  this  mighty  Con- 
troverfy  about  Freedom  of  the  Will  and  Self-determining 
Power,  comes  wholly  to  Nothing ;  all  that  is  contended 
for  being  no  more  than  this.  That  the  Mind  of  Man  does 
what  it  does,  and  is  the  Suljjed  of  what  it  is  the  Subjed  of, 
i  oc 

H  Jl,id.   369,  370.      ,_ 


ij5         Of  cki/ing  in  Things  indiffcTcnt.       Part  11. 

,  or  that  what  is,  is ;  wherein  None  has  any  Controverfy  with 
tliem.  Or,  2.  The  Meaning  muft  be,  that  a  Man  ha» 
Power  to  will  as  he  pleafes  or  chufes  to  will :  That  is,  he 
has  Power  by  one  Art  of  Choice,  to  chufe  another ;  by  an 
antecedent  Act  of  Will  to  chufe  a  confequent  Aft  ;  and 
ttierein  to  execute  his  own  Choice.  And  if  this  be  their 
Meaning,  it  is  nothing  but  Shuffling  with  rhofe  they  difpuie 
with,  and  baffling  their  own  Reafon.  For  ftill  the  Queftion 
leturns,  wherein  lies  Man's  Liberty  in  that  antecedent  Aft 
of  Will  which  chofe  the  confequertf  Aft.  The  Anfwer  ac- 
cording to  the  fame  Principles  muft  be,  that  his  Liberty  in- 
this  alfo  lies  in  his  willing  as  he  would,  or  as  he  chofe,  or 
agreeaWe  to  another  Aft  of  Choice  preceding  that.  And  fo- 
the  Queftion  returns  ifz  infinitum,  and  the  like  Anfwer  muft  be 
made  in  infinitum :  In  order  to  fupport  their  Opinion,  there 
muft  be  no  Beginning,  but  free  Afts  of  Will  muft  have 
been  chofen  by  foregoing  free  Afts  of  Will,  in  the  Soul  of 
^very  Man,  without  Beginning ;  and  fo  before  he  had  a' 
Being,  from  all  Eternity. 


^[•se903oceiMecaooeaooeooaoMoe(M«eoooeMoi«Mtaoseooseo«oc>aoocQ09ca<occooeoooc'aooeo39e<^' 

Section     VI. 

Concerning  the  IVi/I's  determining  in  Things  whic¥ 
are  perfeSfly  indifferent,  in  the  View  of  the 
Mind, 

A  Great  Argument  for  Self-determining  Power,  is  the 
fuppofed  Experience  we  univerfally  have  of  an  Ability 
to  determine  our  Wills,  in  Cafes  wherein  no  prevailing  Mo- 
tive is  prefentcd  :  The  Will  (as  is  fuppofed)  has  its  Choice  to' 
jnake  between  two  or  more  Things,  that  are  perfeftly  equal 
in  the  View  of  the  Mind  ;  and  the  Will  is  apparently  altoge- 
flier  indifferent ;  and  yet  We  find  no  Difficulty  in  coming  to  af 
Choice ;  the  Will  can  inftantly  determine  itfelf  to  one,  by  a- 
^^overci^a  Power  which  it  has  over  itfelf,  \^jthout  being  mov- 
ed by  any  preponderating.  Iacluceflieiit» 

Thus 


Scct.Vi.        Of  chufnig  in  Things  indifferent.         ^^ 

Tiius  the  forementioned  Author  of  an  Ejfcy  07i  the  Frceddrk 
of  the  IViil,  &rc.  P.  2 3,  26,  27,  fnppofes,  "  That  there  are 
"  many  Inllances,  wlierein  the  Will  is  determined  neither 
"  by  prefent  Uneafinefs,  nor  by  the  greatell  apparent  Good, 
.'♦  nor  by  tlie  lail  Diilats  of  the  Underftanding,  nor  by 
"  any  Thing  elfe,  but  merely  by  itfelf,  as  a  Sovereign  Self- 
"  deterrnining  Power  of  the  Soul ;  -and  that  the  Soul  does 
•*  not  will  this  or  that  Aclion,  in  fome  Cafes,  by  aay  other 
"  Influence,  but  becaufe  it  will.  Thus  (fays  he)  I  can  turn 
*'  my  Face  to  the  South,  or  the  North  %  I  can  point  with  iny 

*'   Finger   upward,    or    downward. And    thus,    in    fome 

•**  Cafes,  the  Will  determines  itfelf  in  a  very  fovereign  Ma;i- 
*'  ner,  becaufe  it  will,  without  a  Reafon  borrowed  from  the 
'^  Underllanding  :  and  hereby  it  difcovers  its  own  perfe*! 
'•  Power  of  Choice,  riCng  from  within  itfelf,  and  free  front 
"  all  Influence  or  Reftramt  cf  any  Kind."  And  in  Pages  66', 
.70,  Cif  73,  74,  This  Author  very  exprefHy  fuppofes  the  Will 
in  many  Cafes  to  be  determined  by  no  Moti-ue  at  all,  and  Ac:: 
altogether  ivithout  Moti've,  o;-  Ground  of  PrefercKCc — Here  I 
would  obferve, 

I.  The  very  Snppofitlon  which  is  here  made,  direftly  con- 
tradifts  and  overthrows  iifclf :  For  the  Thing  fuppofed, 
wherein  this  giand  Argument  confifts,  is.  That  among  feveral 
Things  the  Will  actually  chufes  one  before  another,  at  the 
■fame  Time  that  it  is  psrfeflly  indifferent  j  v/hich  is  the  very 
fame  Thing  as  to  fa^,  the  Mind  has  a  Preference,  at  the 
fame  Time  that  it  has  no  Preference.  What  is  meant  can't 
be,  that  the  Mind  is  indiiferent  before  it  comes  to  have  a 
Choice,  or  'till  it  has  a  Preference  ;  or,  which  is  the  fanve 
Thing,  that  the  Mind  is  indifferent  until  it  comes  to  be  not 
indiflfe'rent  :  For  certainly  this  Author  did  not  fuppofe  he 
had  a  Controverfy  with  any  Perfon  in  fuppofing  this.  And 
then  it  is  Nothing  to  his  Purpofe,  that  the  Mind  which 
chufes,  was  indifferent  once  ;  unlefs  it  chufea,  remaining  in- 
different ;  for  otherwife,  it  don't  chufe  at  all  in  that  Cafe  of 
Indifference,  concerning  which  is  all  the  Queflion.  Befides, 
it  appears  in  Fadi,  that  the  Thing  which  this  Autlior  fup- 
pofes, is  not  that  tlie  V/ill  chufes  one  Thing  before  ano- 
ther concerning  which  it  is  indifferent  before  it  chufes;  but 
alfo  is  indifferent  <vijhe?i  it  chufes ;  and  that  its  being  otherwife 
than  indifferent  is  not  'till  afterwards,  in  Confequence  of 
its  Choice;  that  the  chofen  Thing's  appearing  preferable 
and  more  agreeable  than  another,  arifes  from  its  Choice 
^ready  inadet  His  Words  are,  (P.  30,)  '^  Where  the  Ob- 
I  3  '*  ^s 


57       ^f  ^^^Hftf^g  ^^  Things  indifferent.     Tart.  IT. 

"  jeds  which  are  propofed,  appear  equally  fit  or  good,  the 
*'  Will  is  left  without  a  Guide  or  Diredor;  and  therefore 
"  muft  make  its  own  Choice,  by  its  own  Determination ;  it 
**  being  properly  a  Self-determining  Power.  And  in  fuch 
**  Cafes  the  Will  does  as  it  were  make  a  Good  to  itfelf  by  its 
*'  own  Choice,  /.  e.  creates  its  own  Pieafurc  or  Delight 
"  in  this  Self-chofen  Good.  Even  as  a  Man  by  feizing 
*'  upon  a  Spot  of  unoccupied  Land,  in  an  uninhabited" 
"  Country,  majces  it  his  own  Foffefilon  and  Pioperty,  and 
"  as  fuch  rejoices  in  it.  Where  Things  were  indifferent 
*'  before,  the  Will  finds  Nothing  to  make  them  more  agreea- 
"  ble,  confidered  merely  in  themfelves ;  but  the  Pleafure  it 
"  feels  ARISING  FP.OM  ITS  OWN  CHOICE,  and  its 
"  Perfeverance  therein.  We  Icvc  many  Things  which  we 
"  have  chofen,  AND  PURELY  BECAUSE  WE  CHOSE 
*'  THEM." 

This  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  that  we  firfl:  begin  to  prefer  many 
Things,  now  ceafing  any  longer  to  be  indifferent  with 
Refpeft  to  them,  purely  becaufe  we  have  prefer "d  and  chofen 

them  before. Thefe  Things   muft  needs  be  fpoken  incon- 

fiderately  by  this  Author,  Choice  or  Preference  can't  be 
before  itfelf,  in  the  fame  Inftance,  either  in  the  Order  oi^ 
Time  or  Nature  :  It  can't  be  the  Foundation  of  itfelf,  or 
the  Fruit  or  Confequence  of  itfelf.  The  ^•ery  Aft  of  chufing 
one  Thing  rathrr  than  another,  is  preferring  that  Thing,  and 
that  is  fettjng"  a  higher  Value  on  that  Thing.  But  that  the 
Mind  fets  an  higher  Value  on  one  Thing  than  another,  is  not, 
in  the  firft  Place,  the  Fruit  of.itsfettuig  a  higher  Value  on  that 
Thing. 

This  Author  fays,  P.  36.  "  The  Will  may  be  perfectly  in- 
"  different,  and  yet  the  Vv'ill  may  determine  itfelf  to  chufe 
"  one  or  the  other."  And  again  in  the  fame  Page,  *'  lam, 
"  entirely  indifferent  to  eithe-r ;  and  yet,  my  Will  may  de- 
•'  dermine  itfelf  to  chufe,"  And  again,  "  Which  I  fhall  chufe 
*'  muft  be  determined  by  the  *nere  Aft  of  my  Will."  If 
the  Choice  is  determined  by  a  mere  A(ft  of  Will,  then 
the  Choice  is  determined,  by  a  mere  Aft  of  Choice.  And 
concerning  this  Matter,  'viz.  that  the  Aft  of  the  M'lll  itfelf 
is  determined  by  an  Aft  of  Choice,  this  Writer  is  exprefs,  in 
P.  72.  Speaking  of  the  Cafe,  where  there  is  no  fuperiour  Fit- 
nefs  in  Objefts  prefented,  he  has  thefe  Words :  "  There  it 
'.*  muft  aft  by  its  own  CHOICE,  and  determine  itfelf  as 
y.  it  PLEASES."   Where  it  is  fuppofed  that  the  very  Deter- 

tninaiiorij^ 


Se3:.VI.     Of  ihe  Will's  dderfniningy  &c.  5$ 

■minatioji,  which  is  the  Ground  and  Spring  of  the  Will's  Aft, 
is  an  Ait  of  Choice  and  Fleafure,  wherein  one  Ad  is  more 
a'^reeable,  and  the  Mind  betfer  pleafed  in  it  than  another ; 
and  this  Preference,  and  fuperhiir  Fleafedv.efs  is  the  Ground  of 
all  it  does  in  the  Cafe.  And  if  fo,  the  Mind  is  not  indiffe- 
rent when  it  determines  itfelf,  but  had  rather  do  one  Thing 
than  another,  had  ratlicr  determine  itfelf  one  Way  than 
another.  And  therefore  the  Will  don't  aft  at  all  in  In- 
diiference  ;  not  fo  much  as  in  the  firft  Step  it  takes,  or  the 
iirit  Rife  and  Beginning  of  its  acting.  If  it  be  poflible  for 
the  Underllanding  to  ad  in  Indifference,  yet  to  be  fare  the 
"Will  never  does  ]  becaufe  the  Will's  beginning  to  aft  is  the 
very  fame  Thing  as  its  beginning  to  chufe  or  prefer.  And 
if  in  the  very  firlt  Aft  of  the  V7ill,  the  Mind  prefers  fome- 
thing,  then  the  Idea  of  that  Thing  prefer'd,  does  at  that 
Time  preponderate,  or  prevail  in  the  Mind  ;  or,  which  is 
the  fame  Thing,  the  Idea  of  it  has  a  prevailing  Influence  on 
the  Will.  So  that  this  wholly  dellroys  the  Thing  fuppofed, 
^viz.  That  the  Mind  can  bv  a  fovereign  Power  chufe  one  of 
two  or  more  Things,  which  in  the  View  of  the  Mind  are, 
in  every  Refpeft,  perfeftly  equal,  one  of  which  does  not  at 
all  preponderate,  nor  has  any  prevailing  Influence  on  the 
Mind  above  another. 

So  that  this  Author,  in  his  grand  Argument  for  the  Abi- 
lity of  the  Will  to  chufe  one  or  two,  or  more  Things, 
concerning  which  it  is  perfeftly  indifferent,  does  at  the  fame 
Time,  in  Effeft,  deny  the  Thing  he  fuppofes,  and  allows 
lind  aiTerts  the  Point  he  endeavours  to  overthrow ;  even  that 
the  Will,  in  chufing,  is  fubjeft  to  no  prvailing  Influence 
(>f  the  Idea,  or  View  of  the  Thing  chofen.  And  indeed  it 
is  impoffible  to  offer  this  Argument  without  overthrowing  it ; 
the  Thing  fuppofed  in  it  being  inconfiftent  with  itfelf, 
and  that  which  denies  itfelf.  To  fuppofe  the  Will  to  aft 
at  all  in  a  State  of  perfeft  Indifference,  either  to  determine 
itfelf,  or  to  do  any  Thing  elfe,  is  to  affert  that  the  Mind 
chufes  without  chufing.  To  fay  that  when  it  is  indifferent, 
it  can  do  as  it  pleafes,  is  to  fay  that  it  can  follow  its  Plea- 
fure,  when  it  has  no  Pleafure  to  follow.  And  therefore  if 
there  be  any  Difficulty  in  the  Inftances  of  two  Cakes,  or  twp 
Eggs,  &c.  which  are  exaftly  alike,  one  as  good  asanofher; 
concerning  which  this  Author  fuj^pofes  the  Mind  in  Faft  has 
a  Choice,  and  fo  in  Effeft  fuppofes  that  it  has  a  Preftret/ce; 
it  as  much  concern'd  himfeif  to  folve  the  Difficulty,  as  it 
does^  thofe  whom  he  oppofes  :   For  if  thefe  Inllances  prove 

any 


55  Of  the  Will's  deierminitfg  Part  II. 

any  Thing  to  his  Purpofe,  they  pro\-e  that  a  I'vlan  chufes 
without  Choice.  And  yet  this  is  not  to  his  Purpofe ;  be- 
caufe  if  this  is  what  he  afferts,  his  own  Words  are  as  muck 
againft  him,  and  do  as  rrjuch  contradidt  him,  as  the  Words 
.ot  thofe  he  difputes  againft  can  do. 

2.  Thsre  is  no  great  Difficulty  in  {hewing,  in  fuch  Inftan- 
ces  as  are  alledged,  not  only  thai  it  miiji  needs  he  fo,  that  the 
Mind  muft  be  influenced  in  its  Choice  by  fomething  that  has 
a  preponderating  Influence  upon  it,  but  alfo  honx)  it  is  fo, 
A  little  Attention  to  our  own  Experience,  and  a  diftinft 
Confidcration  cf  the  Ads  of  our  Minds  in  fuch  Cafes, 
•^\\\  be  fuiHcieni:  to  clear  up  the  Matter. 

Thus,  fuppofing  I  ha^'c  a  Chefs-board  before  me  ;  and 
becaufe  I  am  required  by  a  Superiour,  or  defired  by  a  Friend^ 
or  to  make  forae  Experiment  concerning  my  own  Ability  and 
Liberty,  or  on  fome  other  Confideration,  I  am  detezmined 
to  touch  fome  one  cf  the  Spots  or  Squares  on  the  Board  with 
my  Finger  _;  not  being  limited  or  direfted  in  the  firft  Propo- 
fal,  or  my  own  firll  Purpofe,  which  is  general,  to  any  one 
in  particular ;  and  there  being  nothing  in  the  Squares  in 
themfeives  confldered,  that  recommends  any  one  of  all  the- 
lixty-four,  more  than  another :  In  this  Cafe,  my  mind  de- 
termines to  give  itfelf  up  to  what  is  vulgarly  called  Accidtnt,  \ 
by  determining  to  touch  that  Square  which  happens  to  be 
moil  in  View,  which  my  Ej-e  is  efpeciaUy  upon  at  that  Mo- 
ment, or  which  happens  to  be  then  moil  in  my  Mind,  or 
which  I  fhall  be  dircdtcd  to  by  feme  other  fuch-like  Accident, 
Here  are  feveral  Steps  of  the  Mind's  proceeding  (tho'  all 
may  be  done  as  it  were  in  a  Moment)  the  firji  Step  is  its 
general  Determination  that  it  will  touch  one  of  the  Squares. 
The  next  Step  is  another  general  Determination  to  give  itfelf 
up  to  Accident,  in  fome  certain  Way ;  as  to  touch  that 
which  fhall  be  moH  in  the  Eye  or  Mind  at  that  Time,  or  to 
fome  other  fuch-like  Accident.  The  third  and  laft  Step  is  a 
f articular  Determination  to  tojjch  a  certain  individual  Spot, 
€ven  that  Square,  wliich,  by  that  Sqrt  of  Accident  the  Mind 

has 

f  I  have  elfewhere  obferved  what  that  is  w4iich  is  vulgarly  called 
Accident;  That  it  is  Nothing  akin  to  \!i\t  Armir.ian  metaphyfical 
Notion  of  Contingence,  fomething  not  connedled  with  any  Thir,g 
foregoing;  But  that  it  is  lomething  that  comes  to  pais  in  the 
Courfe  of  Things,  in  fome  Affair  that  IVIen  arc  concerned  JDj 
unforefeen,  and  net  owiag  to  their  Defigs. 


Sect. VI,  in  Things  indifferent.  6a' 

has  pitcl\ed  upon,  has  aftually  offered  itfelf  beyond  others^ 
Now  'tis  apparent  that  in  none  of  thefs  feveral  Steps  does 
the  Mind  proceed  in  abfolute  Indifference,  but  in  each  of 
them  is  influenced  by  a  preponderating  Inducement.  So  it  is 
in  xhcjirji  Step  ;  The  Mind's  general  Determination  to  touch 
one  of  the  fixty-four  Spots :  I'he  Mind  is  not  abfolutely  in- 
different whether  it  does  fo  or  no  :  It  is  induced  to  it,  for 
the  Sake  of  making  fome  Experiment,  or  by  the  Defire  of  a 
Friend,  or  fome  other  Motive  that  prevails.  So  it  is  in  the 
fecnnd  Step,  The  Mind's  determining  to  give  itfelf  up  to 
Accident,  by  touching  that  which  fhall  be  moft  in  the  Eye, 
or  the  Idea  of  which  fhall  be  moft  prevalent  in  the  Mind,  &c. 
The  Mind  is  riot  abfolutely  indifferent  whether  it  proceeds 
by  this  Rule  or  no ;  but  chufes  it,  becaufe  it  appears  at 
that  Time  a  convenient  and  requifite  Expedient  in  order 
to  fulfil  the  general  Purpofe  aforefaid.  And  fo  it  is  in  the 
third  and  laft  Step,  Its  determining  to  touch  that  indivi- 
dual Spot  which  actually  does  prevail  in  the  Mlind's  View« 
The  Mind  is  not  indifferent  concerning  this  ;  but  is  influ- 
enced by  a  prevailing  Inducement  and  Reafon ;  v/hich  is, 
that  this  is  a  Profecution  of  the  preceding  Determination, 
which  appeared  requifite,  and  was  fix'd  before  in  the  fecond 
Step. 

Accident  will  ever  ferve  a  Man,  without  hinderin?  him  a 
Moment,  in  fuch  a  Cafe.  It  will  always  be  fo  amono-  :i 
Number  of  Objedb  in  View,  one  will  prevail  in  the  Eye, 
or  in  Idea  beyond  others.  When  we  have  our  Eyes  open  in 
the  clear  Sun-fhine,  many  Obje(fts  ftrike  the  Eye  at  once, 
and  mnumerable  Images  may  be  at  once  painted  in  it  by  the 
Rays  of  Light ;  but  the  Attention  of  the  Mind  is  not 
equal  to  feveral  of  them  at  once ;  or  if  it  be.  It  don't  conti- 
nue fb  for  any  Time.  And  fot  it  is  v/ith  Refpeft  to  the 
Ideas  of  the  Mind  in  general :  Several  Ideas  are  not  in 
equal  Strength  in  the  Mind's  View  and  Notice  at  once  ;  or 
at  leafl,  don't  remain  io  for  any  fenf;ble  Continuance.  There 
is  nothing  in  the  World  more  eonflantly  varying,  than  the 
Ideas  of  the  Mind :  They  don't  remain  preclfely  in  the 
fame  State  for  the  leail  perceivable  Space  of  Time;  as  is 
evident  by  this.  That  all  perceivable  Time  is  judged  and 
perceived  by  the  Mind  only  by  the  Succeflion  or  the  fiic- 
cefuve  Changes  of  its  own  Ideas.  Therefore  v/hile  ths 
Views  or  Perceptions  of  the  Mind  remain  prccifely  in  the 
fome  State,  there  is  no  perceivable;  Sp^ce  OC  Length  of  Time, 
becaufe  no  fenfiblc  SuccefTion  at  alU 


6 1         Of  the- Will's  determinw£,  &c.       Part  IL 

As  the  Adls  of  the  Will,  in  each  Step  of  the  fore-men^ 
tioned  Procedure,  don't  come  to  pafs  without  a  particular 
Gaufe,  every  Aft  is  owing  to  a  prevailing  Inducement  ;  fo 
the  Accident,  as  I  have  called  it,  or  that  which  happens  in 
the  unfearchable  Courfe  of  Things,  to  which  the  Mind 
yields  itfelf,  and  by  which  it  is  guided,  is  not  any  Thing 
that  comes  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe  ;  and  the  Mind  in  de- 
termining to  be  guided  by  it,  is  not  determined  by  fomething 
that  has  no  Caufe  ;  any  more  than  if  it  determmed  to  be 
guided  by  a  Lot,  or  the  calling  of  a  Die.  For  tho'  the  Die's 
falling  in  fuch  a  Manner  be  accidental  to  him  that  caits  it, 
yet  none  will  luppofe  that  there  is  no  Caufe  why  it  falls  as 
it  does.  The  involuntary  Changes  in  the  Succeflion  of  our 
Ideas,  tho'  the  Caufe  may  not  be  obferved,  have  as  much  a 
Caufe,  as  the  changeable  Motions  of  the  Motes  that  float  in 
the  Air,  or  the  continual,  infinitely  various,  fuccefiive  Changes 
of  the  Unevenneffes  on  the  Surface  of  the  Water. 

__  There  are  two  Things  efpecially,  which  are  probably  the 
Occalions  of  Confufion  in  the  Minds  of  them  who  infill  up- 
on it,  that  the  Will  afts  in  a  proper  Indifference,  and  without 
being  moved  by  any  Inducement,  in  its  Determinations  in 
fuch  Cafes  as  have  been  mentioned. 

I.  They  feem  to  miftake  the  Point  in  Queftlon,  or  at  leaft 
not  to  keep  it  diftinftly  in  View.  The  Queilion  they  difpute 
about,  is.  Whether  the  Mind  be  indifferent  about  the  ObjeSis 
prefented,  one  of  which  is  to  be  taken,  touch'd,  pointed  to, 
&c.  as  two  Eggs,  two  Cakes,  which  appear  equally  good. 
Whereas  the  Queftion  to  be  confidered,  is.  Whether  the 
Perfon  be  indifferent  with  Refr-^Tt  to  his  own  Anions ;  whe- 
ther he  don't,  on  feme  ~'onf  leration  or  other,  prefer  one 
Aft  with  Refpeft  to  l..  "  Objefts  before  another.  The 
Mind  in  its  Determination  and  Choice,  in  thefe  Cafes,  is 
not  moft  immediately  and  direftly  converfant  about  the 
ObjeSs  prefented;  but  the  Ads  to  be  done  concerning  thefe  Ob- 
jefts. The  Objefts  may  appear  equal,  and  the  Mind  may 
never  properly  make  any  Choice  between  them  :  But  the 
next  Aft  of  the  Will  being  about  the  external  Aftions  to 
he  performed.  Taking,  Touching,  &:c.  thefe  may  iiot  ap- 
pear equal,  and  one  Aftion  may  properly  be  chofen  before 
another.  In  each  Step  of  the  Mind's  Progrefs,  the  Deter- 
mination is  not  about  the  Objefts,  unlefs  indireftly  and  im- 
properly, but  about  the  Aftions,  which  it  chufes  for  other 
Reafons  than  any  Preference  of  the  Objects,  and  for  Reafons 
not  taken  at  all  from  the  Objefts,' 

There 


Sedl.  VI.       Ofchufing  in  Things  indifferent.         62 

There  is  no  Neceffity  of  fuppofing,  that  the  Mind  does 
ever  at  all  properly  chufe  one  of  the  Objefls  before  ano- 
ther; either  before  it  has  taken,  or  afterwards.  Indeed  the 
Man  chufes  to  iake  or  touch  one  rather  than  another ;  but 
not  becaufe  he  chufes  xht  Thing  taken,  or  touch'd;  but  trom 
foreign  Confiderations,  The  Cafe  may  be  fo,  that  of  two 
Things  offered,  a  Man  may,  for  certain  Reafons,  chufe 
and  prefer  the  taking  of  that  which  he  underijalues,  and 
chufe  to  neglect  to  take  that  which  his  Mind  prefers.  In 
fuch  a  Cafe,  chufing  the  Thing  taken,  and  chufing  to  take, 
are  diverfe :  and  fo  they  are  in  a  Cafe  where  the  Things 
prefented  are  equal  in  the  Mind's  Efteem,  and  neither  of 
them  preferred.  All  that  Fact  and  Experience  makes  evi- 
dent, is,  that  the  Mind  chufes  one  Action  rather  than  ano- 
ther :  And  thersfore  the  Arguments  which  they  btirig,  in 
order  to  be  to  their  Purpofe,  ought  to  be  to  prove  that  the 
Mind  chufes  the  Action  in  perfect  Indifference,  with  Refpect 
to  that  Adion ;  and  not  to  prove  that  tlie  Mind  chufes  the 
Action  in  perfect  Indifference  with  Refpect  to  the  Qhjed ; 
which  is  very  poffible,  and  yet  the  Will  not  act  at  all  with- 
out prevalent  Inducement;,  and  proper  Preponderation. 

2.  Another  Reaion  of  Confufion  and  Difficulty  in  this 
Matter,  feems  to  be,  not  diilinguiiliing  between  a  general 
Indifference,  or  an  Indifference  with  Refpect  to  what  is  to 
be  done  in  a  more  diflant  and  general  View  of  it,  and  a  -par- 
ticular Indifference,  or  an  Indifference  with  Refpect  to  the 
next  immediate  Act,  view'd  with  its  particular  and  prefent 
Circumftances.  A  Man  may  be  perfectly  indifferent  with 
Refpect  to  his  own  Actions,  in  the  former  Refpect  ;  and  yet 
not  in  the  latter.  Thus,  in  the  foregoing  Inflance  of  touch- 
ing one  of  the  Squares  of  a  Chefs-board ;  when  'tis  firft 
propofed  that  I  fliould  touch  one  of  them,  I  may  be  per- 
fectly indifferent  v/hich  I  touch  ;  becaufe  as  yet  I  view 
the  Matter  remotely  and  generally,  being  but  in  the  firft 
Step  of  the  Mind's  Progrefs  in  the  Affair  :  But  yet,  when 
I  am  actually  come  to  the  laft  Step,  and  the  very  next  Thing 
to  be  determined  is,  which  is  to  be  touch'd,  having  already- 
determined  that  I  will  touch  that  which  happens  to  be 
moft  in  my  Eye  or  Mind,  and  my  Mind  being  now  fix'd  on 
a  particular  one,  the  Act  of  touching  that,  confidered  thus 
immediately,  and  in  thefe  particular  prefent  Circumftances,  is 
not  what  my  Mind  is  abfolutely  indifferent  about. 

.  ^;^  339CMeoa9<303e;e39COgpClge9eg09C>99gogeso.S2'939cgg;o99oog9SP3MC0990ao9C3aosoa«ea9ao.i^ 

K  S  E  C  T  X  O  K 


63  Of  Ltherty  of  Indifference;  I'art  If  .- 

Section  VII. 

Concerhlng  the  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will  corfifting 
in  Indifference. 

'TX7HAT  has  been  faid  in  the  foregoing  Seftrori,  has: 
V  V  a  Tendency  in  fome  Meafure  to  evince  the  Abfur- 
dity  of  the  Opinion  of  fuch  as  place  Liberty  in  Indifte- 
rence,  or  in  that  Equilibrium  whereby  the  Will  is  without 
ail  antecedent  Determination  or  Bias,  and  left  hitherto  free 
from  any  prepoiTeffmg  Inclination  to  one  Side  or  the  other ; 
that  the  Determination  of  the  Will  to  either  Side  .Tiay  be 
entirely  from  itfclf,  and  that  it  may  be  owing  only  to  its- 
own  Power,  and  that  Sovereignty  which  it  has  over  itfelf,- 
that  it  goes  this  Way  rather  than  that.  || 

But  in  as  much  as  this  has  been  cf  fuch  long  Handing,  and 
has  been  fo  generally  received,  and  fo  much  infifted  on  by 
Pelagians,  Semi-Felagians,  "Jefuits,  Sociytian^,  Arminians ,  and' 
Others,  it  may  deferve  a  more  full  Confideration.  And 
therefore  I  (hall  now  proceed  to  a  more  particular  and  tho- 
rough Inquiry  into  this  Notion. 

Now 

\  Dr.  Whitby,  and  fonie  other  Armiriinns,  make  a  Dlllin<!tion  of  dif- 
ferent Kinds  of  Freedom;  one  of  God,  and  perfect  Spirits  above; 
another  of  Perfons  in  a  Slate  of  Trial.  The  former  Dr.  Whiiby 
allows  to  confift  with  Neceffity ;  the  Ijtfer  He  holds  to  be  without 
Necefi'ity:  And  tJiis  latter  he  fuppofes  'o  be  requifite  to  our  being 
the  Subjefts  of  Praife  or  Difpraiie,  Rewards  or  Punifhments,  Pre- 
cepts and  Prohibitions,  Promi/es  and  T  hreats,  Exhortations  and 
Dehortations,  and  a  Covenant-Treaty.  And  ta  this  Freedom  he 
fuppofes  h:d:fferencc  to  be  requifite.  In  his  Difcourfe  on  the  five 
Points,  P.  299,  300,  he  fays ;  '•  It  is  a  Freedom  (fpeaking  of  a  Free- 
♦'  dom  not  only  from  Co-atlion',  but  from  Neceffity)  requifite,  as  we 
"  conceive,  to  render  us  capable  of  Trial  or  Probation,  and  to 
**  retider  our  Aflions  worthy  of  Praife  or  Difpraife,-  and  our  Per- 
«*  fons  of  Rewards  or  Puniiliments."  And  in  the  next  Page,  fpeak- 
•«'  ing  of  the  fam}  Matter,  He  fays,  "Excellent  to  this  Pufpofe, 
•'  are  the  Words  of  Mr.  'Tborndike :  We  fay  not,  that  Indifference  is 
*'  requifite  to  all  Freedcit<,  but  to  the  Fretdom  of  Man  alone  in  this 
"  State  of  Trai/ail  and  Prof cience  :  the  Ground  of  nvhich  is  God's  Ten- 
"  der  of  a  7rtaty,  and  Conditions  of  Peace  and  Reconcilement  to  fallen 
••  Man,  together  ivith  thofe  Precspts  and  Prohibitions,  thofe  Promifet 
«*  «c;</  Threats,  thofe Eahurtatiom  andDehortationS)  it  is  enforced  -wUh.'*^ 


Seel. VII.  0/ Liberty  cofi/j/'img  in  Indln^rtnce.    S^ 

Now  left  fome  fliould  fuppofe  that  I  don't  underfland  thofe 
that  place  Liberty  in  Indifterence,  or  fhould  charge  me  with 
jnifreprefenting    their  Opinion,  I  would   fignify,  that  I   am 
fenfible,  ttiere  are  fome,  who  when  they  talk  of  the  Liberty 
of  the  Will  as  confifting  in  LidifFerence,  exprefs  themfelves 
as  tho'  they  would  not  be  underftood  of  the  Lidift'crence  of 
the  Inclination   or  Tendency  of  the  Will,   but  of,    I  know 
not  what.  Indifference    of  the  Soul's  Power  of  Willing  ;  or 
that  the  Will,  with  Refpeft  to  its  Power  or  Ability  to  chufe, 
is  indifferent,  can  go  either  Way  indifferently,  either  to  the 
right  Hand  or  left,  either   act  or  forbear  to  act,  one  as  well 
,as  the  other.     Tho'   this    feems   to    be   a  Refining  only   of 
•fome    particular  Writers,  and    newly    invented,  and     which 
will  by  no  Means  confift  with  the  Manner  of  ExprefTion  ufed 
by    the  Defenders    of   Liberty    of  Indifference    in    general. 
And  I  wifh  fuch  Refiners  would  thoroughly  ccnf:der,  whether 
they  diflinctly  know  their  own  Meaning,  when  they  make  a 
Diltinction  between  Indifference  of  the  Soul  as  to  its  Poiver 
or  Ability    of  Willing    or  Cliufmg,  and    th^  Soul's  Indiffe- 
rence as  to    the   Preference    or  Choice    itfclf ;  and    whether 
they  don't  deceive  themfelves  in    imagining  that  they  have 
any    diflinct  Meaning  at  all.     The   Indifference    of  the  Soul 
as  to  its  Ability    or  Power  to  Will,  muft  be  the  fame  Thing 
as  the  Indifference  of  the  State  of  the  Power  or  Faculty  of 
the  Will,  or   the  Indifference  of  the   State   which  the  Soul 
.itfelf,  which   has    that  Power   or  Faculty,  hitherto   reraainj 
in,  as  to  the  Exercife   of  that  Power,  in  the  Choice  it  {hal| 
by  and  by  make. 

But  not  to  infift  any  longer  on  the  Abftrufenefs  an3 
Inexplicablenefs  of  this  Diftinction ;  let  what  will  be  fup- 
pofed  concerning  the  Meaning  of  them  that  make  Ufe  of  it, 
thus  much  mult  at  leaft  be  intended  by  Arminiam,  when 
they  talk  of  Indifference  as  eflsntial  to  Liberty  of  Will,  if 
they  intend  any  Thing,  in  any  Refpect  to  their  Purpofe, 
'viz.  That  it  is  fuch  an  Indifference  as  leaves  the  Will  not 
determined  already  ;  but  free  fiom  actual  PaiTelfion,  and 
vacant  of  Predeterrpinaticn,  fo  far»  that  there  may  be 
Room  for  the  Exercife  of  the  Self-detern-.tning  Ponver  of  the 
Will ;  and  that  the  WiiVs  Freedom  confifts  in,  or  depends 
upon  this  Vacancy  and  Opportunity  that  is  left  for  the  Will 
itfelf  to  be  the  Determiner  of  the  Act  that  is  to  be  the  free 
Act.  ^■'■}  ~ 

.      And 


6^      Q/"  Liberty  conjifting  in  Indifference.   Part  IL 

And  here  I  would  obferve  in  the  frji  Place,  that  to  mak; 
out  this  Scheme  of  Liberty,  the  InditFerence  muft  be  per- 
fed  and  ahjolute ;  there  muft  be  a  perfed  Freedom  from  all 
antecedent  Preponderation  or  Inclination.  Bscaufe  if  the; 
Will  be  already  inclined,  before  it  exerts  its  own  fovereign 
Power  on  itfelf,  then  its  Inclination  is  not  wholly  owing 
to  itfelf:  If  when  two  Oppofites  are  propofed  to  the  Soul 
for  its  Choice,  the  Propofal  don't  find  the  Soul  wholly  in  a 
State  of  Indifference,  then  it  is  not  found  in  a  State  of  Li- 
berty for  mere   Self-determination,-- The   leaft   Degree  of 

antecedent  Bias  muft  be  inconfiftent  with  their  Notion  of 
Liberty.  For  fo  long  as  prior  Inclination  poflefies  the  Will, 
and  is  not  removed,  it  binds  the  Will,  fo  that  it  is  utterly 
impoffible  that  the  Will  ftiould  act  otherwife  than  agreeably 
to  it.  Surely  the  Will  can't  act  or  chufe  contrary  to  a  re- 
maining prevailing  Inclination  of  the  Will.  To  fuppofe 
otherwife,  would  be  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fuppofe,  that  the 
Will  is  inclined  contrary  to  its  prefent  prevailing  Inclination^ 
or  contrar)'  to  what  it  is  inclined  to.  That  which  the  Will 
chufes  and  prefers,  that,  all  Things  confidered,  it  Prepon- 
derates and  inclines  to.  It  is  equally  impoffible  for  the 
Will  to  chufe  contrary  to  its  own  remaining  and  prefent 
preponderating  Inclination,  as  'tis  to  prefir  contrary  to  its, 
own  prefent  Preference,  or  chufe  contrary  to  its  own  prefent 
Choice.  The  Will  therefore,  fo  long  as  it  is  under  the 
Influence  of  an  old  preponderating  Inclination,  is  not  at 
Liberty  for  a  new  free'  Act,  or  any  Act  that  fhall  now  be 
an  Act  of  Self-determination.  The  Act  which  is  a  Self- 
determin'd  free  Act,  muft  be  an  Act  which  the  Will  de- 
termines in  the  Poffeffion  and  Ufe  of  fuch  a  Liberty,  as  con- 
fifts  in  a  Freedom  from  every  Thing,  which,  if  it  were, 
there,  would  ipake  it  impoffible  that  the  Will,  at  that 
Time,  Ihould  be  otherwife  than  that  Way  to  which  it 
tends. 

If  any  one  ftiould  fay,  there  is  no  Need  that  the  In- 
difference ftaould  be  perfeft ;  but  altho'  a  former  Inclination, 
and  Preference  ftill  remains,  yet,  ifitben't  very  ftrong  and 
violent,  poffibly  the  Strength  of  the  Will  may  oppofe  and 
overcome  it : 

This   is  grofly  abfurd ;  for  the  Strength  of  the  Will,    let 
it  be  never  fo  great,  does  not  at  all  enable  it  to  act  one  Way, 
and   not   the  contrary  Way,    both  at  the   fame   Time.     It 
gives  it  no  fuch  Sovereignty  and  Command,  as  to  caufe  it- 
felf 


Sea.VII.  Of  Liberty  of  Will  conffling,  &c.      6^ 

felf  to   prefer  and  not   to  prefer  at   the  fame  Time,    or  to 
chufe  contrary  to  its  own  prefent  Choice. 

Therefore,  if  there  be  the  leaft  Degree  of  antecedent  Pre- 
ponderation  of  the  Will,  it  muft  be  perfedlly  abollfhed, 
before  the  Will  can  be  at  Liberty  to  determine  itfelf  th^  , 
contrary  Way.  And  if  the  Will  determines  itfelf  the 
fame  Way,  it  was  not  a  free  Determination ,  becaufe  the 
Will  is  not  wholly  at  Liberty  in  fo  doing  :  Its  Deter- 
mination is  not  altogether  from  itfelf,  but  it  was  partly  de- 
termined before,  in  its  prior  Inclination :  And  all  the  Free- 
dom the  Will  exercifes  in  the  Cafe,  is  in  an  Increafe  of  In- 
clination, which  it  gives  itfelf,  over  and  above  what  it  had 
by  the  foregoing  Bias. ;  fo  much  is  from  itfelf,  and  fo  much 
is  from  perfeft  Indifference.  For  tho'  the  Will  had  a  pre- 
vious Tendency  that  Way,  yet  as  to  that  additional  Degree 
of  Inclination,  it  had  no  Tendency.  Therefore  the  previ- 
ous Tendency  is  of  no  Confi deration,  with  Refpeft  to  the 
Aft  wherein  the  Will  is  free.  So  that  it  comes  to  the  fame 
Thing  which  was  faid  at  firft,  that  as  to  the  Aft  of  the  Will, 
wherein  the  Will  is  free,  there  mull  be  perfe&  Lidifference,  or 
Equilibrium, 

To  illuftrate  this ;  If  we  fhould  fuppofe  a  fovereign  Self- 
moving  Power  in  a  natural  Body  :  But  that  the  Body  is  in 
Motion  already,  by  an  antecedent  Bias ;  for  Inflance,  Gra- 
vitation towards  the  Center  of  the  Earth  ;  and  has  one  De- 
cree of  Motion  already,  by  Virtue  of  that  previous  Ten- 
aency ;  but  by  its  felf- moving  Pov/er  it  adds  one  Degree 
more  to  its  Motion,  and  moves  fo  much  more  fwiftlv  to- 
wards the  Center  of  the  Earth  than  it  would  do  by  its  Gra- 
vity only  :  It  is  evident,  that  all  that  is  owing  to  a  felf-mov- 
ing  Power  in  this  Cafe,  is  the  additional  Degree  of  Motion  ; 
and  that  the  other  Degree  of  Motion  which  it  had  from 
Gravity,  is  of  no  Confideration  in  the  Cafe,  don't  help  the 
EfFeft  of  the  free  felf-moving  Power  in  tlie  leaf! ;  the  EfFeft 
is  juft  the  fame,  as  if  the  Body  had  received  from  itfelf 
one  Degree  of  Motion  from  a  State  of  perfeft  Reft.  So  if 
we  fhould  fuppofe  a  felf-moving  Power  given  to  the  Scale  of 
a  Balance,  which  has  a  Weight  of  one  Degree  beyond  the 
oppofite  Scale ;  and  we  afcribe  to  it  an  Ability  to  add  to  it- 
felf another  Degree  of  Force  the  fame  Way,  by  its  felf- 
moving  Power;  This  is  juft  the  fame  Thing  as  to  afcribe 
to  it  a  Power  to  give  itfelf  one  Degree  of  Preponderatiori. 
^rom    a    perfeft  Equilibrium  3    and  {o  much  Power  as  the 

Scale 


^7  Of  Liheriy  of  Will  Part  11, 

Scale  has  to  give  itfelf  an  Over-balance  n-om  a  perfect  E- 
quipoife,  ,fo  much  felf-moving  fe!f-preponderating  Power  it 
has,  and  no  more.  So  that  its  free  Power  this  Way  is  al- 
ways to  be  meafured  from  perfect  Equilibrium. 

I  need  fay  no  more  to  prove,  that,  if  IndiiFerence  be 
cffential  to  Liberty,  it  muft  be  perfect  IndifFeience ;  and 
that  fo  far  as  the  Will  is  defiitute  of  this,  fo  far  it  is  defti- 
tute  of  that  Freedom  by  which  it  is  its  own  Mafter,  and  in 
a  Capacity  of  being  its  ov^u  Determiner,  without  being  at 
all  paffive,  or  fubjeft  tc  the  Power  and  Sway  of  fomething 
.elfe,  in  its  Motions  and  Determinations. 

Having  obferved  thefe  Things,  let  us  now  try  whether 
this  Notion  of  the  Liberty  of  Will  confifting  in  Indiffe- 
rence and  Equilibrium,  and  the  Will's  Self-determinatiop 
in  fuch  a  State,  be  Hot  abfurd  and  incoiiGilent. 

And  here  I  would  lay  down  this  as  an  Axiom  of  undoubt- 
ed Truth  ;  That  enjery  free  Acl  is  done  in  a  State  of  Freedom,  and 
pot  only  after  fuch  a  State,  If  an  Adl  of  the  Will  be  an  A(fl 
wherein  the  Soul  is  free,  it  muft  be  exerted  in  a  State  of 
Freedom,  znd  in  the  Time  of  Freedom.  It  will  not  fufiice,  that 
the  Aft  immediately  follows  a  State  of  Liberty ;  but  Li- 
berty muft  yet  continue,  and  co-exift  with  the  A6t ;  the  Soul 
remaining  in  Poffeflion  of  Liberty.  Becaufe  that  is  the  No- 
tion of  a  free  A£i  of  the  Soul,  even  an  Aft  wherein  the  Soui 
?(fes  or  exercifes  Liberty.  But  if  the  Sou]  is  not,  iji  the  very 
Time  of  the  Aft,  in  the  Poffefpon  of  Liberty,  it  can't  at 
that  Time  be  in  the  Ufe  of  it. 

Now  the  Queftion  is,  whether  ever  the  Soul  of  Man  puts 
forth  any  Aft  of  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  in  a  State  of  Li- 
berty, in  that  Notion  of  a  State  of  Liberty,  'viz.  as  implying 
a  State  of  Indifference  ]  or  whether  the  Soul  ever  exerts  an 
Aft  of  Choice  or  Preference,  while  at  that  very  Time 
the  Will  is  in  a  perieft  Equilibrium,  not  inclining  one  Way 
more  than  another.  The  very  putting  of  the  Queftion  is 
fufncient  to  fnew  the  Abfurdity  of  the  affirmative  Anfwer : 
For  how  ridiculous  would  it  be  for  any  Body  to  infift,  that 
the  Soul  chufes  one  Thing  before  another,  when  at  the 
very  fame  Inftant  it  is  perfeftly  indifferent  with  Refpeft  to 
each  !  This  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  the  Soul  prefers 
one  Thing  to  another,  at  the  very  fame  Time  that  it  has  no 
Preference. — ; — Choice  and  Preference  can  no  more  be  in  a 
_  State 


Secl.VII.  cofififling  in  Indifference.  ^i 

State  of  Indifference,  than  Motion  can  be  in  a  State  of  Peft, 
or  thin  the  Pi'eponderation  of  the  Scale  of  a  Balance  can  be 
in  a  State  of  Equilibrium.  Motion  may  be  the  next  Moment 
after  Reft  ;  butcan'tco-exift  with  it,  in  any,  even  the /f^^  Part  of 
it.  So  Choice  may  be  immediately  after  a  State  of  Indifference^ 
but  has  no  Co-exiltence  with  it :  Even  the  very  Beginning  of 
it  is  not  in  a  State  of  Indifference.  And  therefore  if  this  be 
Liberty,  no  Aft  of  the  Will,  in  any  Degree,  is  ever  per- 
formed in  a  State  of  Liberty,  or  in  the  Time  of  Liberty. 
Volition  and  Liberty  are  fo  far  from  agreeing  together,  and 
being  effential  one  to  another,  that  they  are  contrary  one  to 
another,  and  one  excludes  and  deftroys  tlie  other,  as  much 
as  Motion  and  Reft,  Light  and  Darknefs,  or  Life  and  Death. 
So  that  the  Will  afts  not  at  all,  does  not  fo  much  as  bewin 
to  Aft  in  the  Time  of  fuch  Liberty  :  Freedom  is  perfeuly 
at  an  End,  and  has  ceafed  to  be,  at  the  firft  Mom.ent  of 
Aftion  ;  and  therefore  Liberty  can't  reach*  the  Aftion,  to 
afFeft,  or  qualify  it,  or  give  it  a  Denomination,  or  any  Part  of 
it,  any  more  than  if  it  had  ceafed  to  be  twenty  Years  before 
the  Aftion  began.  The  Moment  that  Liberty  ceafes  to  be, 
it  ceafes  to  be  a  Qualification  of  any  Thing.  If  Light  and 
Darlinefs  fucceed  one  another  inftantaneoufly.  Light  qualifies 
Nothing  after  it  is  gone  out,  to  make  any  thing  lightfome 
or  bright,  any  more  at  the  firft  Moment  of  perfeft  Darknefs, 
than  Months  or  Years  after.  Life  denominates  Nothin? 
'vital  at  the  firft  Moment  of  perfeft  Death.  So  Freedom,  if  it 
confifts  'tn,  or  implies  Indifference,  can  denominate  Nothing 
free,  at  the  firft  Moment  of  Preference  or  Preponderation  : 
Therefore  'tis  manifeft,  that  no  Liberty  which  the  Soul  is  pof- 
fefTed  of,  or  ever  ufes,  in  any  of  its  Afts  of  Volition,  con- 
fifts in  Indifference  ;  and  that  the  Opinion  of  fuch  as  fup- 
pofe,  that  Indifference  belongs  to  the  very  Eflence  of  Liberty, 
is  to  the  higheft  Degree  abfurd  and  contradiftory. 

If  any  one  fliould  imagine,  that  this  Manner  of  arguino- 
is  Nothing  but  Trick  and  Delufion ;  and  to  evade  the 
Reafoning,  fhould  fay,  that  the  Thing  wherein  the  Will  ex- 
ercifes  its  Liberty,  is  not  in  the  Aft  of  Choice  or  Prepon- 
deration itfelf,  but  in  determining  itfelf  to  a  certain  Choice 
or  Preference ;  That  the  Aft  of  the  Will  wherein  it  is  free, 
and  ufes  its  own  Sovereignty,  confifts  in  its  caujifig  or  de- 
iermining  the  Change  or  Tranjition  from  a  State  of  Indifference 
to  a  certain  Preference,  or  determining  to  give  a  cettaii? 
Turn  to  the  Balance,  which  has  hitherto  been  even ;  and 
that  this  Aft  the  Will  exerts  in  a  State  of  Liberty,  or  while 
the  Will  yet  remains  in  Equilibrium,  and  perfeft  Mafter  o^ 

it- 


69  Of  Liberty  of  IVillconf fling  inlndi^tTtnct^Vz..  IL 

itfelf : 1   fay,    if  any  One  chufes  to  exprefs  his   Notion 

of  Liberty  after  this,  or  fome  fuch  Manner,  let  us  fee  if  he  can 
make  out  his  Matters  any  better  than  before. 

What  is  afierted  is,  that  the  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  in 
perfeft  Equilibrium,  without  Preference,  determines  to  change 
itfelf  from  that  State,  and  excite  in  itfelf  a  certain  Choice 
or  Preference.  Now  let  lis  fee  whether  this  don't  come 
to  the  fame  Abfurdity  we  had  before.  If  it  be  fo  that 
the  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  perfeftly  Indifferent,  deter- 
mines to  put  itfelf  out  of  that  State,  and  give  itfelf  a  cer- 
tain Preponderation ;  Then  I  would  inquire,  whether  the 
Soul  don't  determine  this  of  Choice  ;  or  whether  the  Will's 
coming  to  a  Determination  to  do  fo,  be  not  the  fame  Thing 
as  the  Soul's  coming  to  a  Choice  to  do  fo.  If  the  Soul  don't 
determine  this  of  Choice,  or  in  the  Exercife  of  Choice, 
then  it  don't  determine  it  voluntarily.  And  if  the  Soul  don't 
determine  it  voluntarily,  or  of  its  own  IVill,  then  in  what 
Senfe  does  its  Will  determine  it  ?  And  if  the  Will  don't 
determine  it,  then  how  is  the  Liberty  of  Will  exercifed  iri 
the  Determination  ?  What  fort  of  Liberty  is  exercifed 
by  the  Soul  in  thofe  Determinations,  wherein  there  is 
no  exercife  of  Choice,  which  are   not  voluntary,  and  whereiii 

the  Will  is  not  concerned  ? But  if  it  be  allowed,  that  this 

Determination  is  an  Aft  of  Choice,  and  it  be  infilled  on,  that 
the  Soul,  while  it  yet  remains  in  a  State  of  perfeft  Indiffe- 
rence, chufes  to  put  itfelf  out  of  that  State,  and  to  turn  it- 
felf one  Way;  then  the  Soul  is  already  come  to  a  Choice,  and 
chufes  that  Way.  And  fo  we  have  the  very  fame  Abfurdity 
which  we  had  before.  Here  is  the  Soul  in  a  State  of  Choice, 
and  in  a  State  of  Equilibrium,  both  at  the  fame  Time  :  the 
Soul  already  chufing  one  Way,  while  it  remains  in  a  State 
of    perfeifl    Indifference,     and   has   no   Choice   of  one   Way 

more  than  the  other. And  indeed  this  Manner  of  talking, 

tho'  it  may  a  little  hide  the  Abfurdity,  in  the  Obfcurity  of 
Expreffion,  is  more  nonfenfical,  and  increafes  the  Inconfilt- 
cnce.  To  fay,  the  free  Aft  of  the  Will,  or  the  Aft  which 
the  Will  exerts  in  a  State  of  Freedom  and  Indifference,  does 
not  imply  Preference  in  it,  but  is  what  the  Will  does  in 
order  to  caufing  or  producing  a  Preference,  is  as  much  as  to 
fay,  the  Soul  chufes  (for  to  Will  and  to  chufe  are  the  fame 
Thing)  without  Choice,  and  prefers  without  Preference,  in 
order  to  canfe  or  produce  th&  Beginning  of  a  Preference,  or 
the  firft  Choice.  And  that  is,  that  the  firlt  Choice  is  exerted 
without  Choice,  in  order  to  produce  itftlf, 


Sedl.VII.  Of  Liberty's  lyh/g  ma  Fozver,dzc.     70 

If  any,  to  evade  thefc  Things,  (hould  own,  that  a  State  of 
Liberty,  'and  &  State  of  Indifterence  are  not  the  fame,  and 
that  the  former  may  be  without  the  latter  ;  But  fhould  fay, 
that  Indifference  is  llill  ejfential  to  the  Freedom  of  an  Adl  of 
V/ill,  in  feme  Sort;,  namely,  as  'tis  neceffary  to  go  imme- 
diately before  it ;  It  being  efiential  to  the  Freedom  of  an  Adl 
of  Will  that  it  fhould  direftly  and  immediately  arife  out  of 
z  State  of  Indifference :  ftill  this  will  not  help  the  Caufe  of 
Arminian  Liberty,  or  make  it  cor.liftent  with  itfelf.  For  if 
the  Aft  fprings  immediately  out  of  a  StAte  of  Indifference, 
then  it  does  not  arife  from  antecedent  Choice  or  Preference.  But 
if  the  Aft  arifcs  direftly  out  of  a  State  of  Indifference,  with- 
out any  intervening  Choice  to  chufe  and  determine  it,  then 
the  Aft  not  being  determined  by  Choice,  is  not  determined 
by  the  Will ;  the  Mind  exercifes  no  free  Choice  in  the 
Affair,  and  free  Choice  and  free  Will  have  no  Hand  in  the 
Determination  of  the  Aft  :  Which  is  entirely  inconfiftent  with 
their  Notion  of  tlie  Freedom  of  Volition. 

If  any  fnould  fuppofe,  that  thefe  DifHcuIties  and  Abfurdi- 
ties  may  be  avoided,  by  faying,  that  the  Liberty  of  the  Mind 
confifts  in  a  Power  to  fufpend  the  Aft  of  the  Will,  and  fo  to 
keep  it  in  a  State  oi  Indifference,  'till  there  has  been  Oppor- 
tunity for  Confideration ;  and  fo  fhall  fay,  that  however 
Indiiierence  is  not  effential  to  Libertj-  in  fuch  a  Manner,  that 
the  Mind  mull  make  its  Choice  in  a  State  of  Indifference, 
which  is  an  Inconfiftency,  or  that  the  Aft  of  Will  muft 
fpring  immediately  out  of  Indifterence  ;  yet  Indifference  may 
be  efl'ential  to  the  Liberty  of  Afts  of  the  Will  in  this  Refpeft  ; 
<vi%.  That  Liberty  confifls  in  a  Power  of  the  Mind  to  for- 
bear to  fufpend  the  Aft  of  Volition,  and  keep  the  Mind  in 
a  State  of  Indifference  for  the  prefent,  'till  there  has  been 
Opportunity  for  proper  Deliberation  :  I  fay,  if  any  one 
imagines  that  this  helps  the  Matter,  it  is  a  great  Miftake  :  Ic 
teconciles  no  Inconfiftency,  and  relieves  no  Difficulty  which 

the  Affair  is  attended  with. For  here  the  following  Things 

muft  be  obferved, 

I.  That  x\\\%fuf pen  ding  of  Volition,  if  tiiere  be  properly  any 
fuch  Thing,  is  itfelf  an  Aft  of  Volition.  If  the  Mind  de- 
termines to  fufpend  its  Aft,  it  determines  it  voluntarily  ;  it 
chufes,  on  fome  Confideration,  to  fufpend  it.  And  this 
Choice  or  Determination,  is  an  Aft  of  the  Will :  And  in- 
deed it  is  fuppofed  to  be  fo  in  the  very  Hypothefis ;  for  'tis 
fuppofed,    that  the  Liberty  of  the  IVill  confifts  in  its  Power 

L  to 


71  Of  Liberty's  lying  in  a  Poiver       Part  It. 

io  do  thus,  and  that  its  doing  it  is  the  very  Thing  whereift 
the  H"  ill  txerci/ts  its  Liberty.  But  how  can  the  Will  exercife 
Liberty  in  it,  if  it  be  net  an  Aft  of  the  Will  ?  the  Liberty 
of  the  Will  is  not  exereifad  in  any  Thing  but  what  the  Wilf 
does. 

7 .  This  determining  to  fufpend  afting  is  not  only  an  Aft 
of  the  V/ill,  but  'tis  luppofed  to  be  the  only  tree  Aft  of 
the  Will ;  becaufe  it  is  faid,  that  this  is  the  Thing  therein  the 

Liberty  of  the  Will  conf:Jis. Now  if  this  be  fo,  then  this  is' 

£ll  the  Aft  of  Will  that  we  have  to  confider  in  this  Contro- 
rerfy,  about  the  Liberty  of  Will,  and  in  our  Inquiries, 
wherein  the  Liberty  of  Man  confifts.  And  now  the  fore- 
mentioned  Difficulties  remain  :  the  former  Queftiorr  returns 
upon  us ;  ^viz.  Wherein  confilb  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  in 
thcfe  A8s  wherein  it  is  {rtt  ?  And  if  this  Aft  of  determining 
a  bufpeniion  be  the  only  Aft  in  which  the  Will  is  free,  then 
wherein  confifts  the  Will's  Freedom  with  Refpeft  to  this  Aft 
of  Sufpeniion  ?  And  how  is  Indifference  effential  to  this  Aft  ? 
The  Anfwer  muft  be,  according  to  what  is  fuppofed  in  the 
Evalion  under  Confideration,  That  the  Liberty  of  the  Vy'llI, 
in  t?iis  Aft  of  Sufpenfion,  confifts  in  a  Power  to  fufpend  even 
this  Aft,  'till  there  has  been  Opportunity  for  thorough  Deli- 
beration. But  this  will  be  to  plunge  direftly  into  the  groJGTeft 
Nonfenfe ;  for  'tis  the  Aft  of  Sufpenfion  itfelf  that  we  are 
fpeaking  of;  and  there  is  no  Room  for  a  Space  of  Delibe- 
ration and  Sufpeniion,  in  order  to  determine  whether  we 
will  fufpend  or  no.  For  that  fuppofes,  that  even  Sufpeniion 
itfelf  may  be  defer'd :  W^hich  is  abfurd ;  for  the  very  de- 
ferring the  Determination  of  Sufpenfion,  to  confider  whe- 
ther we  will  fufpend  or  no,  will  be  aftually  fufpending.  For 
during  the  Space  of  Sufpenfion,  to  confider  whether  to  fuf- 
pend, the  Aft  is  ipfo  fafio  fufpended.  There  is  no  Medium 
between  fufpending  to  aft,  and  immediately  afting  j  and 
therefore  no  Poffibility  cf  avoiding  either  the  one  or  the  other 
one  Moment ;  and  Xo  no  Room  for  Deliberation  before  W3 
do  either  of  them. 

And  befides,  this  is  attended  with  ridiculous  Abfurdity 
another  Way  :  For  now  it  is  come  to  that,  that  Liberty  con- 
fifts wholly  in  the  Mind's  having  Power  to  fufpend  its  Deter- 
mination whether  to  fufpend  or  no;  that  there  may  be 
Time  for  Confideration,  whether  it  be  beft  to  fufpend.  And 
if  Liberty  confifts  in  this  only,  then  tliis  is  the  Liberty  under 
Confideration :  We  have  to  inquire  now,  how  Liberty  with 

Refpee^ 


SecTcVII.  io  fu^end  FpUtion,  ^% 

Refped  to  this  Act  of  fufpending  a  Determination  of  Siii*« 
penlion,  confifts  in  Indif;erence,  or  how  Indifference  is 
effential  to  it.  The  Anfwer,  according  to  the  Hypothefis  wc 
are  upon,  muft  be,  that  it  confifts  in  a  Power  of  fufpending 
even  this  laft  mentioned  Aft,  to  have  Time  to  confider  v/he- 
ther  to  fufpend  that.  And  then  the  fame  Difficulties  and 
Inquiries  return  over  again  with  Refpect  to  that ;  and  fo  on 
forever.  Which,  if  it  would  fnew  any  Thing,  would  ftiew 
only  that  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as  a  free  Act.  It  drives  the 
^xcrcife  of  Freedom  back  //?  i7ifinitum ;  and  that  \%  to  drive 
jt  out  of  the  World. 

And  befides  all  this,  there  is  a  Delufion,  and  a  latent  grofs 
Contradiction  in  the  Aftair  another  Way  ;  in  as  much  as  in 
explaining  how,  or  in  vvhat  Refpect  the  Will  is  free  with 
Regard  to  a  particular  Act  of  Volition,  'tis  faid,  that  its 
Liberty  conlifts  in  a  Power  to  determine  to  fufpend  that  A&t 
which  places  Liberty  not  in  that  Ad  of  Volition  which  the 
Inquiry  is  about,  but  altogether  in  another  antecedent  Act : 
Which  contradicts  the  Thing  fuppofed  in  both  the  Queftion 
and  Anfwer.  The  Quetlion  is,  v.'herein  confifts  the  Mind's 
Liberty  in  a?iy  particular  Ad  of  Volition  ?  And  the  Anfwer,  in 
pretending  to  Ihew  wherein  lies  the  Mind's  Liberty  in  that 
Ad,  in  Eftect  fays,  it  don't  lie  in  that  Act  at  all,  but  in  ano- 
ther, njiz.  a  Volition  to  fi-fpend  that  Ad  :  And  therefore  the 
Anfwer  is  both  contradictory,  and  altogether  impertinent  and 
befide  the  Purpofe,  For  it  don't  fhew  wherein  the  Liberty 
of  the  Will  confifts  in  the  Act  in  Quefcion ;  Inftead  of  that, 
it  fuppofes  it  don't  conlift  in  that  Act  at  all,  but  in  another 
diftinct  from  it,  even  a  Volition  to  fufpend  that  Act.  and  take 
Time  to  confider  of  it.  And  no  Account  is  pretended  to  be 
given  wherein  the  Mind  is  free  with  Refpect  to  that  Act, 
wherein  this  Anfwer  fuppofes  the  Liberty  of  the  Mind  in- 
deed confifts,  'viz.  the  Act  of  Sufpenfion,  or  of  determining 
the  Sufpenfion. 

On  the  Whole,  'tis  exceeding  manifeft,  that  the  Liberty  of 
the  Mind  does  not  confift  in  Indifference,  and  that  Indiffe- 
rence is  not  effential  or  neceflary  to  it,  or  at  all  belonging  to 
it,  as  the  Arminians  fuppofe  ;  that  Opinion  being  full  of  No- 
thing but  Abfurdity  and  Self-con,tradi<fticn. 

L^i  Section 


73         Of  Liberty  without  Neccltity.         Part  II. 

Section     VIII. 

Concerning  the  fuppofed  Liherty  of  the  IVill^  as  op^ 
pofite  to  all  Neceflity. 

J*"  I  ""IS  a  Thing  chiefly  infifted  on  hy  Arminians,  in  this 
X  Controveriy.  as  a  Thing  moll  important  and  effen- 
tial  in  human  Liberty,  that  Volitions,  or  the  Ads  of  the  Will, 
are  conlingejit  Events  ;  underftanding  Contingence  as  oppcfite, 
not  only  to  Conitraint,  but  to  ail  Neceflity  ;  Therel'ore  I 
would  particularly  confider  this  Matter.     And, 

1.  I  would  inquire,  whether  there  is,  or  can  be  any  fuch 
Thing,  as  a  Volition  which  is  contingent  in  fuch  a  Senfe, 
as  not  only  to  come  to  pafs  without  any  NecefTity  of  Con- 
ftraint  or  Co-adVion,  but  alfo  without  a  NectJJitj  ofCon/cquencc,. 
or  an  infallible  Connexion  with  any  Thing  foregoing. 

2.  Whether,  if  it  were  fo,  this  would  at  all  help  the  Caufe 
of  Liberty. 

L  I  would  confider  whether  Volition  is  a  Thing  that  ever 
does,  or  can  come  to  pafs,  in  this  Manner,  contingently. 

And  here  it  muft  be  remembered,  that  it  has  been  already 
fhewn,  that  Nothing  can  ever  come  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe, 
or  Reafon  why  it  exifts  in  this  Manner  rather  than  another ; 
and  the  Evidence  of  this  has  been  particularly  applied  to 
the  Adls  of  the  Will.  Now  if  this  be  fo,  it  will  demon- 
ftrably  follow,  that  the  Ads  of  the  Will  are  never  contingent, 
or  without  Necefiity,  in  the  Senfe  fpoken  of;  in  as  much  as 
thofe  Things  which  have  a  Caufe,  or  Reafon  of  their  Exiftence, 
muft  be  ccnnefted  with  their  Caufe.  This  apj)ears  by  the  fol- 
lowing Confiderations. 

I.  For  an  Event  to  have  a  Caufe  and  Ground  of  its  Ex- 
iftence, and  yet  not  to  be  connefted  with  its  Caufe,  is  an 
Inconfiftence.  For  if  the  Event  be  not  connefted  with  the 
Caufe,  it  is  not  dependent  on  the  Caufe ;  its  Exift- 
ence is  as  it  were  loofe  from  its  Influence,  and  may  at- 
tend it,  or  may  not ;  it  being  a  mere  Contingence,  whe- 
ther it  follows  or  attends  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe, 
or  not :  And  that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  not  to  be  depen- 
dent 


Sefl.VlII.    Of  the  fuppojed  Liberty,  Sec,  74 

dent  on  it.  And  to  fay,  the  Event  is  not  dependent  on  its 
Caufe,  is  abfurd  :  'Tis  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  it  is  not  its 
Caufe,  nor  the  Event  the  EfFeCl  of  it :  For  Dependence  on 
the  Influence  of  a  Caufe,  is  the  very  Notion  of  an  Effeft.  If 
there  he  no  fuch  Relation  between  one  Thing  and  another, 
confifting  in  the  Connexion  and  Dependence  of  one  Thing 
on  the  influence  of  another,  then  it  is  certain  there  is  no 
fuch  Relation  between  them  as  is  fignified  by  the  Terms 
Caufe  and  Effe^.  So  far  as  an  Event  is  dependent  on  a  Caufe, 
and  connefted  with  it,  fo  much  Caufality  is  there  in  the  Cafe, 
and  no  more.  The  Caufe  does,  or  brings  to  pafs  no  more  in 
any  Event,  than  is  dependent  on  it.  If  we  fay,  the  Con- 
nection and  Dependence  is  not  total,  but  partial,  and  that  the 
Sffedt,  tho*  it  has  fome  Conneflion  and  Dependence,  yet  is 
not  entirely  dependent  on  it ;  That  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to 
fay,  that  not  all  that  is  in  the  Event  is  an  Effect  of  that  Caufe, 
but  that  only  Part  of  it  arifes  froni  thence,  and  Part  fome 
other  Way. 

2.  If  there  are  fome  Events  which  are  not  necefiTarily'con- 
nedted  with  their  Caufes,  then  it  will  follow,  that  there  are 
fome  Things  v/hich  come  to  pafs  without  any  Caufe,  contra- 
ry to  the  Suppofition.  For  if  there  be  any  Event  which  was 
not  necelTarily  connected  with  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe  un- 
der fuch  Circumltances,  then  it  was  contingent  whether  it 
would  attend  or  follow  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  or  no:  It 
might  have  followed,  and  it  might  not,  when  the  Caufe  was 
the  fame,  its  Influence  the  fame,  and  under  the  fame  Circum- 
(lances.  And  if  fo,  why  did  it  fellow,  rather  than  not  follow  ? 
There  is  no  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  this  :  Therefore  here  is  fome- 
thing  without  any  Caufe  or  Reafon  why  it  is,  njiz.  the  follow- 
ing of  the  Effea  on  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  with  which 
it  was  not  necelTarily  connected.  If  there  be  a  neceflTary 
Connexion  of  the  Effedf  on  any  Thing  antecedent,  then  we 
may  fuppofe  that  fometimes  the  Event  will  follow  the  Caufe, 
and  fometimes  not,  when  the  Caufe  is  the  fame,  and  in 
every  Refpeft  in  the  fame  State  and  Circumftances.  And  what 
can  be  the  Caufe  and  Reafon  of  this  ftrange  Phenomenon, 
even  tbis  Diverfity,  that  in  one  Inftance,  the  EfFeft  Ihould 
follow,  in  another  not  ?  'Tis  evident  by  the  Suppofition, 
that  this  is  wholly  without  any  Caufe  or  Ground.  Here  is 
fomething  in  the  prefent  Manner  of  the  Exiflence  of  Things, 
and^  State  of  the  World,  that  is  abfolutely  without  a  Caufe  : 
Which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition,  and  contrary  to  what 
Jias  been  before  demonftrated. 

3.  To 


75  Of  the  Juppojed  Liberty  Part  II. 

3.  To  fuppofe  there  are  Tome  Events  which  have  a 
Caufe  and  Ground  of  their  Exiftence,  that  yet  are  not  ng- 
ceffarily  connedled  v/ith  their  Caufe,  is  to  fuppofe  that  they 
have  a  Caufe  which  is  not  their  C^ufe.  Thus ;  If  the  EfFeft 
be  not  neceflarily  conneded  with  the  Caufe,  with  its  Influr 
.6nce,  and  influential  Circumftances ;  then,  as  I  obferved 
before,  'tis  a  Thing  poffible  and  fuppofable,  that  the  Caufe 
may  fometimes  exert  the  fame  Influence,  under  the  fame 
Circumfl:ances,  and  yet  the  EfFeft  not  follow.  And  if  this 
aflually  happens  in  any  Inftance,  this  Inflance  is  a  Proof,  in 
Fad,  that  the  Injluence  of  the  Caufe  is  not  fufiicient  to  pro- 
duce the  EfFed.  For  if  it  had  been  fuflicient,  it  would  have 
done  it».  And  yet,  by  the  Suppofition,  in  another  Inftance, 
the  fame  Caufe,  with  perfectly  the  fame  Influence,  and 
when  all  Circumflances  which  have  any  Influence,  are  the 
fame,  it  nuas  folhnjjed  with  the  EfFedl.  'Sty  which  it  is  mani- 
feft,  that  the  EiFed  in  this  laft  Infl;ance  was  not  owing  tq 
the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  but  mufl:  come  to  pafs  fome 
other  Way.  For  it  was  proved  before,  that  the  Influence 
of  the  Caufe  was  not  fufficient  to  produce  the  EfFed.  And 
if  it  was  not  fufficient  to  produce  it,  then  the  Produdion 
of  it  could  not  be  owing  to  that  Influence,  but  muft  be 
owing  to  fomething  elfe,  or  owing  to  Nothing.  And  if  the 
Effed  be  not  owing  to  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  then  i^ 
is  not  the  Caufe.  Which  brings  us  to  the  Contradidion, 
of  a  Caufe,  and  no  Caufe,  that  which  is  the  Ground  and 
Reafon  of  the  Exiftence  of  a  Thing,  and  at  the  fame  Time 
is  not  the  Ground  ^nd  Reafon  of  its  Exiftence^  nor  i§ 
fufficient  to  be  fo. 

If  the  Matter  be  not  already  fo  plain  as  to  render  any 
further  Reafoning  upon  it  impertinent,  I  would  fay,  that 
that  which  feems  to  be  the  Caufe  in  the  fuppofed  Cafe,  can 
be  no  Caufe,  its  Power  and  Influence  having,  on  a  full 
Trial,  proved  infuflicient  to  produce  fuch  an  EiFed  :  and  if 
it  be  not  fufficient  to  produce  it,  then  it  don't  produce  it. 
To  fay  ojherwife,  is  to  fay,  there  is  Power  to  do  that  which 
there  is  not  Power  to  do.  If  there  be  in  a  Caufe  fufficient 
Power  exerted,  and  in  Circumfl:ances  fufficient  to  produce  an 
Effed,  and  fo  the  Effed  be  adually  produced  at  ove  Time ; 
Thefe  Things  all  concurring,  will  produce  the  Effed  at  all 
Times,  And  fo  we  may  turn  it  the  other  Way  ;  That  which 
proves  not  fufficient  at  one  Time,  cannot  be  fufficient  at 
another,  with  precifely  the  fame  influential  Circumftances  a 
And  therefore  if  the  Effed  follows,  it  is  not  owing  to  that 

Caufe  ; 


Sed.VIII.         without  all  NecefTity.  76 

Caufe  ;  unlefs  the  different  Time  be  a  Circumflance  which 
has  Influence  :  But  that  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition ;  for 
'tis  fuppofed  that  all  Circumftances  that  have  Influence,  are 
the  fame.  And  befides,  this  would  be  to  fuppofe  the  Time 
to  be  the  Caufe  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition  of 
the  other  Thing's  being  the  Caufe.  But  if  merely  Diverfity 
of  Time  has  no  Influence,  then  'tis  evident  that  it  is  as 
much  of  an  Abfurdity  to  fa^y,  the  Caufe  was  fufficient  to 
produce  the  Effeft  at  one  Time,  and  not'  at  another ;  as  to 
fay,  that  it  is  fufiicient  to  produce  the  EfFeft  at  a  certain  Time, 
and  yet  not  fufficient  to  produce  the  fame  EfFedl  at  that  fame 
Time. 

On  the  Whole,  it  is  clearly  manifeft,  that  every  EfFeft  has 
^  necefl"ary  Connexion  with  its  Caufe,  or  with  that  which 
is  the  true  Ground  and  Reafon  of  'its  Exiftence.  And 
therefore  if  there  be  no  Event  without  a  Caufe,  as  was 
proved  before,  then  no  Event  whatfoever  is  contingent  in 
the  Manner  that  Arminians  fuppofe  the  free  Afts  of  the  Will 
to  be  contingent. 


•K!*ccceocoogooo9000ccoo900390coaoooaao0300o.^iooceoco9so(3QBcasc>39a9cao6oi33aco90ooooo^^ 

Section     IX. 

Of  the  Connexion  of  the  A^s  of  the  Will  with 
the  Dilates  of  the  Underftandmor. 

IT  is  manifeft,  that  the  A6Is  of  the  Will  are  none  of 
them  contingent  in-  fuch  a  Senle  as  to  be  without  all 
Neceflity,  or  fo  as  not  to  be  neceflary  with  a  Neceflity 
of  Confequence  and  Connexion  ;  becaufe  every  Adl  of 
the  Will  is  fome  Way  conneded  with  the  Underftanding, 
and  is  as  the  greateft  apparent  Good  is,  in  the  Manner  which 
has  already  been  explained;  namely,  that  the  Soul  always 
wills  or  chufes  that  which,  in  the  prefent  View  of  the  Mind, 
confidered  in  the  Whole  of  that  View,  and  all  that  belongs 
to  it,  appears  moft  agreeable.  Becaufe,  as  was  obferved  be- 
fore, Nothing  is  more  evident  than  that,  when  Men  ad  vo- 
luntarily, and  do  what  they  pleafe,  then  they  do  what  ap- 
pears moft  agreeable  to  them  j   and  to  %  otherwife,  would. 

be 


77         Of  the  Connexion  of  the  Will        Part  IL- 

be  as  much  as  to  affirm,  that  Men  don't  chufe  what  ap- 
pears to  fuit  them  beft,  or  what  feeras  moft  pleafing  to 
them;  or  that  they  don't  chufe  what  they  prefer:  Which 
brings  the  Matter  to  a  Contradidion. 

As  'tis  very  evident  in  itfelf,  that  the  Atls  of  the  Will 
have  feme  ConiieiSion  with  the  Diftates  or  Views  of  the 
Underftanding,  fo  this  is  allowed  by  feme  of  the  chief  of 
the  Arminian  Writprs,    particularly     by  Dr.  Whitby   and  Dr. 

Samuel  Clark. Dr.  Turnbull,  tlio'    a   great  Enemy    to    the 

Doftrine  of  Neceffity,  allows  the  fame  Thing.  In  his 
Chrijiian  Philofophy,  (P.  196,)  He  with  much  Approbation 
cites  another  Philofopher,  as  of  the  fame  Mind,  in  thefe 
Words :  "  No  Man,  (fays  an  excellent  Philofopher)  fets 
*'  himfelf  about  any  Thing,  but  upon  fome  View  or  other, 
"  which  ferves  him*  for  a  Reafon  for  what  he  does;  and 
**  whatfoever  Faculties  he  employs,  the  Underftanding,  with 
"  fuch  Light  as  it  has,  well  or  ill  informed,  conftantly 
**  leads ;  and  by  that  Light,  true  or  falfe,  all  her  operative 
"  Powers  are  direfted.  The  Will  itfelf,  how  abfolute  and 
*'  incontrolable  foever  it  may  be  thought,  never  fails  iri 
'*  its  Obedience  to  the  Dictates  of  the  Underftanding. 
'*  Temples  have  their  facred  Images;  and  we  fee  what  In- 
"  fluence  they  have  always  had  over  a  great  Part  of  Mar^- 
"  kind ;  But  in  Truth,  the  Ideas  and  Images  in  Men's 
**  Minds  arc  the  invifible  Powers  that  conftantly  govern 
"  them ;  and  to  thefe  they  all  pay  univerfally  a  ready  Sub- 
"  miiTion." 

But  v.'hether  this  be  in  a  juft  Confiftence  with  Themfelves, 
and  their  own  Notions  of  Liberty,  I  defire  may  now  be  im- 
partially confidered. 

Dr.  Whitby  plainly  fuppofes,  that  the  Afts  and  Determina- 
tions of  the  Will  always  follow  the  Undcrftanding's  Appre- 
henfion  or  View  of  the  greateft  Good  to  be  obtain'd,  or  Evil 
to  be  avoided ;  or  in  other  Words,  that  the  Determinations 
of  the  Will  conftantly  and  infallibly  follow  thefe  two  Things 
in  the  Underftanding  :  i.  The  Degree  of  Good  to  be  obtained, 
and  Evil  to  be  avoided,  propofed  to  the  Underftanding, 
and  apprehended,  viewed,  and  taken  Notice  of  by  it. 
■2.  The  Degree  of  the  Underftanding  s  Vienjj,  Notice  or  Appre- 
henfion  of  that  Good  or  Evil ;  which  is  increafed  by  Atten- 
tion and  Confideration.  That  this  is  an  Opinion  he  is  ex-> 
ceeding  peremptory  in,  (as  he  is  in  every  Opinion  which  he 
maintains  in   his  Controverfy   with  the  Cahnnijls)  with  Dif- 

dain 


Sect.  IX.  ziLV'/i' /i'i' Underftanding.  ^g 

dain  of  the  contrary  Opinion,  as  abfurd  and  Self-contra-. 
dictory,  will  -  appear  by  tha  Ibiiowing  Words  of  his,  in  his 
Difcourfe  on  the  rive  Points.  * 

•<  Now,  'tis  certain,  that  what  naturally  makes  the  Un- 
*•'  derllaiidxng  to  perceive,  is  Evidence  propofed,  and  appre- 
"  hendcd,  confidered  or  adverted  to:  for  Nothing  elfe  caa 
*'  be   requilite  to   maice   us   come  to  the  Knowledge   of  the 

*'  Truth. -Again,  what   makes   the  Will   chufe,  is   fome- 

"  thing  approved  by  the  Underftanding ;  and  confequently 
"  appearing  to  the  Soul  as  Good.  And  whatfoever  it  re- 
**  fufeth,  is  fomething.  reprefented  by  the  Underftanding, 
"  and  fo  appearing  to  the  Will,  as  Evil.  Whence  all  that 
"  God  requires  of  us  is,  and  can  be  only  this  ;  to  refufe  the 
"  Evil,  and  chufe  the  Good.  Wherefore,  to  fay  that  Evi- 
"  dence  propofed,  apprehended  and  confidered,  is  not  fufR- 
"  cient  to  make  the  Underltanding  approve;  or  that  the 
«'  greateft  Good  propofed,  the  greateit'£vil  threatned,  whea 
*'  equally  belie v'd  and  refleded  on,  is  not  fuficient  to  ,cn- 
*'  gage  the  Will  to  chufe  the  Good  and  refufe  the  Evil,  is 
**  in  EfTeft  to  fay,  that  'which  alone  doth  mo-ve  the  H  ill  to  chufe. 
*«  or  to  refufe,  is  net  fufficient  to  engage  it  fo  to  do ;  v/hich 
"  being  contradictory  to  itfelf,  muft  of  Necedity  be  falfe- 
"  Be  it  then  fo,  that  we  naturally  have  an  Averfation  to 
**  the  Truths  propofed  to  us  in  the  Gofpel ;  that  only  caa 
**  make  us  indifpofed  to  attend  to  them,  but  cannot  hinder 
<*  our  Conviftion,  when  we  do  apprehend  them,  and  attend 

"  to  them.— Be  it,  that  there  is  in  us  alfo  a  Renitency  to 

*'  the  Good  we  are  to  chufe ;  that  only  can  indifpofe  us  to 
"  believe  it  is,  and  to  approve  it  as  our  chiefeft  Good.  Be 
'*«  it,  that  we  are  prone  to  the  Evil  that  we  Ihould  decline; 
"  that  only  can  render  it  the  more  difficult  for  us  to  be- 
"  lieve  it  is  the  worft  of  Evils.  But  yet,  nuhat  ave  do  really 
' '  helie'oe  to  be  our  chiepji  Good,  luillfiill  be  chef  en  ;  and  luhat  tvs 
"  apprehend  to  be  the  ivorji  of  E'vils,  n^vill,  ixihilfi  nue  do  continue 
'*  under  that  Convitiion,  be  rcfufed  by  us.  It  therefore  can  be 
"  only  requifite,  in  order  to  thefe  Er.Js,  that  the  Good  Spi- 
**  rit  (hould  fo  illuminate  our  Underftandings,  that  we  at- 
**  tending  to,  and  confidering  what  lies  before  us,  fhould 
*'  apprehend,  and  be  convinced  cf  our  Duty ;  and  that  the 
*'  Bleffmgs  of  the  Gofpel  flrould  be  fo  propounded  to  us,  as 
*'  that  we  may  difcern  them  to  be  our  chiefeft  Good ;  and 
**  the  Miferies  it  thrcateneth,  fo  as  we  may  be  convinced 
«'  they  are  the  worft  of  Evils ;  that  vve  may  chufe  the  one, 
««  and  refufe  the  other." 

M  Her« 

•  Edit.  2d.  P.  an,  213,  2J3, 


79*        Of  the  Connedlion  of  the  Will      Part  lE 

Here  let  it  be  obferved,  how  plainly  and  peremptorily  it  is 
afierted,  that  the  great efi  Good  propofed,  and  the  greatcji  Evil 
threatened,  nvhen   equally  belUn:ed  and  refleded  ott,  is  Jufficicnt  to" 
mgage  the  Will  to  chafe  the  Good,  avd  refnfe  the  E'vil,  and  is  that 
alone  nvhich  dyih  mo^e  the  Will  to  chuj'e  or  to  rcfufe ;  and  that  it  is 
contradiSlory  to  it/elf,  to  ffppij'e  othertvijt;  and  therefore  mufi   of 
Necef^ty  be  falfe ;  and  then  njuhat  vJe  do  really  belienje  to  be  our  chief- 
efi  Good  nvill fill  be  chofen,  and  nvhat  nue  apprehend  to  be  the  nvorji 
cf  Evils,  'willy'whilji  nve  continue  under  that  Con'viBion,  be  refufed 
by  us.     Nothing  could  have  been  faid  more  to  the  Purpofe, 
fully  to  fignify  and  declare,    that  the  Determinations  of  the 
Will  mufI:  evermore  follow  the' Illumination,  Conviftion  and' 
Notice  of  the  Underilanding,    with  Regard  to   the    greatelt 
Good   and   Evi!  propofed,    reckoning  both    the   Degree   of 
Good  and  Evil  underftood,  and  the  Degree  of  Underftand- 
^^vi^.  Notice  and  Conviftion  of  tliat  propofed  Good  and  Evil  ; 
and  that  it  is  thus  neceflarilv,  arid  can  be  otherwife  in  no  In- 
flance  :  becaufe  it  is  afllerted,  that  it  implies  a  Contradidion, 
to  fuppofe  it  ever  to  be  otherwiffe. 

I  am.  fenfibie,  the  Doftor's  Aim  in  thefe  Aflertions  is  againll' 
the  Cal^lnifs;  to  fhew,  in  Oppofition  to  them,  that  there  is 
no  Need  of  any  phyfical  Operation  of  the  Spirit  of  God  on 
die  Will,  to  change  and  determine  that  to  a  good  Choice, 
but  that  God's  Operation  and  Affiftance  is  only  morali 
fuggefting  Ideas  to  the  Undcrftanding  ;  which  he  fuppofes  to 
he  enough,  if  thofe  Ideas  are  attended  to,  infallibly  to  ob- 
tain the  End.  Bat  whatever  his  Defign  was.  Nothing  can 
more  direcHy  and  fully  prove,  that  every  Determination  of 
the  Will,  in  chufing  and  refufing,  isneceffary;  direftly  con- 
trary to  his  own  Notion  of  the  Liberty  of  the  Will.  For  if 
th6  Determination  of  the  Will,  evermore,  in  this  Manner, 
follows  the  Light,  Conviftion  and  View  of  the  Underftand- 
ing,  concerning  the  greateft  good  and  Evil,  and  this  be  that 
alone  which  moves  the  Will,  and  it  be  a  Contradi«5tion  to' 
fuppofe  otherwife  ;  then  it  is  nereffarily  fo,  the  Will  neceffarily 
follows  this  Light  or  View  of  the  Underftanding,  not  only- 
in  fome  of  its  Afts,  but  in  every  Afl  of  chufing  and  refu- 
lino-.  So  that  the  Will  don't  determine  itfelf  in  any  one  of 
its  own  Afts;  but  all  its  Ads,  every  Aft  of  Choice  and  Re-' 
fufal,  depends  on,  and  is  neceflarily  conneded  with  fome  an- 
tecedent Caufe  ;  which  Caufe  is  not  the  Will  itfelf,  nor  any 
A^  of  its  own,  nor  any  Thing  pertaining  to  that  Faculty, 
but  fomething  belonging  to  another  Faculty,  whofe  Afts  go 
before  the  Will,  in  all  its  Ad?,  and  govern  and  determine; 
lierii-  everj?  one, 

Here, 


Sedi:.  IX.      .  with,  the  Undcrftanding.  g© 

Here,  if  it  fhould  be  replied,    that  altho'  it  be  true,    thtt 
according  to  the  Doftor,  the  final  Determination  of  the  "Wiii 
always  depends   upon,    and   is   infallibly  connected   v/ith  the 
Underftanding  s    Conviftion,     and     Notice    of   the   greateil 
Good ;  yet  the  Afts  of  the  Will  are  not  neceflary ;  becauie 
that  Convidion  -and  Notice   of  the  Underftanding  is  firft  de- 
pendent on  a  pi;ecediu^  Aft  of  the  Vv'ill,  in  determining  to 
'attend  to,   and  take  Notice  of  the  Evidence  exhibited ;  by 
which  Means  the  Mind  obtains  that  Degree  of    Convidioa 
which  is  fufficient   and  effeftual  to  determine  the  confcquent 
.and  ultimate   Choice  of  the  "Will ;    and  that  the  Will  with 
Regard  to  that  preceding  hOt,    whereby  it  determines  whe- 
ther to  attend  or  no,  is  not  neceflary  ;  and  that  in  this,  the 
Xiberty  of   the   Will   connfts,    that  when   God  holds   forth 
Sufficient  objeftive  Light,    the  Will  is  at  Liberty  whether  to 
command  the  attention  of  the  Mind  to  it. 

Nothing  can  be  more  weak  and  inconfiderate  than  fuch  a 
"Reply  as  this.  For  that  preceding  Aft;  of  the  Will,  in  de>-  ' 
terrr.ining  to  attend  and  conlider,  ftill  is  as  an  .4d  of  the  Will, 
(it  is  fo  to  be  lure,  if  the  Liberty  of  the  Will  conlifts  in  it,  as 
is  fuppofed)  and  if  it  be  an  Aft  of  the  Will,  it  is  an  Act 
of  Choice  or  Refiifal :  And  therefore,  if  what  the  Doctor 
afferts  be  true,  it  is  determined  by  fome  antecedent  Light  in 
the  Underftanding  concerning  the  greateft  apparent  Good  or 
Evil.  For  he  alTerts,  it  is  that  Light  nvhich  alone  doth  move  the 
Will  to  chufe  or  rcfufe  :  And  therefore  the  Will  muft  be  moved 
by  that  in  chuiing  to  attend  to  the  objective  Light  offered,  in 
primer  to  another  confequent  Act  cf  Choice ;  fo  that  this  Act 
is  no  lefs  neceflary  than  the  other.  And  if  we  fuppofe  ano- 
ther Act  of  the  Will,  ftill  preceding  both  thefe  mention'd,  to 
determine  both,  ftill  that  alfo  muft  be  an  Act  of  the  Will,  and  an 
Act  of  Choice  :  and  fo  muft,  by  the  fame  Principles,  be  infallibly 
determin'd  by  fome  certain  Degree  of  Ligbtin  the  Underftanding 
concerning  the  greateft  Good.  And  let  us  fup.pQfe  as  many 
Acts  of  the  Will,  one  preceding  another,  as  we  pleafe,  yet 
they  are  every  one  of  them  neceffarily  determined  by  a  cer- 
tain Degree  of  Light  in  the  Underftanding,  concerning  the 
greateft  and  moft  eligible  Good  in  that  Cafe ;  and  fo,  not 
one  of  them  free  according  to  Dr.  Whitby  ^  Notion  of  Free- 
dom. And  if  it  be  faid,  the  Reafon  why  Men  don't  attend 
to  Light  held  forth,  is  becaufe  of  ill  Habits  contracted  by 
^vil  Acts  committed  before,  v/hereby  their  Minds  are  in- 
difpofed  to  attend  to,  and  conlider  of  the  Truth  held  forth 
M  3  tok 


Si         Of  the  Conneaion  of  the  Will        Part  IL, 

to  them  by  God,  the  Dffieulty  is  not  at  all  avoided :  ftiU 
the  Queftion  returns,  What  determined  the  Will  in  thofe 
preceding  evil  Afts  ?  It  muft,  by  Dr.  Whithj'i  Principles, 
Itill  be  the  View  of  the  Underftanding  concerning  the 
greateft  Good  and  Evil.  If  this  View  of  the  Underftanding 
be  that  alone  nvhich  doth  mo^oe  the  Will  to  chuj'e  or  rcfufe,  as  the 
Doftor  afferts,  then  every  Acl:  of  Choke  or  Rrfiijat,  from  a 
Man's  firft  Exiftence,  is  moved  and  determined  by  this  View  i 
and  this  View  of  the  Underlianding  exciting  and  governing 
the  Aft,  muft  be  before  the  A<fl :  And  therefore  the  Will  is 
necelTarily  determined,  in  every  one  of  its  Afts,  from  a  Man's 
firft  Exiftence,  by  a  Caufe  befide  the  Will,  and  a  Caufe  that  don't 
proceed  from,  or  depend  on  any  Aft  of  the  Will  at  all ;  which 
at  once  utterly  abolifties  the  Doftor's  whole  Scheme  of  Li- 
berty of  Will :  and  he,  at  one  Stroke,  has  cut  the  Sinev/s 
of  all  his  Arguments  from  the  Goodnefs,  Righveoufnefs, 
Faithfulnefs  and  Sincerity  of  God,  in  his  Commands,  Pro- 
jnifes,  Threatnings,  Calls,  Invitations,  Expoftulationfi, 
which  he  makes  Ufe  of,  under  the  Heads  of  Reprobation, 
Eleftion,  Unlverfal  Redemption,  fufiicient  and  effeftual 
Grace,  and  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  of  Man  ;  and  has 
enervated  and  made  vain  all  thofe  Exclamations  againft 
the  Doftrine  of  the  Calvinijis,  as  charging  God  with  mani- 
feft  Unrighteoufnefs,  Unfaithfulnefs,  Hypocrify,  Fallaci.-, 
pufnefs,  and  Cruelty ;  which  he  has  over,  and  over,  and  over 
again,  numberlefs  Times  in  his  Book. 

Dr.  Samuel  Claris  in  his  Demonftration  of  the  Being  and 
Attributes  of  God,  §  to  evade  the  Argument  to  prove  the 
Neceflity  of  Volition,  from  its  neceflary  Conneftion  with  the 
laft  Diftate  of  the  Underftanding,  fuppofes  the  latter  not 
to  be  diverfe  from  the  Aft  of  the  Will  itfelf.  But  if  it  be 
fo,  it  will  not  alter  the  Cafe  as  to  the  Eviden.ce  of  the  Ne- 
ceflity  of  the  Aft  of  the  Will.  If  the  Diftate  of  the  Under- 
lending  be  the  very  fame  with  the  Determination  of  the 
Will  or  Choice,  as  Dr.  Clark  fuppofes,  then  this  Determi- 
nation is  no  Fruit  or  EffeR  of  Choice :  And  if  fo,  no  Liberty 
of  Choice  has  any  Hand  in  it :  As  to  Volition  or  Choice,  it 
is  neceflary;  That  is.  Choice  can't  prevent  it.  If  the  laft? 
Diftate  of  the  Underftanding  be  the  fame  with  the  Deter- 
mination of  Volition  itfelf,  then  the  Exiftence  of  that  De- 
termination muft  be  neceffary  as  to  Volition ;  in  as  much 
as  Volition  can  have  no  Opportunity  to  determine  whether 
^t  (hall  exift  or  no,  it  having  Exiftence  already  before  Voli- 

tioi^ 
^  Edit.  6.  P.  93. 


LcCi.  IX.  ^'?V^  if->e  Underftanding.  82 

jion  has  Opportunity  to  determine  any  Thing.  It  13  itfelf 
the  very  Rife  and  Exiilence  of  Volition.  But  a  Thino-,  af- 
ter it  exifts,  has  no  Opportunity  to  determine  as  to  its  own 
Exiilence  ;  it  is  too  late  for  that. 

If  Liberty  confifts  in  that  winch  JrTniniaus  fuppofe,  fviz, 
in  the  Will's  determining  its  own  Afts,  having  free  Oppor- 
tunity, and  being  without  all  Necsirity  ;  This  is  the  fame 
as  to  fay,  that  Liberty  confilb  in  the  Soul's  having  Power 
jmd  Opportunity  to  have  what  Determinations  of  the  Will 
it  pleafcs  or  chufes.  And  if  the  Determinations  of  the  Will, 
and  the  laft  Dictates  of  the  Underftanding  be  the  fame 
Thing,  then  Liberty  conf.fts  in  the  Mind's  having  Power  to 
have  what  Dictates  of  the  Underftanding  it  pieafes,  having/ 
Opportunity  to  chufe  its  own  Dictates  of  Underftanding. 
But  this  is  abfurd ;  for  it  is  to  make  the  Determination  of 
Choice  prior  to  the  Didate  of  Underftanding,  and  the 
Ground  of  it;  which  can't  confift  with  the  Dictate  of  Un« 
derftanding's  being  the  Determination  of  Choice  itfelf. 

Here  is  no  Way  to  do  in  this  Cafe,  but  only  to  recur  to 
the  old  Abfurdity,  of  one  Determination  before  another, 
and  the  Caufe  of  it ;  and  another  before  that,  determining 
that ;  and  {o  on  i/i  ififinitum.  If  the  laft  Dictate  of  the  Un- 
derftanding be  the  Determination  of  the  Will  itfelf,  and  the 
Soul  be  free  with  Regard  to  that  Dictate,  in  the  Jrminian 
Notion  of  Freedom ;  then  the  Soul,  before  that  Dictate  of 
its  Underftanding  exifts,  voluntarily  and  accordino-  to  its 
own  Choice  determines,  in  every  Cafe,  v.hat  that  Dictate 
of  the  Underftanding  (hall  be ;  otherwife  that  Dictate,  as  to 
the  Will,  is  i:aceflary ;  and  the  Acts  determined  by  it,  muft 
alfo  be  neceffary.  So  that  here  is  a  Determination  of  the 
Mind  prior  to  that  Dictate  of  the  Underftanding,  an  Act  of 
Choice  going  before  it,  chufing  and  determining  what  that 
Dictate  of  the  Underftanding  ihall  be :  and  this  precediiig 
Act  of  Choice,  being  a  free  Act  of  V/ill,  muft  alio  be  the 
fame  with  another  laft  Dictate  of  the  Undcrftandino- :  And 
if  the  mind  alfo  be  free  in  that  Dictate  of  Underftanding,  that 
muft  be  determined  ftill  by  another ;  and  fo  on  forever, 

BefidcE,  if  the  Dictate  of  the  Underftanding,  and'  Dcr 
termination  of  the  WiH  be  the  fame,  this  confounds  the  Un- 
derftanding and  Will,  and  makes  them'  the  fame.  Whether 
they  be  the  fame  or  no,  I  will  not  now  difpute;  but  only 
^veuld  obferve,  that  if  it  be  fo,  and  the  Arminia?:  Notion  of 

Liberty 


,«3     0/"//^^  Connedlion  of  the  Will,  Szc.  -  Part  li. 

Liberty   confifts   in  a  Self-determining   Power    in  the   Under- 
./landing,    free  of  all    Necefiity;    being   independent,    unde- 
termined by  any  Thing  prior  to  its  own  Adts  and  Determi- 
nations ;    and  the   more  the  Underftanding  is   thus  indepen- 
dent, and  fovereign  over  its  own  Determinations,  the   more 
free.     By  this  therefore  the  Freedom  of  the  Soiil,  as  a  moral 
Agent,  muft  confift  in  the  Independence  of  the  Underftand- 
ing  on  any   Evidence   or    Appearance   of  Things,     or   any 
Thing  whatfcever  that  ftands  forth  to  the  View  of  the  Mind^ 
prior  to   the   Underftandiag's  Determination.      And  what   a 
Sort  of  Liberty  is   this  !    confifling  in  an  Ability,  Freedom 
and  Eafinefs  ot  judging,    either  according  to  Evidence,  or  a- 
gainft  it ;    having  a   fovereign   Command    over   itfelf  at  all 
Times,  to  judge,    either  agreeably  or  difagreeably  to  what  is 
plainly  exhibited   to  its  own   View.     Certainly,  'tis  no  Li- 
berty that   renders  Perfons  the  proper  Subjedts  of  perfwafive 
Keafoning,  Arguments,  Expoftulations,   and  fuch-like  moral 
Means  and  Inducements.     The  Ufe  of  which  with  Manicind, 
is  a  main  Argument  of  the  Armhnans,  to  defend  their  Notion. 
of  Liberty  without    all    Neceflity.       For    according    to    this, 
the  more  free  Men  are,  the  lefs  they  are  under  the  Govern- 
ment of  fuch   Means,  lefs  fubjeft  to  the  Power  of  Evidence 
and  Reafon,  and  more  independent  on  their  Influence,  in  theif 
Determinations, 

And  wliether  the  Underftanding  and  Will  are  the  fame  or 
no,  as  Dr.  Clark  feems  to  fuppofe,  yet,  in  order  to  maintain 
the  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty  without  Neceflity,  the  free 
Will  is  not  determined  by  the  Underftanding,  nor  necefliirily 
connefted  with  the  Underftanding;  and  the  further  from 
fuch  Cormeftion,  the  greater  the  Freedom.  And  when 
the  Liberty  is  full  and  complete,  the  Determinations  of  the 
Will  have  no  Connexion  at  all  with  the  Dictates  of  the 
Underftanding.  And  if  fo,  in  vain  are  all  Applications  to 
the  Underftanding,  in  order  to  induce  to  any  free  virtuous 
Act  ;  and  fo  in  vain  are  all  Inftructions,  Counfels,  Invitati- 
ons, Expoftulations,  and  all  Arguments  and  Perfwafives  what- 
foever  :  For  thefe  are  but  Applications  to  the  Underftanding, 
and  a  clear  and  lively  Exhibition  of  the  Objects  ot  Choice  to 
the  Mind's  View.  But  if,  after  all,  the  Will  muft  be  felf-de- 
termined,  and  independent  on  the  Underftanding,  to  what  Pur- 
pofe  are  Things  thus  reprefented  to  the  Underftanding,  in  orde? 
tp  determine  the  Choice  ? 

«^ooco9oeo<)0(»oc«o«coosocogccogceoscoMoc(><^e*occoooopcoce«cK«o«««o«ooeauooo<)cooooo^ 

Section. 


Sed.X.  A^s  of  the  Will  connecJred  with  Motives.   %'' 

Section     X. 

Vdiiion   necejfarily   conneEfed  with   the  Injj-uence  of 
■  Motives ;    with   partiailar  Ohjervations    on  ths 
great  Incof7ji(ience  of  Mr.  Chubb' j  Affert ions  and 
ReafoningSy  about  the  Freedom  of  the  IVill. 

THAT  every  Ad  of  the  Will  has  fome  Caufe,  and 
confequently  (by  what  has  been  already  provedj  has-" 
a  neceflary  Connexion  with  its  Caufe,  and  fo  is  ne- 
ceffary  by  a  Neceffity  of  Connexion  and  Gonfequence,  is 
evident  by  this,  That  every  Aft  of  the  Will  whatfoever,  is 
excited  by  fome  Motive  :  Which  is  mamfeft,  becaafe,  if  rhe 
Will  or  Mind,  in  willing  and  chufing  after  the  Manner  that 
it  does,  is  excited  fo  to  do  by  no  Motive  or  Inducement, 
then  it  has  no  End  which  it  propofes  to  itfelf,  or  purfiies 
in  fo  doing;  it  aims  at  Nothing,  and  feeks  Nothing.  And 
if  it  feeks  Nothing,  then  it  don't  go  after  any  Thing,  or  ex- 
ert any  Inclination  or  Prsference  towards  any  Thing  ;  which  ■ 
brings  the  Matter  toa  Contradiftion  :  Becaufe  for  the  Mind  to' 
will  Something,  and  for  it  to  go  after  Something  by  an  Ad  of 
Preference  and  Inclination,  are  the  fame  Thing. 

But  if  every  Aft  of  the  Will  is  excited  by  a  Motive,  th'ea-. 
that  Motive  is  the  Caufe  of  the  Aft  of  the  Will.  If  the  A^^s 
of  the  Will  are  excited  by  Motives,  then  Motives  are  the 
Caufes  of  their  being  excited  ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  Things 
the  Caufe  of  their  being  put  forth  into  Aft  andExiftence.  And 
if  fo,  the  Exiftence  of  tlie  Afts  of  the  Will  is  properly  the  Ef- 
feft  of  their  Motives.  Motives  do  Nothing  as  Motives  or  In- 
ducements, but  by  their  Influence  ;  and  fo  much  as  is  done  by 
their  Influence,  is  the  EfFeft  of  them.  For  that  is  the  Notion 
of  an  EfFeft,  fomething  that  is  brought  to  pafs  by  the  InSuenee 
of  another  Thing. 

And  if  Volitions  are  properly  the  EfFefts  of  their  Motives, - 
then  they  are  neceffarily  connefted  with  their  Motives.     Every 
EfFeft   and   Event   being,    as  was  proved  before,    neceffarily 
connefted  with  that  which  is  the  proper  Ground  and  Reaforj- 
of  its  Exillence,    Thus  it  is  manifdt,    that  Volition. is  ne- 

ceflary,. 


S^  uiasDfiheV^illconne^lediijithMoiivts.  Parr.  IL 

ceflary,  and  is  not  from  any  Self-determining  Power  In  the 
Will :  The  Volition  \vhich  is  cauied  by  previous  Motive  and 
Inducement,  is  not  cauied  by  the  Will  exercifing  a  fovereigit 
Power  over  itfelf,  to  determine,  caufe  and  excite  Volitions 
in  itfelf.  This  is  not  coniiflent  with  the  Will's  acting  in  a 
State  of  Indifference  and  Equilibrium,  to  determine  itfelf  to 
a  Preference;  for  the  Way  in  which  Motives  operate,  is  by 
biaffing  the  Will,  and  giving  it  a  (^rtain  Inclination  or  Pre- 
V  onderaticn  one  Way. 

Here  it  may  be  proper  to  obferve,  that  Mr.  Chubb,  in  his 
Collection  of  Tracts  on  various  Subjefts,  has  advanced  a 
Scheme  of  Liberty,  which  is  greatly  divided  againft  itfelf^ 
^nd  thoroughly  fubverfive  of  itfelf  j  and  that  many  Ways. 

I.  He  is  abundant  in  averting,  that  the  Will,  in  all  its 
Adls,  is  iniiuenced  by  I'vlotive  and  Excitement ;  and  that 
this  is  the  pre'vious  Ground  and  Reafon  of  all  its  Ai^s,  and 
that  it  is  never  otherwife  in  any  Inftance.  He  fays,  (P;  262.) 
iV(3  A^iojz  can  take  place  tvithout  fame  Moti've  to  excite  it.  And 
inT.  263.  Volition  cannot  take  place  miithoiufome  PREVIOUS  Rea- 
Jcn  or  Moti've  to  induce  it.  And  in  P.  3 1  Oi  /jBion  nuould  ?iot  take 
Place  'without  fome  Ren/on  or  Moti've  to  induce  it ;  it  being  abjurd  to 
/uppo/cy  that  the  adi've  Faculty  <vjould  be  exerted  ivitkout  fome 
PREVIOUS  Reafon  to  difpofe  the  Mind  to  AFiion.  So  alfo  P.  257. 
And  he  fpeaks  of  thefe  Things  as  what  we  may  be  abfolufely 
certain  of,  and  which  are  the  Foundation,  the  only  Foundation 
we  have  of  a  Certainty  of  the  moral  Perfections  of  God.  Pi 
252*  '^S^'  ^>4»  '^'iS>  '^^^'  ^^^'  ^^3>  ^64. 

And  yet  at  the  fame  Time,  by  his. Scheme,  the  Influence 
of  Motives  upon  lis  to  excite  to  Action,  and  to  be  actually  a 
Ground  of  Volition, is  confequerit  en  the  Volition  or  Choice  of  the 
Mind.  For  he  very  greatly  infiils  upon  it,  that  in  all  free  Actions, 
before  the  Mind  is  the  Subject  of  thofe  Volitions  which  Motives' 
excite,  it  cl^ufes  to  be  fo.  It  chufes  whether  it  will  comply 
with  the  Motive,  which  prefents  itfelt  in  View,  or  not ;  and 
when  various  Motives  are  prefented,  it  chufes  which  it  will 
.  yield  to,  and  which  it  will  reject.  So  P.  256.  Emery  Man  has 
Poivcr  to  aS,  or  to  refrain  from  aBing  agreeably  'vnth,  or  contrary 
to,  any  Moti-zie  that  prefents.  P.  2^7.  E-very  Matt  is  at  Liberty  to 
aJi,  or  refrain  from  ailing  agreeably  'withy  or  contrary  to,  ivhat  each 
of  thefe  Moti-jes,  confederedfingly,  <would  excite  him  to. — Man  has 
Poiver,  and  is  as  much  at  Liberty  to  rcje£i  the  Motive  that  does 
prc'Vail,  as  he  hcs  Pan/jerj  and  is  at  Liberty  to  tfe^i  thofi  Motives 

thai 


Std.  X.    Inconjiftence  of  Mr.  Chubb V,  &;c.         3 6 

that  do  not.  And  fo  P.  3  lO,  311.  In  order  to  conjiitute  a  moral 
Age?it,  it  is  necejj'ary,  that  hejhould  hwve  Fo^wer  to  ad,  or  to  re- 
frain from  aSing,  upon  Jnch  moral  Moti'ves  as  he  pleafes.  And  to 
the  like  Purpofe  in  many  other  Places.  According  to  thefa 
Things,  the  Will  acts  firft,  and  chufes  or  refafes  to  com- 
ply with  the  Motive  that  is  prefented,  before  it  falls  under 
its  prevailing  Influence :  And  'tis  firft  determined  by  the 
Mind's  Pleafure  or  Choice,  what  Motives  it  will  be  induced 
by,  before  it  is  induced  by  them. 

Now,  how  can  thefe  Things  hang  together  ?  How  can  the 
Mind  iirft  act,  and  by  its  Act  of  Volition  and  Choice  determine 
what  Motives  fhall  be  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of  its  Volition. 
,and  Choice?  For  this  fuppofes,  the  Choice  is  already  made, 
before  the  Motive  has  its  EiFect ;  and  that  the  Volition  is  al- 
ready exerted,  before  the  Motive  prevails,  fo  as  actually  to  be 
the  Ground  of  the  Volition  ;  and  makes  the  prevailing  of  the 
Motive,  the  Confequence  of  the  Volition,  which  yet  it  is  the 
Ground  of.  If  the  Mind  has  already  chofen  to  comply  with 
a  Motive,  and  to  yield  to  its  Excitement,  it  don't  need  to 
yield  to  it  after  this  :  for  the  Thing  is  effected  already,  that 
the  Motive  would  excite  to,  and  the  Will  is  before-hand 
with  the  Excitement ;  and  the  Excitement  comes  in  too  late, 
ar.d  is  needlefs  and  in  vain  afterwards.  If  the  Mind  has 
already  claofen  to  yield  to  a  Motive  which  inrntes  to  a  Th!r;|;,' 
that  implies  and  In  Fact  is  r.  ch"'?.r.g  ^\iz  Thxng  in'vited  to  ^ 
and  the  very  Act  of  Choice  is  before  the  Influence  of  the 
Motive  which  induces,  and  is  the  Ground  of  the  Choice  ; 
the  Son  is  before-hand  with  the  Father  that  begets  him  : 
The  Choice  is  fuppofed  to  be  the  Ground  of  that  Influence 
of  the  Motive,  which  very  Influence  is  fuppofed  to  be  the 
Ground  ot  the  Choice.  And  fo  Vice  'verfa.  The  Choice  is 
fuppofed  to  be  the  Confequence  of  the  Influence  of  the  Mo- 
jive,  which  Influence  of  the  Motive  is  the  Confequence  of  that 
very  Choice. 

And  befides,  if  the  Will  acts  firft  towards  the  Motive  before 
it  falls  under  its  Influence,  and  the  prevailing  of  the  Motive 
upon  it  to  induce  it  to  act  and  chufe,  be  the  Fruit  and  Con- 
fequence of  its  Act  and  Choice,  then  how  is  the  Motive  a 
PREVIOUS  Ground  and  Reafon  of  the  Ad  and  Choice,  fo  that 
in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  Volition  cannot  take  Place  ^without fame 
PREVIOUS  Reafon  and  Motive  to  induce  it ;  and  that  this  Act 
is  confequent  upon,  and  follows  the  Motive  ?  Which  Things 
]\^r.  Ck'iM^  often  aflerts,  as  of  certain  and  undcabted  Truth. 

N  So 


87'  Inconfiftence  of  Mr.  Chubb'jr  Part  HI. 

So  that  the  very  fame  Motive  is  both  pre'vious  and  cofi/equent; 
both  before  and  after,  both  the  Ground  and  Fruit  of  the- 
very  fame  Thing ! 

11.  Agreeable  to  the  fore-mention'd  inconfiftent  Notion  of 
the  Will's  firft  acting  towards  the  Motive,  chufing  whether, 
it  will  comply  with  it,  in  order  tb  its  becoming  a  Ground  of 
the  Will's  acting,  befbre  any  Act  of  Volition  can  take 
Place,  Mr.  Chubb  frequently  calls  Motives  and  Excitements 
to  the  Action  of  the  Will,  the  pafffve  Ground  or  Reajon  of  that 
ABio7i.  Which  is  a  remarkable  Phrafe ;  than  which  I  pre- 
furae  there  is  none  more  unintelligible,  and  void  of  diftinct 
and  conliftent  Meaning,  in  all  the  Writings  of  Duns,  Scotus, 
or  Thomas  Aquinas.  When  he  reprefeats  the  Motive  to 
Aftion  or  Volition  as  paffive,  he  muft  mean- — paffive  in  that 
Affair,  or  paffive  with  Refpedt  to  that  Aftion  which  he 
fpeaks  of;  otherwife  it  is  Nothing  to  his  Purpofe,  or  relating 
to  the  Defign  of  his  Argument:  He  muft  mean  (if  that 
can  be  called  a  Meaning)  that  the  Motive  to  Volition  is  firft 
afted  lipon  or  totvards  by  the  Volition,  chufing  to  yield  to  it, 
making  it  a  Ground  of  A(!ilion,  or  determining  to  fetch  its 
Influence  fronr  thence ;  and  fo  to  make  it  a  previous 
Ground  of  its  own  Excitation  and  Exiftence  :  Which  is 
die  fame  Abfurdity,  as  if  one  fhould  fay,  that  the  Soul  of 
Man,  or  any  ether  Thing  fhould,  previous  to  its  exifting, 
chufe  what  Caufe  it  would  come  into  Exiftence  by,  and 
fhould  aft  upon  its  Caufe,  to  fetch  Influence  from  thence, 
tu  bring  it  into  Being  ;  and  fo  its  Caufe  Ihouid  be  a  paffive 
Ground  of  its  Exiftence  ! 

Mr.  Chubb  does  very  plainly  fuppofe  Motive  or  Excitement 
to  be  the  Ground  of  the  Bein^  of  Volition.  He  fpeaks  of  it  as 
the  Ground  or  Reafon  of  \he  EXERTION  of  an  Aft  of 
the  Will,  P.  391.  &  392  ;  and  exprefly  fays,  that  Volition 
cannot  TAKE  PLACE  without  fome  prenjious  Ground  or  Mo- 
ii'veto  induce  it,  P.  363.  And  he  fpeaks  of  the  Aft  as  FROM 
the  Motive,  and  FROM  THE  INFLUENCE  of  the  Moti've^ 
P.  552,  and  from  the  Influence  that  the  Motive  has  on  the 
Man,  forihe  PRODUCTIQNofanJaion,  P.  3 1 7.  Certain- 
ly, there  is  no  Need  of  multiplying  Words  about  this-: 
■"Tis  eafily  judged,  whether  Motive  can  be  the  Ground  of 
Volition's  being  exerted  and  taking  Place,  fo  that  the 
very  Produftion  of  it  is  from  the  Influence  of  the  Motive, 
and  yet  the  Motive,  before  it  becomes  the  Ground  of  the 
Volition,  is   paffive^  or  afted  upon  by  the  Volition;     But 

this 


'Bed.  X-.  Scheme  tf  Liberty^  &c,  %% 

this  I  will  fay.  That  a  Man  who  infifts  fo  much  ow  Glear- 
nefs  of  Meaning  in  others,  and  is  fo  much  in  blaming 
iheir  Confufion  and  Inconfiftence,  ought,  if  he  was  able,  to 
have  explained  his  Meaning  in  this  Phrafe  of  paji-ve  Ground 
of  Ad  ion  i  fo  as  to  fhew  it  not  to  be  confufed  and  incon- 
fiftent. 

If  any  fhould  fuppdfe,  that  Mr.  Chubb,  when  he  fpeaks  of 
Motive  as  a  pajji've  Ground  of  ASiiofi,  don't  mean  pafTive 
with  Regard  to  that  Volition  which  it  is  the  Ground  of,  but 
fome  other  antecedent  Volition,  (tho'  his  Purpofe  and  Ar- 
gument, and  whole  Difcourfe,  will  by  no  Means  allow  of 
fuch  a  Suppofition)  yet  it  would  not  help  the  Matter  in  the 
leafl:.  For,  (i.)  If  we  fuppofe  there  be  an  Ad  of  Volition 
or  Choice,  by  which  the  Soul  chul'es  to  yield  to  the  Invi- 
tation of  a  Motive  to  another  Volition,  by  which  the  Soul 
chufes  fomething  elfe ;  both  thefe  fuppofed  Volitions  are  in 
Eftecl  the  very  fame.  A  Volition,  or  chufing  to  jneld  to 
the  Force  of  a  Motive  inviting  to  chufe  fomething,  comes  to 
juft  the  fame  Thing  as  chuling  the  Thing  which  the  Mo- 
tive invites  to^  as  I  obferved  before.  So  that  here  can  be  no 
Room  to  help  the  Mztter,  by  a  Diftinflion  of  two  VdlitionSo 
(z.)  If  the  IVIotive  be  paffive  with  Refpeft,  not  to  the  fame 
Volition  tliat  the  Motive  excites  to,  but  one  truly  diftin(?l 
and  prior ;  yet,  by  Mr.  Chubb,  that  prior  Volition  can't 
take  Place,  without  a  Motive  or  Excitement,  as  a  previous 
Ground  of  its  Exiflence.  For  he  infifts,  that  it  is  abfurd  to 
fuppofe  any  Volition  Jhould  take  Place  iviihout  fome  previous 
Motive  to  induce  it.  So  that  at  laft  it  comes  to  juft  the  fame 
Abfurdity :  for  if  every  Volition  muft  have  a  previous  Mo- 
tive, then  the  very  firji  in  the  whole  Series  muft  be  excited 
by  a  previous  Motive ;  and  yet  the  Motive  to  that  firft  Vo- 
lition is  paffive  ;  but  can't  be  paffive  v.'ith  Regard  to  ano- 
ther antecedent  Volition,  becaufe,  by  the  Suppofition,  it  is 
the  very  firft :  Therefore  if  it  be  paffive  with  Refped  to 
any  Volition,  it  muft  be  fo  with  Regard  to  that  very  Vo- 
lition that  it  is  the  Ground  of,  and  that  is  excited  by  it. 

III.  Tho'  Mr.  Chubb  aflerti,  as  above,  that  every  Volitiorx 
has  fome  Motive,  and  that,  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  na 
Volition  can  take  Place  ^without  fome  Motive  to  induce  it ;  yet  he 
aflerts,  tliat  Volition  does  not  always  follow  the  ftrongcft  Mo- 
tive ;  or  in  other  Words,  is  not  governed  by  any  fuperiour 
Strength  of  the  Motive  that  is  followed,  beyond  Motives  to- 
the    contrary,  j)revious    to    the   Volition    itfelf.     His    own 

N  3  Worduj 


^9  Inconfjience  of  Mr.  Chxihhs         Part  11. 

Words,  P.  258,  are  as  follows  :  "  The'  with  regard  to  phy£- 
'*  cal  Caufes,  that  which  is  ftrongeft  always  prevails, 
"  yet  it  is  otherwife  with  regard  to  mofal  Caufes.  Of 
"  thefe,  foraetimes  the  llronger,  fometimes  the  weaker, 
"  prevails.  And  the  Ground  of  this  Difference  is  evident, 
«*  namely,  that  what  we  call  moral  Caufes,  ftrictly  fpeak- 
«'  ing,  are  no  Caufes  at  all,  but  barely  paffive  Reafons  of, 
**  or  Excitements  to  the  Action,  or  to  the  refraining  from 
**  acting :  which  Excitements  we  have  Power,  or  are  at 
•*  Liberty  to  comply  with  or  reject,  as  I  have  {hewed  above." 
And  fo  throughout  the  Paragraph,  he,  in  a  variety  of 
Phrafes,  infills,  that  the  Will  is  not  always  determined  by  the 
ftrongeft  Motive,  unlefs  by  ftrongeft  we  prepofteroufly  meaa 
actually  prevailing  in  the  Event ;  which  is  not  in  the  Mo- 
tive, but  in  the  Will  ;  but  that  the  Will  is  not  always  de- 
termined by  the  Motive  which  is  ftrongeft,  by  any  Strength 
previous  to  the  Volition  itfelf.  And  he  elfewhere  does  a- 
bundantly  aflert,  that  the  Will  is  determined  by  no  fuperiouc 
Strength  or  Advantage  that  Motives  have,  from  any  Conftitu- 
tion  or  State  of  Things,  or  any  Circumftances  whatfoever, 
previous  to  the  actual  Determinatioo  of  the  Will.  And  in- 
cleed  his  whole  Difcourfe  on  human  Liberty  implies  it,  his. 
whole  Scheme  is  founded  upon  it. 

But    thefe  Things    cannot    ftand  together. There    Is. 

fuch  a  Thing  as  a  Diverfity  of  Strength  in  Motives  to  Choice^ 
previous  to  the  Choice  itfelf.  Mr.  Chubb  himfelf  fuppofes, 
that  they  ds>  pre^vioujly  in'vite,  induce,  excite  and  dijpofe  the  Mind 
io  ABion.  This  implies,  that  they  have  fomething  in  them- 
felves  that  is  in-viting,  fome  Tendency  to  induce  and  difpofe 
to  Volition,  previous  to  Volition  itfelf.  And  if  they  have 
in  themfelves  this  Nature  and  Tendency,  doubtlefs  they  have 
it  in  certain  limited  Degrees,  which  are  capable  of  Diver- 
fity ;  and  fome  have  it  in  greater  Degrees,  others  in  lefs  ; 
and  they  that  have  moft  of  this  Tendency,  confidered  with 
all  their  Nature  and  Circumftances,  previous  to  Volition, 
they  are  the  ftrongeft  Motives ;  and  thofe  that  have  leaft,  are 
the  weakeft  Motives. 

Now  if  Volition  fometimes  don't  follow  the  Motive  v;hich 
IS  ftrongeft,  or  has  moft  previous  Tendency  or  Advantage,  all 
Things  confidered,  to  induce  or  excite  it,  but  follows  the 
weakeft,  or  that  which  as  it  ftands  previoufly  in  the  Mind's 
View,  has  leaft  Tendency  to  induce  it ;  herein  the  Will  ap- 
parently acts  wholly  without  Motive,  without  any  previous 
P-cafon  to  difpofe  the  Mind  to  it,  contrary  to  what  the  lame 

Author 


Sed.  X.  Scheme  of  Liberty,  &c,  ^o 

Author  fuppofes.  The  Aft  wherein  the  Will  mud  proceed 
without  previous  Motive  to  induce  it,  is  the  Ad  of  prefer- 
ring the  weakeft  Motive.  For  how  abfurd  is  it  to  fay.  The 
Mind  fees  previous  Reafon  in  the  Motive,  to  prefer  that 
Motive  before  the  other ;  and  at  the  fame  Time  to  fuppofe, 
that  there  is  Nothing  in  the  Motive,  in  its  Nature,  State,  or 
any  Circumftances  of  it  vvhatfoever,  as  it  ftands  in  the  pre- 
vious View  of  the  Mind,  that  gives  it  any  Preference  ;  but 
on  the  contrary,  the  other  Motive  that  ftands  in  Competition 
with  it,  in  all  thefe  Pvcfpefts,  has  nicft  belonging  to  it,  that 
is  inviting  and  moving,  and  has  moft  of  a  Tendency  to 
Choice  and  Preference  ?  This  is  certainly  as  much  as  to 
fay,  there  is  previous  Ground  and  P..eafon  in  the  Motive  for 
the  Aft  of  Preference,  and  yet  no  previous  Reafon  for  it.  By 
the  Suppofition,  as  to  all  that  is  in  the  two  rival  Motives 
which  tends  to  Preference,  previous  to  the  Aft  of  Preference, 
it  is  not  in  that  which  is  prefer'd,  but  wholly  in  the  other  : 
becaufe  appearing  fuperiour  Strength,  and  all  appearing  Pre- 
fcrablenefs  is  in  that ;  and  yet  Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes,  that  the 
Aft  of  Preference  is  from  pre'v'wns  Grou7td  and  Reafon  in  the 
Motive  which  is  preferred.  But  are  thefe  Things  confiftent  ? 
Can  there  be  previous  Ground  in  a  Thing  for  an  Event 
that  takes  Place,  and  yet  no  previous  Tendency  in  it  to  that 
Event  ?  If  one  Thing  follows  another,  without  any  previ- 
ous  Tendency  to  its  following,  then  I  (hould  think  it  very 
plain,  that  it  follows  it  without  any  Manner  of  previous  Rea- 
fon why  it  fhould  follow. 

Yea,  in  this  Cafe,  Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes,  that  the  Event 
follows  an  Antecedent  or  a  previous  Thing,  as  the  Ground 
of  its  Exiftence,  not  only  that  has  no  Tettdency  to  it,  but  a 
contrary  Tendency.  The  Event  is  the  Preference  which  the 
Mind  gives  to  that  Motive  which  is  weaker,  as  it  ftands  in 
the  previous  View  of  the  Mind ;  the  immediate  Antecedent 
is  the  View  the  Mind  has  of  the  two  rival  Motives  ccn- 
■^unftly  ;  in  which  previous  View  of  the  Mind,  all  the  P/e- 
ferablenefs,  or  previous  Tendency  to  Preference,  is  fuppofed 
.  to  be  on  the  other  Side,  or  in  the  contrary  Motive ;  and  all 
the  Unworthinefs  of  Preference,  and  fo  previous  Tendency 
to  Comparitive  Negleft,  Rejeftion  or  Undervaluing,  is  oa 
that  Side  which  is  prefer'd  :  And  yet  in  this  View  of  the 
Mind  is  fuppofed  to  he,  t\\t  previous  Ground  or  Reafon  of  this 
Aft  of  Preference,  exciting  it,  and  d/fpojing  the  Mind  to  it  : 
Which,  I  leave  the  Reader  to  judge,  whether  it  be  abfurd' 
9r  not,    If  it  be  not,   then  it  is  not  abfurd  to  fay,  that  th^ 

previous 


^i  Inconfifience  of  Mr.  Chuhh's  Part  II. 

previous  Tendency  of  an  Antecedent  to  a  Confequent,  is  the 
Ground  and  Reafon  why  that  Confequent  does  not  follow  ; 
and  the  Want  of  a  previous  Tendency  to  an  Event,  yea,  a 
Tendency  to  the  Contrary,  is  the  true  Ground  and  Reafon 
why  that  Event  does  follow. 

An   Aft  of  Choice  or   Preference  is   a   comparative  Aft, 
■wherein  the  JVIind  afts  with  Reference  to  two  or  more  Things 
that  are  compared,  and  ftand   in  Competition  in  the  Mind's 
View.     If  the  Mind,  In   this   comparative  Aft,  prefers  that 
which  appears  inferiour  in  the  Comparifon^    then  the  Mind 
herein   afts  abfolutely   without  Motive,    or  Inducement,    or 
any   Temptatiou  whatfoevcr.     Then,    if  a  hungry  Man  has 
the  Offer  of  two  Sorts    of  Food,  both  which  he  finds  an  Ap- 
petite to,  but  has  a  ftronger  Appetite  to  one  than  the  other ; 
and  there  be  no  Circumftances  or  Excitements  whatfoever  in 
the  Cafe  to  induce   him   to  take  either  one  or  the  other,  but 
merely  his  Appetite :  If  in   the   Choice  he    makes   between 
them,  he   chufes   that   which  he   has  leaft   Appetite  to,  and 
xefufes  that  to  which  he  has  the  ftrongeft  Appetite,  this  is 
a  Choice  made  abfolutely   without  previous  Motive,  Excite- 
ment, Reafon  or  Temptation,  as  much  as  if  he  were  perfeftly 
without  all    Appetite  to  either :      Becaufe    his  Volition   in 
this  Cafe  is  a  comparative  Aft,  attending   and  following  a 
comparative  View  of  the  Food  which  he  chufes,  viewing  it 
as  related  to,  and  compared  with  the  other  Sort  of  Food,  in 
which   View    his    Preference     has    abfolutely    no     previous 
Ground,  yea,   is   againft  all  previous   Ground   and   Motive. 
And  if  there  be  any  Principle  in  Man  from  whence  an  Aft 
of  Choice   may   arife   after    this   Manner,     from    the   fame 
-principle  Volition  may  arife  wholly  without   Motive  on  ei- 
ther Side.     If  the  Mind  in  its  Volition  can  go  beyond  Mo- 
tive,   then  it  can  go  without  Motive  :    for  when   it  is  be- 
yond  the   Motive,    it  is   out  of  the   Reach    of  the   Motive, 
out  of  the  Limits  of  its  Influence,  and  fo  without  Motive. 
Jf  Volition  goes  beyond  the  Strengtli  and  Tendency  of  Mo- 
tive,   and  efpecially  if  it   goes    againft   its   Tendency,    this 
demonft rates  the  Independence  of  Volition  or  Motive.     And  if 
fo,  no  Reafon  can  be  given  for  what  Mr.  Chubb  fo  often  af- 
ferts,  even   that  in   the  Nature  of  Things  Folition  cannot  take 
Flace  -without  a  Moti-ve  to  induce  it. 

If  the  moft  High  fhould  endow  a  Balance  with  Agency 
or  Aftivity  of  Nature,  In  fuch  a  Manner,  that  when  une- 
qual Weights  are  put  into  the  Scales,   its  Agency  could  enable 


Se(5t.  X.  Schejne  of  Liberty,  &c.  92 

it  tc  caufe  that  Scale  to  defcend  which  has  the  leaft  Weight, 
snd  fo  to  raife  the  greater  Weight  ;  this  would  clearly  de- 
monftrate,  that  the  Motion  of  the  Balance  does  not  depend 
on  Weights  in  the  Scales,  at  leaft  as  much,  as  if  the  Ba- 
lance fhould  move  itfelf,  when  there  is  no  Weight  in  ei- 
ther Scale,  And  the  Aftivity  of  the  Balance  which  is 
fufficient  to  move  itfelf  againft  the  greater  Weight,  muft  cer- 
tainly be  more  than  fufficient  to  move  it  when  there  is  na 
Weight  at  all. 

Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes,  tjiat  the  Will  can't  ftir  at  all  without" 
fbme  Motive  ;  and  alfo  fuppofes,  that  if  there  be  a  Motive 
to  one  Thing,  and  none  to  the  contrary.  Volition  will  in- 
fallibly follow  that  Motive.  This  is  virtually  to  fuppofe  an 
entire  Dependence  of  the  Will  on  Motives  :  If  it  were  not 
wholly  dependent  on  them,  it  could  furely  help  itfelf  a  little 
without  them,  or  help  itfelf  a  little  againft  a  Motive,  with- 
out help  from  the  Strength  and  Weight  of  a  contrary  Mo- 
tive. And  yet  his  fuppofing  that  the  Will,  when  it  has  be- 
fore it  various  cppofitc  Motives,  can  ufe  them  as  it  pleafes,, 
and  chule  its  own  Influence  from  them,  and  negleft  the 
ftrongeft,  and  follow  the  weakeft,  fuppofes  it  to  be  wholly  in- 
dependent on  Motives. 

It  further  appears,  on  Mr.  Chubb'i  Suppofition,  that  Vo- 
lition muft  be  without  any  previous  Ground  in  any  Motive, 
thus :  If  it  be  as  he  fuppofes,  that  the  Will  is  not  deter- 
mined by  any  previous  fuperiour  Strength  of  the  Motive^ 
but  determines  and  chufes  its  own  Motive,  then,  when  the 
rival  Motive  are  exadly  equal  in  Strength  and  Tendency  to 
induce,  in  all  Refpefts,  it  may  follow  either ;  and  may  in 
fuch  a  Cafe,  fometimes  follow  one,  fometimes  the  other. 
And  if  fo,  this  Diverfity  which  appears  between  the  Adis 
of  the  Will,  is  plainly  without  previous  Ground  in  either 
of  the  Motives  ;  for  all  that  is  previouily  in  the  Motives,  is 
fuppofed  precifely  and  perfedly  the  fame,  without  any  Di- 
verfity whatfoever.  Now  perfeft  Identity,  as  to  all  that  is 
previous  in  the  Antecedent,  can't  be  the  Ground  and  Rea- 
fon  of  Diverfity  in  the  Confequent.  Perfeft  Identity  in  the 
Ground  can't  be  a  Reafon  why  it  is  not  followed  with  the  fame 
Confequence  :  And  therefore  the  Source  of  this  Diverfity  of 
Confequence  muft  be  fought  for  elfewhere. 

And  laftly,  it  may  be  obferved,  that  however  Mr,  Chub& 
does  much  infift  that  no  Volition  can  take  Place  without 

feme 


93  Jnconjifience  of  Mr.  ChubbV        Part  IL 

Ibme  Motive  to  induce  it,  which  previoufly  difpofes  the- 
Mind  to  it ;  yet,  as  he  alfo  infilts  that  the  Mind  without 
Reference  to  any  previous  fuperiour  Strength  of  Motives, 
picks  and  chufes  for  its  Motive  to  follow  ;  He  himfelf  here- 
in plainly  fuppofes,  that  with  Regard  to  the  Mind's  Prefe- 
rence of  one  Motive  before  another,  it  is  not  the  Motive  that 
difpofes  the  Will,  but  the  Vv'ill  difpofes  itfelf  to  follow  the 
Motive. 

IV.  Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes  Necftffity  to  be  utterly  inconlifl- 
e-nt  with  Agency  ;  and  that  to  fuppofe  a  Being  to  at  an  Agent 
in  that  which  is  neceifary,  is  a  plain  Contradiftion.  P.  311, 
and  throughout  his  Difcourf<;s  on  the  Subject  of  Liberty,  he 
fuppofes,  that  Neceffity  cannot  confift  with  Agency  or  Freedom; 
and  that  to  fuppofe  otherwife,  is  to  make  Liberty  and  Ne- 
ceffity, Aftion  and  Paffion,  the  fame  Thing.  And  fo  he 
feems  to  fuppofe,  that  there  is  no  Action  flriftly  fpeaking, 
but  Volition ;  and  that  as  to  the  Effefts  of  Volition  in 
Body  or  Mind,  in  themfelves  confidered,  being  neceifary, 
they  are  faid  to  be  free,  only  as  they  are  the  Effeds  of  an  Aft 
that  is  noj_  neceifary. 

And  yet,  according  to  him.  Volition  itfelf  is  the  EfeS 
of  Volition ;  yea,  every  A(ft  of  free  Volition  :  and  therefore 
every  Aft  of  free  Volition  muft,  by  what  has  now  been  ob- 
ferved  from  Him,  be  neceffary.  That  every  Aft  of  free 
Volition  is  itfelf  the  EfFeft  of  Volition,  is  abundantly  fup- 
pofed  by  Him.  In  P.  341,  he  fays,  "  If  a  Man  is  fuch  a 
*'  Creature  as  I  have  above  proved  him  to  be,  that  is,  if  he 
"  has  in  him  a  Power  or  Liberty  of  doing  either  Good  or 
"  Evil,  and  either  of  thefe  is  the  Subjeft  of  his  own  free 
"  Choice,  fo  that  he  might,  IF  HE  HAD  PLEASED, 
"  have  CHOSEN  and  done  the  contrary." Here  He  fup- 
pofes, all  that  is  Good  or  Evil  in  Man  is  the  Effeft  of  his 
Choice  ;  and  fo  that  his  good  or  evil  Choice  itfelf  is  the 
FfFeft  of  his  Pleafure  or  Choice,  in  thefe  Words,  He  might 
if  he  had  PLEASED,  ha^ue  CHOSEN  the  contrary.  So  in  P.  3  ^6, 
"  Tho'  it  be  highly  reafonable,  that  a  Man  fhould  always 

•'  chufe  the  greater  Good, yet  he  may,  if  he  PLEASES, 

♦'  CHUSE  otherwife."  Which  is  the  fame  Thing  as  if  he 
had  faid.  He  may,  if  he  chufes,  chufe  others-wife.  And  then  he 
goes  on,  " — that  is,  he  may,  if  he  pleafes,  chufe  what  is 
good  for  himfelf,"  &c.  And  again,  in  the  fame  Page,  "  The 
•'  Will  is  not  confined  by  the  Underftanding  to  any  parti- 
*'  cular  Sort  of  Goodj  whether  greater  or  lefs  i  but  is  at 

«  Liberty 


Se(5l.  X.  Scheme  'of  Liberty ^  &c.  04 

""  Liberty  to  chufe  what  Kind  of  Good  it  pleafes." If  there 

be  any  Meaning  in  thefe  lall  Words,  the  Meaning  mull  b* 
t:his,  that  the  Will  is  at  Liberty  to  chife  <what  Kind  of  Good  it 
chiifes  to  chife;  iuppoling  the  Aft  of  Choice  itfelf  deter- 
mined by  an  antecedent  Choice.  The  Liberty  Mr.  Chubb 
fpeaks  of,  is  not  only  a  Man's  having  Power  to  move  his 
Body  agreeably  to  an  antecedent  Aft  of  Choice,  but  to  ufe 
or  exert  the  Faculties  of  his  Soul.  Thus,  in  P.  379,  fpeaking 
of  the  Faculties  of  his  Mind,  be  fays,  "  Man  has  Power,  and 
"  is  at  Liberty  to  negleft  thcfe  Faculties,  to  ufe  them  aright, 
*.*  or  to  abufe  them,  as  he  pleafes."  And  that  he  fuppofes  an 
Aft  of  Choice,  or  Excrcife  of  Pleafure,  properly  diftinft 
sfroniy  and  antecedent  to  thofe  Afts  thus  chofen,  direfting, 
commanding  and  producing  the  chofen  Afts,  and  even  the 
Afts  of  Choice  themfelves,  is  very  plain  in  Y,  283.  "  He 
*•  Cdcn.  command  his  Actions  ;  and  herein  coniifts  his  Liberty  : 
V  He  can  give  or  deny  himfelf  that  Pleafure  as  he  pleafes.'* ^ 

And  P.    377,   "  If  the  Aftions  of  Men are  not  the  Prj- 

•*  duce  of  a  free  Choice  ^  or  Eleftion,  but  fpring  from  a  Neceflity 

"  of  Nature, he  cannot  in  Reafon  be  the  Objeft  of  Re- 

"  ward  or  Punifhir.ent  on  their  Account,  Whereas,  if 
"  Aftion  in  Man,  whether  Good  or  Evil,  is  the  Produce  of 
"  Will  or  free  Choice  ;  fo  that  a  Man  in  either  Cafe,  had  it 
"  in  his  Power,  and  was  at  Liberty  to  have  CHOSEN  the 
"  contrary,  he  is  the  proper  Objeft  of  Reward  or  Punilh- 
"  niient,  according  as  he  CHUSES  to  behave  Himfelf." 
Here  in  thefe  laft  Words,  he  fpeaks  oi  Liberty  of  CHUSING, 
according  as  he  CHUSES.  So  that  the  Behaviour  which  he 
fpeaks  of  as  fubjeft  to  his  Choice,  is  his  chrtfng  itfelf,  as 
well  as  his  external  Gonduft  confequent  upon  it.  And. 
therefore  'tjs  evident,  he  means  not  only  external  Aftions,  but 
the  Afts  of  Choice  themfelves,  when  he  fpeaks  oi  all  free 
Anions,  as  the  PRODUCE  of  free  Choice.  And  this  is  abun-  ' 
dantly  evident  in  what  he  fays  in  P.  372,  &  373,  * 

Now  thefe  Things  imply  a  twofold  great  Abfurdity  and 
Inconfiftencc. 

1,  To  fuppofe,  as  Mr,  Chubb  plainly  does,  that  every 
free  Aft  01  Choice  is  commanded  by,  and  is  the  Produce  of  free 
Choice,  is  to  fuppofe  the  firft  free  Aft  of  Choice  belonging  to 
the  Cafe,  yea,  the  firft  free  Aft  of  Choice  that  ever  Man  ex- 
erted, to  be  the  Produce  of  an  antecedent  Aft  of  Choice.  But 
I  hope  I  lieed  not  labour  at  all  to  convince  my  Readers,  that  'tis 
an  Abfurdity  to  fay,  the  very  frji  Aft  is  the  Produce  of  ano- 
ther Aft  that  "went  before  it. 

O  X,  If 


9.5  Inconfifience  of  Mr.  ChubbV  Part  IL 

2.  If  it  were  both  poffible  and  real,  as  Mr.  Chubb  iniifts, 
that  every  free  Ad  of  Choice  were  the  Produce  or  the  Effeft 
of  a  free  Aft  of  Choice ;  yet  even  then,  according  to 
his  Principles,  no  one  Ad  of  Choice  would  be  free,  but  every 
one  necefiary  5  becaufe,  every  Ad  of  Choice  being  the  Effed 
of  a  foregoing  Ad,  every  Ad  would  be  neceflarily  con- 
neded  with  that  foregoing  Caufe.  For  Mr.  Chubb  himfelf 
fays,  P.  389,     "  When  the  Self-moving  Power  is  exerted,  it 

•'  becomes  the  neceffary  Caufe  of  its  Etfeds." So  that  his 

Notion  of  a  free  Ad,  that  is  rewardable  or  punilhable,  is  a 
Heap  of  Contradidions.  It  is  a  free  Act,  and  yet,  by  his 
own  Notion  of  Freedom,  is  neceffary ;  and  therefore  by  him 
it  is  a  Contradiction,  to  fuppofe  it  to  be  free.  According  to 
him,  every  free  Act  is  the  Produce  of  a  free  Act ;  fo  that 
there  muft  be  an  infinite  Number  of  free  Acts  in  Succeffion, 
without  any  Beginning,  in  an  Agent  that  has  a  Beginning  : 
And  therefore  here  is  an  infinite  Number  of  free  Acts, 
every  one  of  them  free ;  and  yet  not  any  one  of  them  free, 
but  ever}'  Act  in  the  whole  infinite  Chain  a  neceffary  Effect. 
All  the  Acts  are  rewardable  or  puniihable,  and  yet  the  Agent 
cannot,  in  Reafon,  be  the  Object  of  Reward  or  Punifhment,  on 
Account  of  any  one  of  thefe  Actions.  He  is  active  in  them 
all,  and  paffive  in  none ;  yet  active  in  none,  but  paffive  in 
all,  effc. 

V.  Mr.  Chubb  does  moft  ftrenuouily  deny,  that  Motives 
are  Canfes  of  the  Acts  of  the  Will ;  or  that  the  moving 
Principle  in  Man  is  ?no'ved,  ox  caufed to  be  exertedhy  y^oXxv^^. 
His  Words  P.  388  &  389,  are,  "  If  the  moving  Principle  in 
"  Man  is  MOVED,  or  CAUSED  TO  BE  EXERTED, 
**  by  fomething  external  to  Man,  fwhich  all  Motives  are ,  then 
"  it  would  not  be  a  Self-moving  Principle,  feeing  it  would  be 
**  moved  by  a  Principle  external  to  itfelf.  And  to  fay,  that  a 
"  Self-moving  Principle  is  MOVED,  or  CAUSED' TO  BE 
*'  EXERTED,  by  a  Caufe  external  to  itfelf,  is  abfurd  and 
*'  a  Contradidion,  &c." And  in  the  next  Page,  'tis  particu- 
larly and  largely  infifted,  that  Motives  are  Caufes  in  no  Cafe, 
that  they  are  merely  pajji've  in  the  ProduSion  of  ASlion,  and  have 
710  Caufality  in  the  Proau&ion  of  it, — no  Caufality,  to  be  the  Caufe 
of  the  Exertion  of  the  Will, 

Now  I  defire  it  may  be  confidered,  how  this  can  poffibly 
confift  with  what  he  fays  in  other  Places,  Let  it^be  noted 
here, 

i.Mr» 


Sed.  X.  Scheme  of  Liberty y  &c.  ^5 

1.  Mr.  Chubb  abundantly  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  £*•- 
citements  of  the  ABs  of  the  Will;  and  fays,  that  Motinjes  do 
excite  Volition,  and  induce  it,  and  that  they  are  neceflary"  to 
this  End  ;  that  in  the  Rea/on  and  Nature  of  Things,  Volitioft  can- 
not take  Place  i/jithout  Motinjes  to  excite  it.  But  now  if  Motives 
excite  xhc^fiW,  ihty  mo've  li ;  and  yet  he  fays,  'tis  abfurd  to  fay, 
the  Will  is  moved  by  Motives.  And  again,  (if  Language  is 
of  any  Significancy  at  all)  If  Motives  excite  Volition,  then 
they  are  the  Caufe  of  its  being  excited ;  and  to  caufe  Voli- 
tion to  be  excited,  is  to  caufe  it  to  be  put  forth  or  exerted. 
Yea,  Mr.  Chubb  fays  himfelf,  P.  317,  Motive  is  neceflary 
to  the  Exertion  of  the  adive  Faculty.  To  excite,  is  poiitively 
to  do  fomething ;  and  certainly  that  which  does  fomething,  is 
the  Caufe  of  the  Thing  done  by  it.  To  create,  is  to  caufe  to 
be  created ;  to  make,  is  to  caufe  to  be  made ;  to  kill,  is  to 
caufe  to  be  killed  ;  to  quicken,  is  to  caufe  to  be  quickened  ; 
and  to  excite,  is  to  caufe  to  be  excited.  To  excite,  is  to  be  a 
Caufe,  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe,  not  merely  a  negative 
Occafion,  but  a  Ground  of  Exiftence  by  pofitive  Irjfluence. 
The  Notion  of  exciting,  is  exerting  Influence  to  caufe  the 
Effed  to  arife  or  come  forth  into  Exiftence. 

2.  Mr.  Chubb  himfelf,  P.  317,  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  the 
Ground  and  Rcafon  of  Aftion  BY  INFLUENCE,  and  BY 
PREVAILING  INFLUENCE.  Now,  what  can  be  meant 
by  a  Caufe,  but  fomething  that  is  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of 
a  Thing  by  its  Influence,  an  Influence  that  is  frevaUnt  and 
fo  efl'eaual  ? 

3.  This  Author  not  only  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  the  Ground 
and  Reafon  of  Action,  by  prevailing  Influence  ;  but  exprefly 
of  their  Influence  as  pre-jailing  FOR  THE  PRODUCTION 
of  an  Action,  in  the  fame  P.  317  :  which  makes  the  Incon- 
fiftency  ftill  more  palpable  and  notorious.  The  froduSlion 
of  an  Effect  is  certainly  the  Caufing  of  an  Effect ;  and  pro- 
iuili've  Influence  is  caufal  Influence,  if  any  Thing  is :  And 
that  which  has  this  Influence  prevalently,  fo  as  thereby  to 
become  the  Ground  of  another  Thing,  is  a  Caufe  of  that 
Thing,  if  there  be  any  fuch  Thing  as  a  Caufe.  This  In- 
fluence, Mr.  Chubb  fays.  Motives  have  to  produce  an  Action  ; 
and  yet  he  fays,  'tis  abfurd  and  a  Contradiction,  to  fay  they 
are  Caufes. 

4.  In  the  fame  Page,  He  once  and  again  fpeaks  of  Mo- 
tivf »  as  difpofing  the  Agent  to  Action,  bj  their  Influence.     Hii 

O  3.  Words 


^-  Inconfijience  of  Mr.  ChMhh' s        Part  11. 

Words  are  thefe  :  "  As  Motive,  which  takes  Place  in  the. 
**  Underftanding,  and  is  the  Produft  of  Intelligence,  i& 
«.*  NECESSARY'  to  Aftion,  that  is,  to  the  EXERilON  of 
**  the  afiive  Faculty,  becaufe  that  Faculty  would  not  be  ex- 
<'  erted  without  fome  PREVIOUS  REASON  to  DISPOSE 
**  the  Mind  to  Adiion ;  (o  from  hence  it  plainly  appears, 
**  that  when  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  difpofed  to  one  Action  ra- 
*'  ther  than  another,  this  properly  fignifies  the  PREVAIL- 
"  ING  INFLUENCE  that  one  Motive  has  upon  a  Man 
«.'  FOR  THE  PRODUCTION  of  an  Aftion,  or  for  the 
**  being  at  Reft,  before  all  other  Motives,  for  the  Produdion 
*'  of  the  contrary.  For  as  Motive  is  the  Ground  and  Rea- 
*'  fon  of  any  Adion,  fo  the  Motive  that  prenjaih,  DISPOSES 
**  the  Agent  to  the.  Performance  of  that  Aftion." 

Now,  if  Motives  difpofe  the  Mind  to  Aftion,  then  they 
caufe  the  Mind  to  be  difpofed  ;  and  to  caufe  the  Mind  to  be 
difpofed,  is  to  caufe  it  to  be  willing ;  and  to  caufe  it  to  be 
willing,  is  to  caufe  it  to  will  ;  and  that  is  the  fame  Thmg 
as  to  be  the  Caufe  of  an  Aft  of  the  Will,  And  yet  thia 
fame  Mr,  Chubb  holds  it  to  be  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  Motive  to  be 
a  Caufe  of  the  Acl  of  the  Will. 

And  if  we  compare  thefe  Things  together,  we  have  here 
again  a  whole  Heap  of  Inconfiftences.  Moti'ves  are  the  previous 
Ground  a?id  Reajon  of  the  Afts  of  the  Will ;  yea,  the  neceffary 
Ground  and  Reafon  of  their  Exertion,  'without  nuhich  they  nvill  not 
ie  exerted,  and  cannot  in  the  Nature  of  Things  take  Place  ;  and* 
they  do  excite  thefe  Adts  of  the  Will,  and  do  this  by  a  pre- 
vailing Infiuence  ;  yea,  an  Influence  nvhich  pre'vails  for  the  Pro- 
duaion  of  the  Aa  of  the  Will,  and  for  the  difpoftng  of  the  Mind 
to  it :  and  yet  'tis  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  Motives  to  he  a  Caufe  of  an 
A(fl  of  the  Will,  or  that  a  Principle  of  IV ill  is  monjed  or 
caufed  to  be  exerted  by  it,  or  that  it  has  any  Caufality  in  the  Pro- 
duilion  of  it,  cr  any  Caufality  to  be  the  Caufe  of  the  Exertion  of 
ihe  Will. 

A  due  Confideration  of  thefe  Things  which  Mr.  Chubb  has 
advanced,  the  ftrange  Inconfiftences  which  the  Notion  of  Li- 
berty confifting  in  the  Will's  Power  of  Self-determination 
void  of  all  NecefTity,  united  with  that  Didate  of  common 
Senfe,  that  there  can  be  no  Volition  without  a  Motive,  drove 
him  info,  may  be  fufficient  to  convince  us,  that  it  is  utterly  im- 
poffible  ever  to  make  that  Notion  of  Liberty  confiftent  with 
the  Influence  of  MQtiye&  in  Volition,  And  as  it  is  in  a  man- 
ner 


Se6t.  X.  Scheme  of  LibeHy,  &e.  ^% 

ncr  felf-evident,  that  there  can  be  no  Ad  of  Will,  ChoicQ 
or  Preference  of  the  Mind,  without  feme  Motive  or  Inducer 
ment,  fomcthing  in  the  Mind's  Vievvj  which  it  aims  at,  feeksj 
inclines  to,  and  goes  after  ;  fo  'tis  moft  manifeft,  there  is  no 
fuch  Liberty  iri  the  Univerfe  as  Arminiam  infilt  on  j  nor  any 
fuch  Thing  poffiblCj  or  conceivable. 


Section     XI. 

'^he  Evidence  of  G  O  D's  certain  Foreknowledge  of 
the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents. 

THAT  the  Afls  of  the  Wills  of  moral  Agents  are  not 
contingent  Events,  in  that  Senfe,  as  to  be  without  ail 
Neceffity,  appears  by  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  fuch 
Events. 

In  handling  this  Argument,  I  would  in  \S\QfirJi  Place  prove, 
that  God  has  a  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  voluntary  AOs 
of  moral  Agents  ;  zndtfecondly,  Ihew  the  Confequence,  or  how 
it  follows  from  hence,  that  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  are 
not  contingent,  fo  as  to  be  without  Neceffity  of  Connexion 
and  Confequence. 

First,  I  am  to  prove,  that  God  has  an  abfolute  and  cer- 
tain Foreknowledge  of  the  free  Aftions  of  moral  Agents. 

One  would  think,  it  fhould  be  wholly  needlefs  to  enter  on 
fuch  an  Argument  with  any  that  profefs  themfelves  Chriftians  ; 
But  fo  it  is ;  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  free  Ads 
of  moral  Agents,  is  denied  by  fome  that  pretend  to  believe 
the  Scriptures  to  be  the  Word  of  God  ;  and  efpecially  of  late. 
I  therefore  (hall  confider  the  Evidence  of  fuch  a  Prefcience  in 
the  Moft  High,  as  fully  as  the  defigned  Limits  of  this  Effay 
will  admit  of;  fuppoling  myfelf  herein  to  have  to  do  with  fuch 
as  own  the  truth  of  the  Bible. 

Arc.  I.  My  firji  Argument  fhall  be  taken  from  God's 
Trediaion  of  fuch  Events.  Here  I  would  in  the  firft  Place  lay- 
down  thefc  two  Things  as  Axioms, 


r^^  GOD  certainly  foreknows  Part  II, 

(i.)  If  God  don't  foreknow,  He  can't  foretel  fuch  Events; 
that  is.  He  can't  peremptorily  and  certainly  foretel  them. 
Ji  God  has  no  more  than  an  uncertain  Guefs  concerning 
Events  of  this  Kind,  then  He  can  declare  no  more  than  an 
uncertain  Guefs.  Pofitively  to  foretel,  is  to  profefs  to  fore- 
knov/,  or  to  declare  pofitive  Foreknowledge. 

(2.)  If  God  don't  certainly  foreknow  the  future  Volitions 
of  moral  Agents,  then  neither  can  He  certainly  foreknow 
thofe  Events  v/hich  are  confequent  and  dependent  on  thefe 
Volitions.  The  Exiftence  of  the  one  depending  on  the 
Exiftence  of  the  other,  the  Knowledge  of  the  Exiftence  of 
the  one  depends  on  the  Knowledge  of  the  Exiftence  of  the 
•other ;  and  the  one  can't  be  more  certain  than  the  other. 

Therefore,  how  many,  how  great,  and  how  extenfive  fc- 
ever  the  Confequences  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents 
may  be  ;  tho'  they  ihould  extend  to  an  Alteration  of  the  State 
of  Things  through  the  Univerfe,  and  fhould  be  continued 
in  i  Series  of  fucceffive  Events  to  all  Eternity,  and  ihould 
in  the  Progrefs  of  Things  branch  forth  into  an  infinite  Num- 
ber of  Series,  each  of  them  going  on  in  an  endlefs  Line  or 
Chain  of  Events  j  God  muft  be  as  ignorant  of  all  thefe  Con- 
fequences, as  He  is  of  the  Volition  v/hence  they  firft  take 
their  Rife  :  All  thefp  Events,  and  the  whole  State  of  Things 
depending  on  them,  how  important,  extenfive  and  vaft  fo- 
ever,  muft  be  hid  from  him. 

Thefe  Pofitions  being  fuch  as  I  fuppofe  none  will  deny,  I 
»ow  proceed  to  obferve  the  following  Things. 

I.  Men's  moral  Condufl  and  Qualities,  their  Virtues 
and  Vices,  their  Wickednefs  and  good  Pradtice,  Things  re- 
wardable  and  punifhablc,  have  often  been  foretold  by  God. — - 
fharaoh'^  moral  Condu<Sl,  in  refufing  to  obey  God's  Com- 
mand, in  letting  his  People  go,  was  foretold.  God  fays  to 
Mo/es,  Exod.  iii.  19.  I  am  Jure,  that  the  King  0/ Egypt  njoill  not 
let  you  go.  Here  God  profeffes  not  only  to  guefs  at,  but  to 
know  Pharaoh' &  future  Difobedience.  In  Chap.  vii.  4.  God 
fays.  But  Pharaoh  Jhall  not  hearken  unto  you  ;  that  I  may  lay 
mine  Hand  upon  Egypt,  &c.  And  Chap.  ix.  30.  M.ofest{&y%  to 
Pharaoh,  As  for  thee >  end  thy  Servants,  IKNOfVthatyenfjill 

■not  fear  the  Lord.     See  alfo  Chap.  xi.  9. The  moral  Con- 

duft  of  foftahy  by  Name,  in  his  zealoufly  exerting  himfelf  in 
Oppoiicion  to  Idolatry,  in  pi^ticular  Ads  of  his,  was  foretold 

abov^ 


Sed.  XI.        the  Volit tons  of  moral  Agents,         lOo 

above  three  Hundred  Years  before  he  was  bom,  and  th« 
Prophecy  feal'd  by  a  Miracle,  and  renewed  and  confirm- 
ed by  th*  Words  of  a  fecond  Prophet,  as  what  furely  would. 
not  fail,  I  Kings  xiii.  i, — 6,  52.  This  Prophecy  was  alfo 
in  EfFed  a  Prediftion  of  the  moral  Conduft  of  the  People, 
in  upholding  their  Schifmatical  and  Idolatrous  Worftiip  'till 
that  Time,  and  the  Idolatry  of  thofe  Priefts  of  the  high 
Places,  which  it  is  foretold  Jojiah  Ihould  offer  upon  that 
Altar  of  Bethel. — Micaiah  foretold  the  foolifh  and  fiiiful  Con- 
dudl  of  Ahab,  in  refufing  to  hearken  to  the  Word  of  the; 
Lord  by  him,  and  chufing  rather  to  hearken  to  the  falfc 
Prophets,  in  going  to  Ramoth-Gilead  to  his  Ruin,  i  Kings  xxi. 
20, — 22. — The  moral  Condudt  of  Hazael  was  foretold,  in 
that  Cruelty  he  fhould  be  guilty  of;  on  which  Hazael  fays. 
What,  is  thy  Ser'vant  a  Dog,  that  he  Jhould  do  this  Thing  !  ^  he 
Prophet  fpeaks  of  the  Event  as  what  he  knew,  and  not  what 
he  conjeftured.  2  Kings  viji.  12.  I  knonv  the  Evil  thou  auilt  do 
tin  to  the  Children  of  KxztX:  Thou  <vjilt  dafh  their  Children ,  and  rip 

up  their  Women  nvith  Child. The  moral  Condud:  oi  Cyrus  is- 

foretold,  long   before  he   had  a  Being,  in  his  Mercy  to  God's 
People,  and  Regard  to  the  true  God,  in    turning  the  Capti- 
vity of  the  Jeius,  and   promoting  the  building  of  the  Tem- 
ple. Ifai.  xliv.  28.  &lxv.  13.  Compare  2  Chron.  xxxvi.  22,  23- 
and   Ez.ra'\.   i, — 4. — How     many   Inftances    of  the    moral 
Conduft  of  the  Kings  of  the  l^orth  and  South,  particular  Inftances 
of  the  wicked  Behaviour  of  the  Kings  of  Syria  and  Egypt,  arc 
foretold    in     the  xith   Chap,  of  Daniel?  Their  Corruption, 
Violence,  Robbery,  Treachery,  and  Lies.     And  particularly, 
how  much  is  foretold  of  the  horrid  Wickednefs  of  Antioihis, 
Epiphanes,  called  there  a  "vile  Per/on,  inftead  of  Epiphanes,  or 
Illuftrious.     In  that  Chapter,  and  alfo  in  Chap.  viii.  ver.  9, — 
14,  23,  to  the  End,  are  foretold  his  Flattery,  Deceit  and  Lies, 
his  having  his  Heart  fet  to  do  Mifchief,  and  fet  againji  the  holy 
Covenant ,  his  deJiroyi?ig  and  treading  under  Foot  the  holy  People j 
in  a  marvellous  Manner,  his  having  Indignation  againji  the  holy 
Covenant,  fetting  his  Heart  againji  it,  and  confpiring  againji  it  ^ 
his  polluting  the  SanBiiary  of  Strength,  treading  it  under  Foot, 
taking  avuay  the  daily  Sacrifice,  and  placing  the  Abomi?iation  that 
maketh  defolate  ;  his  great  Pride,  magnifying  him/elf  againji  Gody 
and   uttering   marvelous  Blafphemies   againji  Him,  'till  God  in 
Indignation  Jhould  dejiroy  him.     Withal  the  moral  Conduft  of 
the  Jeivs,  on  Occafion  of  his  Perfecution,  is  p^edifted.     'Tis 
foretold,  that   he  Jhould  corrupt  many   by  Flatteries,  Chap.  xi. 
32, — 34.     But   that   others   ftiould    behave   with   a   glorious 
Conftancy    and  Fortitude,  in  Oppofition    to    him,  ver.  32. 

And 


loi  GOD  certainly  foreknows         Part  it. 

And  that  forae  good  Men  ftiould  fall,  and  repent,  'vtr.  35: 
Chrift  foretold  Peter  %  Sin,  in  denying  his  Lord,  with  its  Cir- 
cumftances,  in  a  peremptory  Manner.  And  fo,  tbat  great 
Sin  of  judas,  in  betraying  his  Mafter,  and  its  dreadful  and 
eternal  Punilhnient  in  Hell,  was  foretold  in  the  like  pofitive 
Manner,  Matth.  xxvi.  21, — 25.  and  parallel  Places  in  the 
other  Evangeliils. 

2.  Many  Events  have  been  foretold  by  God,  which  were 
confequent  and  dependent  on  the  moral  Ccnduft  of  parti- 
cular ?erfons,  and  were  accompliflied,  either  by  their  vir- 
tuous or  vicious  Adlions. — Thus,  the  Children  of  i/ra^/'s  going 
down  into  B.gypt  to  dwell  there,  was  foretold  to  Abraham^. 
Gen.  XV.  which  was  brought  about  by  the  Wickednefs  of 
,7V^/^'s  Brethren  in  felling  him,   and  the  Wickednefs  of^^o- 

Jeph\  Miftrefs,  and  his  own  fignal  Virtue  in  refifting  her 
Temptation.  Tlie  Accomplifhment  of  the  Thing  prefigur'd 
in  Jofeph's  Dream,    depended  on   the  fame   moral   Conduft. 

yotham's,  Parable  and   Prophecy,  Judges  ix.   15, 20.  was 

accomplifned  by  the  wicked  Conduft  oi  Abimelech,  and  the 
Men  of  Shechem.  The  Prophecies  againft  the  Houfe  of  Eli^ 
3  Sam.  Ghap.  ii  &  iii.  were  accomplifhed  by  the  Wickednefs 
of  Doeg  the  Edomite,  in  acciifing  the  Priefts ;  and  the  great 
Impiety,  and  extreme  Cruelty  of  Saul  in  deftroying  the 
Priefts  at  'Nob.  i  Sam.  xxii. — Nathans  Prophecy  againft  David, 
2  Sam.  xii.  11,  12.  was  fulSl'd  by  the  horrible  Wickednefs  of 
Ahfolom,  in  rebelling  againft  his  Father,  feeking  his  Life^ 
and  lying  with  his  Concubines  in  the  Sight  of  the  Sun.  The 
Prophecy  againft  Solomon,  i  Kings  xi.  n, — 13.  was  fulfil'd 
by  Jeroboam's  Rebellion  and  Ufurpation,  which  are  fpokent 
of  as  his  Wickednefs,  2  Chron.xm.  5,  6.  compare  ver.  18.  The 
Prophecy  againft  Jeroboam's  Family,  i  Kings  xiv.  was  fulfil'd 
by  the  Confpiracy,  Treafon,  and  cruel  Murders  oi  Baa/ha ^ 
2  Kings  XV.  ^7,  &c.  The  Prediftions  of  the  Prophet  Jehu 
againft  the  Koufe  of  BaaJJm,  i  Kings  xvi.  at  the  Beginning, 
were  fulfil'd  by  the  Treafon  and  Parricide  of  Zimri,  i  Kings 
xvi.  9, — - — 15,  20. 

3.  How  often  has  God  foretold  the  future  moral  Conduft 
of  Nations  and  Peoples,  of  Numbers,  Bodies,  and  Suc- 
cefiions  of  Men ;  with  God's  judicial  Proceedings,  and 
many  other  Events  confequent  and  dependent  on  their. 
Virtues  and  Vices  ;  which  could  not  be  foreknown,  if 
the  Volitions  of  Men,  wherein  they  aded  as  moral  Agents, 
bad  not  been  fojrefeen  ?  The  future  Cruelty  of  the  Egyptians 


Sedt.  XI      the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  io2 

in  opre/Iing  Ifrael,  and  God's  judging  and  punifiiing  them 
for  it,  was  foretold  long  before  it  came  to  pafs.  Gen.  xv. 
13,  14.  The  Continuance  of  the  Iniquity  oi  \S\q  Amorites^ 
and  the  Increafe  of  it  until  it  Jhould  be  full,  and  they  ripe 
for  Deltrudion,  was  foretold  above  four  Hundred  Years  be- 
fore-hand, Gen,  XV.  16.  Ad.  vii.  6,  7.  The  Prophecies  of 
the  Deftru6tion  oi  Jerztfalem,  and  the  Land  oijudah,  were 
abfolute  ;  2  Kings  xx.  17, — 19.  Chap.  xxii.  15,  to  the  End. 
It  was  loretold  in  Hezekiah's  Time,  and  was  abundantly  in- 
lifted  on  in  the  Book  of  the  Prophet  Ifciah,  who  wrote  No- 
thing after  Hezekiah's  Days.  It  was  foretold  in  Jofiah'%  Time, 
in  the  Beginning  of  a  great  Reformation,  2  Kings  xxii.  And 
it  is  manifell  by  innumerable  Things  in  the  Prediftions  of 
the  Prophets,  relating  to  this  Event,  its  Time,  its  Cir- 
cumftances,  its  Continuance  and  End  ;  the  Return  from 
the  Captivity,  the  Reftoration  of  the  Temple,  City  and  Land, 
and  many  Circumftances,  and  Confequeiices  of  That;  I  fay, 
thefe  fhew  plainly,  that  the  Prophecies  of  this  great  Event 
were  abfolute.  And  yet  this  Event  was  connedled  with,  and 
dependent  on  tu'o  Things  in  Men's  moral  Condud  :  firft,  the 
injurious  Rapine  and  Violence  of  the  King  of  Babylon  and 
his  People,  as  the  efficient  Caufe  ;  which  God  often  fpeaks 
of  as  what  he  highly  refented,  and  would  feverely-punifh  ; 
and  2dly,  The  final  Obftinacy  of  the  Jenjus.  That  great  E- 
vent  is  often  fpoken  of  as  fufpended  on  this.  Jer.  iv.  i.  &  v.  i. 
vii.  I, — 7.  xi.  I,— 6.  xvii.  24,  to  the  End.  xxv.  i, — 7. 
xxyi.  I, — 8.  13.  &  xxxviii.  17,  18.  Therefore  this  Deftruc- 
tion  and  Captivity  could  not  be  foreknown,  unlefs  fuch  a 
moral  Conduct  of  the  Chaldeans  and  Je'zvs  had  been  fore- 
known. And  then  it  was  foretold,  that  the  People  Jhould  be 
finally  ohftinate,  to  the  Deftru6tion  and  utter  Defolation  of  the 

City  and  Land.    Ifai.  vi.  9, n.  fer.  i.  18,  19.  vii.  27, — 

29.  Ezek.  iii.  7.  &  xxiv.   13,  14. 

The  final  Obfcinacy  of  thofe  fe^s  v/ho  were  left  in  the 
Land  of  Ifrael,  and  who  afterwards  went  down  into  Egypt,  in 
their  Idolatry  and  Rejection  of  the  true  God,  was  foretold  by 
God,  and  the  Prediftion  confirmed  with  an  Oath,  Jer.  xliv. 
26,  27.  And  God  tells  the  People,  Ifai.  xlviii.  3,  4, — 8.  that  he 
had  predifted  thofe  Things  which  fhould  be  confequent  on 
their  Treachery  and  Obflinacy,  becaufe  he  knew  they  would 
be  obftinate  ;  and  that  he  had  declared  thefe  Things  before- 
hand, for  their  Conviftion  of  his  being  the  only  true  God,  l^c. 

P  The 


ro3  GOD  certainly  foreknows       Fart.  ll\ 

The  Deftrudion  of  Babylon,  with  many  of  the  Circum- 
fiances  of  it,  was  foretold,  as  the  Judgment  of  God  for  the  ex- 
ceeding Pride  and  Haughtinefs  of  the  Heads  of  that  Monar- 
chy, Nebi/chadfiezzar,  and  his  Succeffors,  and  their  wickedly 
deftroying  other  Nations,  and  particularly  for  their  exalting, 
themfelves  againft  the  true  God  and  his  People,  before  any 
of  thefe  Monarchs  had  a  Being ;.  I/ai.  Chap,  xiii,  xiv,  xlvii : 
Compare  Hahbak.  ii.  5,  to  the  End,  and  Jet:  Chap.  1.  and  li. 
That  Ba'^ylon'%  Deftrudtion  was  to  be  a  Recompence,  according  tor 
the  Works  of  their  onvn  Hands ,  appears  by  fer.  xxv.  14. — The 
Immorality  which  the  People  of  Babylon,  and  particularly  het 
Princes  and  great  Men,  were  guilty  of,  that  very  Night  that 
the  City  was  deftroyed,  their  Revelling  and  Drunkennefs  at 
Bel/hazzar'i  Idolatrous  Feaft,  was  foretold,-  Jer.M.  39,  57^ 

The  Return  of  the  ycl^3s  from  the  Babyhnijh  Captivity  isv 
often  very  particularly  foretold,  with  many  Circumftances,. 
and  the  Promifes  of  it  are  very  peremptory ;  Jer.  xxxi.  35^ 
— 40.  and  xxxii.  6-, — 15,  41, — 44.  and  xxxiii.  24, — 26. 
And  the  very  Time  of  their  Return  was  prefix'd  ;  Jer.  xxv, 
11,12.  and  xxix.  10.  11.  2  Chron.  xxxvi.  %i.  Ezek.  iv.  6.  and. 
Dan.  Vs..  2.  And  yet  the  Prophecies  reprcfent  their  Returnr 
as  confequent  on  their  Repentance.  And  their  Repentance  it- 
felf  is  very  exprefly  and  particularly  foretold,  Jer.  xxix.  12,. 
13,  14.  xxxi.  8,  9,  18, — 31.  xxxiii.  8.  1.  4,  5.  Ezek.  \'u 
8,  9j  10.  vii.  16.  xiv.  22,  23.  and  xx.  43,  44, 

It  was  foretold  under  tte  old  Teftament,  that  the  Mefliah 
jfhould  fufTer  greatly  through  the  Malice  and  Cruelty  of  Men ; 
as  is  largely  and  fully  fet  forth,  P/al.  xxii.  applied  to  Chrift. 
in  the  New  Teftament,  Matt.  xx\\\.  35,  43.  Luke  xxiii,  34. 
Joh.  xi :c.  24.  Heb.  ii.  12.  And  llkewife  in  PfaL  Ixix.  which ». 
it  is  alfo  evident  by  the  New  Teftament,  is  fpoken  of  Chrift  ; 
Johnw.  25.  vii.  5,  ^c.  and  ii.  17.  Rom.  xv.  3.  Matt,  xxvii. 
34,  a8.  Mark  xv.  23-.  John  xix.  29.  The  fame  Thing  is  alfo 
foretold,  Ifai.  liii.  &  1.  6..  &  Mic.  v.  i.  This  Cruelty  of 
Men  was  their  Sin,  and  what  they  afted  as  moral  Agents.  It 
was  foretold,  that  there  ftiould  be  an  Union  of  Heathen  and 
Jcnvijh  Rulers  againfl  Chrift,  Pfal.  ii.  i,  z.  compar'd  with 
Aas  iv.  25, 28.  It  was  foretold,  that  the  Je^s  fhould  ge- 
nerally rejeft  and  defpife  the  Mefliah,  Ifai.  xlix.  5,  6,  7.  and 
liii.  I. — 3.  Pfalm.  xxii.  6,  7.  and  Ixix.  4^  8,  19,  20.  And  it 
was  foretold,  that  the  Body  of  that  Nation  ftiould  be  rejeded 
in  the  Mefliah's  Days,  from  being  God's  People,  for  their 
C)b:ftinacy  in  Sin;  -^«/. xlix,  4— -7.  and  yiii.  14,  15,  16.  com- 

paredi 


Sccfl.  XL         the  Fo! it  ions  of  moral  Agents.         104 

pared  whh.  Rom.  x.  19.  and  Ifai.  Ixv.  at  the  Beginning,  com- 
pared with  Rom.  X.  20,  21.  It  was  foretold,  that  Chrift  ftiould 
te  rejeded  by  the  chief  Priefts  and  Rulers  among;  the  Jews, 
P/atm.  cxviii.  22.  compared  with  Matt.  xxi.  42.  Ads  iv.  n. 
1  Pet.  ii.  4,  7. 

Chrift  himfelf  foretold  his  being  delivered  into  the  Hands 
of  the  Elders,  chief  Priefts  and  Scribes,  and  his  being  cruel- 
ly treated  by  them,  and  condemned  to  Death ;  and  that  he 
by  them  Ihould  be  deli'vered  to  the  Gentiles  ;  and  that  He  fhculd 
be  mocked,  and  fconrged,  and  crucified,  [Matt.  xvi.  21.  &  xx. 
17, 19.  Luke  ix.  22.  "John  viii.  28.)  and  that  the  Peo- 
ple fhould  be  concerned  in  and  confenting  to  his  Death,  [Luke 
XX.  13, — 18.}  efpecially  the  Inhabitants  6i  Jem/alem  ;  Luke 
xiii.  35, — 35;.  He  foretold,  that  the  Difciples  fnould  all  be 
offended  becaufe  of  Him  that  Night  that  he  was  betrayed, 
and  fhould  forfake  him  ;  Matt.  xxvi.  31.  John  xvi.  32^ 
He  foretold  that  he  ftould  be  rejedled  of  that  Genera- 
tion, even  the  Body  of  the  People,  and  that  they  ftiould 
continue  obftinate,  to  their  Ruin  ;  Mati  xii.  45.  xxi.  33,-42. 
and  xxii.  i, — 7.  Luke  xiii.  16,  21,  24.  xvii.  25.  xix.  14,  27, 
41, 44.  XX.   13., 18.  and  xxiii.  34, 39, 

As  it  was  foretold  in  both  old  Tettament  and  new,  that 
the  Jenxjs  ftiould  rejeft  the  Mefliah,  fo  it  was  foretold  that  the 
Gentiles  fliould  receive  Him,  and  fo  be  admitted  to  the 
Privileges  of  God's  People;  in  Places  too  many  to  be  now 
particularly  mentioned.  It  was  foretold  in  the  old  Tefta- 
ment,  that  the  Jenvs  ftiould  envy  the  Gentiles  on  this  Account; 
Deut.  xxxii.  2U  compar'd  with  Rom^  x.  19.  Clirift  Himfelf 
often  foretold,  that  the  Gentiles  would  embrace  the  true 
Religion,  and  become  his  Followers  and  People  ;  Matth.  viii. 

10,  I!,  12.  xxi.  41, 43.  and  xxii.  8, —  i  o.  Z^k^^  xiii.  28.  xiv. 

16, 24.  and  XX.   16.  John  x.  16.  He  alfo  foretold  the  Jeijjs 

Envy  of  the  Gentiles  on  this  Occafion  ;  Matt.  xx.   12, 16. 

Luke  XV.  26,  to  the  End.  He  foretold,  that  they  ftiould  conti- 
nue in  this  Oppofition  and  Envy,  and  ftiould  manifeft  it  in 
•ruel  Perfecutions  of  his  Followers,  to  their  utter  De- 
ftruftion  ;  Matt.  xxi.  33,— 42.  xxii.  6.  and  xxiii.  34, — 39, 
Luke  xi.  49,-51.  The  Jenvs  Obftinacy  is  alfo  foretold,  A^s 
xxii.  1 8.  Chrift  often  foretold  the  great  Perfecutions  his 
Followers  ftiowld  meet  with,  both  from  Je^vjs  and  Gentiles  ; 
Matt.  X.  16,— 18,  21,  22,  34,-36.  and  xxiv.  9.  Mark  xiii.  9. 
Luke  X.  3.  xii.  1 1,  49,-53.  and  xxi.  12,  16,  17.  John  xv.  18, 
*;'iU  and  xvi.    1,-4.  20,-22,  33.     He  foretold  theMar- 

P  3  tyrdom 


105  GOD  certainly  foreknows  Part  II. 

tyrdom  of  particular  Perfons ;  Matt.  xx.  23.  Jch.  xiii.  36. 
and  xxi.  18,  19,  22.  He  foretold  the  great  buccefs  of  the 
Gofpel  in  the  City  of  Samaria,  as  near  approaching ;  which 
afterwards  was  fulfilled  by  the  Preaching  of  Philip,  Joh.  iv. 
3^, — 38.  He  foretold  the  Rifing  of  many  Deceivers,  after 
his  Departure,  Matt.  xxiv.  4,  5,  11.  and  the  Apcftacy  of 
many  of  his  profefs'd  Followers ;  Matt.  xxiv.  10, — 12. 

The  Perfecutions,  which  the  Apoftle  Paul  was  to  meet  with 
in  the  World,  were  foretold  ;  ASs  ix.  16. — xx.  23,  tff  xxi.  1 1 . 
The  Apoftle  fays  to  theChriftian  Ephefians,  ABs  xx.  29,  30.  / 
Inoiv,  that  after  mj  Departure  Jhall grie^oous  Wolnjes  enter  in  among 
you,  nat /paring  the  Flock  :  Aljo  of  your  o'lxnfel'vesjhall  Men  arije^ 
{peaking  perverfe  Things,  to  draiu  anuay  I^ifciples  after  them.. 
The  Apoftle  fays.  He  knenu  this  ;  but  he  did  not  know  it,  if 
God  did  not  know  the  future  Aftions  of  moral  Agents. 

4.  Unlefs  God  foreknows  the  future  Ads  of  moral  Agents, 
all  the  Prophecies  we  have  in  Scripture  concerning  the  great 
Antichrijiian  Apoftacy  ;  the  Rife,  Reign,  wicked  Qualities 
and  Deeds  of  the  Man  of  Sin,  and  his  Inftruments  and  Ad- 
herents ;  the  Extent  and  long  Continuance  of  his  Domi- 
nion, his  Influence  on  the  Minds  of  Princes  and  others, 
to  corrupt  them,  and  draw  them  away  to  Idolatry,  and  other 
foul  Vices ;  his  great  and  cruel  Perfecutipns ;  the  Behaviour 
of  the  Saints  under  thefe  great  Temptations,  &c.  &c.  I  fay, 
unlefs  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  are  forefeen,  all  thefe 
Prophecies  are  uttered  without  knowing  the  Things  foretold. 

The  Prediftions  relating  to  this  great  Apoftacy  are  all  of  a 
moral  Nature,  relating  to  Men's  Virtues  and  Vices,  and  their 
Exercifes,  Fruits  and  Confequences,  and  Events  depending 
on  them  ;  and  are  very  particular ;  and  moft  of  them  often 
repeated,  with  many  precife  Charafterifticks,  Defcriptions,  and 
Limitations  of  Qualities,  Conduft,  Influence,  Eftefts,  Ex- 
tent, Duration,  Periods,  Circumftances,  final  Iflue,  &c, 
which  it  would  be  very  long  to  mention  particularly.  And 
to  fuppofe,  all  thefe  are  predicled  by  God  without  any  cer- 
tain Knowledge  of  the  future  moral  Behaviour  of  free  Agents, 
would  be  to  the  utmoft  Degree  abfurd, 

5.  Unlefs  God  foreknows  the  future  A61s  of  Men's  Wills, 
and  their  Behaviour  as  moral  Agents,  all  thofe  great  Things 
u'hich  are  foretold  in  both  Old  Teftament  and  New  con- 
cerning   the  Eredfion,  Eftablilhmentj   and    univerfal  E:Jteni; 

of 


Se(5l.  XI.         the  FoUtions  of  moral  Agents.        jq4> 

of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Mejfiah,  were  predifted  and  pro- 
mifed  while  God  was  in  Ignorance  whether  any  of  thefe 
Things  would  come  to  pafs  or  no,  and  did  but  guefs  af 
them.  For  that  Kingdom  is  not  of  this  World^,  ic  don't 
conlift  in  Things  external,  but  is  within  Men,  and  confifts 
in  the  Dominion  ot  Virtue  in  their  Hearts,  in  Righteouf- 
'nefs,  and  Peace,  and  Joy  in  the  Holy  Ghoft ;  and  in  thefe 
Things  made  manifeft  in  Practice,  to  the  Praife  and  Glory 
of  God.  The  Meffiah  came  to /woe  Men  from  their  Sim,  and 
deliver  them  from  their  fpititual  Enemies ;  that  they  might 
ferve  Him  iii  Righteorfnefs  and  Holinefs  before  Him  :  He  ga've 
Himfelf  for  us ,  that  he  might  redeem  us  from  all  Iniquity,  and  pu- 
rify unto  Himfelf  a  peculiar  Feople,  zealous  of  good  If  orks .  An4 
therefore  his  Succefs  confifts  in  gaining  Men's  Hearts  to 
Virtue,  in  their  being  made  God's  njoilling  People  in  the  Day 
of  his  Pofjer.  His  Conqueft  of  his  Enemies  confifts  in  his 
Vidory  over  Men's  Corruptions  and  Vices.  And  fuch 
Succefs,  fuch  Viftory,  and  fuch  a  Reign  and  Dominion  is 
often  exprelly  foretold  :  That  his  KingdomJ&allf  II  the  Earth  ; 
that  all  People,  Nations  and  Languages  Jhould  fernje  and 
obey  Him ;  and  fo,  that  all  Nations  Jhould  go  up  to  the  Moun~ 
tain  of  the  Houfe  of  tie  Lord,  that  He  might  teach  them  his 
Ways,  and  that  they  might  nvalk  in  his  Paths  :  And  that  all  Men 
Jhould  be  dra-ivn  to  Chriji,  and  the  Earth  be  full  of  the  Knoiu- 
' ledge  of  the  Lord  (by  which,  jn  the  Style  of  Scripture,  is 
meant  true  Virtue  and  Religion)  as  the  Waters  co'ver  the  Seas  j 
that  God's  Laix)  Jhould  be  put  into  Mens  iimvard  Parts,  and  lurit- 
ten  in  their  Hearts  ;  and  that  God's  People  Jhould  be  all  Righ- 
teous, &c.   &c. 

A  very  great  Part   of  the  Prophecies    of  the  Old   Tefta-' 

nient  is  taken  up  in  fuch  Prediftions  as  thefe. And  here 

I  would  obferve,  that  the  Prophecies  of  the  Univerfal  PrevaT 
lence  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Meffiah,  and  true  Religion  of 
Jefus  Chrift,  are  delivered  in  the  moft  peremptory  Manner, 
and  confirmed  by  the  Oath  of  God.  Ijai.  xlv,  22,  to  the  End, 
Look  to  me,  and  beyejaved,  all  the  Ends  of  the  Earth  ;  for  I  am 
God,  and  there  is  none  elfe.  I  hanje  SWORN  by  my  Self  the 
Word  is  gone  out  of  my  Mouth  in  Rightcoujnejs,  and  Jhall  ?tot  re- 
turn, that  unto  Me  every  Knee  Jhall  boiv  ;  and  e'very  Tongue  Jhall 
f'wear.  SURELT,  JJmll  one  Jay,  in  the  Lord  hwve  I  Righte- 
oujnejs  and  Strength  :  e-ven  to  Him  Jhall  Men  come,  l£c.  But  here 
this  peremptory  Declaration,  and  great  Oath  of  the  moft 
High,  are  delivered  with  fuch  mighty  Solemnity,  to  Things 
which  God  did  not  know,  if  He  did  not  certainly  forefee  the 
^olitions  of  moral  Agents, 

An4 


I07  GOD  certainly  foreknows         Part  11. 

And  all  the  Prediftions  of  Chrift  and  his  Apoftles,  to  the 
like  Purpofe,  muft  be  without  Knowledge :  As  thofe  of  our 
Saviour  comparing  the  Kingdom  of  God  to  a  Grain  of 
Muftard-Seed,  growing  exceeding  great,  from  a  fmall  Begin- 
ning ;  and  to  Leaven,   hid  in  three  Meafures  of  Meal,    'till 

the  whole  was  leaven'd,  &c. And  the  Prophecies  in  the  E- 

piftles  concerning  the  Reftoration  of  the  Nation  of  the  J^^ws 
to  the  true  Church  ef  God,  and  the  bringing  in  the  Fulnefs 
of  the  Gentiles  ;  and  the  Prophecies  in  all  the  Revelation  con- 
cerning the  glorious  Change  in  the  moral  State  of  the  World 
of  Mankind,  attending  the  DeftruSion  of  Antichrift,  the 
Kingdoms  of  the  World  becoming  the  Kingdoms  of  our  Lord  and 
vf  iis  Chrif  ;  and  its  being  granted  to  the  Church  to  be  arrayed 
in  that  fine  Linen,  'white  and  clean ^  'which  is  the  Righteoufnefs 
of  Saints,  &c. 

Corol.  I.  Hence  that  great  Promife  and  Oath  of  God  to 
Abraham,  Ifaac  and  Jacob,  fo  much  celebrated  in  Scripture, 
both  in  the  Old  Teftament  and  New,  namely,  That  in  their 
Seed  all  the  Nations  and  Families  of  the  Earth  Jhould  be  bleffed, 
jnuft  be  made  on  Uncertainties,  if  God  don't  certainly  fore- 
know the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  For  the  Fulfilment 
in  this  Promife  confifts  in  that  Succefs  of  Chrift  in  the  Work 
of  Redemption,  and  that  Setting  up  of  his  fpiritual  Kingdom 
over  the  Nations  of  the  World,  which  has  been  fpoken  of. 
Men  are  bleffed  in  Chrift  no  otherwife  than  as  they  are  bro't 
to  acknowledge  Him,  truft  in  Him,  love  and  ferve  Him, 
as  is  reprefented  and  predifted  in  Pfal.  Ixxii.  ri.  All  Kings 
fhall  fall  dowjn  before  Him  ;  all  Nations  Jhall  ferve  Him.  With 
ver.  17.  Men  Jhall  be  blejfed  in  him  ;  all  Nations  Jhall  call  hint 
Blejed.  This  Oath  to  Jacob  and  Abraham  is  fulfilled  in  fub- 
duing  Men's  Iniquities  ;  as  is  implied  in  that  of  the  Prophet 
Micah,  Chap.  vii.   19,  to. 

Carol.  2.  Hence  alfo  it  appears.  That  firft  Gofpel- promife 
that  ever  was  made  to  Mankind,  that  great  Predidion  of 
the  Salvation  of  the  Mefliah,  and  his  Vidlory  over  Satan, 
made  to  our  firft  Parents,  Gen.  iii.  i  j.  if  there  be  no  certain 
Prefcience  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  muft  have  no 
better  Foundation  than  Conjedlure.  For  Chrift's  Viftory 
over  Satan  confifts  in  Men's  being  faved  from  Sin,  and  in 
the  Vidlory  of  Virtue  and  Holinefs,  over  that  Vice  and 
Wickednefs,  which  Satan  by  his  Temptation  has  introduced, 
and  wherein  his  Kinedom  confifts. 

^  6.  If 


Scdl.  XL       the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  loZ 

6.  If  it  be  fo,  that  God  has  not  a  Prefcience  of  the  future 
Aftions  of  moral  Agents,  it  will  follow,  that  the  Prophecies 
of  Scripture  in  general  are  without  Foreknowledge.  For 
Scripture-Prophecies,  almoft  all  of  them,  if  not  univerfally 
without  any  Exception,  are  either  Predidions  of  the  Aftings 
and  Behaviours  of  moral  Agents,  or  of  Events  depending 
on  them,  or  fome  Way  conneded  with  them  ;  judicial  Dif- 
penfations.  Judgments  on  Men  for  their  Wickednefs,  or  Re- 
wards of  Virtue  and  Righteoufhefs,  remarkable  Manifefta- 
tions  of  Favour  to  the  Righteous,  or  Manifeftations  of  fo- 
vereign  Mercy  to  Sinners,  forgiving  their  Iniquities,  and 
magnifying  the  Riches  of  divine  Grace  -y  or  Difpenfations  of 
Providence,  in  fome  RefpeS  or  other,  relating  to  the  Conduft 
of  the  Subjefts  of  God's  moral  Government,  wifely  adapt- 
ed thereto  ;  either  providing  for  what  Ihould  be  in  a  future 
State  of  Things,  through  the  Volitions  and  voluntary  Ani- 
ons of  moral  Agents,  or  confequent  upon  them,  and  regu- 
lated and  ordered  according  to  them.  So  that  all  Events 
that  are  foretold,  are  either  moral  Events,  or  other  Events 
which  are  connefted  with,  and  accommodated  to  moral 
Events^ 

That  the  Predid^ions  of  Scripture  in  general  muft  be  with- 
out Knowledge,  if  God  don't  forefee  the  Volitions  of  Men, 
will  further  appear,  if  it  be  confidered,  that  almoft  all  E- 
vents  belonging  to  the  future.  State  of  the  World  of  Man- 
kind, the  Changes  and  Revolutions  which  come  to  pafs  in. 
Empires,  Kingdoms,  and  Nations,  and  all  Societies,  depend 
innumerable  Ways  on  the  Ads  of  Men's  Wills  ;  yea,  on  an 
innumerable  Multitude  of  Millions  of  Millions  of  Volitions, 
of  Mankind.  Such  is  the  State  and  Courfe  of  Things  in: 
the  World  of  Mankind,,  that  one  lingle  Event,  which  ap- 
pears in  itfelf  exceeding  inconfiderable,  may  in  the  Progrefs  and 
Series  of  Things,  occalion  a  Succeffion  of  the  greateft  and  moft 
important  and  extenfive  Events  ;  caufmg  the  State  of  Mankind 
to  be  vaftly  different  from  what  it  would,  otherwife  have  been» 
for  all  fucceeding  Generations. 

For  Inftance,  the  coming  into  Exiftenee  of  thofe  particu- 
lar Men,  who  have  been  the  great  Conquerors  of  the  World, 
which  under  God  have  had  the  main  Hand  in  all  the  con- 
fequent State  of  the  World,  in  all  after-Ages  ;  fuch  as 
Bebuchadnezzar,  Cyrus,  Alexander,  Pompey,  Julius  Cefar,  &c. 
undoubtedly  depended  on  many  Millions  of  Afts  of  the 
Will,  which  followed,  and  were  occafion'd  one  by  ano- 
ther. 


j'09  GOD  certainly  foreknows  Part  IL 

ther,  in  their  Parents.  And  perhaps  moft  of  thefe  Volition* 
depended  on  Millions  of  Volitions  of  Hundreds  and  Thou- 
fands  of  others,  their  Contemporaries  of  the  fame  Genera- 
tion ;  and  moft  of  thefe  on  Millions  of  Millions  of  Voliti- 
ons of  others  in   preceding  Generations. As  we  go  back, 

ftill  the  Number  of  Volitions,  which  were  fome  Way  the 
Occafion  of  the  Event,  multiply  as  the  Branches  of  a  River, 
"till  they  come  at  laft,  as  it  were,  to  an  infinite  Number. 
"iThis  will  not  feem  ftrange,  to  any  one  who  well  confiders  the 
Matter ;  if  we  recolleft  what  Philofophers  tell  as  of  thfe  in- 
numerable Multitudes  of  thofe  Things  which  are  as  it  were 
the  Principia,  or  Stamina  Vit<£^  concerned  in  Generation  ; 
the  Animalcula  in  Semine  majculo,  and  the  O'va  in  the  Womb 
of  the  Female ;  the  Impregnation,  or  animating  of  one  of 
thefe  in  Diftinftion  from  all  the  reft,"  muft  depend  on  Things 
infinitely  minute,  relating  to  the  Time  and  Circumftances  of 
the  Adt  of  the  Parents,  the  State  of  their  Bodies,  ^c. 
which  muft  depend  on  innumerable  foregoing  Circum- 
ftances and  Occurrences ;  which  mtift  depend,  infi- 
nite Ways,  on  foregoing  Afts  of  their  Wills ;  which  are 
occafioned  by  innumerable  Things  that  happen  in  the 
Coiirfe  of  their  Lives,  in  which  their  own,  and  their  Neigh- 
bour's Behaviour,  muft  have  a  Hand,  an  infinite  Number 
of  Wa\'s.  And  as  the  Volitions  of  others  muft  be  fo  many 
Ways  concerned  in  the  Conception  and  Birth  of  fuch  Men  ; 
fo,  no  lefs,  in  their  Prefer vatiori,  and  Circumftances  of  Lire, 
their  particular  Determinations  and  Aftions,  on  which  the 
great  Revolutions  they  were  the  Occafions  of,  depended.  Ai 
for  Inftance.  When  the  Confpirators  in  Perjia,  againft. 
the  Magi,  were  confulting  about  a  Succeffion  to  the  Empire, 
it  came  into  the  Mind  of  one  of  them,  to  propofe,  that  he 
whofe  Horfe  neighed  firft,  when  they  came  together  the 
ilext  Morning,  fhould  be  King.  Now  fuch  a  Thing's  com- 
ing into  his  Mind,  might  depend  on  innumerable  Incidents, 
wherein  the  Volitions  of  Mankind  had  been  concerned. 
But  in  Confequence  of  this  Accident,  Darius,  the  Son  of 
Hijia/pes,  was  King.  And  if  this  had  not  been,  probably 
his  Succeflbr  would  not  have  been  the  fame,  and  all  the 
Circumftance:;  of  the  PerfMti  Empire  might  have  been  far 
otherwife.  And  then  perhaps  Alexander  might  never  have 
conquered  that  Empire.  And  then  probably  the  Circum- 
ftances of  the  World  in  all  fucceeding  Ages,  might  have 
been  vaftly  otherwife.  I  might  further  inftance  in  many 
other  Occurrences ;  fuch  as  thofe  on  which  depended  Alex- 
anders 


Scdl.  XI.        "the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.        no 

mnders  Prefervation,  in  the  many  critical  Junftures  of  his 
Life,  wherein  a  fmall  Trifle  would  have  turned  the  Scale 
againft  him ;  and  the  Prefervation  and  Succefs  of  the  Ra- 
man  People,  in  the  Infancy  of  their  Kingdom  and  Common- 
Wealth,  and  afterwards;  which  all  the  fucceeding  Changes, in 
their  State,  and  the  mighty  Revolutions  that  afterwards 
came  to  pafs  in  the  habitable  World,  depended  upon.  But 
thefe  Hints  may  be  fufficient  for  every  difcerning  confide- 
-rate  Perfon,  to  convince  him,  that  the  whole  State  of  the 
World  of  Mankind,  in  all  Ages,  and  the  very  Being  of  every 
■Perfon  who  has  ever  lived  in  it,  in  every  Age,  fince  the 
Times  of  the  ancient  Prophets,  has  depended  on  more 
.Volitions,,  or  Ads  of  the  Wills  of  Men^  than  there  are 
Sands  on  the  Sea-ihorco 

,  And  tlierefore,  unlefs  God  does  moft  exad^ly  and  perfefl- 
vly  forefee  the  future  A(f^s  of  Men's  Wills,  all  the  Pre- 
didions  which  he  ever  uttered  concerning  Da<vid,  Hezekiah, 
■Jofich,  Nebuchadnezzar y  Cyrus,  Atexander  ;  concerning  the  four 
Monarchies,  and  the  Revolutions  in  them  ;  and  concerning 
all  the  Wars,  Commotions,  Vidlories,  Profperities  and  Cala- 
mities, of  any  of  the  Kingdoms,  Nations,  or  Communities 
of  the  World,  have  all  been  without  Knowledge. 

So  that,  according  to  this  Notion  of  God's  not  forefeeing 
the  Volitions  and  free  Adions  of  Men,  God  could  forefee 
Nothing  pertaining  to  the  State  of  the  World  of  Mankind 
in  future  Agesj  not  fo  much  as  the  Being  of  one  Perfois 
that  fhould  live  in  it ;  and  could  foreknow  no  Events,  but 
only  fuch  as  He  would  bring  to  pafs  Himfelf  by  the  extra- 
ordinary Interpofition  of  his  immediate  Power ;  or  Things 
which  Ihould  come  to  pafs  in  the  natural  material  World, 
by  the  Lav/s  of  Motion,  and  Courfe  of  Nature,  whereira 
that  is  independent  on  the  Adiions  or  Works  of  Mankind  : 
That  is,  as  he  might,  like  a  rery  able  Mathematician  and 
Aftronomer,  with  great  Exaftnefs  calculate  the  Revolutions 
of  the  heavenly  Bodies,  and  the  greater  Wheels  of  the 
Machine  of  the  external  Creation. 

And  if  we  clofely  confider  the  Matter,  there  will  appear 
Reafon  to  convince  us,  that  he  could  not  with  any  abfo- 
lute  Certainty  forefee  even  thefe.  As  to  the  Fhji,  namely 
Things  done  by  the  immediate  and  extraordinary  Interpo- 
fition  of  God's  Power,  thefe  can't  be  forefeen,  unlefs  it  can 
be  forefeen  whea  thg:c  (hall  be  Occafton  for  fuch  extraordi^ 

Q^  i)ary 


Ill  GOD  certainly  foreknows         Part  If. 

nary  Interpofition.  And  that  can't  be  forcfeen,  unlefs  the 
State  of  the  moral  World  can  be  forefeen.  For  whenever  God 
thus  interpofes,  it  is  with  Regard  to  the  State  of"  the  moral 
Worlds  requiring  fuch  Divine  Interpofition.  Thus  God 
could  not  certainly  forefee  the  univerfal  Deluge,  the  Cal- 
ling of  Ahrahamy  the  Deftruftion  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah ^ 
the  Plagues  on  Egypt,  and  Ifrael'%  Redemption  out  of  it,  the 
expelling  the  feven  Nations  of  Canaany  and  the  bringing 
Jjrael  into  ^at  Land ;  for  thefe  all  are  rcprefented  as  con- 
nefted  with  Things  belonging  to  the  State  of  the  moral 
World.  New  can  God  foreknow  the  moft  proper  and  con- 
venient Time  of  the  Day  of  Judgment,  and  general  Conflagra- 
tion ;  for  that  chiefly  depends  on  the  Courfe  and  State  of 
Things  in  the  moral  World. 

Nor,  Secondly y  can  we  on  this  Suppofition  reafonably  think  ,r 
that  God  can  certainly  forefee  what  Things  fhall  come  to 
pafs,  in  the  Courfe  of  Things,  in  the  natural  and  material 
World,  even  thofe  which  in  an  ordinary  State  of  Things 
Slight  be  calculated  by  a  good  Aftronomer.  For  the  moral 
World  is  the  End  of  the  natural  World  ;  and  the  Courfe 
of  Things  in  the  former,  is  undoubtedly  fubordinate  to  God'^» 
Defigns  with  Refpeft  to  the  latter.  Therefore  he  has  feen- 
Caufe,  from  Regard  to  the  State  of  Things  in  the  moral  World, 
extraordinarily  to  interpofe,  to  interrupt  and  lay  an  Arreft  on 
the  Courfe  of  Things  in  the  natural  World  j  and  even  ia 
the  greater  Wheels  of  its  Motion  j  even  fo  as  to  flop  the  Sun  in 
its  Courfe^  And  unlefs  he  can  forefee  the  Volitions  of  Men, 
and  fo  know  fomething  of  the  future  State  of  the  moral 
World,  He  can't  know  but  that  he  may  ftill  have  as  great 
Occafion  to  interpofe  in  this  Manner,  as  ever  He  had :  nor 
can  He  forefee  how,  or  when.  He  fhall  have  Occafion  thus  to 
interpofe, 

CoroL  I.  It  appears'  from  the  Things  which  have  been  ob- 
fcrved,  that  unlefs  God  forefees  the  Volitions  of  moral  A- 
gents,  that  cannot  be  true  which  is  obferved  by  the  Apoftle 
James,  Aft.  xv.  I?.  Knoixn  unto  God  are  all  his  Works  from 
the  Be  ginning  of  the  World. 

Carol.  2.  It  appears  from  what  has  been  obferved,  that  unlefe 
God  foreknows  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  all  the  Prophe- 
cies of  Scripture  have  no  better  Foundation  than  mere  Con- 
jefture ;  and  That,  in  moft  Inftances,  a  Conjefture  which 
snuft  have  the  utmoft  Uncertainty  j  depending  on  an  innu- 
merable 


Se(5l.  XL     ibe  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  112 

xnerable,  and  as  it  were  infinite.  Multitude  of  Volitions* 
which  are  all,  even  to  God,  uncertain  Events :  However, 
thefe  Prophecies  are  delivered  as  abfolute  Predidtions,  and  very 
many  of  them  in  the  moft  pofitive  Manner,  with  Affeverations  ; 
and  fome  of  them  with  the  moft  folcran  Oaths, 

CoroL  3.  It  alfo  follows  from  what  has  heen  obferved, 
that  if  this  Notion  of  God's  Ignorance  of  future  Volitions 
be  true,  in  vain  did  Chrift  fay  (after  uttering  many  great 
and  important  Predictions,  concerning  God's  moral  Kingdom, 
snd  Things  depending  on  Men's  moral  Adions)  Matth.  xxiv. 
3  ^.  Heaven  and  Earth  Jhall  pafs  anxjay  ;  but  my  Words  Jhall 
aiat  pafs  aiuaj.. 

Carol.  4.  From  the  fame  Notion  of  God's  Ignorance,  it 
would  follow,  that  in  vain  has  God  himfelf  often  fpoken  of  the 
Predictions  of  his  Word,  as  Evidences  of  his  Foreknowledge  j 
and  fo  as  Evidences  of  that  which  is  his  Prerogative  as  GOD.» 
and  his  peculiar  Glory,    greatly  diftinguilhing  Him  from  all 

other  Beings ;  as  in  T/a/.  xli.  22 26*  xliii.  g,  10.  xliv  &. 

adv.  21.  xlvi.  10.  &  xlviii.  14. 

Argum.  II.  If  God  don't  foreknow  the  Volitions  of  mo- 
ral Agents,  then  he  did  not  foreknow  the  i^«// of  Man,  nor 
of  Angels,  and  fo  could  not  foreknow  the  great  Things 
which  are  con/equ€?zt  on  thefe  Events ;  fuch  as  his  fending 
his  Son  into  the  Wwld  to  die  for  Sinners,  and  all  Things 
pertaining  to  the  great  Work  of  Redemption ;  all  the 
Things  which  were  done  for  four  Thoufand  Years  before 
Chrift  came,  to  prepare  the  Way  for  it  j  and  the  Incarnation, 
Life,  Death,  Refurreftion  and  Afcenlion  of  Chrift ;  and  the 
fetting  Him  at  the  Head  of  the  Univerfe,  as  King  of  Hea- 
ven and  Earth,  Ang[els  and  Men ;  and  the  fetting  up  his 
Church  and  Kingdom  in  this  World,  and  appointing  Kim 
the  Judge  of  the  World ;  and  all  that  Satan  fhoald  do  in 
the  World  in  Oppofition  to  the  Kingdom  of  Chrift  c  And 
the  great  Tranfadions  of  the  Day  of  Judgment,  that  Men 
and  Devils  fhall  be  the  Subjeds  of,  and  Angels  concerned 
in  ;  they  are  all  what  God  was  ignorant  of  before  the  Fall. 
And  if  fo,  the  following  Scriptures,  and  others  like  them, 
muft  be  without  any  Meaning,  or  contrary  to  Truth,  Eph, 
\.  4.  According  as  he  hath  chojen  us  in  Him  before  the  Foundation  of 
the  World.  I  Pet.  i.  20.  Who  'verity  ivas  fore-ordained  before  the 
Foundation  of  the  World.  2  Tim.  i.  9.  Who  hath  fa'ved  us ,  and 
called  us  nuith  an  holy  Calling ;  not  according  to  our  Works,  but 
Q[_  3  acctrding 


J 13  GOD  certainly  {ort\inows.        Part.  If. 

(iccordittg  to  his  o'wn  Purpdfe^  and  Grace,  nvhjeh  luas  give»  us  /'«? 
Chriji  Je/us  before  the  World  began.  So,  Eph.  iii.  1 1 .  (/"peeking 
of  the  Wifdom  of  God  in  the  Work  of  Redemption)  according 
to  the  eternal Purpoje  •vjhich  he  ptirpofedin  'J ejus  Chriji,  Tit.  i.  2< 
In  hope  of  eternal  Life,  m^hichGod,  that  cannot  lie ,  promifed  before, 
the  World  began.  Rom.  viii.  29.  Whomhedidforehionu,  them 
he  alfo  did  predefiinate,  &c.  I  Pet.  i.  2.  Ele£i,  according  to 
the  ForeknoiMledge  of  God  the  Father. 

If  God  did  not  foreknow  the  Fall  of  Man,  nor  the  Re- 
demption by  Jefus  Chrift,  nor  the  Volitions  of  Man  fince 
the  Fall ;  then  He  did  not  foreknow  the  Saints  in  any  Senfe  ; 
neither  as  particular  Perfons,  nor  as  Societies  or  Nations  ; 
either  by  Eledion,  or  mere  Forefight  of  their  Virtue  or  good' 
"Works ;  or  any  Forefight  of  any  Thing  about  them  relating 
to  their  Salvation;  or  any  Benefit  they  have  by  Chrift,  or' 
any  Manner  of  Concern  of  their'e  v^ith  a  Redeemer. 

Arc.  III.  On  the  Suppofition  of  God's  Ignorance  of  the 
future  Volitions   of  free  Agents,  it  will    follow,   that  God. 
muft  in  many  Cafes   truly    repent   what  He  has   done,  fo    a^' 
properly  to  wilh  He   had   done  otherwife  :    by  Reafon  that 
the  Event  of  Things,  in  thofe  Affairs  which  are  moit  impor- 
tant, 'viz.  the  Affairs  of  his   moral  Kingdom,  being   uncer- 
tain  and  contingent,  often  happens  quite  otherwife  than  he 
•was  aware  beforehand.     And  there  would  be  Reafon  to  un- 
derftand  That,  in   the   moft   literal  Senfe,   in  Gen.  vi.  6.  // 
repented  the  Lotd,  that  he  had  made  Man  on  t  he-Earth,  and  it  grieved 
him  at  his  Heart.     And    that,   i    Sam.  xv.   1 1 .    cohtrary   to' 
that.  Numb,  xxiii.    19.   God  is   not   the  Son   of  Man,  that  he 
fhotdd  repent.     And,   i  Sam.  xv.    i^,  29.  Aljo  the  Strength,  of 
Jfrael  nvill  not  lie,  nor  repent :  for  he  is  not  a  Man  that  hefhould 
repent.     Yea,  from   this   Notion  it    will    follow,  that  God 
5s  liable  to  repent  and  be  grieved  at  his  Heart,  in  a  literal 
Jjenfe,  continually ;  and    is    always    expofed    to    an   infinite 
Number    of  real  Difappointments,    in    his    governing    the 
World ;  and    to    manifold,   conftant,   great  Perplexity    and 
Vexation:  But  this  is  not  very  confiftent  with  his  Title  of. 
God  over  all,  ble(fed  for  e'uermore  ;  which  reprefents  Him  as 
jjoffeffed   of  perfeft,  conftant  and  uninterrupted  Tranquillity 
and  Felicity,  as  God  over  the  Univcrfe,  and  in  his  Manage- 
Jnent  of  the  Affairs  of  the  World,  as  fupreme  and  univer- 
sal Ruler.     StcRom,  i.  25.  ix,  5.  2  Cor.  xi.  31.  1  Tm.  vi.  15. 

J\ KG)  > 


ged.  XI.         the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.         n^ 

Arc.  IV.  It  will  alfo  follow  from  this  Notion,  that  a? 
God  is  liable  to  be  continually  repentir.g  what  He  has  done; 
fo  he  muit  be  expofsd  to  be  conftantly  changing  his  Mind  and 
Intentions,  as  to  his  future  Conduft  ;  altering  his  Meafures,  re- 
iinquilhing  his  old  Defigns,  and  forming  new  Schemes  and  Pro- 
jedions.  For  his  Purpofes,  even  as  to  the  main  Parts  of  his 
iScheme,  namely,  fuch  as  belong  to  the  State  of  his  moral 
Kingdom,  mult  be  always  liable  to  be  broken,  thro'  want 
qi  Forefight ;  and  He  muft  be  continually  putting  his  Syftem 
to  rights,  as  it  gets  out  of  Order,  through  the  Contin- 
gence'of  the  Aftions  of  moral  Agents  :  He  muft  be  a  Being, 
who,  mftead  of  being  abfolutely  immutable,  muft  neccfla- 
riiy  be  the  Subjeft  of  infinitely  the  moft  numerous  Ads  of 
Repentance,  and  Changes  of  Intention,  of  any  Being  what- 
ioe^'er;  for  this  plain  Pvcafon,  that  his  vaftly  extenfive 
Charge  comprehends  an  infinitely  greater  Number  of  thofe 
Thing's  which  are  to  Him  contingent  and  uncertain.  In 
fach  a  Situation,  He  muft  have  little  elle  to  do,  but  to  mend 
bVoken  Links  as  well  as  he  can,  and  be  rectifying  his  dif- 
jointed  Frame  and  difordered  Movements,  in  the  heft  Man- 
ner the  Cafe  will  allow.  The  fupreme  Lord  of  all  Things 
muft  needs  be  under  great  and  miferable  Difadvantages,  in 
governing  the  World  which  He  has  made,  and  has  the  Care 
6f,  through  his  being  utterly  unable  to  find  out  Things 
of  chief  Importance,  which  hereafter  fhall  befal  his  Syftem  ; 
which  if  He  did  but  know,  He  might  make  feafonable  Pro- 
vifion  for.  In  many  Cafes,  there  may  be  very  great  Neceffity 
that  He  ftiould  m.ake  Provifion,  in  the  Manner  of  his  order- 
ing and  difpoftng  Things,  for  fome  great  Events  which 
are  to  happen,  of  vaft  and  extenfive  Influence,  and  endlefs 
Confequence  to  the  Univerfe ;  which  He  may  fee  after- 
wards, when  it  is  too  late,  and  may  wilh  in  vain  that  He 
had  known  beforeh-and,  that  He  might  have  ordered  his 
Affairs  accordingly.  And  it  is  in  the  Power  of  Man,  on 
thefe  Principles,  by  his  Devices,  Purpofes  and  Aftions, 
thus  to  difappoint  God,  break  his  Meafures,  make  him  con- 
tinuaUy  to  change  his  Mind,  fubjeft  Him  to  Vexation,  and 
bring  Him  into  Confufion. 

But  how  do  thefe  Things  confift  with  Reafon,  or  with  the 
Word  of  God  ?  Which  reprefents,  that  all  God's  Works, 
all  that  He.  has  ever  to  do,  the  whole  Scheme  and  Series' 
t»f  his  Operations,  are  from  the  Beginning  perfedly  in  his 
View  ;  and  declares,  that  •whate'ver  Dc^jices  and  Defigns  are 
in  the  Hearts  of  Men,  the  Counfel  of  the  Lord  is  that  <which 
i^all  Jlandt  and  .  the  Thoughts   of  his  Heart    to  all  Generations. 

Prov. 


11^  'G  O  D  certainly  fortknowz        PartIL 

Proy.  xix. -21,  Pfal.  xxxiii.  lo,  ii.  And  that  txihkh  the  Lord 
ef  Hofts  hath  purpofed,  none Jhall  dijannul^  Ifai.  xiv.  27.  And 
that  he  cannot  befruftrated  in  omDefign  or  Thought ^  Job.  xlii.  2. 
^nd  that  ijjhat  God  doth  yitjhalllxe fare'ver^  thatNothing  can  he  ptO. 
io  it^  or  taken  from  it.  Eccl.  iii.  14.  The  Stability  and  Per- 
petuity of  God's  Counffcls  are  exprefly  fpoken  of  as  con- 
nected with  the  Foreknov/ledge  of  God,  Ifai.  xlvi.  10.  /)«■- 
glaring  the  End  from  the  Beginning,  and  from  ancient  Times  the 
Things  thai  are  not  yet  done  ;  faying,  Mj  Counfd  fhallftand^ 

and  I  <will  do  all  my  i'leqfxre.— And  how  are  thcfe  Things 

confiitent  with  what  the  Scripture  fays  of  God's  Immu- 
tability, which  reprefents  him  as  nvitheui  Variablenefs ^  or 
Shadoiu  of  Turning  ;  and  fpeakt;  of  Him  moft  particularly  as 
unchangeable  with  Regard  to  his  Purpofes.  Mai.  iii.  6.  /  am 
the  Lord ;  I  change  not  ;  therefore  ye  Sons  of  Jacob  are  not 
confumed,  Exod.  iii.  14.  /  AM  THAT  I  AM.  Job  xxiii- 
13,  14.  He  is  in  one  Mind  ;  and  <vaho  can  turn  him  ?  And  'what 
his  Soul  dejireth,  e^enthat  he  doth:  far  he perfarmeih  the  Thinjg 
that  is  appointed  for  me. 

Arg.  V.  If  this  Notion  of  God^s  Ignorance  of  tTie  future 
"Volitions  of  moral  Agents  be  thoroughly  confidered  in  its 
Confequences,  it  will  appear  to  follow  from  it,  that  God,  after 
jhe  had  made  the  World,  was  liable  to  be  wholly  fruftrated 
of  his  End  in  the  Creation  of  it ;  and  fo  has  been  in  liice 
Manner  liable  to  be  fruftrated  of  his  End  in  all  the  great 
Works  he  hath  wrought.  'Tis  manifeft,  the  moral  World 
is  the  End  of  the  natural :  The  reft  of  the  Creation  is 
but  an  Houfe  which  God  hath  built,  with  Furniture,  for  mo- 
id Agents :  And  the  good  or  bed  State  of  the  moral  World 
<lepends  on  the  Improvement  they  make  of  their  natural 
Agency,  and  fo  depends  on  their  Volitions.  And  there- 
fore, if  thefe  can't  be  forefeen  by  God,  becanfe  they 
are  contingent,  and  fubjeft  to  no  Kind  of  Neceflity,  then 
the  Affairs  of  the  moral  World  are  liable  to  go  Wrong,  to  any 
affignable  Degree ;  yea,  liable  to  be  utterly  ruined.  As  on 
this  Scheme,  it  may  well  be  fuppofed  to  be  literally  faid, 
when  Mankind,  by  the  Abufe  of  their  moral  Agency, 
became  very  corrupt  before  the  Flood,  that  the  Lord  repented 
thai  he  had  made  Man  on  the  Earth,  and  it  grieved  Him 
at  his  Heart ;  fo,  when  He  made  the  Univerfe,  He 
did  not  know  but  that  He  might  be  fo  difappointed  in  it, 
that  it  might  grieve  Him  at  his  Heart  that  He  had  made  it. 
Jt  adiually  proved,  that  all  Mankind  became  linful,  and  a 
very  great  Part  of  the  Angels  apoftatized  :   Ar.d  how  could 

Cod 


Setft.  XI.     the  Volitions  of  mtyral  Agents,  ri^ 

God  know  before-hand,  that  all  of  them  would  not  ?  And 
how  could  God  know  but  that  all  Mankind,  notwith- 
Handing  Means  ufed  to  reclaim  them,  being  fiill  left  to  the 
Freedom  of  their  own  Will,  would  continue  in  their  Apoftaty, 
and  grow  worfe  and  worfe,  as  thej  of  the  Old  World  before 
the  i'lood  did  ? 

According  to  the  Scheme  I  am  endeavoaring  to  confute^ 
neither  the  Fall  of  Men  nor  Angels,  could  be  torefeen,  and 
God  muft  be  greatly  difappointed  in  thefe  Events  ;  and  fo 
the  grand  Scheme  and  Contrivance  for  our  Redemption, 
and  deftroying  the  Works  of  the  Devil,  by  the  MefTiah,  and 
all  the  great  Things  God  has  done  in  the  Profecution  of 
thefe  Defigns,  muic  be  only  the  Fruits  of  his  own  Difap- 
pointment,  and  Contrivances  of  his  to  mend  and  patch  up, 
as  well  as  he  could,  his  Syftem,  which  originally  was  all 
very  good,  and  perfeftly  beautiful ;  but  was  mar'd,  broken 
and  confounded  by  the  free  Will  of  Angels  and  Men- 
And  ftiil  he  muft  be  liable  to  be  totally  difappointed 
a  fecond  Time  :  He  could  not  know,  that  He  Ihould 
have  his  defired  Succefs,  in  the  Incarnation,  Life, 
Death ,^  Refurreftion  and  Exaltation  of  his  only  begot- 
ten Son,  and  other  great  Works  accomplifhed  to  reftore  the 
State  of  Things  :  He  could  not  know  after  all,  whether 
there  would  actually  be  any  tolerable  Meafure  of  Reftora- 
tion  ;  for  this  depended  on  the  free  Will  of  Man.  There 
has  been  a  general  great  Apoftacy  of  almoft  all  the  Chriftian 
World,  to  that  which  was  worfe  than  Keathenifm  ;  which 
continued  for  many  Ages.  And  how  could  God,  v>dthout 
forefeeing  Men's  Volitions,  know  whether  ever  Chriftendom 
would  return  from  this  Apoftacy  ?  And  which  way  could  He 
tell  before -hand  how  foon  it  would  begin  ?  The  Apoftle  fays, 
it  began  to  work  in  his  Time ;  and  how  could  it  be  known 
how  far  it  would  proceed  in  that  Age  ?  Yea,  how  could 
it  be  known  that  the  Gofpel,  which  was  not  effeftual  for 
the  Reformation  of  the  Jenvs,  would  ever  be  efFedual  for 
the  turning  of  the  Heathen  Nations  from  their  Heathen  Apo- 
ftacy, which  they  had  been  confirmed  in  for  fo  many  Ages  ? 

*Tis  reprefented  often  m  Scripture,  that  God  who  made 
the  World  for  Himfelf,  and  created  it  for  his  PleafurC;, 
would  infallibly  obtain  his  End  in  the  Creation,  and  in  all 
his  Works ;  tliat  as  all  Things  are  of  Him,  fo  they  would 
all  be  to  Him  ;  and  that  in  the  final  Iffue  of  Things,  it 
would  appear  that  He  is  tJje  firjl,  and  the  laji.     Rev.  xxi.  6. 

And 


i  1 7  Certain  Foreknowledge  Part  II, 

And  he  /aid  unto  me.  It  is  done.  I  am  Alpha  and  Omega,  the 
Beginning  atid  the  End,  the  firfl  and  the  laji.  But  thefe  Things 
are  not  confxftent  with  God's  being  fo  liable  to  be  difappointed 
in  all  his  Works,  nor  indeed  with  his  faihng  of  his  End  in  any 
Thing  that  he  has  undertaken,  or  done. 


^oMo<wooxocaaeeoicea0oaaoiW(»aoW»ao9(<^eos:(Mooaoeaaoooa»oB<MOo(Wooaoac(x>aoo9ac<i^ 

Section     XII. 

G  0  Z)'a  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  future  Vo- 
litions of  moral  Agents^  inconjijfent  with  fuch  a 
Gontingence  of  thofe  Volitions^  as  is  without  all 

■    Necefiltyc 

HAVING  proved,  that  God  has  a  certain  and  infal- 
lible Prefcience  of  the  Afts  of  the  Will  of  moral  Agents, 
I  come  now,  in  the  Second  Place,  to  fhew  the  Ccnfequence  j 
to  {hew  how  it  follows  from  hence,  that  thefe  Events  are  necef- 
fary,  with  d  Neceffity  of  Connexion  or  Confequence. 

The  chief  Arminian  Divines,  fo  far  as  I  have  had  Oppor- 
tunity to  obferve,  deny  this  Confequence;  and  affirm,  that 
if  fuch  Foreknowledge  be  allowed,  'tis  no  Evidence  of  any 
Neceffity  of  the  Event  foreknown.  Now  I  delire,  that  this 
Matter  may  be  particularly  and  thoroughly  inquired  into. 
I  cannot  but  think,  that  on  particular  and  full  Confideration, 
it  may  be  perfedly  determined,  whether  it  be  indeed  fo,  or 
not. 

In  arder  to  a  proper  Confideration  of  this  Matter,  I  would 
obferve  the  following  Things : 

I.  'Tis  very  evident,  with  regard  to  a  Thing  whofe  Ex- 
iftence  is  infallibly  and  indiffolubly  connedled  with  fome- 
thing  which  already  hath,  or  has  had  Exiftence,  the  Exiftence 
of  that  Thing  is  neceffary.    Here  may  be  noted. 


Sed.  XII.         infers  fome  Neceflity.  i  i  % 

1 .  I  obferved  before,  in  explaining  the  Nature  of  Neceffity, 
that  in  Things  which  are  paft,  their  paft  Exiftence  is  now 
neceflary :  having  already  made  fure  of  Exiftence,  'tis  too 
late  for  any  Poffibility  of  Alteration  in  that  Refpeft  :  "Tis  now 
impoffible,  that  it  Ihould  be  o-therwife  than  true,  that  that 
Thing  has  exifted. 

2.  If  there  be  any  fuch  Thing  as  a  divine  Foreknowledge 
of  the  Volitions  of  free  Agents,  that  Foreknowledge,  by  the 
Suppofitior,  is  a  Thing  which  already  has,  and  long  ago  had 
Exiftence ;  and  fo,  now  its  Exiftence  is  neceflary  ;  it  is  now 
utterly  impolTible  to  be  othe^wife,  than  that  this  Foreknov/ledge 
fhould  be,  or  Ihould  have  been. 

5.  'Tis  alfo  very  manireft,  that  thofe  Things  which  are 
Indiffolubly  connected  with  other  Things  that  are  neceflary;, 
are  themfelves  neceflfary.  As  that  Propoiition  vvhofe  Truth 
is  neoeflarily  connefted  v\'ith  another  Propofition,  which  is 
neceflarily  true,  is  itlelf  neceflaril}'-  true.  To  fay  other- 
wife,  would  be  a  Contradiction  ;  it  would  be  in  JEfFeft  to 
fay,  that  the  connection  was  indiflbluble,  and  yet  was  not 
fo,  -but  might  be  broken.  If  That,  whofe  Exiftence  is  in- 
diflblubly  coinneded  with  fomething  whofe  Exiftence  is  no\^'' 
neceflary,  is  itfelf  not  neceflary,  then  it  may  prffibty  vot  exift, 
notwithftanding  that  indiflbluble  Connedion  of  its  Exiftence. 
■ — Whether  the  Abfurrdity  be  not  glaring,  let  the  Reader 
judge. 

4.  *Tis  no  lefs  evident,  that  if  there  be  a  full,  certain 
and  infallible  Foreknowledge  of  the  future  Exiftence  of  the 
Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  then  there  is  a  certain  infallible 
and  indiflbluble  Connedion  between  thofe  Events  and  that 
Foreknowledge ;  and  that  therefore,  by  the  preceding  Ob- 
Fervations,  thofe  Events  are  neceflary  Events ;  being  infallibly 
and  indifl'olubly  conneded^  with  that  whofe  Exiftence  already  is, 
and  fo  is  now  neceflfary,  and  can't  but  have  been. 

To  fay,  the  Foreknowledge  is  certain  and  infallible,  and  yet 
the  Conneftion  of  the  Event  witlv  that  Foreknowledge  is 
not  indiflbluble,  but  diflfoluble  and  fallible,  is  very  abfurd. 
To  affirm  it,  would  be  the  fame  Thing  as  to  affiyn,  that 
there  is  no  neceflary  Connedion  between  a  Propofition's 
being  infallibly  known  to  be  true,  and  its  being  true  in- 
deed. So  that  it  is  perfedly  demonftrable,  that  if  there  be 
any  infallible  Knowledge  of  future  Volitions,    the  Event  is 

R  nccejfarj  / 


ii^  C?r/^/;? Foreknowledge  Part.  II. 

^ecejfary ;  ox,  in  other  Words,  that  it  is  impojfihle  but  the 
Event  ihould  come  to  pafs.  For  if  it  be  not  impoffible 
but  that  it  may  be  otherwife,  then  it  is  not  impoiTible  but 
that  the  Propofition  which  aSrnis  its  future  coming  to 
pafs,  may  not  now  be  true.  But  how  abfurd  is  that,  on  the 
Suppofition  that  there  is  now  an  infallible  Knowledge  ( i.  e. 
Knowledge  which  it  is  impoirible  fnould  fail)  that  it  is  true. 
There  is  this  Abfurdity  in  it,  that  it  is  not  impoffible  but 
that  there  now  fliould  be  no  Truth  in  that  Propolitiony 
which  is  now  infallibly  known  to  be  true. 

'  11.  That  no  future  Event  can  be  certainly  foreknown, 
whofe  Exiftence  is  contingent,  and  without  all  Neceffity, 
may  be  proved  thus ;  'Tis  impoffible  for  a  Thing  to  be 
certainly  known  to  any  IntelleCl  without  Enjidevce.  To 
fuppofe  otherwife,  implies  a  Contradiflion  :  Becaufe  for  a 
Thing  to  be  certainly  known  to  any  Undcrftanding,  is  for 
it  to  be  evident  to  that  Undcrftanding :  And  for  a  Thing 
to  be  e'videfit  to  any  Undcrftanding,  is  the  fame  Thing,  as 
for  that  Underftanding  to  fee  Enjidence  of  it :  But  no  Un- 
dcrftanding, created  or  increated,  can  fee  E'vidence  where 
there  is  none  :  For  that  is  the  fame  Thing,  as  to  fee  that  to- 
be,  which  is  not.  And  therefore,  if  there  be  any  Truth 
which  is  abfolutely  without  Evidence,  that  Truth  is  abfo- 
Intely  unknowable,  infomuch  that  it  implies  a  Contradi<5lion 
to  fuppofe  that  it  is  known. 

But  if  there  be  any  future  Event,  whofe  Exiftence  is 
contingent,  without  all  Neceffity,  the  future  Exiftence  of 
that  Event  is  abfolutely  n/jithout  E'videtue.  If  there  be  any 
Evidence  of  it,  it  muft  be  one  of  thefe  two  Sorts,  either 
Self-E"cidence,  or  Proof;  for  there  can  be  no  other  Sort  of 
Evidence  but  one  of  thefe  two  ;  an  evident  Thing  muft  be' 
either  evident  in  itfelf,  or  evident  in  fomething  elfe  ;  that  is,< 
evident  by  Connexion  with  fomething  elfe.  But  a  future 
Thing,,  whofe  Exiftence  is .  without  all  Neceffity,  can  have 
neither  of  thefe  Sorts  of  Evidence.  It  can't  be  Self-e^jident  : 
For  if  it  be,  it  may  be  now  known  by  what  is  now  to" 
be  feen  in  the  Thing  '  itfelf ;  either  its  prefent  Exiftence, 
or  the  Neceflity  of  its  Nature :  But  both  thefe  are  con- 
trary to  the  Suppofition.  It  is  fuppofed,  both  that  the 
Thing  has  no  prefent  Exiftence  to  be  feen ;  and  alfo 
that  it  is  not  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  to  be  necefla- 
:^ily  exiftent  for  the  future :  So  that  its  future  Ex- 
jftence  ia  not  Self-evident,    And,  /ecqndlj,    neither  is  there 

any 


Scd.  XII.  mfers  fome  NecefTity.  ,  1 20 

any  Troof,  or  Evidence  in  any  Th'mg  clje,  or  Evidence  of 
Connexion  with  fomething  elfe  that  is  evident :  For  this 
alfo  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition.  'Tis  fuppofed,  that 
there  is  now  Nothing  exiftent,  with  which  the  future  Ex- 
iftence  of  the  conthigent  Event  is  connefted.  For  fuch  a 
Connexion  deftrovs  its  Contingence,  and  fuppofes  Neceffity.. 
Thus  'tis  demonftrated,  that  there  is  in  the  Nature  of  Things 
abfolutely  no  Evidence  at  all  of  the  future  Exigence  of 
that  Event,  which  is  contingent,  without  all  Neceffity  (if 
any  fuch  Event  there  be)  neither  Self-Evidence  nor  Proof. 
And  therefore  the  Thing  in  P^eaiity  is  not  evident ;  and 
fo  can't  be  feen  to  be  evident,  or,  which  is  the  fame 
Thing,  can't  be  known. 

Let  us  confider  this  ir  an  Example.  Suppofe  that  five 
Thoufand  its^n  Hundred  and  fixty  Years  ago,  there  was 
no  other  Being  but  the  divine  Being ;  and  then  this 
World,  or  fome  particular  Body  or  Spirit,  all  at  once 
ftarts  out  of  Nothing  into  Being,  and  takes  on  itfelf  a 
particular  Nature  and  Form ;  all  in  ahfolute  Contingence, 
without  any  Concern  of  God,  or  any  other  Caufe,  in  the 
Matter ;  without  any  Manner  of  Ground  or  Reafon  of 
its  Exiftence;  or  any  Dependence  upon,  or  Conneftion 
at  all  with  any  Thing  foregoing :  I  fay,  that  if  this  be 
fuppofed,  iliere  was  ho  Evidence  of  that  Event  before- 
hand. There  was  no  Evidence  of  it  to  be  fecn  in  the 
Thing  itfelf;  for  the  Thing  itfelf,  as  yet,  was  not.  And 
there  was  no  Evidence  of  it  to  be  feen  in  any  Thing  elfe; 
for  E'vidence  in  fomething  elfe,  is  CojtneBion  nuith  fomething 
elfe :  But  fuch  Connection  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition. 
There  was  no  Evidence  before,  that  this  Thing  ivould  hap- 
pen;  for  by  the  Sijppofition,  there  was  no  Reafon  why  it 
fhould  happen,  rather  than  fomething  elfe,  or  rather  thau 
Nothing.  And  if  fo,  then  all  Things  before  were  exadly 
equal,  and  the  fame,  with  Refped  to  that  and  other  poffi-r 
ble  Things ;  there  was  no  Preponderation,  no  fuperiour 
Weight  or  Value ;  and  therefore  Nothing  that  could  be 
of  any  Weight  or  Value  to  determine  any  Underftanding. 
The  Thing  v.-as  abfolutely  without  Evidence,  and  abfo- 
lutely unknowable.  An  Incrgafe  of  Underftanding,  or  of 
the  Capacity  of  Difcerning,  has  no  Tendency,  and  makes 
no  Advance,  to  a  difcerning  any  Signs  or  Evidences  of  it, 
let  it  be  increafed  never  fo  much ;  yea,  if  it  be  increafed 
infinitely.  The  Increafe  of  the  Strength  of  Sight  may  have 
a  Tendency  tQ   enable  to    difcern    the  Evidepce    which    is 

l^  3  fa? 


121  Certain  TorcknovA&dgt  Part  IL 

far  off,  and  very  much  hid,  and  deeply  inv'olved  in  Cloudy 
and  Darknefs ;  but  it  has  -no  Tendency  to  enable  to  difcerr^ 
Evidence  where  there  is  none.  If  the  Sight  be  infinitely 
ilrong,  and  the  Capacity  of  Difcerning  infinitely  great,  it 
will  enable  to  fee  all  that  there  is,  and  to  fee  it  perfeftly, 
and  with  Eafe ;  yet  it  has  no  Tendency  at  all  to  enable  a 
!Being  to  difcern  that  Evidence  which  is  not :  But  on  the 
contrary,  it  has  a  Tendency  to  enable  to  difcern  with  great 
Certainty  that  there  is  none. 

III.  To  fuppofe  the  future  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  not 
to  be  neceffary  Events ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  Events 
which  it  is  not  irapofiible  but  that  they  may  not  come  to 
pafs ;  and  yet  to  fuppofe  that  God  certainly  foreknows 
them,  and  knows  all  Things ;  is  to  fuppofe  God's  Know- 
ledge to  be  inconfiftent  with  itfelf.  For  to  hy,  that  God 
certainly,  and  without  all  Conjedture,  knows  that  a  Thing 
will  infallibly  be,  which  at  the  fame  Time  he  knows  to  be. 
fo  contingent,  that  it  may  poiTibly  not  be,  is  to  fuppofe  his 
Knowledge  inconfiftent  with  itfelf;  or  that  one  Thing 
that  he  knows  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  another  Thing 
that  he  knows.  *Tis  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  He  now 
knows  a  Propofition  to  be  of  certain  infallible  Truth, 
which  he  knows  to  be  of  contingent  uncertain  Truth.  If 
a  future  Volition  is  fo  without  all  Neceffity,  that  there  is  no- 
thing hinders  but  that  it  may  not  be,  then  the  Prcpofition 
which  afferts  its  future  Exiftence,  is  fo  uncertain,  that  there 
is  Nothing  hinders  but  that  the  Truth  of  it  may  entirely 
fail.  And  if  God  knows  all  Things,  He  knows  this  Pto- 
pofition  to  be  thus  uncertain.  And  that  is  inconfiftent 
with  his  knowing  that  it  is  infallibly  true  ;  and  fo  incon- 
fiftent with  his  infallibly  knowing  that  it  is  true.  If  the 
Thing  be  indeed  contingent,  God  views  it  fo,  and  judges 
it  to  be  contingent,  if  he  views  Things  as  they  are.  If  the 
Event  be  not  neceffary,  then  it  is  poffible  it  may  never  be  ; 
And  if  it  be  poffible  it  may  never  be,  God  knows  it  may 
poffibly  never  be ;  and  that  is  to  know  that  the  Propofition 
which  affirms  its  Exiftence,  may  poiTibly  not  be  true  ;  and 
that  is  to  know  that  the  Truth  of  it  is  uncertain  ;  which 
furely  is  inconfiftent  with  his  knowing  it  as  a  certain 
Truth.  If  Volitions  are  in  Themfelves  contingent  Events, 
without  all  Neceffity,  then  'tis  no  Argument  of  Perfeftion 
of  Knowledge  in  any  Being  to  determine  peremptorily 
that  they  will  be  ;  but  on  the  contrary,  an  Argument  of 
Ignorance-  and   Miftake ;    Becaufe    it    would    argue,    that 


Scdt.  XII.         infers  fome  'NcctiTity.  222 

he  fuppofes  that  Propofition  to  be  certain^  which  in  its 
own  Nature,  and  all  Things  confidered,  is  uncertain  and 
contingent.  To  fay  in  fuch  a  Cafe,  that  God  may  have 
Ways  of  knowing  contingent  Events  which  we  can't  con- 
ceive of,  is  ridiculous  ;  as  much  fo,  as  to  fay,  that  God 
may  know  Contradidions  to  be  true,  for  ought  we  know, 
or  that  he  may  know  a  Thino;  to  be  certain,  and  at  the  fam& 
Time  know  it  not  to  be  certam,  tho'  we4;an't  conceive  how  ; 
becaufe  he  has  Ways  of  knowing,  which  we  can't  com- 
prehend. 

CoroL  I.  From  what  has  been  obferved  It  is  evident,  that 
the  abfolute  Decrees  of  God  are  no  more  inconfiftent  with 
human  Liberty,  on  Account  of  any  NecefTity  of  the  Event 
which  follows  from  fuch  Decrees,  than  the  abfolute 
Forekno'-wledge  of  God.  Becaufe  the  Connexion  betweerx 
the  Event  and  certain  Foreknowledge,  is  a-s  infallible  and 
indiflbluble,  as  betv/een  the  Event  and  an  abfolute  Decree. 
That  is,  'tis  no  more  impoifible  that  the  Event  and  Decree 
Ihould  not  agree  together,  than  that  the  Event  and  abfolute 
Knowledge  fhould  difagree.  The  Conncwiion  between  the 
Event  and  Foreknowledge  is  abfolutely  perfeft,  by  the  Suppo- 
fition  :  becaufe  it  is  fuppofed,  that  the  Certainty  ar.d  Infallibi- 
lity of  the  Knowledge  is  abfolutely  pcrfcft.  And  it  being  fo, 
the  Certainty  can't  be  increafed  ;  and  therefoie  the  Con- 
nexion between  the  Knowledge  and  Thing  known,  can't  be 
increafed  j  io  that  if  a  Decree  be  a*dded  to  the  Foreknow- 
ledge, it  don't  at  all  increafe  the  Connexion,  or  make  it 
more  infallible  and  indiflbluble.  If  it  were  not  fo,  the 
Certainty  of  Knowledge  might  be  increafed  by  the  Ad- 
dition of  a  Decree  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition, 
which  is,  that  the  Knowledge  is  abfolutely  perfeft,  or  perfcd; 
to  the  highelt  poffible  Degree, 

There  is  as  much  of  an  Impoflibility  but  that  the  Things 
which  are  infallibly  foreknown,  fhould  be,  or  (which  is  the 
fame  Thing)  as  great  a  Neceflity  of  their  future  Exiftcnce^ 
as  if  the  Event  were  already  written  down,  and  was  known 
and  read  by  all  Mankind,  thro'  all  preceding  Ages,  and 
there  were  the  moil  indiffoluble  and  perfeft  Connexion 
poffible,  between  the  Writing,  and  the  Thing  written. 
In  fuch  a  Cafe,  it  would  be  as  impoffible  the  Event-  fhould 
fail  of  Exiftence,  as  if  it  had  exiiled  already ;  and  ^ 
Decree  can't  make  an  Event  furer  or  more  neceffary  thai^ 
|his. 

And 


1 23       Foreknowledge  infers  Necefjiiy       Part.  II, 

And  therefore,  if  there  be  any  fuch  Foreknowledge,  as 
it  has  been  proved  there  is,  then  Necelfity  of  Connexion 
and  Confequence,  is  not  at  all  inconfiftent  with  any  Li- 
berty which  Man,  or  any  ether  Creature  enjoys.  And 
from  hence  it  may  be  infer'd,  that  abfolute  Decrees  of 
God,  which  don't  at  all  increafe  the  Neceffity,  are  not  at  all 
inconfiftent  with  the  Liberty  which  Man  enjoys,  on  any 
foch  Account,  as  that  they  make  the  Event  decreed  neceflary, 
and  render  it  utterly  impoffible  but  that  it  fhould  come  to 
pafs.  Therefore  if  abfolute  Decrees  are  inconfiftent  with 
Man's  Liberty  as  a  moral  Agent,  or  his  Liberty  in  a  State 
of  Probation,  or  any  Liberty  whatfoever  that  he  enjoys,  it 
is  not  on  Account  of  any  Neceffity  which  abfolute  De- 
crees infer. 

Dr.  Whitby  fuppofes,  there  is  a  great  Difference  between 
God's  Foreknowledge,  and  his  Decrees,  with  Regard  to 
Neceffity  of  future  Events.  In  his  Difcourfe  on  the  five 
Points,  P.  474,  &c.     He    fays,  "  God's  Prefcience    has   no 

*•  Influence  at  all  on  our  Aftions. Should  God  (fays  he) 

"  by  immediate  Revelation,  give  me  the  Knowledge  of  the 
"  Event  of  any  Man's  State  or  Aftions,  would  my  Know-? 
•'  ledge    of  them    have    any   Influence     upon    his   Aflions  ? 

"  Surdy   none   at    all. Our  Knowledge   doth    not   affeft 

*'  the  Things  we  know,  to  make  them  more  certain,  or 
"■  more  future,  than  they  would  be  without  it.  Now  Fore- 
''  knowledge  in  God  is  Knowledge.  As  therefore  Know- 
"  ledge  has  no  Influence  on  Things  that  are,  fo  neither  has 
*"  Foreknowledge  on  Things  that  ihall  be.  And  confe- 
"  quently,  the  Foreknowledge  of  any  Adion  that  would  be  , 
'*  otherwife  free,  cannot  alter  or  diminifh  that  Freedom. 
"  Whereas  God's  Decree  of  Eledlion  is  powerful  and  aftive, 
'■'  and  comprehends  the  Preparation   and  Exhibition   of  fuch 

"  Means,  as   fhall  unfruftrably  produce  the  End. Hence 

"'  God's  Prefcience  renders  no  Adions  negeffary."  And  to 
this  Purpofe,  P.  473.  he  cites  Origen,  where  he  fays,  God's 
Prefcience  is  not  the  Caufe  of  Things  future ,  but  their  being  fu- 
ture is  the  Caufe  of  God's  Prefcience  that  they  nuill  be :  And 
Le  Blanc,  where  he  fays.  This  is  the  trueji  Refolution  of  this 
Difficulty,  that  Prefcience  is  not  the  Caufe  that  Things  are  future  ; 
but  their  being  future  is  the  Caufe  they  are  forefeen.  In  like 
Manner  Dr.  Clark,  in   his  Demonftration   of  the  Being   and 

Attributes   of  God,    P,  9^, 99.     And     the   Author    of 

the  Freedom  of  Will,  in  God  and  the  Creature,  fpeaking  to  the 
like   Purpc.fe  with  Dr.  Whitby,    reprefents   Foreknowledge  as 

halving 


Seel.  %lt,  us  much  as  a  Decree.  3  24 

ha'ving  no  more  Infiitence  on  Things  knonun,  to  make  them,   neceffc" 
ry,  than  After- K^iotvledge,  or  to  that  Purpofe. 

1*0  all  which  I  would  fay ;  That  what  is  faid  about: 
Knowledge,  its  not  having  Influence  on  the  Thing  known 
to  make  it  neceflary,  is  Nothing  to  the  Purpofe,  nor  does 
it  in  the  leaft  affeft  the  foregoing  Reafoning.  "Whether 
Prefcience  be  the  Thing  that  makes  the  Event  neceflary  or  no^ 
it  alters  not  the  Cafe.  Infallible  Foreknewledge  may  pronje 
the  Neceflity  of  the  Event  foreknown,  and  yet  not  be  the 
Thing  which  caufes  the  Neceffity.  If  the  Foreknowledge  be 
abfolute,  this  pro'-ves  the  Event  known  to  be  neceflary,  or 
proves  that  'tis  impofllble  but  that  the  Event  fhould  be, 
by  fome  Means  or  other,  either  by  a  Decree,  or  fome 
other  Way,  if  there  be  any  other  Way  :  Becaufe,  as  was  faid 
before,  'tis  abfurd  to  fay,  that  a  Propofition  is  known  to 
be  certainly  and  infallibly  true,  which  yet  may  poffibly  prove 
not  true. 

The  Whole  of  the  feeming  Force  of  this  Evafion  lies  in 
this ;  that,  in  as  much  as  certain  Foreknowledge  don't 
cau/e  an  Event  to  be  neceflary,  as  a  Decree  does ;  therefore 
it  don't  proa)e  it  to  be  neceflary,  as  a  Decree  does.  But  there 
13  no  Force  in  this  arguing  :  For  it  is  built  wholly  on  this 
Suppofition,  that  Nothing  can  profe  or  be  an  Enjidence  of  a 
Thing's  being  neceflary,  but  that  which  has  a  caufal  In- 
Jluence  to  make  It  fo.  But  this  can  never  be  maintained„ 
If  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  future  exifting  of  an  E- 
vent,  be  not  the  Thing  which  firft  makes  it  impoflible  that 
it  (hould  fail  of  Exiftence ;  yet  it  may,  and  certainly  does 
demonjirate,  that  it  is  impoflible  it  Ihould  fail  of  it,  how- . 
ever  that  Impofllbility  comes.  If  Foreknowledge  be  not 
the  Caufe,  but  the  EfFeft  of  this  Impofllbility,  it  may  prove 
that  there  is  fuch  an  Impofllbility,  as  much  as  if  it  were  the 
Caufe.  It  is  as  ftrong  arguing  from  the  Effeft  to  the 
Caufe,  as  from  the  Caufe  to  the  Effed.  'Tis  enough,  that 
an  Exiftence  which  is  infallibly  foreknown,  cannot  fail,  whe- 
tTier  that  impofllbility  arifes  from  the  Foreknowledge,  or  i& 
prior  to  it.  'Tis  as  evident,  as  'tis  pofllble  any  Thing  fliould 
be,  that  it  is  impoflible  a  Thing  which  is  infallibly 
known  to  be  true,  fhould  prove  not  to  be  true :  therefore 
there  is  a  NeceJJjty  that  it  fhould  be  otherv/ife ;  whether  the 
Knowledge  be  the  Caufe  of  this  Neceflity,  or  the  Neceflity 
the  Caufe  of  the  Knowledge. 

All  certain  Knowledge  whether  it  be  Foreknowledge  or 
After-Knowledge,   or    concomitant  Knowledge,  proves    the 

Thing 


125       Toxtkno^vltdgt  infers  Neceffify      Part.  IL 

Thing  known  now  to  be  neccfTary,  by  feme  Means  or  other  ; 
or  prove,  that  it  is  impoflible  it  fhould  now  be  other- 
wife  than  true. 1   freely  allow,  that  Foreknowledge  don't 

prove  a  Thing  to  be  neceifary  any  more  than  After-Know- 
iedge  :  But  then  After-Knowledge  which  is  certain  and  infalli- 
ble, proves  that  'tis  now  become  impoffible  but  that  the 
Proportion  known  ihould  be  true.  Certain  After-Knowledge 
proves  that  it  is  now,  in  the  Time  of  the  Knowledge,  by 
fome  Means  or  other,  become  impoffible  but  that  the  Propo- 
rtion which  predicates  p(jj!  Exiftence  on  the  Event,  fhould 
be  true.  And  (o  does  certain  Foreknowledge  prove,  that 
now,  in  the  Time  of  the  Knowledge,  it  is  by  fome  Means 
or  otlier,  become  impoffible  but  that  the  Propofition  whicK 
predicates  future  Exillence  on  the  Event,  fhould  be  true. 
The  Neceffity  of  the  Truth  of  the  Propofitions,  confifling 
in  the  prefent  Impoffibility  of  the  Non-Exiflence  of  the  Event 
affirmed,  in  both  Cafes,  is  the  immediate  Ground  of  the 
certainty  of  the  Knowledge ;  there  can  be  no  Certainty  of 
Knowledge  without  it. 

There  mufl:  be  a  Certainty  in  Things  themfelves,  before 
they  are  certainly  known,  or  (which  is  the  fame  Thing) 
known  to  be  certain.  For  Certainty  of  Knowledge  is  no- 
thing elfe  but  knowing  or  difcerning  the  Certainty  there  is 
in  the  Things  themfelves  which  are  known.  Therefore 
there  mufl  be  a  Certainty  in  Things  to  be  a  Ground  of  Cer- 
tainty of  Knowledge,  and  to  render  Things  capable  of  be- 
ing known  to  be  certain.  And  this  is  Nothing  but  the  Ne- 
ceifity  of  the  Truth  known,  or  its  being  impoffible  but  that 
it  fhould  be  true ;  or,  in  other  Words,  the  firm  and  infalli- 
ble Connexion  between  the  Subjefl  and  Predicate  of  the 
Propofition  that  contains  that  Truth.  All  Certainty  of 
Knowledge  confifts  in  the  View  of  the  Firmnefs  of  that 
Connexion.  So  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  fu- 
ture Exiflence  of  any  Event,  is  his  View  of  the  firm  and  in- 
diffoluble  Connexion  of  the  Subjedt  and  Predicate  of  the 
Propofition  that  affirms  its  future  Exiflence.  The  Subjeft  \i 
that  poffible  Event ;  the  Predicate  is  its  future  exifling : 
But  if  future  Exiflence  be  firmly  and  indifTolubly  conneded 
with  that  Event,  then  the  future  Exiflence  of  that  Event 
is  neceiTary.  If  God  certa;inly  knows  the  future  Exiflence 
of  an  Event  which  is  wholly  contingent,  arid  may  poffibly 
never  be,  then  He  fees  a  firm  Conneftion  between  a  Sub- 
jeft  and  Predicate  that  are  not  firmly  connefted;  which  h 
a  Contradiflion. 

I 


l&e'ifl,  XII.  'as  much  as  a  Decree.  126 

I  allow  ^hat  Dr.  Whitby  fays  to  be  true.  That  mere 
Knonuleige  don't  aj^eB  the  "l  hing  knoiun^  to  make  it  more  certain 
or  more  futjne.  But  j-et,  I  fay,  it  jicppofes  and  prcves  the 
Thihg  to  be  already,  both  future,  and  certain ;  i.  e.  neceffa- 
rily  future.  Knowledge  of  fziiurity,  fuppofes  Fnturi-ty  ;  and 
a  certain  Kno'ivledge  oi  Futurity,  fuppofes  certain  Futurity,  an- 
tecedent to  that  certain  Knowledge.  But  there  is  no  other 
certain  Futurity  of  a  Thing,  antecedent  to  Certainty  of 
Knowledge,  than  a  prior  Impoffibility  but  that  the  Thing 
fhould  prove^  true  ;  or  (which  is  the  fame  Thihg)  the 
Neceflity  of  the  Event, 

I  would  obferve  one  Thing  further  toncerning  this  Mat- 
ter, and  it  is  this ;  That  if  it  be  as  thofe  forementiort'd 
Writers  fuppofes  that  God's  Foreknowledge  i's  not  the 
Caufe,  but  the  EfFeft  of  the  Exiftence  of  the  Event  fore- 
known; this  is  fo  far  from  fnewing  that  this  Foreknowledge 
don't  infer  the  Neceflity  of  the  Exiftence  of  that  Event,  that 
it  rather  (hews  the  contrary  the  more  plainly.  Becaufe  it 
Ihews  the  Exiiler.ce  of  th*;  Everit  to  be  fo  fettled  and  firm,  tliat 
It  is  as  if  it  had  already  been  ;  in  as  much  as  in  EffeSl  it 
"dually  exifts  already ;  its  future  Exiftence  has  already 
had  adtual  hif.uence  and  Efficiency,  and  has  produced  an  Effed, 
viz.  Prefcience :  The  Effeft  exifts  already;  S.nd  as  the 
Effe^  fuppofes  the  Caufe,  is  connefted  with  the  Caufe,  and 
depends  entirely  upon  it ;  therefore  it  is  as  if  the  future  E- 
yent,  which  is  the  Caufe,  had  exifted  already.  The  Efi"e6l 
is  firm  as  pollible,  it  having  already  the  Poffeflioh  of  Ex- 
iftence, and  has  made  fure  ot  it.  But  the  Effeft  can't  be 
more  firm  and  ftable  than  its  Caufe^  Ground  and  Reafon. 
The  Building  can't  be  firmer  than  the  Foundacion. 

To  iliuftrate  this  Matter,  let  us  fuppofe  the  Appearances 
and  Images  of  Things  in  a  Glafs  ;  for  Inftance,  a  reflecting 
Telefcope  to  be  the  real  EfFefts  of  heavenly  Bodies  (at 
a  Diftance,  and  out  of  Sight)  which  they  refemble : 
if  it  be  fo,  then,  as  thefe  Images  in  the  Telefcope  have 
had  a  paft  aftual  Exiftence,  and  it  is  become  utterly 
impofTiblffi  now  that  it  fhould  be  otherwife ,  than  that 
they  have  exifted ;  fo  they  being  the  true  EfFefis  of  the 
heavenly  Bodies  they  refemble,  this  proves  the  exifting  of 
thofe  heavenly  Bodies  to  be  as  real,  infallible,  firm  and 
neceffary,  as    the    exifting    of  thefe  Etfefts ;  the    one   being 

connefted    with,  and   wholly   depending  on    the  other. • 

Now  let   us  fuppofe  future  Exiftences  forae  Way  or  othet 

S  to 


i2'^         Forekno\^ ledge  infers  Neccjjily      Part  11. 

to  ,havc  Influence  back,  to  produce  EfFefts  befcre-hand.. 
and  caufe  exaft  and  pcrfe(fHm:.^es  of  themfelves  in  a  Glafs- 
a  Thoufand  Years  before  they  exift,  yea,  in  a!!  preced- 
ing Ages  ;  But  yet  that  thefe  Images  are  real  Effects  of 
thefe  tuture  Exiftences,  perfcftly  dependent  on,  and  con- 
nected with  their  Ca'ufe ;  thefe  Effe<fts  and  Images,  having  ' 
already  had  aftual  Exiftence,  rendering  that  Matter  of  their 
ExilHng  perfectly  firm  and  liable,  and  utterly  impoffible 
to  be  othervvife ;  this  proves  in  like  Manner  as  in  the 
other  Inflance,.  that  the  Exiftence  of  the  Things  which 
are  their  Caufes,  is  alfo  equally  fure,  firm  and  neceflary ; 
and  that  it  is  alike  impoffible  but  that  they  fhould  be,  as 
if  they  had  been  already,  as  their  Eftedts  have.  And  if, 
inftead  of  Images  in  a  Glafs,  we  fuppofe  the  antecedent 
Eftedls  to  be  perfeft  Ideas  of  them  in  the  divine  Mind, 
v/hich  have  exiiled  there  from  all  Eternity,  which  are  as 
properly  EfFefts,  as  truly  and  properly  connefted  with  their 
Caufe,    the   Cafe  is  not  altered. 

Another  Thing  which  has  been  faid  by  fome  Arminiam, 
to  take  off  the  Force  of  what  is  urged  from  God's  Pre- 
science, againft  the  Contingence  of  the  Volitions  of  moral 
Agents,  is  to  this  Purpofe  ;  "  That  when  we  talk  of 
"  Foreknowledge  in  God,  there  is  no  flrid  Propriety  in 
"  our  fo  Speaking ;  and  that  altho'  it  be  true,  that  there  is 
**  in  God  the  moit  perfeft  Knowledge  of  all  Events  from 
"  Eternity  to  Eternity,  yet  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as 
*♦  before  and  after  in  God,  but  Ke  fees  all  Things  by 
"  one  pefefl  unchangeable  View,  without  any  SucceffionJ' 
To  this  I   anfwer, 

I.  It  has  been  already  fhcvv-n,  that  all  certain  Knowledge 
proves  the  Neceffity    of  the   Truth  known;    whether  it   be 

before,  after,  o'c  nt  the  fame  Time. Tho'    it   be    true,    that 

there  is  no  Succeffion  in  God's  Knowledge,  and  the  Manner 
of  his  Knowledge  is  to  us  inconceivable,  yet  thus  much' 
we  know  concerning  it,  that  there  is  no  Event,  paft» 
prefent,  or  to  come,  that  God  is  ever  uncertain  of  :  He 
never  is,  never  was,  and  never  will  be  without  infallible 
Knowledge  of  it :  He  always  fees  the  Exiftence  of  it  to^ 
be  certain  and  infallible.  And  as  he  always  fees  Things 
juft  as  they  are  in  Truth  ;  hence  there  never  is  in  Reality 
any  Thing  contingent  in  fuch  a  Senfe,  as  that  poffibly  it 
may  happen  never  to  exift.  If,  ftridly  fpeaking,  there  is  no 
Joreknovvlcnge  in  God,    'tis  becaufe    thofe  Things    which 

are 


StCt.  XII.         as  much  as  a  Decree.  i  it 

are  future  to  ns,  are  as  prefent  to  God,  as  if  they  already- 
had  Exiftence  :  and  that  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  that  future 
Events  are  always  in  God's  View  as  evident,  clear,  fure 
and  neceflary,  as  if  they  already  were.  If  there  never  is 
a  Time  wherein  the  Exiftence  of  the  Event  is  not  prefent 
with  God,  then  there  never  is  a  Time  wherein  it  is  not 
as  much  impoflible  for  it  to  fail  of  Exiftence,  as  if  its 
Exiftence  were  prefent,  and  were  already  come  to  pafs. 

God's  viewing  Things  fo  perfeftly  and  unchangeably  as  that 
there  is  no  Succeffion  in  his  Ideas  or  Judgment,  don't  hinder 
but  tliat  there  is  properly  now,  in  the  Mind  of  God,  a  certain 
and  perfedl  Knowledge  of  the  moral  Adlions  of  Men,  Vvhich  to 
us  are  an  Hundred  Years  hence  :  yea  the  Objedion  fuppofes 
this  3  and  -therefore  it  certainly  don't  hinder  but  that,  by  the 
foregoing  Arguments,  it  is  now  impofllble  thefe  moral  Aftioas 
Ihould  not  come  to  pafs. 

We  know,  that  God  knov/s  the  futare  volantary  Acllcns 
■cf  Men  in  fuch  a  Senfe  before-hand,  as  that  he  is  able  par- 
ticularly to  declare,  and  foxetel  them,  and  write  them, 
or  caufe  thfipi  to  be  written  down  in  a  Book,  as  He  often 
has  done ;  and  that  therefore  the  neceflary  Conneftiou 
which  there  is  tetween  God's  Knowledge  and  the  Event 
known,  does  as  much  prove  the  Event  to  be  neceflary 
before-hand,  as  if  the  divine  Knowledge  were  in  the  fame 
Senfe  before  the  Event,  as  the  Predidion  or  V/riting  13. 
If  the  Knowledge  be  infallible,  then  the  Expreffton  of  it  iu 
the  written  Predidion  is  infallible  ;  that  is,  there  is  an 
infallible  Connedion  beiween  that  written  Predidion  and 
the  Event.  And  if  fo,  then  it  is  impoflible  it  fnouid 
ever  be  otherwife,  than  that  that  Predidion  and  Event 
ihould  agree :  And  this  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay, 
'tis  impoiiible  but  that  the  Event  fliould  come  to  pafs  : 
And    this    is  the  fame  as  to  fay,    that   its  coming   to   pafs. 

is  neceflary. So   that   it  is    manifeft,  that  there    being  no 

proper  Succeflion  in  God's  Mind,  makes  no  Alteration  as 
to  the  Neceflity  of  the  Exiftence  of  the  Events  which  God 
knows.      Yea, 

2.  This  is  fo  far  from  weakening  the  Proof,  which  has 
been  given  of  the  Impoflibility  of  the  not  coming  to  pafs  of 
future  Events  known,  as  that  it  eftabhfhes  that  wherein  the 
Strengtit  of  the  foregoing  Arguments  coniifts,  and  fnews 
the  Clcarnefs   of  the  Evidence.     For, 

S  3  (I.)  T-hc 


1 29  Certam¥orekno\vltdgciriffrs/df?ieNcceirity.¥.ll. 

(i.)  The  very  Reafon  why  Grod's  Knowledge  is  wirh- 
put  bucceliion.,  is,  becaufe  it  is  ablolutely  perteft,  to  thej 
higheit  polfible  Degree  of  Clearnefs  and  Certainty  :  All 
Things,  whether  paft,  prefent  or  to  come,  being  view'd 
with  equal  Evidence  and  Fulnefs  ;  future  Things  being 
feen  vwth  as  much  Clearnefs,  as  if  they  were  prefent  ; 
the  View  is  always  in  abfolute  Perfection  ;  and  abfolute 
conftant  Perfedlion  admits  of  no  Alteration,  and  fo  no 
Succeffion  ;  the  aftual  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  known,  don't 
at  all  increafe,  or  add  to  the  Clearnefs  or  Certainty  of 
the  Thing  known  :  God  calls  the  Things  that  are  not,  as 
tho'  they  were  ;  they  are  all  one  to  Him  as  if  they 
had  already  exiiled.  But  herein  confifts  the  Strength  of 
the  Demonftration  before  given,  of  the  luipoflibility  of  the 
not  exilting  of  thofe  Things  whofe  Exiftence  God  knows  ; 
That  it  is  as  irapofTible  they  fliould  fail  of  Exiftence,  as  if" 
they  exifted  already.  This  Objeftion,  inftead  of  weakening 
this  Argument,  fets  it  in  the  cleareft  and  llrongeft  Light  ; 
for  it  fuppofes  it  to  be  fo  indeed,  that  the  Exiftence  of 
future  Events  is  in  God's  View  fo  much  as  if  it  already 
had  been,  that  when  they  come  adually  to  exift,  it  makes 
not  the  leaft  Alteration  or  Variation  in  his  View  or 
Knowledge  of  them. 

(2.)  The  Objeftion  is  founded  on  the  Immutah'ility  of  God's 
Knowledge :  For  'tis  the  Immutability  of  Knowledge  makes 
his  Knowledge  to  be  without  Succeffion.  But  this  moft 
diredly  and  plainly  demonftrates  the  Thing  I  infift  on, 
'uiz.  That  'tis  utterly  impoffible  the  known  Events  ihould 
fail  of  Exiftence.  For  if  that  were  poffible,  then  it  would, 
be  poffible  for  there  to  be  a  Change  in  God's  Knowledge 
and  View  of  Things.  Fot  if  the  known  Event  fhould 
fail  of  Exiftence,  and  not  come  into  Being,  as  God  expeded, 
then  God  would  fee  it,  and  fo  would  change  his  Mind, 
and  fee  his  former  Miftake ;  and  thus  there  would  be 
Change  and  Succeffion  in  his  Knowledge.  But  as  God  is 
immutable,  and  fo  it  is  utterly  and  infinitely  impoffible 
that  his  View  ftiould  be  changed ;  fo  'tis,  for  the  fame 
Reafon,  juft  fo  impoffible  that  the  fore-known  Event  Ihould 
not  exift :  And  that  is  to  be  impoffible  in  the  higheft 
Degree  :  and  therefore  the  contrary  is  neceffary.  Nothing 
is  more  impoffible  than  that  the  immutable  God  fhould' 
be  changed,  by  the  Succeffion  of  Time ;  who  compre- 
|:ends  all  Things,    from  Eternity  to  Eternity,    in  one,    mofl: 

perfe6li 


Sedt.XII.  Foreknowledge  pi'oves  NeceJJtly.         13© 

perfeft,     and  unalterable  View ;    fo    that  his  whole  eternal 
Duration  is  f^it<^  iijierminabilis,  tata,jimul,  i3  perfeSci  i'ojpjjto. 

On  the  Whole,  I  need  not  fear  to  fay,  that  there  is  no 
(Geometrical  Theorem  or  Propofltion  whatfoever,  more  capa- 
ble of  ftrift  Demonil: ration,  than  that  God's  certain  Prc- 
fcience  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  is  inconfiftent  with 
fuch  a  Contingence  of  thefe  Events,  a^  is  without  ajl 
rs^ecefiity  ;  and  fo  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Arminun  Notion  of 
liberty. 

Corol.  2.  Hence  the  Dodrine  of  the  Cah'inijis,  concerning 
ihe  abfolute  Decrees  of  God,  does  not  at  all  infer  any 
more  Fatality  of  Things,  than  will  demonftrably  follow  from 
the  Doftri;ie  of  jnoft  Armir^ian  Divines^  who  acknowledge 
God's  Omnifcience,  and  univerfal  Prefcience.  Therefore 
all  Objeftio^  they  make  againft  the  Dodrine  of  the  Cal-uinijis, 
as  implying  Hohbes'^i  Doctrine  of  NecefTity,  or  the  Stoical 
Doftrine  of  Fate,  lie  no  rnore  againft  the  Dodrine  of 
Cahinijis,  than  their  own  Dodrine :  And  therefore  it  don't 
tecome  thofe  Divines,  to  raife  fuch  an  Out-cry  againft  the 
Caluinijis,  on  this  Account. 

Corol.  5.  Hence  all  arguing  from  Neceflity,  againft  the 
Dodrine  of  the  Inability  of  unregenerate  Men  to  perform 
the  Conditions  of  Salvation,  and  the  Commands  of  God 
requiring  fpiritual  Duties,  and  againft  the  Cal^vittijiic  Dodrine 
of  efficacious  Grace  ;  I  fay,  all  Arguings  of  Arminians 
(fuch  of  them  as  own  God"s  Omnifcience)  againft  thefe 
Things,  on  this  Ground,  that  thefe  Dodrines,  tho'  they 
don't  fuppofe  Men  to  be  under  any  Conftraint  or  Coadion, 
yet  fuppofe  them  under  Neceflity,  with  Refped  to  their  moral 
Adions,  and  thofe  Things  which  are  required  of  them  in  Order 
to  their  Acceptance  with  God  ;  and  tlieir  arguing  againft 
the  Neceflity  ©f  Men's  Volitions,  taken  from  the  Reafon- 
ablenefs  of  God's  Commands,  Promifes,  and  Threatenings,  . 
and  the  Sincerity  of  his  Counfels  and  Invitations  ;  and  all 
Objedions  againft  any  Dodrines  of  the  Cal'vinifis  as  being 
inconfiftent  with  human  Liberty,  becaufe  they  infer  Neceflity  ; 
I  fay,  ail  thefe  Arguments  and  Objedions  muft  fall  to 
the  Ground,  and  be  juftly  eftcem'd  vain  and  frivolous, 
as  coming  from  them  ;  being  maintain'd  in  an  inconfiftence 
with  themfelves,  and  in  like  Manner  levelled  againft  their  owi) 
podrj;\e,  as  againft  the  Dodrine  of  the  Cahifi^s, 

Section 


^3f  ^^^^  NeceJJity  and  Ccntingence       Fart.  IL 

Section     XIIL 

i'Vhether  we  Juppoje  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents 
to  be  conneEied  with  any  Thing  antecedent^  or 
not,  yet  they  muji  he  necejfary  in  fuch  a  Senfe 
as  to  overthrow  Arminian  Liberty. 

EVERY  Aa  of  the  Will  has  a  Caufe,  or  it  has  not. 
If  it  has  a  Caufe,  then,  according  to  what  has 
already  been  demonftrated,  it  is  not  contingent,  but 
neceffary;  the  EfFeft  being  neceffarily  dependent  and  eon- 
sequent  on  its  Caufs ;  and  that,  let  the  Caufe  be  what 
it  will.  If  the  Caufe  is  the  Will  itfelf,  by  antecedent 
Afts  chuUng  and  determining ;  ftill  the  determined  and 
taufed  Aft  muft  be  a  neceffary  Effect.  The  Act  that 
is  the  determined  Effect  of  the  iorcgoing  Act  which  is  its 
Caufe,  can't  prevent  the  Efficiency  of  its  Caufe ;  but  muft 
be  wholly  Subject  to  its  Determination  and  Command^ 
as  much  as  the  Motions  of  the  Hands  and  Feet :  The 
confequent  commanded  Acts  of  the  Will  are  as  paffive 
and  as  neceffary,  with  Refpect  to  the  antecedent  determining 
Acts,  as  the  Parts  of  the  Body  are  to  the  Volitions 
which  determine  and  command  them.  And  therefore,  if 
all  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  are  tlius,  if  they  are  all 
determined  Effects,  determined  by  the  Will  itfelf,  that 
is,  determined  by  antecedent  Choice,  then  they  are  all 
neceffary ;  they  are  all  fubject  to,  and  decifively  fixed  by 
the  foregoing  Act,  which  is  their  Caufe  :  Yea,  even  the 
determining  Act  itfelf;  for  that  muft  be  determined  and 
fixed  by  another  Act,  preceding  that,  if  it  be  a  free  and 
voluntary  Act ;  and  fo  muft  be  neceffary.  So  that  by  this 
all  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  are  neceffary,  and  can't  be 
free  unlefs  they  are  neceffary :  Becaufe  they  can't  be  free, 
according  to '  the  ^irW^/rtr// Notion  of  Freedom,  unlefs  they 
are  determined  by  the  Will ;  which  is  to  be  determined 
by  antecedent  Choice ;  which  being  their  Caufe,  proves 
them  neceffary.     And  yet  they  fay,  Neceffity  is  utterly  incon- 

fjftent 


Sc(fl.  XliT.  incGJifillent  with  hrmivimn  Liberty.  73  2i 

Sftent  with  Liberty.  So  that,  by  their  Scheme,  the  Acts 
of  the  Will  can't  be  free  unlefs  they  are  neceflary,  and' 
yet  cannot  be  free  if  they  be  not  neceflary  ! 

But  if  the  other  Part  of  the  Dilemma  be  taken,  and 
it  be  affirmed  that  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  have  x\o 
Caufe,  and  are  connected  with  nothing  whatfoever  that 
goes  before  them  and  determines  them,  in  order  to  maintain- 
their  proper  and  abfolute  Contingence,  and  this  Ihould  be 
allowed  to  be  pofiible ;  ftill  it  will  not  ferve  their  Turn- 
For  if  the  Volition  comes  to  pafs  by  perfect  Contingence, 
and  Avifhout  any  Caufe  at  all,  then  it  is  certain,  no  Act 
of  the  Will,  no  prior  Act  of  the  Soul  was  the  Caufe,  no 
iJetermination  or  Choice  of  the  Soul,  had  any  Hand  in 
it.  The  Will,  or  the  Soul,  was  indeed  the  Subject  of  what 
happened  to  it  accidentally,  but  v.'as  not  the  Caufe.  The 
Will  is  not  active  in  caufmg  or  determining,  but  purely 
the  paflive  Subject ;  at  leaft  according  to  their  Notion  of 
Aftion  and  Paffion.  In  this  Cafe,  Contingence  does  as 
much  prevent  the  Determination  of  the  Will,  as  a  proper 
Caufe;  and  as  to  the  Will,  it  was  neceflary,  and  could  be 
no  otherwife.  For  to  fuppofe  that  it  could  have  beer». 
othcrwife,  if  the  Will  or  Soul  had  pleafed,  is  to  fuppofe 
that  the  Aft  is  dependent  on  fome  prior  Aft  of  Choice  or 
Pleafiire ;  contrary  to  what  now  is  fuppofed  :  It  is  to  fup- 
pofe that  it  might  have  been  otherwife,  if  its  Caufe  had 
made  it  or  ordered  it  otherwife.  But  this  don't  agree  to 
its  having  no  Caufe  or  Orderer  at  all.  That  mull  be 
neceflary  as  to  the  Soul,  which  is  dependent  on  no  free 
A&.  of  the  Soul  :  But  that  which  is  without  a  Caufe,  is  de^ 
pendent   on  no  free  Ad  of  the  Soul :  becaufe,  by  the  Sup- 

?ofilion,  it  is  dependent  on  Nothing,  and  is  conneded  with 
Nothing.  In  fuch  a  Cafe,  the  Soul  is  neceflarily  fubjefled 
to  what  Accident  brings  to  pafs,  from  Time  to  Time,  as 
much  as  the  Earth,  that  is  inaftive,  is  neceflarily  fub- 
jeded  to  what  falls  upon  it.  But  this  don't  confift  with 
the  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty,  which  is  the  Will's  Power 
of  determining  itfelf  in  its  own  Ads,  and  being  wholly- 
active  in   it,  without  Paflivenefs,  and  without  being  fubject 

to  Necefl!»ty. Thus,  Contingence  belongs  to  the  Arminian 

Notion  of  Liberty,  and  yet  is  inconfdlent  with  it. 

I  would  here  obfervc,  that  the  Author  of  the  Ejjay  on 
the  Freedom  of  Will,  in  God  and  the  Creature,  Page  76,  77V 
fays  as  follows,  *^  The  Word  Chance  always  means  fomcr 

"  thing 


333  ^^/^  Nec'effi,  dndContirigenceincohfi.  "jcithficz,  P.lL 

•*  thing  done  without  Defign.  Chance  and  Defign  ftand 
*'  in  direft  Oppofition  to  each  other :  and  Chance,  cari 
"  never  be  properly  applied  to  the  Ads  of  the  Will; 
''  which  is  the  Spring  of  all  Defign,  and  which  defignS  ' 
"  to  chufe  whdtfoever  it  dotli  chufe,  whether  there  be  arly 
*•  fuperiour  Fitnefs  in  the  Thing  which  it  chufes,  or  no  : 
"  and  it  defigns  to  determine  itfelf  to  one  Thing,  where 
"  two  Things  perfedly  equal  are  propofed,  merely  becaufe  it 
♦'  will."  But  herein  appears  a  verj  great  Inadvertence  in  this 
Author.  For  if  the  Will  be  the  Spring  of  all  Dejtgn,  as  he 
fays,  then  certainly  it  is  not  always  the  Effc'il  of  Defign  : 
and  the  Afts  of  the  Will  themfelves  muft  fometimes  come 
to  pafs  when  they  don't  fpring  from  Defign  ;  and  confe- 
quently  come  to  pafs  by  Chance,  according  to  his  own 
Definition  of  Chance.  AnAii  the  M' ill  dejigns  to  chufe  nvhat- 
foe'ver  it  daes  chufe,  and  defgns  to  determine  itfelf,  as  he  fays; 
then  it  defigns  to  determine  all  its  Defigns.  Which 
carries  us  back  from  one  Defign  to  a  foregoing  Defign 
determining  that,  and  to  another  determining  that ;  and 
fo  on  in  infinitum.  The  very  firft  Defign  muft  be  the 
EfFed  of  foregoing  Defign,  or  elfe  it  muft  be  by  Chance, 
in   his   Notion   of  it. 

Here  another  Alternative  may  be  propofed,  relating  to 
the  Connexion  of  the  Aifls  of  the  Will  with  fomething 
foregoing  that  is  their  Caufe,  not  much  unlike  to  the  other  ; 
which  is  this :  Either  huma:n  Liberty  is  fuch  that  it  may 
well  ftand  with  Volitions  being  neceffarily  conn&fted  with 
the  Views  of  the  Underftanding,  and  fo  is  confiftent  with 
Neceffity ;  or  it  is  inconfiftent  with,;  and  contrary  to  fuch 
a  Connexion  and  Neceffity.  The  former  is  direftly  fub- 
■verfive  of  the  Arminiati  Notion  of  Liberty,  confifting  in  Free- 
dom from  all  Neceffity.  And  if  the  latter  be  chofen,  and  it 
be  faid,  that  Liberty  is  inconfiftent  with  any  fuch  neceflTary 
Connexion  of  Volition  with  foregoing  Views  of  the  Under- 
ftanding, it  confifting  in  Freedom  from  any  fuch  Neceffity, 
of  the  Will  as  that  would  imply  ;  then  the  Liberty  of 
the  Soul  confifts  (in  Part  at  leaft)  in  the  Freedom  from 
Reftraint,  Limitation  and  Government,  in  its  adings,-  by  the 
Underftanding,  and  in  Liijerty  and  Liablenefs  to  aft  contrary 
to  the  Underftanding's  Views  and  Didates :  and  confe- 
quently  the  more  the  Soul  has  of  this  Difengagednefs,  in 
its  afting,  the  more  Liberty.  Now  let  it  be  confidefed 
what  this  brings  the  noble  Principle  of  human  Liberty  to> 
particularly  when  it  is  poffcfiTed  and  enjoyed  in  its  Pcrfedion, 


Std.  Xllt.    Arminiah  Liberty  inconfifient.         134 

^j'lz..  a  full  ?.nd  perfeft  Freedom  and  Liablenefs  to  aft 
altogether  at  Random,  without  the  leaft  Connexion  with, 
or  Reftraint  or  Government  by,  any  Diftate  of  Reafon, 
or  any  Thing  whatfoever  apprehended,  confidered  or  viewed 
by  the  Underftanding ;  as  being  inconfiftent  with  the  full 
and  perfed  Sovereignty  of  the  Will  over  its  own  Determina- 
tions.  The  ^Motion  Mankind  have  conceived  of  Liberty,  is 

fome  Dignity  or  Privilege,  fomething  worth  claiming.  But 
what  Dignity  or  Priviledge  is  there,  in  being  given  up  to  fuch 
a  wild  Contingence  as  this,  to  be  perfef^Iy  and  conftantly  liable 
to  aft  unintelligently  and  nnreafonabiy,  and  as  much  without 
the  Guidance  ot  Underftanding,  as  if  we  had  none,  or  were  as 
dellitute  of  Perception  as  the  Smoke  that  is  driven  by  the 
Wind ! 


(^^^^^)^^^^)^)^'^)^)^M^}^^)^)^)^)^) 


{)6()6()eC)@()6C)8()8()§()9C)@C)§(  )§C)^)^)^)2()909C)9C)8C)90§C) 


PART 


(     135     ) 

PART       III. 

Wherem  is  inquired^  whether  any  fuch 
Liberty  of  Will ^  as  Arminians  yi^/^/, 
be  necejjary  to  Moral  Aqency, 
Virtue  ^;^^  Vice,  Praise,  and 
Dispraise,  ^c. 

•&ao{3caooo30ooooooao«oooc<oooeaoeeoooegooo<»*aoao9Sefia9Seaooe990eo99eqDl>oo90e33()B099<»!|h 

Section     I. 

G  O  D's  moral  Excellency  necefjaryy  yet  virtuous 
and  Praife-'worthy. 

F*^^"^  AVING  confidcred  xht  Jirji  Thing  that  was  pro- 
^  R  ^  pofed  to  be  inquired  into,  relating  to  that  Fieedom 
uV  ^j  of  Will  which  ^^/-OT/W^/zr  maintain ;  namely,  Whe- 
k  ^*2"  9^  ^^^^  ^"^  ^^'^^^  Thing  does,  ever  did,  or  ever  can 
exift,  or  be  conceived  of;  I  come  now  to  iMcfecoud 
Thing  propofed  to  be  the  Subjeft  of  Inquiry,  'viz.  Vv'^hether 
any  fuch  Kind  of  Liberty  be  requifite  to  moral  Agency,  Virtue 
and  Vice,  Praife  and  Blame,  Reward  and  Puni^-*ment,  ^c. 

I  fliall  begin  with  fome  Confideration  of  the  Vir  tue  and 
Agency  of  the  Supreme  moral  Agent,  and  Fountain,  of  all 
Agency  and  Virtue. 

Dr,  Whiiby,  in  his  Difcourfe  on  the  five  Poii^'s,  P.  14.  fays, 

"'  If  all  human  Aftions  are  neceffary.  Virtue  and  Vice  muft 

«  be  empty  Names  j    we  being  capable  of  Nothing   that  is 

T  2  J^  blames 


136     God'jjmordl'ExctWtncY  necejfary,     Part  III. 

**  blanie-wortiiy,  or  deferyeth  Praife ;  For  who  c?n.  blan;? 
*'  a  Perfon  far  doing  only  what  he  could  not  help,  or  judge 
**  that  he  deferveth  Praife  only  for  what  he  could  not  avoid  ?" 
To  the  like  Purpofe  he  fpeaks  in  Places  innumerable ;  efpe- 
cially  in  his  Difcourf?  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will ;  conftantly 
maintaining,  uiat  a  i^r^'fi/jOT  not  only  from  Coadion,  hut  NeceJJity, 
is  abfolutely  requifite,  in  order  tp  Aftions  beijig  either  wor- 
thy of  Blame,  or  deferving  of  Praife.  And  to  this  agrees,  as 
is  well  known,  the  current  Dodlrine  of  Armiman  Writers ; 
'^ji'ho  in  generial  hold,  that  there  is  no  Virtue  or  Vice^  Reward 
or  Punifhmenit,  nothing  to  be  commended  or  blamed,  with- 
out tliis  Freedom.  And  yet  Dr.  V/hitby,  P.  300,  allows,  that 
God  is  without  this  Freedom ;  And  Arminians,  fo  far  as  I 
liave  had  Opportunity  to  obferve,  generally  acknowledge, 
that  God  is  Ineceffarily  holy,  and  his  Will  neceffarily  deter- 
mined to  that  which  is  Good. 

So  that,  plutting  thefe  Things  together,  the  infinitely  holy 
God,  who  always  ufed  to  be  elleemed  by  God's  People,  not 
only  virtuous,  but  a  Being  in  whom  is  all  poffible  Virtue, 
and  every  Virtue  in  the  moft  abfolute  Purity  and  Perfedion, 
and  in  infinitely  gieater  Brightnefs  and  Amiablenefs  than  in 
any  Creature ;  the  ^oft  perfect  Pattern  of  Virtue,  and  the 
Fountain  from  whom  all  others  Virtue  is  but  as  Beams  from 
the  Sun;  and  who  has  been  fuppofed  to  be,  on  the  Ac- 
count of  his  Virtue  and  Holinefs,  infinitely  more  worthy 
to  be  efteemed,  loved,  honoured,  admired,  commended, 
extoird  and  prajfed,  than  any  Creature ;  and  He  who  is 
thus  every  where  repreiented  in  Scripture ;  I  fay,  this  Being, 
according  to  this  Notion  of  Dr.  Whitby,  and  other  Arminians, 
has  no  virtue  at  all ;  Virtue,  when  afcribed  to  Him,  is  but 
an  empty  Name  ;  and  he  is  deferving  of  no  Commendation  or 
Praife ;  becaufe  he  is  under  Neceflity,  He  can't  avoid  being 
holy  aad  good  as  he  is ;  therefore  no  Thanks  to  him  for  it. 
It  feems,  the  Holinefs,  Juftice,  Faithfulnefs,  &c.  of  the  moft 
High,  muft  not  be  accounted  to  be  of  the  Nature  of  that 
which  is  virtuous  and  Praife-worthy.  They  will  not  deny, 
that  thefe  Things  in  God  are  good  ;  But  then  we  muft  un- 
derftand  them,  that  they  are  no  more  virtuous,  or  of  the 
Nature  of  anyT^hing  commendable,  than  the  Good  that  is 
in  any  other  Being  that  is  not  a  moral  Agent ;  as  the  Bright- 
nefs of  the  Sun,  and  the  Fertility  of  the  Earth  are  good,  but 
not  virtuous,  bccauie  thefe  Properties  are  neceffary  to  thef^ 
Bodies,  and  not  the  Fx^it  of  Self-determining  Power, 
•    ■  '  Ther^ 


Sect.  I.    yet  Virtuous  and  Praife-worthy.  137 

There  needs  no  other  Confutation  of  this  Notion  of  God's 
not  being  virtuous  or  Praife-worthy,  to  Chrittians  acquainted 
with  the  Bible,  but  only  ftating  and  particularly  reprefentino- 
of  it.  To  bring  Texts  of  Scripture,  wherein  God  is  repre-. 
fented  as  in  every  R?fpect,  in  the  higheft  Manner  virtuous, 
and  fupremely  Praile-worchy,  would  be  endlefs,  and  is  altoge- 
ther needlefs  to  fuch  as  have  been  brought  up  under  the  Light 
of  the  Gofpelj, 

It  were  to  be  wifhed,  that  Dr.  Whitby,  ai)d  other  Divines 
of  the  fame  Sort,  had  explain'd  themfelves,  when  they  have 
aflerted  that  That  which  is  necefi'ary,  is  not  defernjing  of 
V'raije ;  at  the  fame  Time  that  they  have  own'd  God's  Per- 
feftion  to  be  necelTary,  and  lb  in  Effeft  reprefented  God  as 
i)Ot  deferving  Praife.  Certainly,  if  their  Words  have  any 
Meaning  at  all,  by  Praife,  they  muft  mean  the  Exercife  or 
Tedirnony  of  fome  Sort  of  Efteem,  Refpeft,  or  honourable 
Regard.  And  will  they  then  fay,  that  Men  are  worthy  of 
that  Efteem,  Refpeft,  and  Honour  for  their  Virtue,  fmall 
and  imperfeft  as  it  is,  which  yet  God  is  not  worthy  of,  for  his 
infinite  Righteoufnefs,  Holinefs,  and  Goodnefs  ?  If  fo,  it 
muft  be  b'ecaufe  of  fome  Sort  of  peculiar  Excellency  in  the 
virtuous  Man,  which  is  his  Prerogative,  wherein  he  really 
has  the  Preference  ;  fome  Dignity,  that  is  entirely  dillin- 
guifli'd  from  any  Excellency,  Araiablenefs  or  Honourablenefs 
in  God  ;  not  in  Imperfedion  and  Dependance,  but  in 
Pre-eminence ;  which  therefore  he  don't  receive  from  God, 
nor  is  God  the  Fountain  or  Pattern  of  it ;  nor  can  God,  in 
that  Refpeft,  ftand  in  Competition  with  him,  as  the  Objeft  of 
Honour  and  Regard  ;  but  Man  may  claim  a  peculiar  Eileem, 
Commendation  and  Glory,  that  God  can  have  no  Pretenllon 
to.  Yea,  God  has  no  Rights  by  virture  of  his  neceffary  Ho- 
linefs, to  intermeddle  with  that  grateful  Refped  and  Praife» 
due  to  the  virtuous  Man,  who  chufes  Virtue,  in  the  Exercife 
of  a  Freedom  ad  utrumque  ;  any  more  than  a  precious  Stone. 
which  can't  avoid  being  hard  and  beautiful. 

And  if  it  be  fo,  let  it  be  explained  what  that  peculiar 
Refpeft  is,  that  is  due  to  the  virtuous  Man,  which  dilFers 
in  Nature  and  Kind,  in  fome  Way  of  Pre-eminence,  from 
all  that  is  due  to  God.  What  is  the  Nature  or  Defcription 
of  that  peculiar  AfFeftion  ?  Is  it  Efteem,  Love,  Admiration, 
Honour,  Praife,  or  Gratitude  ?  The  Scripture  every  where 
reprefents  God  as  the  higheft  Objeft  of  all  thefe  :  there  we 
jrcad  of  the  SqkI's  magnifying  the  Lird,  of  laving  Him  with  all  the 

Heart, 


13  §  CoHcemug  G  O  D's  Virtue.       Part  III, 

Heart,  njuith  all  the  Soul,  nuith  all  the  Mittd,  ajtd  njoith  all  the 
Strength;  admiring  him,  and  his  righteous  AHs,  or  greatly  re- 
garding thsm,  as  mar-vellous  and  ivonderful ;  honouring,  glorify-,, 
ing,  exalting,  extolling,  hlejjing,  thanking,  and  praijlng  Him  j 
giving  unto  Him  all  the  Glory  of  the  Good  which  is  done  or  re- 
ceived, rather  than  unto  Men;  that  no  Flejh  Jhould glory  in  his 
PreJ'ence  ;  but  that  He  {hould  be  regarded  as  the  Being  to  whom 
all  Glory  is  due.  What  then  is  that  Refpeft  ?  What  Paflion, 
AfFeftion,  or  Exereife  is  it,  that  Arminians  call  Praife,  diverfe 
from  all  thefe  Things,  which  Men  are  worthy  of  for  their  Vir- 
tue, and  which  God  is  not  worthy  of,  in  any  Degree  ? 

If  that  Neceffity  which  attends  God's  moral  Perfedlions 
and  Aftions,  be  as  inconfiftent  with  a  Being  worthy  of 
Praife,  as  a  Neceffity  of  Coaftion  ;  as  is  plainly  implied  \i\ 
or  inferred  from  Dr.  Whitby's  Difcourfe  ;  then  why  fhoul4 
we  thank  God  for  his  Goodnefs,  any  more  than  if  He  were 
forced  to  be  good,  or  any  more  than  we  fhould  thsnk  one 
of  our  Fellow-Creatures  who  did  us  Good,  not  freely,  and 
of  good  Will,  or  from  any  Kindnefs  of  Heart,  but  from  mere 
Compulsion,  or  extrinfical  Neceffity  ?  Arminians  fuppofe, 
that  God  is  neceffarily  a  good  and  gracious  Being  :  for  this 
they  make  the  Ground  of  fome  of  their  main  Argument^ 
againft  many  Dodrines  maintain'd  by  Cal-vinijis  :  They  fay, 
thefe  are  certainly  falfe,  and  it  is  impojihle  they  Ihould  be  true^ 
becaufe  they  are  not  confident  with  the  Goodnefs  of  God, 
This  fuppofes,  that  it  is  impojjihle  but  that  God  fhould  be 
good  :  for  if  it  be  poffible  that  He  fhould  be  otherwife,  then 
-that  ImpofTibility  of  the  Truth  of  thefe  Dpftrines  ceafes,  accordr» 
ing  to  their  own  Argument. 

That  Virtue  in  God  is  not,  in  the  mofl  proper  Senfe, 
reivardable,  is  not  for  Want  of  Merit  in  his  moral  Perfec- 
tions and  Atlions,  fufficient  to  deferve  Rewards  from  hia 
Creatures ;  but  becaufe  He  is  infinitely  above  all  Capacity 
of  receiving  any  Reward  or  Benefit  from  the  Creature  :  He 
is  already  infinitely  and  unchangeably  happy,  and  we  can't 
be  profitable  unto  Him.  But  flill  he  is.  worthy  of  our  fupreme 
Benevolence  for  his  Virtue  5  and  would  be  worthy  of  our 
Beneficence,  which  is  the  Fruit  and  Expreffion  of  Benevo- 
lence, if  our  Goodnefs  could  extend  to  Him.  If  God  de- 
lerves  to  be  thanked  and  praifed  for  his  Goodnefs,  He  would 
for  the  fame  Reafon,  deferve  that  we  fhould  alfo  requite  his 
Kindnefs,  if  that  were  poffible.  What  /hall  I  retider  to  the 
Lord  for  all  his  Benefits  ?   is  the  natural  Language  of  Thank- 

fulnefs  i 


Sect.  II.         Chrift's  Obedience /zd'c.^ry.         13^ 

fulnefs :  and  {o  far  as  in  us  lies,  it  is  our  Duty  to  recompenfe 
God's  Goodnefs,  and  render  again  according  to  Benefits  receinjcd* 
And  that  we  might  have  Opportunity  for  fo  natural  an  Ex- 
preflion  of  our  Gratitude  to  God,  as  Beneficence,  notwith- 
ftanding  his  being  infinitely  above  our  Reach ;  He  has  ap- 
pointed others  to  be  his  Receivers,  and  to  Hand  in  his  Stead, 
as  the  Objects  of  our  Beneficence;  fuch  are  efpecially  our 
indigent  Brethren. 

S    E    C    T    I    O    N    II. 

'The  A^s  of  the  Will  of  the  human  Soul  o/"  J  e  s  u  s 
Christ  ncCelTarily  holy,  yet  truly  virtuouSf 
praife-worthyy    rewardable,  &c. 


I  Have  already  confidered  how  Dr.  Whitby  infifts  upon  it, 
that  a  Freedom,  not  only  from  Coaction,  but  Necefiity, 
is  requifite  to  either  Virtue  or  Vice,  Praife  or  Difpraife,  Re'vjari 
or  Fufiijhmentt  He  alfo  infifts  on  the  fams  Freedom  as  abfo- 
lutely  requifite  to  a  Perfon's  being  the  Subject  of  a  Lanjo,  of 
Precepts  OT  Prohibitiojis  ;  in  the  Book  before  mentioned  ;  P.  301, 
314,  328,  339,  340,  341,  342,  347,  361,  373,  410.  And  of 
Promifes  zndiThreatnings ;  P.  298,  301,305,  311,  339,  340, 
363.  And  as  requifite  to  a  State  of  Trial ;  P,  297,  &c. 

Now  therefore,  with  an  Eye  to  thefe  Things,  I  would  in- 
quire into  the  moral  Conduct  and  Practice  of  our  Lord  Jefun 
Chrift,  which  he  exhibited  in  his  human  Nature  here,  in 
his  State  of  Humiliation.  And  Firjl,  I  would  ftiew,  that  his 
holy  Behaviour  was  ?iecejfary ;  or  that  it  was  impnjjible  it 
Ihould  be  othcrwife,  than  that  He  fhould  behave  himfelf 
holily,  and  that  he  Ihould  be  perfectly  holy  in  each  indivi- 
dual Act  of  his  Life.  And  Secondly,  that  his  holy  Behaviour 
was  properly  of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  and  was  'vjorthy  of 
Praife ;  and  that  He  was  the  Subject  of  Zaw,  Precepts  or 
Commands,  Fromifei  and  Rewards  i  and  that  he  was  in  a  State 
of  TriaU 

I,  It 


I40      The  Aas  of  the  Will  of  Chrifl,      Part  IIL- 

J.  It  was  impojftble,  that  the  Afts  of  the  Will  of  the  human 
Soul  of  Chrift  Ihould,  in  any  Inftance,  Degree  or  Circum- 
ftance,  be  othervvife  than  holy,  and  agreeable  to  God's  Na- 
ture and  Will.     The  following  Things  make  this  evident. 

I .  God  had  promifed  fo  efFedually  to  preferve  and  uphold 
Him  by  his  Spirit,  under  all  his  Temptations,  that  he  rfiould 
not   fail   of  reaching  the  End   for   which  He   came   into   the 

World  ; which  he  would  have  fail'd  of,  had  he  fallen  into 

Sin.  We  have  fuch  a  Promife,  Ifai.  xlii.  1,2,3,4.  Behold  my 
Servant,  njohom  I  uphold  ;  mine  Elc£i,  in  ivhom  my  Soul  ielighteth  : 
I  ha^jeput  my  Spirit  upon  Him  :  Hejhall  bring  forth  Judgmtit  to  the 
Gentiles  :  Hejhall  jiot  crj ,  nor  lift  up,  nor  cauje  his  Voice  to  be  heard 
iti  the  Street. — Hejhall  bring  forth  Judgment  iinto  Truth.  Hejhall 
not  fail,  nor  he  di/couraged,  till  he  ha'vefet  Judgment  in  the  Earth  ; 
and  the  IJles  Jhall  njuait  for  his  Lam:.  This  Promife  of  Chrift 's 
having  God's  Spirit  put  upon  Him,  and  his  not  crying  and 
lifting  up  his  Voice,  &c.  relates  to  the  Time  of  Chrift's  Ap- 
pearance on  Earth ;  as  is  manifeft  from  the  Nature  of  the 
Promife,  and  alfo  the  Application  of  it  in  the  New  Tefta- 
ment,  Matth.  xii.  18.  And  the  Words  imply  a  Promife  of 
his  being  fo  upheld  by  God's  Spirit,  that  he  (hould  be  pre- 
ferved  from  Sin ;  particularly  from  Pride  and  Vain-glory, 
and  from  being  overcome  by  any  of  the  Temptations  he 
Ihould  be  under  to  affeft  the  Glory  of  this  World  ;  the  Pomp 
of  an  earthly  Prince,  or  the  Applaufe  and  Praife  of  Men  :  and 
that  he  fhould  be  fo  upheld,  that  he  fhould  by  no  Means 
fail  of  obtaining  the  End  of  his  coming  into  the  World,  of 
bringing    forth  Judgment   unto  Vidory,  and   eftablifhing   his 

Kingdom   of  Grace   in  the  Earth.— And  in  the  following 

Verfes,  this  Promife  is  confirmed,  with  the  greateft  imagina- 
ble Solemnity.  Thus  Jaith  the  LORD,  HE  that  created  the 
Hea'vens,  and Jiretched  them  oiU  ;  He  that  fpread  forth  the  Earth, 
and  that  <vohich  cometh  out  of  it ;  He  that  ginjeth  Breath  unto  the 
People  upon  it,  and  Spirit  to  them  that  'walk  therein  :  I  the  Lord 
have  called  Thee  in  Righteoujnejs ,  and 'will  hold  thine  Hand  ;  and. 
<will  keep  Thee,  and  gi'ue  Thee  for  a  Co'venant  of  the  People,  for 
a  Light  of  the  Gentiles,  to  open  the  blind  Eyes,  to  bring  out  the 
Prijoners  from  the  Prifon,  and  them  that  ft  in  Darknefs  out  of  the 
Prifofi-Houje.     I  am  JEHOVAH,  that  is  my  Name]  Sec. 

Very  parallel  with  thefe  Promlfes  is  that,  I/ai.  xllx.  7,8,9. 
which  alfo  has  an  apparent  Refpeft  to  the  Time  of  Chrift's 
Humiliation  on  Earth.  Thus  Jaith  the  Lord,  the  Redeemer  of 
Ifrael,  and  his  holy  One,  to  him  nvhom  Man  dejpifeth,  to  Him 

(whum 


S&61.  IL  neceilarily  holy.  141 

ivhom  the  }^athn  abhorrcth,  to  a  Ser^jant  of  Rulers  ;  Kings  Jhall 
fee  andarijcy  Princes  aljo.jhall  <u)orJhip ;  becanj):  of  the  Lord  that  is 
faithful-y  and  the  holj  One  of  Krad,  and  He  jhall  chtfe  '■fhee. 
"■Thus  faith  the  Lord,  In  an  acceptable  '■fime  have  I  heard  Thee  ; 
in  a  Day  of  Salvation  ha've  I  helped  Thee  ;  and  I  luilTprefernje 
Thee,  and  gi've  Thee  for  a  CTuenant  of  the  People,  to  ejiablijb 
the  Earth,    ice. 

And   in   Jfci.  1.  5;- g.  we   have  the  Meffiah  exprefllng 

his  Affuran^e,  that  God  would  help  Him,  by  fo  opening 
his  Ear,  or  inclining  his  Heart  to  God's  Commandments^, 
that  He  fhoald  not  be  rebellious,  bat  Ihould  perfeverc, 
and  not  apoftarife,  or  turn  his  Back :  that  through  God's 
Help,  He  fhoald  be  immovable,  in  a  Way  of  Obedience, 
under  the  great  Trials  ot"  Reproach  and  Suffering  he  ftiould 
meet  with  j  feiting  his  Face  like  a  Flint :  So  that  He  knew 
He  Ihoald  not  be  afhamed,  or  fruftrated  in  his  Defign  j 
and  finally  fhould  be  approved  and  juftified,  as  having  done 
his  Work  fc.ithfully.  The  Lord  hath  opened  mine  Ear  ;  fo  thai 
I  'was  not  rebellious,  neither  turned  a'-jsay  my  Back  :  1  gwve  my 
Back  to  the  SmiUrs,  and  my  Cheeks  'to  them  that  plucked  off  the 
Hair;  I  hid  not  my  Face  from  Jhame  and  Spitting.  For  the. 
Lord  God  njoiUhelp  me  ;  therefore  Jkall I  not  be  confounded:  there- 
.fore  ha've  I  fet  my  Face  as  a  Flint,  and  I  knoiu  that  I  Jhall 
not  he  ajhamed.  He  is  near  that  jufifieth  me  :  ■i.-jho  ivill  contend 
nvith  me  t  Let  us  fan  d  together ,  Who  is  v'.im  Aduerfary  ?  Let 
him  come  near  to  me.  Behold  the  Lord  God.ijuill  help  7ne  :  ivho  is 
He  that  Jhall  condemn  me  ?  Lo,  they  Jhall  all  ivax  old  as  a  Gar-'^ 
ment,  the  Moth  fj all  eat  them  up. 

2.  The  fame  Thing  is  evident  from  all  the  Promifes 
"which  God  made  to  the  Meffiah,  of  his  future  Glory, 
Kingdom  and  Succefs,  in  his  Ofiice  and  Charafter  of  a 
Mediator :  which  Glory  could  not  have  been  obtained,  if 
his  Holinefs  had  fail'd,  and  he  had  been  guilty  of  Sin. 
God's  abfoUue  Promife  of  any  Things  makes  the  Things 
promifed  7iecejfary,  and  their  failing  to  take  Place  abfolutely 
imp'JJihle :  and  in  like  Manner  it  makes  thofe  Things  ne- 
ceflary,  on  which  the  Thing  promifed  depends,  and  without 
which  it  can't  take  EfFed.  "Therefore  it  appears,  that  it 
was  utterly  impdffible  that  Chrift's  Holinefs,  Ihould  fail, 
from  fuch  abfolute  Promifes  as  thofe,  Pfal.  ex.  4.  The  Lord 
hathj'zvorn,  andxvill  not  repent.  Thou  art  a  Prieffere'ver,  after  the 
Order  of  Melchizedek.  And  from  e\ery  other  Promife  in 
that  Pfalm,  contained  in  each  Verfe  of  it.   And  iY«/.  ii,  6,  7. 

U  I 


142<        The  A5fs  of  the  Wili  of  Chrill:,     Part:  III. 

I  nulll  declare  the  Decree  :  The  Lord  hath  /aid  unto  ?ne,  Thoit 
art  my  Sok,  this  Day  ha've  I  begotten  Thee :  Ajk  of  Me,  and  I 
c-Mill  give  Thee  the  Heathen  for  thine  Inheritance,  &c.  Pfal.  xlv. 
3,  4,  &c.  Gird  thy  Sivordon  thy  Thigh,  O  Jiiofl  Mighty,  ivith  thy 
Glory  and  thy  Majefty ;  and  in  thy  Majejiy  ride  prof perotijly.  And 
fo  every  Thing  that  is  faid  from  thence  to  the  End  of  the  Pfalm. 
Arid  thofe  Protnifes,  7/«/.  lii.  13,  14,  15.  &  liii.  10,  11,12. 
And  all  thufe  Promifes  which  God  makes  to  the  MciTiah,  of 
Succefs,  Dominion  and  Glory  in  the  Character  of  Redeemer, 
in'  Ifai.  Chap,  xlix. 

3.  It  was  often  promifed  to  the  Church  of  God  of  old, 
for  their  Comfort,  that  God  would  give  them  a  righteous, 
fnilefs  Saviour.  Jer.  xxiii.  5,  6.  Behold^  the  Days  come,  faith  the 
Lord,  that  I  qjjill  raifs  up  unto  David  a  righteous  Branch;  and  a 
Kingfjall  reign  and  prof  per  ^  ajidfhall  execute  fndgmsnt  and  fujiice 
in  the  Earth.  In  his  Days  Jhall  ]Mdi-i]\  be  fanjed,  and  \{r&t\f jail 
d-voell  fafely.  And  this  is  the  Name  '■uuhereby  Hejhall  be  called.  The 
Lord  our  Righteoufnefs,  So,  Jer.  xxxiii.  i  5. — I  ivill  caufe  the  Branch 
of  Righteotifnefs  to  gronv  up  unto  David ;  and  He fh all-execute  Judg- 
ment and  Righteoufnefs  in  the  Land,  Ifai.  ix.  6.  "j.  For  unto  us 
a  Child  is  born; -Upofz  the  Throne  o/' David  and  of  his  King- 
dom, to  order  it,  and  to^  efablijh  it  <iuith  Judgment  and  Jiijiice, 
from  henceforth ,  e'ven  for  ever:  The  Zeal  of  the  Lord  of  Hojis  nvill 
do  this.  Chap.  xi.  at  the  Beginning.  There  fhall  come  forth  a 
Rod  out  of  the  Stem  of  Jeffe,  and  a  Branch  Jhall grc^v  out  of  his 
Roots  ;  and  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  fhall  refi  upon  Him, The  Spi- 
rit of  Knoauledge,  and  of  the  Fear  of  the  Lord: With  Righ- 
teoufnefs fhall  He  judge  the  Poor,  d::d  rspro've  qjjith  Equity : 

Righteojfnefs  Jhall  be  the  Girdle  of  his  Loins,  and  Faithfulnefs 
the  Girdle- of  His  Rei?is.  Chap.  lii.  13.  My  Servant  fhall  deal 
prudently.  Chap.  liii.  9.  Becaufe  He  had  done  no  Violence,  neither 
nvas  Guile  found  in  His  Mouth.  If  it  be  impoffible,  that  thefe 
Promifes  fllould  fa''!,  and  it  be  eafier  for  Heaven  and  Earth  to 
pafs  away,  than  for  one  Jot  or  Tittle  of  thefe  Promifes  of 
Cod  ta  pafs  away,  then  it  was  impoffible  that  Chrift  fhould 
commit  any  Sin.  Chritl  himfelf  figniiied,  that  it  was  im- 
poffible but  that  the  Tilings  which  were  fpoken  concerning 
Him  Ihould  be  fulftlled.  Luke  xxiv.  44. — That  all  Things  muji 
he  fulfilled,  nvhich  tvere  ^written  in  the  La'w  of  Mofes,  and  in 
the  Prophets,  and  in  the  Pfalms  concerning  Me.  Mat.  xxvi.  55. 
^4.  But  hovo  thenfpall  the  Scripture  be  fulfilled,  that  thus  it  muf{ 
%e?  Mark  xiv.  49.  But  the  Scriptures  muft  be  fulfilled.  And  fo' 
the  Apoftle,  Ads  ii  1 6,  17.— — This  Scripture  rmji  needs  have 
keen  fulfidkdv 

4.  AH. 


.^ect.  n.  necefiarily  Mv.  ,14'! 

4.  All  the  Promlfes  which  were  made  to  the  Church  of  old, 
of  the  Meffiah  as  a  future  Saviour,  from  that  made  to  our  firit 
Parents  in  Paradife,  to  that  which  was  delivered  by  the  Prophet 
Malachi,  fliew  it  to  be  impoffible  that  Chrift  fliould  not  have 
perfevered  in  perfeft  Holinefs.  The  antient  Prediftions  given 
to  God's  Church,  of  rhe  Meffiah  as  a  Saviour,  were  of  the  Na- 
ture of  Promifes ;  as  evident  by  the  Prediftions  thenifelves,  aud 
the  Manner  of  delivering  them.  But  they  are  expreily,  and 
very  often  called  Promifes  in  the  New-Teftament  ;  as  in  Luke 
1.  54,  55,  72,  73.  Ads  Alii.  32,  33.  Ro?n.  I.  I,  2,  3.  and 
Chap.  XV.  8.  Heb.  vi.  13,  &c.  Thefe  Promifes  were  often 
made  with  great  Solemnity,  and  confirmed  with  an  Oath ;  as 
in  Gen.  xxii.  16,  17.  By  mjfelfha--ve  I  /•-M'jrn,  faith  the  Lord, 
that  in  Meffmg,  1  nvill  blefs  ihee,  and  in  multiplying,,  I  ^vcill  mul- 
tiply thy  Seed,  as  the  Stars  of  He^^ven ,  and  as  the  Sand  <vohich  is 

ripon  the  Sea-Shore  : And  in  thy  Seed  fhall  all  the  Nations  of 

the  Earth  he  bleffed.  Compare  Luke  i.  72,  73.  aixl  Gal.  iii. 
8,  15,  16.  The  Apoftle  in //f^.  vI.  17.  18.  fpeaking  of  this 
Promife  to  Abraham,  fays.  Wherein  God  luilling  ?nore  abundant- 
ly to  /heiv  to  the  Heirs  of  Promife  the  I tnmnt ability  of  his  Counfel^ 
confirmed  it  by  an  Oath  ;  that  by  tn)JO  IMMUfABLE  Things,  in 
ivhich   it   nvas    IMPOSSIBLE  for  God  to  lie,   he   might  hwve 

firong  Conflation. In  which  Words,  the  Neccffity  of  the  Ac- 

complifliment,  or  (which  is  the  fame  Thing)  the  Impsfihility 
of  the  contrary,  is  fully  declared.  So  God  confirmed  the  Pror- 
mife  of  the  great  Salvation  of  the  Meffiah,  made  to  Dnnjid,  hj 
ail  Oath;  Pfal.  Ixxxix.  3,  4.  ■/  ha-ue  made  a  Co'venant  njoith 
Ttiy  Chofen,  I  hanje  fnvorn  unto  David  my  Servant ;  ,  fhv  Seed 
•will  I  efiablifb  for  enicr,  and  build  up  thy  Throne  to  all  Generations^ 
There  is  Nothing  that  is  io  abundantly  fet  forth  in  Scripture, 
as  fure  and  irrefragable,  as  this  Promife'and  Oath  to  Da-Sid. 
See  Pfal.  Ixxxix.  34,  35,  ^6.  2.  Sam.  xxiii.  c.  Ifai.  Iv.  3'. 
ABs  ii.  29,  30.  and  xiii.  34.  The  Scripture  exprefly  fpeaks 
of  it  as  utterly  impojfible  that  thiJ  Promife  and  Oa^h  to  Da-nid^ 
concerning  the  everlafting  Dominion  of  the  Meffiah  of  his  Seed, 
Ihould  fail.  Jer.  xxxiii.  15,  &c.  In  thofe  Days^  and  at  that 
Time,  I  nx)ill  caufe  the  Branch  of  Righteoifnefs  to  groiv  up. unto 
David. — ■ — For  thus  faith  the  Lord,  'Dai\'idifha]l  nenjer  ivant  a 
Man  to  ft  upou  the  Throne  of  the  Hoife  of  Ifrael,— — ver,  20. 
2  J.  If  you  can  break  my  Co'uenant  of  the  Day,  and  my  Covenant 
of  the  Night,  atidthat  there  fionld  7iot  be  Day  and  Night  in  their 
Seafon ;  then  may  alfo  my  Covenant  be  broken  'with  David  my 
Servant,  that  He  fhould  not  have  a  Son  to  reign  upon  his  Throne. 
So  in  ver.  25,  26. — Thus  abundant  is  the  Scripture  in  rcprefent- 
\xi^  how  impoffible  it  was,  that  the  Promifes  made  of  Old  con- 

U  ^  cerning 


< 


.  1 44         ^^^  ^^^  ^f  i^^  Will  of  Chrift,     Part  III. 

cerning  the  great  Salvation  and  Kingdom  cf  the  Meffiah, 
fhould  fail  :  Which  implies,  that  it  was  impoiTible  that 
this  Meifiah,  the  fecond  Adam,  the  promifed  Seed  of  j- 
'  braham,  and  of  David,  (hould  fall  from  his  Integrity,  as, 
the   firft  Adam   did. 

^.  All  the  Promifes  that  were  made  to  the  Church  of  God 
under  the  Old  Teftament,  of  the  great  Enlargement  of  the 
Church,  and  Advancement  of  her  Glory,  in  the  Days  of 
the  Gofpel,  after  the  Coming  of  the  Meifiah  ;  the  Increafe. 
of  her  Light,  Liberty,  Holinefs,  Joy,  Triumph  over  her 
Enemies,  <5c.  of  which  fo  great  a  Part  of  the  Old  Tefta- 
■TTient  confifts ;  whigh  are  repeated  fo  often,  are  fo  varioufly 
•exhibited,  fo  frequently  introduced  with  great  Pomp  and  So- 
lemnity, and  are  fo  abundantly  fealed  with  typical  and  fym- 
bolical  Reprefentations ;  I  fay,  ajl  thefe  Fromifes  implj^ 
that  the  Mefiiah  fliould  perfeft  the  Work  of  Redemption ; 
and  this  implies,  that  He  fhould  perfevere  in  the  Work 
which  the  Father  had  appointed  Him,  being  in  all  Things 
conformed  to  his  Will.  Thefe  Promifes  were  often  confirm- 
'cd  by  an  Oath.  (See  7/c/.  liv.  9.  with  the  Context;  Chap. 
Ixii.  I'-'.)  And  it  is  reprefented  as  utterly  impoffible  that 
thefe  Promifes  {hould  fail.  [IJcii'  xlix.  15.  with  the  Con- 
text, Chap.  liv.  10.  with  the  Context ;  Chap.  li.  4, — 8.  Chap. 
■jcl.  8.  with  the  Context.)  And  therefore  it  was  impojjible^  th^t 
the  Meffiah  fhould  fail,  or  commit  Sin. 

6.  It  was  impojjihh,  that  the  Meffiah  fhould  fail  of  perfe-. 
vering  in  Integrity  and  Holinefs,  as  the  firft  Adam  did, 
becaufe  this  would  have  been  inconfiftent  with  the  Pro- 
jTiifes  which  God  made  to  the  blefled  Virgin,  his  Mother, 
and  to  her  Hufband  ;  implying,  that  He  Jholud  fa've  his  People 
from  their  Sins,  that  God  nvould  gi've  Him  the  Throne  of  his  Fa' 
'ther  David,  that  He  jhould  reign  o'ver  the  Hou/e  cf  Jacob/i/r- 
fjer;  and  that  0/" /6/V  Kingdom  there  fionld  be  no  End.  Thefe 
Promifes  were  fure,  and  it  was  impnjjihle  they  (hould  fail. 
And  therefore  the  Virgin  Mary,  in  trufting  fully  to  tliera, 
afted  reafonably,  having  an  immovable  Foundation  of  her- 
Faith  ;  as  Elizabeth  obferves,  ver.  45.  And  blejfed  is  Jhe  that 
helieveth  ;  for  there  Jhall  be  a  TerformanCe  of  thofe  things  ijjhich 
'twere  told  her  frdm  the  Lord. 

7.  That  it  fliould  have  been  poffible  that  Chrifl:  fiiould 
fin,  and  fo  fail  in  the  Work  of  our  Redemption,  does  not 
confift  with  the  eternal  Pjirpcfe  and  Decree  of  God,  reveal'd; 

.-:.v.s-i-  "  -  in. 


Secfl.  IL  neceiTarily  holy.  I45 

an  the  Scriptures,  that  He  would  provide  Salvation  for  fallwi 
Man  in  and  by  Jefus  Chrift,  and  that  Salvation  fhould  be 
offered  to  Sinners  through  the  Preaching  of  the  Gofpel. 
Such  an  abfolute  Decree  as  this  Arminians  don't  deny. 
Thus  much  at  lead  (out  of  all  Controverfy)  is  implied  in  fuch 
ScriptureSj  as  i  Cor.  ii.  7.  Eph.  i.  4,  c.  and  Ch.  iii.  9,  10  11. 
I  Fet,  i.  19,  20.  Such  an  abfolute  Decree  as  this,  Arminians 
allow  to  be  fignilied  in  tbefe  Texts.  And  the  Arminians 
Election  of  iSiations  and  Societies,  and  general  Eleftion 
of  the  Chriftian  Church,  and  conditional  Elcftion  of  parti- 
cular Perfons,  imply  this.  God  could  not  decree  before  the 
Foundation  of  the  World,  to  fave  all  that  fhould  believe 
in,  and  obey  Chrift,  unlefs  he  had  abfolutely  decreed  that 
Salvation  fhould  be  provided,  and  effeftually  wrought  out 
"oj  Chrift.  And  fince  (as  the  Arminians  themfelves  ftrenu- 
oufly  maintain)  a  Decree  of  God  infers  NeceJJity ;  hence 
it  became  necejfary  that  Chrift  fhould  perfevere,  and  adually 
work  out  Salvation  for  us,  and  that  He  fhould  not  fail  by 
the  Commiflion  of  Sin. 

8.  That  it  fliould  have  been  poffible  for  Chrift 's  Ho- 
linefs  to  fail,  is  not  confiftent  with  what  God  pro- 
mifed  to  his  Son  before  all  Ages.  For,  that  Salvation 
ihould  be  offered  to  Men  thro'  Chrift,  ^nd  beftowed  on 
all  his  faithful  Followers,  is  what  is  at  leaft  implied  in 
that  certain  and  infallible  Promife  fpoken  of  by  the  Apoftle, 
Tit.  i.  2.  In  hope  of  eternal  Life  ;  'which  God,  that  cannot  lie, 
promifed  before  the  World  began.  This  don't  feem  to  be  con- 
troverted by  Arminians.  * 

9,  That  it  fhould  be  poffible  for  Chrift  to  fail  of  doing 
his  father's  Will,  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Promife  made 
to  the  Father  by  the  Son,  by  the  Z,o^c^  that  was  with  the 
Father  from  the  Beginning,  before  he  took  the  human 
Nature:  as  may  be  feen  in /^/.  xl.  6,  7,  8.  (compar'd  with 
the  Apoftle's  Interpretation,  Heb.  x.  5, — 9.)  Sacrifice  and 
Offering  thou  didfi  not  defire  :  mine  Ears  hajl  thou  opened,  (or 
bored;)  Burnt-Offering  and  Sin-Offering  Thoti  haft  not  required. 
Then  f aid  I,  Lo,  I  come  :  In  the  Volume  of  the  Book  it  is  njoritten 
cf  me,  I  delight  to  do  thy  JVill,  O  my  God,  and  thy  Laiv  is  nxji th- 
in my  Heart.  Where  \s>  a  manifeft  Allufion  to  the  Cove- 
pant  which  the  willing  Servant,  who  loved  his  Mafter's  Ser- 
vice, made  with  his  Mafter,  to  be  his  Servant  for  ever,   on 

the 

*  See  Dr.  Whitby  on  the  five  Points,  P.  48,  49,  50. 


146      The  A&s  of  the  Will  of  Chrift,      Part  HI, 

the  Day  wherein  he  had  his  Ear  bored ;  which  Covenant 
v/as  probably  inferred  in  the  publick  K.ecoids,  called  the 
Volume  of  the  Book,  by  the  Judges,  who  were  called  to  take 
Cognizance  of  the  Tranfadion ;  Exod.  xxi.  If  tiie  Logos, 
who  was  with  the  Father,  before  the  World,  and  who  made 
the  World,  thus  engaged  in  Covenant  to  do  the  Will  of  the 
Father  in  the  human  Nature,  and  the  Promife,  was  as  it  were 
recorded,  that  it  might  be  made  fure,  doubtlefs  it  was  im- 
pojjible  that  it  ihould  fail ;  and  fo  it  was  impoJftbU  that  Chrift 
•fhould  fail  of  doing  the  Will  of  the  Father  in  the  human 
Nature. 

I  o.  If  it  was  poffibie  for  Chrift  to  have  failed  of  doing 
the  Will  of  his  Father,  and  fo  to  have  failed  of  efFeftually 
•working  out  Redemption  for  Sinners,  then  the  Salvation  of 
all  the  Saints,  who  were  faved  ftom  the  Beginning  of  the 
World,  to  the  Death  of  Chrift,  was  not  built  on  a  firm 
Foundation.  The  Mefliah,  and  the  Redemption  which  He 
was  to  work  out  by  his  Obedience  unto  Death,  was  the 
Foundation  of  the  Salvation  of  all  the  Ppfterity  of  fallen 
Man,  that  ever  were  faved.  Therefore,  if,  when  the  Old- 
Teftament  Saints  had  the  Pardon  of  their  Sins,  and  the  Fa- 
vour of  God  promifed  them,  and  Salvation  beftowed  upon 
them,  ftill  it  was  poffibie  that  the  Meffiah,  when  he  came, 
might  commit  Sin,  then  all  this  was  on  a  Foundation  that 
was  not  firm  and  ftable,  but  liable  to  fail ;  fomething  which 
it  was  poffibie  might  never  be.  God  did  as  it  were  truft 
to  what  his  Son  had  engaged  and  promifed  to  do  in  future 
Time ;  and  depended  fo  much  upon  it,  that  He  proceeded 
aftually  to  fave  Men  on  the  Account  of  it,  as  tho'  it  had  been 
jilready  done.  But  this  Truft  and  Dependance  of  God,  orj 
the  Suppofition  of  Chrift's  being  liable  to  fail  of  doing  his 
Will,  was  leaning  on  a  Staff"  that  was  weak,  and  might 
poffibly  break.  The  Saints  of  old  trufted  on  the  Promifes 
of  a  future  Redemption  to  be  wrought  out  and  compleated 
by  the  Meffiah,  and  built  their  Comfort  upon  it :  Abraham 
faw  Chrift's  Day  and  rejoyced  ;  and  "he  and  the  other  Pa- 
triarchs died  in  the  Faith  of  the  Promife  of  it.  [Heh.  xi.  13.) 
But  on  this  Suppofition,  their  Faith  and  their  Comfort,  and 
their  Salvation,  was  built  on  a  moveable  fallible  Foundation  ; 
Chrift  was  not  to  them  a  tried  Stone,  a  fure  Foundation;  as 
in  Ifa'u  xxviii.  16.  Danj'id  entirely  refted  on  the  Covenant  of 
God  with  him,  concerning  the  future  glorious  Dominion  and 
Salvation  of  the  Meffiah,  of  his  Seed;  fays,  it  was  all  his  Sal'va/iof/, 
and  all  his  Dejire ;  and  comforts  himfelf  that  this  Covenant  was 


SedwiL  •  necefTatily  hdy.  147* 

an  e-~jerlaj}ing  Co'venant,  ordered  in  all  Things  and /tire,  2  Sam, 
xxiii.  5.  But  if  Chrift's  Virtue  might  fail,  he  was  miftaken  : 
his  great  Comfort  was  not  built  To  fure,  as  he  thought  it 
was,  being  founded  entirely  on  the  Determinations  of  the 
Free-Will  of  Chrilt's  human  Soul ;  which  was  fubjeft  to  r.o 
Neceffity,  and  might  be  determined  either  one  Way  or  the 
other.  Alfo  the  Dependance  of  thofe  who  looked  for  Re- 
demption in  Jerufale?n,  and  waited  for  the  Confolation  o£ 
J/rael,  [Luken.  z^,  &  38.)  and  the  Confidence  of  the  Difci- 
ples  of  Jefus,  v/ho  forfook  all  and  followed  Him,  that  they 
might  enjoy  the  Benefits  of  his  future  Kingdom,  was  built  on- 
a  fandy  Foundation. 

II.  The  Man  Chrift  Jefus,  before  he  had  finifhed  his 
Courfe  of  Obedience,  and  while  in  the  midft  of  Tempta-' 
tions  and  Trials,  was  abundant  in  politively  predifting  his 
own  future  Glory  in  his  Kingdom,  and  the  Enlargement  of- 
his  Church,  the  Salvation  of  the  Gentiles  through  Him,  &c,- 
and  in  Promifes  of  Bleffings  he  would  beitow  on  his  true 
Difciples  in  his  fiiturc  Kingdom  ;  on  which  Promifes  he  re- 
quired the  full  Dependance  of  his  Difciples.  {Joh.  xiv.), 
Biit  the  Difciples  would  have  had  no  Ground  for  fuch  De- 
pendance, if  Chrift  had  been  liable  to  fail  in  his  Work  : 
And  Chrift  himfelf  would  have  been  guilty  of  Prefumption, 
in  fo  abounding  in  peremptory  Promifes  of  great  Things,, 
which  depended  on  a  mere  Contingence ;  -viz.  the  Determi- 
nations of  his  free  Will,  confifting  in  a  Freedom  ad  ntrumque^ 
to  either  Sin  or  Holinefs,  ftanding  in  Indifference,  and  incident,, 
iii  Thoufands  of  future  Inftances,  to  go  either  one^Way  or  the 
other. 

Thus  it  is  CAtidcnt,  that  it  was  impojjihle  that  the  Ads  of 
the  Will  of  the  human  Soul  of  Chrift  fhould  be  otherwife  than 
holy,  and  conformed  to  the  Will  of  the  Father ;  or,  in  other 
Words,  they  were  ncceffarily  fo  conformed. 

I  have  been  the  longer  in  the  Proof  of  this  Matter,  it  being 
a  Thing  denied  \>y  fome  of  the  greateft  Arminians,  by  Epifcophcs 
in  particular  ;  and  becaufe  I  look  upon  it  as  a  Point  clearly  and 
abfolutely  determining  the  Controverfy  between  Caluinijis  and 
Arminians,  concerning  the  Neceffity  of  fuch  a  Freedom  of  Will 
as  is  infifted  on  by  the  latter,  in  order  to  moral  Agency,  Vir- 
tue, Command  or  Prohibition,  Promife  or  Threatning,  Re- 
ward or  Puniftiment,  Praife  or  Difpraifs,  Merit  or  Demerit. 
1  now  therefore  proceed, 

U,  Ta 


148  '        Chris  t's  Righteoufnefs         Part  111, 

II.  To  confider  whether  Christ,  in  his  holy  Behaviour  on 
Earth,  was  not  thus  a  moral  Agent,  fubjeft  to  Commands ^  Pro' 
mifesy  &c. * 

Dn  Whithy  very  oftert  fpeaks  of  what  he  calls  a  Freedom 
ad  utrumlibet,  without  Ntceffity,  as  requiilte  to  Lanv  and  Com- 
mands ;  and  fpeaks  of  Neceflity  as  entirely  inconfiftent  with 
hijunBions  and  Prohibitions.  But  yet  we  read  of  Chrift's  being 
the  Subjeft  of  the  Commands  of  hi>s  Father^  Joh.  x.  18.  and 
XV.  10.  And  Chrift  telL  us,  that  every  Thing  that  He  Jaid, 
or  did,  was  in  Compliance  with  Commandments  he  had  recei-ved 
of  the  Father;  Joh.  xii.  49,  50.  &  xiv.  31.  And  we  often 
read  of  Chrift's  Obedience  to  his  Father's  Commands,  Rom.  Vi 
19.  Phil.  ii.   i8»  Heb.  V.  8. 

The  forementioned  Writer  reprefents  Promifes  offered  as 
Motives  to  Perfons  to  do  their  Duty,  or  a  being  tnoi-ed  and  i?i- 
duced  by  Promifes,  as  utterly  inconfiftent  with  a  State  wherein 
Perfons  have  not  a  Liberty  ad  utrumlibet,  but  are  neceffarily 
determined  to  one.  (See  particularly,  P.  298,  &  311.)  But 
the  Thing  which  this  Writer  afferts,  is  demonftrably  falfey 
if  the  Chriftian  Religion  be  true.  If  there  be  any  "Truth  in 
Chriftianity  or  the  holy  Scriptures,  the  Man  Chrift  Jefas 
had  his  Will  infallibly,  unalterably  and  unfniftrably  deter- 
mined to  Good,  and  that  alone;  but  yet  he  had  Promifes 
of  glorious  Rewards  made  to  Him,  on  Condition  of  his  per- 
fevering  in,  and  perfedting  the  Work  which  God  had  ap- 
pointed Him;  Ifaii  liii.    10,   11,   12.     Pfal.  ii.  &  ex.     Ifaii 

xlix.  7j  8,  9. In  Luke  xxii.  28,  29,  Chrift  fays  to  his  Dif- 

ciples.  Ye  are  They  tvhich  hanje  continued  njuith  me  in  my  Tempta- 
tions; and  I  appoint  unto  you  a  Kingdom,  as  my  Father  hath  ap^ 
pointed  unto  ?nei  The  Word  moft  properly  fignifies  to  ap- 
point by  Covenant,  or  Promife.  The  plain  Meaning  of  Chrift's 
Words  is  this  :  "As  you  have  partook  of  my  Temptations 
*'  and  Trials,  and  have  been  ftedfaft,  and  have  overcome  ;  I 
*'  promife  to  make  you  Partakers  of  my  Reward,  and  to  give 
"  you  a  Kingdom ;  as  the  Father  has  promifed  me  a  Kingdom 
*'  for  continuing  ftedfaft,  and  overcoming  in  thofe  Trials." 
And  the  Words  are  well  explained  by  thofe  in  Rev.  iii.  2i« 
To  him  that  overCometh,  njuill  I  grant  to  Jit  <voith  me  in  my  Throne  ; 
even  as  I  alfo  onjercame,  and  am  Jet  dovjn  ivith  my  Father  in  his 
Throne.  And  Chrift  had  not  only  Promifes  of  glorious  Suc- 
cefs  and  Rewards  made  to  his  Obedieiice  and  Sufferings^ 
but  the  Scriptures  piairily  reprefent  Him  as  ufmg  thefe  Pro- 
mifes for  Motives  a.'id  Inducerasnts  to  obey  and  fufFer  ;  and 

particularly 


Std:.  li.      Pratje-warthyy  rew'ardable y  Sec,       14^ 

■p^rticularJy  that  PromWe  of  a  Kingdom  which  the  Fathef 
had  appointed  Him,  or  fitting  with  the  Father  on  his  Throne ; 
as  in  Heb.  xii.  I,  2.  Let  us  lay  ajtde  e'very  Weighty  and  the  Sin 
luhich  doth  cnjily  bi-Jet  its,  and  let  us  run  ijuith  Fatience  the  Race 
that  is  Jet  before  us,  looking  unto  fefus,  the  Author  and  Finijher 
of  our  Faith  ;  <vjho  for  the  foy  that  nvasfet  before  Him,  endured 
the  Crofs,  defpifing  the  Shame,  and  is  fet  do<vj7i  on  the  right  Hand 
of  the  Throne  of  God^ 

And  ho^/  ftrange  would  it  be  to  hear  any  Chriilian  affert, 
that  the  holy  and  excellent  Temper  and  Behaviour  of  Je- 
fus  Chrifti  and  that  Obedience  which  he  performed  under 
fuch  great  Trials,  was  not  -virtuous  or  Praife-ivorthy ;  bccaufe 
his  Will  was  not  free  ad  utrumque;  to  either  Holinefs  or  Sin, 
but  was  unalterably  determin'd  to  one  ;  that  upon  this  Ac- 
count, there  is  no  Virtue  at  all,  in  all  Chrift's  Humilityj 
Meeknefsj  Patience,  Charity,  Forgivenefs  of  Enemies,  Con- 
tempt of  the  World,  Heavenly- mindednefs,  Submiffion  to 
the  Will  of  God,  perfect  Oljedience  to  his  Commands, 
(iho'  He  was  obedient  unto  Death,  even  the  Death  of  the 
Crofs)  his  great  Compaffion  to  the  Aftlifted,  his  unparal- 
lel'd  Love  to  Mankind,  his  Faithfulnefs  to  God  and  Man, 
under  fuch  great  Trials ;  his  praying  for  his  Enemies,  even 
when  nailing  Him  to  the  Crofs;  That  Virtue,  when  applied 
to  thefe  Things,  is  hut  an  empty  Name ;  That  there  was  no 
Merit  in  any  of  thefe  Things ;  that  is,  that  Chrift  was  wor- 
thy  of  Nothing  at  all  on  the  Account  of  them,  worthy  of  no 
Reward,  no  Praife,  no  Honour  or  Refped:  from  God  or 
Man ;  Becaufe  his  Will  was  not  indifferent,  and  free  either 
to  thefe  Things^  or  the  Contrary  ;  but  under  fuch  a  ftrong 
Inclination  or  Bias  to  the  Things  that  were  excellent,  as 
made  it  imp  fjible  that  he  fhould  chufe  the  contrary ;  That 
upon  this  Account  (to  ufe  Dr.  Whitby'?,  Language)  it  'would 
be  fenjibly  unreafonable  that  the  human  Nature  Ihould  be  re- 
warded for  any  of  thefe  Things. 

According  to  this  Doftrine,  That  Creature  who  is  evi- 
dently fet  forth  in  Scripture  as  the  Firji-bom  of  e'very  Crea- 
ture, as  having  in  all  Things  the  Pre-eminence,  and  as  the  high- 
eft  of  all  Creatures  in  Virtue,  Honour,  and  Worthinefs  of 
Efteem,  Praife  and  Glory,  on  the  Account  of  his  Virtue,  is 
iefs  worthy  of  Reward  or  Praife,  than  the  very  leaft  of  Saints  5 
yea,  no  more  worthy  than  a  Clock  or  mere  Machine,  that  i3 
purely  paflive,  and  moved  by  Natural  Neceffity^ 

w  M 


%^o  Christ's  Righteoufncfs  Part  IIL 

If  we  judge  by  fcrlptural  Rcprefen-tations  of  Things,  wfe 
have  Reafon  to  fuppofe,  that  Chrift  took  on  him  our  Na- 
ture, and  dwelt  with- us  in  this  World,  in  a  fufFering 
State,  not  only  to  fatisfy  for  our  Sins ;  but  that  He,  being 
in  cur  Nature  and  Circumftances,  and  under  our  Trials^ 
might  be  our  moft  fit  and  proper  Example,  Leader  and 
Captain,,  in  the  Exercife  of  glorious  and  viftorious  Vir- 
tue, and  might  be  a  vifible  Inllance  of  the  glorious  End 
and  Reward  of  it  ;  That  we  might  fee  in  Him  the 
Beauty,  Amiablenefs,  and  true  Honour  and  Glory,  and 
exceeding  Benefit  of  that  Virtue,  which  it  is  proper  for  us 
human  Beings  to  praftife ;  and  might  thereby  learn,  and 
be  animated,    to  feek  the  like  Glory   and  Honour,    and  to 

(ci)t;un  the    like   glorious   Reward.     See  Ueb.    ii.    9, 14, 

with  v^  8,  9.  and  xii.  i,  2,  3.  yoi>.  x.v.  10.  Rom.  viii.  17.. 
2  Tm.  ii.  1 1,  12.  I  Pei.  ii.  19,  20.  and  iv.  13.  But  if  there 
was  Nothing  of  any  Virtue  or  Merit,  or  VVorthinefs  of  any 
Reward,  Glory,  Praife  or  Commendation  at  all,  in  all  that 
He  did,  becaufe  it  was  all  neceflary,  and  He  could  not 
help  it ;  then  how  is  here  any  Thing  fo  proper  to  animate 
and  incite  us,  free  Creatures,  by  patient  Continuance  in 
Well-doing,  to  feek  for  Honour,.  Glory,  and  Virtue? 

God  fpeaks  of  Himfelf  as  peculiarly  well-pleafed  with 
tfhe  Righteoufnefs  of  this  Servant  of  his.  Ifai.  xlii.  21.  The 
Lord  is  •well  plcajcd  for  his  Righteoufnefs  Sake.  The  Sacrifices  of 
Old  are  fpoken  of  as  a  fweet  Savour  to  God,  but  the  Obe- 
dience of  Chrift   as   far    more   acceptable  than   they.     Pfal. 

xl.  6,   7.      Sacrifce  and  Offering  Thou  didji  ?!0t  dcf  re  : Mine 

Ear  haji  Thou  opened  [as  thy  Servant  performing  willing 
Obedience  ;]  Burnt-Offering  and  Sin-Offering  haft  thou  not  re- 
quired: Then  faid  I ,  Lo,  I  come  [as  a  Servant  that  chearfully 
anfwers  the  Calls  of  his  Matter :]  /  delight  to  do  thy  Will,  O 
my  God,  and  thy  Laiv  is  nvilhin  ?nine  Heart.  Matth,  xvii.  J. 
This  is  my  belo'ved  Son,  in  'whom  I  am  nvell-pleafed.  And 
Chrift  tells  us  exprefly,  that  the  Father  loves  Him  for 
that  wonderful  Inftance  of  his  Obedience,  his  voluntarily 
yielding  himfelf  to  Death,  in  Compliance  with  the  Father's 
Command,  Joh.  k.    17,   18.  Therefore  doth  my  Father  lonje  me, 

becaufe  I  lay  donvn  my  Life  : No  Man   taketh  it  from   me ; 

but  I  lay  it  don.vn  of  7nyfelf- This  Ca?nmandment  recei'ved  I  of 

■my  Father. 

And  if  there  was  no  Merit  in  Chrift's  Obedience  antcr 
Peath,   if  it  was  not    worthy  of  Praife,   and  of  the  moft? 

glorious 


Sedl.  II.     Praife-worthy^  rewardaMe,  &c.         151 

glorious  Rewards,  the  heavenly  Hofts  were  exceedingly 
miftaken,  by  the  Account  that  is  given  of  them,  in  Rev.  v. 

S, 12. 'Thf  four  Beajis  and  the  fonr-and-t'voenty  Elders  fell 

danxiu  before  the  Lamb,  ha-uing  e'very  one  of  them  HarpSy  and 
golden  trials  full  of  Odours  ; And  they  fung  a  nenxj  fang,  fay- 
ing.  Thou  art  WORTHY  to  take   the   Book,    and   to    open    the 

Seals  thereof;  for  thou  nxjafi  flain, And  I  beheld,  and  I 

heard  the  V oice  of  many  Angels  round  about  the  Throne,  and  the 
Beajis,  and  the  Elders,  and  the  Number  of  them  njuas  ten  Thoifand 
Times  ten  Thoufand,  and  Thoufands  of  Thoufands,  faying  luith  a 
loud  Voice,  WORTHY  is  the  Lamb  that  'uias  flain,  to  recei've 
Po'wer,  and  Riches,  and  Wifdom,  and  Strength,  and  Honour^ 
and  Glory,  and  Bleffing, 

Chrift  fpeaks  of  the  eternal  Life  which  He  was  to  re- 
ceive, as  the  Reward  of  his  Obedience  to  the  Father's  Com- 
mandments. Joh.  xii.  49,  50.  I  haije  not  fpoken  of  myjelf ;  but 
the  Father  ^which  fent  me.  He  ga've  me  a  Commandment  tvhat  I 
Jhould fay,  and  <i.vhat  I Jhouldfpeak  :  And  I  knauj  that  his  Com- 
mandment is  Life  e'verlajling  :  Wkatfoe'ver  I fpcak  therefore,  enjen 
as  the  Father  Jaid  unto  me,  fo  I f peak. God  promifes  to  di- 
vide Him  a  Portion  with  the  Great,  &c.  for  his  being  his 
righteous  Servant,  for  his  glorious  Virtue  under  fuch  great 
Trials  and  Sufferings  ;  IfaL  liii.  1 1,  12.  He  fhall fee  of  the  Travel 
of  his  Soul  and  be  fat  is  fie  d :  By  his  Knonuledge  Jhall  my  righteous 
Servant  jufiify  many  ;  for  he  Jhall  bear  their  Iniquities,  Therefore 
ivill  I  divide  him  a  Portio?:  <with  the  Great,  and  he  Jhall  divide  the 
Spoil  luith  the  Strong,    becaufe  He  hath  poured  out  his  Soul  unto 

Death, The  Scriptures  reprefent  God  as  rewarding  Him 

fer  above  all  his  other  Servants.  Phil.  ii.  7,  8,  9.  He  took  on 
Him  the  Form  of  a  Servant,  and  nuas  made  in  the  Likenefs  of 
Men  :  and  being  found  in  Fajhion  as  a  Man,  He  humbled  himfelf, 
and  became  obedient  unto  Death,  even  the  Death  of  the  CroJ's  : 
Wherefore  GOD  alfo  hath  highly  exalted  Him,  and  given  Him  a 

Name  above  every  Name. Pfal.   xlv.   7.   Thou  loveji  Right e- 

oufnefs,  and  hateji  Wickednefs :  Therefore  God,  thy  God,  hath 
anointed  Thee  viitb  the  Oil  of  Gladnefs  above  thy  Fellows. 

There  is  no  Room  to  pretend,  that  the  glorious  Benefits 
beftowed  in  Confequence  of  Chrift's  Obedience,  are  not  pro- 
perly of  the  Nature  of  a  Reward.  What  is  a  Reward,  in 
the  moft  proper  Senfe,  but  a  Benefit  beftowed  in  Confe- 
quence of  fomething  morally  excellent  in  Quality  or  Beha- 
viour, in  Teftiraony  of  well-pleafednefs  in  that  moral  Ex- 
cellency, and  Refpeft  and  Favour  on  that  Account  ?  If 
W  3  wc 


152       Christ's  Righteoufnefs,  &c:     Part  II L. 

we  conCder  the  Nature  of  a  Reward  molt  ftridly,  and  make 
the  utmoft  of  it,  and  add  to  the  7  hings  contained  in  this 
Defcription,  proper  Merit  or  Worthiness,  and  the  Beftow- 
ment  of  the  Benefit  in  Confequence  of  a  Promife ;  ftill  it 
will  be  found,  there  is  Nothing  belonging  to  it,  but  that 
the  Scripture  is  moft  express  as  to  its  belonging  to  the 
Glory  beftowed  on  Chrift,  after  his  Su^fFerings  ;  as  appears 
from  what  has  been  already  obferved  :  There  was  a  glo- 
rious Benefit  beftowed  in  Confequence  of  fomething  mo- 
lally  excellent,  being  called  Righteoufnefs  and  Obedience ; 
There  was  great  Favour,  Lo^e  and  Well-pleafednefs,  for 
this  Righteoufnefs  and  Obedience,  in  the  Beftower ;  There 
was  proper  Merit,  or  Worthinefs  of  the  Benefit,  in  the  O-t 
bedience ;  It  was  beftowed  in  Fulfilment  of  Promifes,  made 
to  that  Obedience  ;  and  was  beftowed  therefore,  or  becaitfe 
he  had  performed  that   Obedience. 

I  may  add  to  all  thefe  Things,  that  Jcfus  Chrift, 
while  here  in  the  Flefti,  was  manifeftly  in  a  State  of  Trial. 
The  laft  Adam,  as  Chrift  is  called,  i  Cor.  xv.  45.  Rom.  v.  14. 
taking  on  Him  the  human  Nature,  and  fo  the  Form  of 
a  Servant,  and  being  under  the  Law,   to  ftand  and  aft   for 

US,  was  put  into  a  State  of  Trial,  as  the  firft  Adam  was. ■ 

Dr.  Whitby  mentions  thefe  three  Things  as  Evidences  of 
Perfons  being  in  a  State  of  Trial,  (on  the  five  Points,  P.  298, 
299 ;)  namely.  Their  Affiiftions  being  fpoken  of  as  their 
Trials  or  Temptations,  their  being  the  Subjefts  of  Promifes, 
and  their  being  expofed  to  Satan's  Temptations.  But  Chrift 
was  apparently  the  Subjeft  of  each  of  thefe.  Concerning 
Promifes  made  to  Him,  I  have  fpoken  already.  The 
Difficulties  and  Afp.iaions  He  met  with  in  the  Courfe  of  his 
Obedience,  are  called  his  Temptations  or  Trials,  Luke  xxii.  2S. 
Te  are  they  nvhich  hanje  continued  nvith  ?ne  in  my  Temptations,  or 
Trials.  Heb.  ii.  18.  For  in  that  he  Himf elf  hath  fnffercd,  being 
tempted,  [or  tried]  He  is  able  to  fuccour  them  that  are  tempted. 
And  Chap.  iv.  15.  We  hanjenot  an  High-Pricfi,  avhich  cannot  be 
touched  nuith  the  Feeling  of  our  Infirmities  ;  but  <was  in  all  Points 
tempted  like  as  nve  are,  yet  njoithoui  Sin.  And  as  to  his  being- 
tempted  by  Satan,  it  is  what  none  will  difpute. 

Section 


(    '53    ) 

^«aee9Me9Meoeeojoeeaoeoocccaooojsoo3coo<^)oco3coo?3co3oocaoocoooe3eee3eocoocc3oeeiJ§^ 

Section  III. 

^'he  Caje  of  Juch  as  are  given  up  of  God  to 
Sin,  and  of  fallen  Man  in  generaly  proves  mo-< 
ral  Necejfity  and  Inability  to  be  confjlent  with 
Blame-worthinefs, 

DR.  Whitby  aflerts  Freedom,  not  only  from  Coacfllon, 
but  Neceffity,  to  be  eflential  to  any  Thing  defer\  ing 
the  Name  of  Sin,  and  to  an  Action's  being  culpable :  in  thefe 
Words,  (Difcourfe  on  five  Points,  Edit.  3.  P.  348.)  "  If 
"  they  be  thus  neceffitated,  then  neither  their  Sins  of  Omif- 
"  fion  or  Commiffion  could  deferve  that  Name  ;  it  being  eflen- 
**  tial  to  the  Nature  of  Sin,  according  to  St.  Aajiin's  Defini- 
"  tion,  thatit  be  an  Aftion,  a  quo  liberum  eji  abftinere.  TJiree 
"  Things  f^em  plainly  necelfary  to  make  an  Atlion  or  Omifli- 
"  on  culpable  ;  i .  That  it  be  in  our  Power  to  perform  or  for- 
*'  bear  it :  For,  as  Origen,  and  all  the  Fathers  fay,  no  Man  is 
*'  blame-worthy  for  not  doing  what  he  could  not  do." — And 
♦*  elfewhere  the  Dodor  infills,  that  when  any  do  Evil  of  Ne- 
*'  ceffity,  v/hat  tliey  do  is  no  Vice,  that  they  are  guilty  of  no 
*'  Fault,  §  are  worthy  of  no  Blame,  Difpraife,  |j  or  Difho- 
♦'  nour,  +  but  are  unblameable.  * 

If  thefe  Things  are  true,  in  Dr.  TVhlthyi,  Senfe  of  Neceflity, 
they  will  prove  all  fuch  to  be  blamelefs,  who  are  given  up  of 
(jod  to  Sin,    in  what  they  commit  after  they  are  thus  given 

up. That  there  is  fuch  a  Thing  as  Men's   being  judicially 

given  up  to  Sin,  is  certain,  if  the  Scripture  rightly  informs  us  ; 
fuch  a  Thing  being  often  there  fpoken  of:  as  in  Pfalms,  Ixxxi.' 
1 2.  So  I  ganje  them  up  to  their  onvn  Hearts  Liiji,  and  they  n.val- 
ked  in  their  onvn  Coimfels.  Afts.  vii.  42.  "-Theti  God  turned, 
and  ga--ve  them  up  to  ivorjhip  the  Hoji  of  Heaven.  Rom,  i.  24. 
Wherefore,  God  alfo  ga've  the?n  rtp  to  Uncleannefs,  through  the 
1,71  ft s  of  their  onvn  Hearts,  to  dijhonour  their  onvfz  Bodies  betaveen 
Themfel-ves.  Ver.  26.  For  this  Caufe  God  ga've  them  up  to  vile 
JffeSiions.  Ver.  28.  And  even  as  they  did  not  like  to  retain  God 
in  their  Kno^wledge ,  God  gave  them  over  to  a  reprobate  Mind,  to 
do  thofe  Things  that  are  7iot  convenient.  'Tis 

(^  Difc.    on  five  Points,     P.  347.  360,  361.  377.     \\  303.  326.  329, 
jind  many  other  Places,     +371.     *  304.  361, 


1^4       Of  the  Inability  and  Sin  of  Juch       Part  III. 

'Tis  needlefs  to  ftand  particularly  to  inquire,  what  God's 
gi'vifig  Men  2ip  to  their  oavn  Heart's  Lujis  figniiies  :  It  is  fuffi.- 
cientto  obferve,  that  hereby  is  certainly  meant  God's  fo  or- 
dering or  difpofmg  Things,  in  fome  Refpeft  or  other,  either 
by  doing  or  forbearing  to  do,  as  that  the  Confequence  flionld 
be  Men's  continuing  in  their  Sins.  So  much  as  Men  are 
given  up  to,  fo  much  is  the  Confequence  of  their  being 
given  up  ;  whether  that  be  lefs  or  more.  If  God  don't  order 
Things  fo,  by  Adion  or  Permifllon,  tltat  Sin  will  be  the 
Confequence^  (hen  the  Event  proves  that  they  are  not  given 
up  to  that  Confequence,  If  Good  be  the  Confequence,  in- 
ftead  of  Evil,  then  God's  Mercy  is  to  be  acknowledged  in 
that  Good ;  which  Mercy  nuift  be  contrary  to  God  s 
Judgment  in  giving  up  to  Evil.  If  the  Event  muft  prove 
that  they  are  given  up  to  Evil  as  the  Confequence,  then  the 
Perfons  who  afe  the  Subjefts  of  this  Judgment,  muft  be  the 
Sabjedls  of  fuch  an  Event,  and  fo  the  Event  is  neceffary. 

If  not  only  CoaSilon,  but  all  Neceffity,  will  prove  Men 
biamelefs,  then  'Judas  was  blamelefs,  after  Chrift  had  given 
him  over,  and  had  already  declared  his  certain  Damnation, 
and  that  he  Ihould  'verity  betray  Him.  He  was  guilty  of  no 
Sin  in  betraying  his  Mafter,  on  this  Suppofition ;  tho'  his  fo 
doing  is  fpoken  of  by  Chriit  as  the  moft  aggravated  Sin, 
more  heinous  than  the  Sin  of  Pilate  in  crucifying  Him. 
And  the  yeius  in  Egypt,  in  'Jere?niah'%  Time,  v/ere  guilty  of 
no  Sin,  in  their  not  worfhipping  the  true  God,  after  God 
had  S'worn  by  his  great  Name,  that  his  Name  Jhould  be  no  more 
named  in  the  Mouth  of  any  Man  of  Judah,  in  all  the  Land  of 
Egypt.     Jer.  xliv.  26. 

Dr.  Whitby  (Difc.  on  five  Points,  P.  302,  303,)  denies, 
that  Men,  in  this  World,  are  ever  fo  given  up  by  God  to  Sin, 
that  their  Wills  {hould  be  ncGeffarily  determined  to  Evil  ;  tho'* 
He  owns,  that  hereby  it  may  become  exceeding  difficult  for  Men 
to  do  Good,  having  a  ftrong  Bent,  and  powerful  Inclination  to 

what  is  Evil. But  if  we  fhould  allow  the  Cafe  to  be  juft  as 

he  reprefents,  the  Judgment  of  giving  up  to  Sin  will  no  bet- 
ter agree  with  his  Notions  of  that  Liberty,  which  is  effential 
to  Praife  or  Blame,  than  if  we  (hould  fuppofe  it  to  render  the 
avoiding  of  Sin  impojjihle.  For  if  an  Impoffibility  of  avoiding 
Sin  wholly  excufes  a  Man ;  then,  for  the  fame  Reafon,  its 
being   difficult  to  avoid  it  excufes  him   in  Part ;    and     this 

juft  in  Proportion  to    the  Degree    of  Difficulty, —If  the 

Influence 


Se^.lll.         ai  are  given  up  to  Sin.  15^ 

Influence  of  moral  Impoflibility  or  Inability  be  the  faine,  t» 
excufe  Perfons   in     not   doing,    or  not  avoiding  any  Thing, 
as  that  of  «rt('«r«/ Inability,  (whicii  is  fuppofed)  then  undoubt- 
edly, in  like  Manner,  moral  Difficulty  has  the  fame  Influence 
to  excufe  with  natural  Difficulty.     But  all  allow,  that  natuiai 
Impoflibility  wholly  eScufes,    and  alfo   that   natural  Difficulty 
excufes  in  Part,  and  makes  the  Aft  or  Omiffion  kfs  blame- 
able,  in  Proportion   to  the   Difficulty.     All  natural  Difficidty, 
according    to  the  plained    Diftates    of  the  Light  of  Katare, 
excvifes   in  fome  Degree,  fo  that  the  Negleft  is  not  fo  blame- 
able,  as  if  there  had  been  no  Difficulty   in  the  Cafe  :    and  fo 
the  greater  the  Difficulty  is,  ftill  the  more  excuiable,  in  Pro- 
portion  to  the  Increafe  of  the  Difficulty.     And  as  natural  im- 
poflibility wholly  excufes  and  excludes  all  Blame,  fo  the  nearer 
the  Difficulty  approaches   to    Impoffibility,    Itill  the    nearer  a 
Perfon  is  to   Blamelcfnt  fs,    in   Proportion   to  that  Approach. 
And  if  the  Cafe  of  moral  Impoffibility  or  Neceffity,  be  juit  the 
fame  with   natural   Neceffity    or  Coaftion,  as    to  Influence  to 
excufe  a  Negleft,  then  alfo,  for  the  fame  Reafon,    the  Cafe  of 
natural  Difficulty  don't  differ  in  Influence,  to  excufe  a  Negleft, 
front   moral  Difficulty,    arifing   from   a  ilrong  Bias  or  Pent  to 
Evil,  fuch   as  Dr  Whitby  owns   in    the  Cafe   of  thofe  that  arc 
given  up  to   their  own   Hearts   Lulls.     So    that    the  Fault  of 
fuch   Perfons  muft    be    leffen'd,    in    Proportion   to  the    Diffi- 
culty,    and   Approach   to   Impoffibility.     If  ten   Degrees   of 
moral   Difficulty   make   the  Ac^on  quite    impoilible,    and  fo 
wholly  excufe,  then   if  there  be  nine  Degrees   of  Difficulty^ 
the  Perfon  is  in  great   Part  excufed,    and  is  nine  Degrees  in 
ten,  lefs  Blame-worthy,  than  it  there  had  V^een   no  Difficulty 
at  all  ;    and   he  has    but   one    Degree    of  Blame- worthinefs* 
The  Reafon  is  plain,  on  Arminian  Principles;  njiz,.    becaufe  as 
Difficulty,    by  antecedent  Bent   and  Bias   on  the  Will,  is  in- 
creafed.    Liberty   of  Indifference,    and   Self-determination  in 
the  Will,  is  diminilhed  :  fo  much  Hindrance  and  Impediment 
is  there,    in   the  Way    of  the  Will's  afting   freely,    by  mere 
Self-determination.     Ahil  if  ten  Degrees   of  fuch  Hindrance 
take   away  all  fuch  Liberty,    then  nine   Degrees  take  away 
nine  Parts  in  ten,    and  leave    but   one   Degree  of  Liberty. 
And  therefore  there  is    but    one   Degree  of    Blameablenefs, 
asteris  paribus,    in  the  Negleft ;    the  Man   being  no  further 
blameable  in   what  he  does,    or  neglefts,  than  he  haa  Liberty 
in  that  Affair  :    For  Blame  or  Praife   (fay  they)  arifes  wholly 
fi-ora  a  good  Ufc  or  Abufe  of  Liberty^ 

Fro» 


156  Of  the  inability  and  Sin  Part  lIL 

From  all  which  it  follows,  that  a  llrono;  Bent  and  Bias  one 
Way,  and  Difficulty  of  going  the  contrary,  never  caufes  a 
Perfon  to  be  at  all  more  expofcd  to  Sin,  or  any  Thing  blame- 
able  :  Becaufeas  the  Difficulty  is  increafed,  fo  much  the  lefs 
is  required  and  expefted.  Tho'  in  one  Refpert,  Expofednefs 
to  Sin  or  Fault  is  increafed,  'viz.  by  an  Increafe  of  Expofed- 
nefs to  the  evil  Adion  or  Omiffion  ;  yet  it  is  diminifned  in 
another  Refped,  to  balance  it ;  namely,  as  the  Sinfulnefs  or 
Blameablenefs  of  the  Aftion  or  Omiffion  is  diminifned  in  the 
fame  Proportion.  So  that,  on  the  Whole,  the  Affair,  as  to 
Expofednefs  to  Guilt  or  Blame,  is  left  juft  as  it  was. 

To  illuftrate  this,  let  us  fuppofe  a  Scale  of  a  Balance  to  be 
intelligent,  and  a  free  Agent,  and  indued  with  a  felf-moving 
Power,  by  Virtue  of  which  it  could  aft  and  produce  Eifeds 
to  a  certain  Degree  ;  ex.  gr.  to  move  itfelf  up  or  down  with 
a  Force  equal  to  a  Weight  of  ten  Pounds ;  and  that  it  might 
therefore  be  required  of  it,  in  ordinary  Circumftances,  to 
move  itfelf  dov/n  with  that  Force  ;  for  which  it  has  Power 
and  full  Liberty,  and  therefore  would  be  blame-worthy  if  it 
Jtail'd  of  it.  But  then  let  us  fuppofe  a  Weight  often  Pounds 
to  be  put  in  the  oppofite  Scale,  which  in  Force  entirely  coun- 
ter-balances its  felf-moving- Power,  and  fo  renders  it  impoffi- 
ble  for  it  to  move  down  at  all ;  and  therefore  wholly  excufes  it 
from  any  fuch  Motion.  But  if  we  fuppofe  there  to  be  only 
nine  Pounds  in  the  oppofite  Scale,  this  renders  its  Motion 
not  impoifible,  but  yet  more  difficult ;  fo  that  it  can  now  only 
move  down  with  the  Force  of  one  Pound :  But  however,  this 
is  all  that  is  required  of  it  under  thefe  Circumftances ;  it  is 
wholly  excufed  from  nine  Parts  of  its  Motion  :  And  if  the 
Scale,  under  thefe  Circumftances,  negledls  to  move,  and  re- 
mains at  Reft,  all  that  it  will  be  blamed  for,  will  be  its  Ne- 
gleft  of  that  one  tenth  Part  of  its  Motion  ;  which  it  had  as  much 
Liberty  and  Advantage  for,  as  in  ufual  Circumftances,  it  has 
for  the  greater  Motion,  which  in  fuch  a  Cafe  would  be  required. 
So  that  this  new  Difficulty,  don't  at  all  increafe  its  Expofednefs 
to  any  Thing  blame-worthy. 

And  thus  the  very  Suppofition  of- Difficulty  in  the  Way  of  a 
Man's  Z)«r>',  or  Proclivity  to  Sin,  thro'  a  being  given  up  to 
Hardnefs  of  Heart,  or  indeed  by  any  other  Means  whatfoever, 
is  an  Inconfiftence,  according  to  Dr.  Wluioy's  Notions  of  Li- 
berty, Virtue  and  Vice,  Blame  and  Praife.  The  avoiding  Sin 
and  Blame,  and  the  doing  what  is  virtuous  and  Praife-v/orthy, 
^ull  be  always  equally  eafy. 


Sea.  III.  ^fallen  Man.  157 

Dr.  IVhiloy'h  Notions  of  Liberty,  Obligation,  Virtue,  Sin, 
&c.  lead  Him  into  another  great  Inconfiftence,  He  abundantly 
inlifts,  that  Necelfuy  is  inconiillent  with  the  Nature  cf  Sin  or 
Fault.  He  fays  in  the  foremention'd  Treatife,  P.  14.  Who  can. 
i;la:Ki;  a  PcrJ^n  f:r  d-Aug  n.\jhcit.he  could  not  help  ?  and  P.  i  5.  It 
hiinv  jinfibly  unjrijl,  to  punijh  any  Ma?i  for  doing  that  <ivhich  it 
•was  never  in  his  Pavj^r  to  a'void.  And  in  P.  341.  to  confirm 
his  Opinion,  he  quotes  one  of  the  Fathers,  faying.  Why  doth 
God  command y  if  Man  hath  not  Free-ivill  and  Ponver  to  obey  ? 
And  again  in  the  fame  and  the  next  Page,  Who  <zvill  not  cry  out, 
that  it  is  FoUy  to  command  him,  that  hath  ?tot  Liberty  to  do  nuhat 
is  commanded ;  and  that  it  is  unjj/Ji  to  condemn  Htm,  that  has  it 
not  in  his  Fonrer  to  do  luhat  is  required ?  And  in  P.  373.  He 
cites  another  faying,  A  La<vj  is  given  to  Him  that  can  turn  to 
both  Parts;  i.  e.  obey  or  tratfgrefs  it :  But  no  Lanu  can  be  a-* 
gainji  Him  avho  is  bciind  by  fiuiure. 

And  yet  the  fame  Dr.  Whitby  afTerts,  that  fallen  Man  is  not 
able  to  perform  perfect  Obedience.  In  P.  165.  He  has  thefe 
Words,  "  The  Nature  of  Adam  had  Power  to  continue  inno- 
"  cent,  and  without  Sin  ;  v/hereas  it  is  certain  our  Nature  ne- 
•'  ver  had  fo."  But  if  we  han't  Power  to  continue  innocent 
and  without  Sin,  then  Sin  is  confident  with  Necefiity,  and  we 
may  be  finful  in  that  which  we  have  not  Power  to  avoid ;  and 
tliofe  Things  can't  be  true,  which  He  afTerts  elfewhere,  name- 
ly, '*  That  if  we  be  neceifitated,  neither  Sins  of  Omiffion  nor 
"  Commiffion,  would  deferve  that  Name."  (P.  348.)  If  we 
have  it  not  in  our  Power  to  be  innocent,  then  v/e  have  it  not  ia 
our  Power  to  be  blaraelefs  ;  and  if  fo,  we  are  under  a  Necef- 
fity  of  being  blame- worthy.  And  how  does  this  conlift  with 
what  he  fo  often  alferts,  that  Neceiiity  is  inconfzftent  with 
Blame  or  Praife  ?  If  we  have  it  not  in  our  Power  to  perform 
perfeft  Obedience  to  all  the  Commands  of  God,  then  we  are 
under  a  Neceffity  of  breaking  fome  Commands  in  fome  De- 
gree: having  no  Power  to  perform  fo  much  as  is  com- 
manded. And  if  fo,  why  does  he  cry  out  of  the  Unreafon- 
ablenefs  and  Folly  of  commanding  beyond  what  Men  have 
Power  to  do  ? 

And  Arminians  in  general  are  very  inc6nfifl:ent  with  them- 
felves  in  what  they  fay  of  the  Inability  of  fallen  Man  in  this 
Refped.  They  ftrenuoully  maintain,  that  it  would  be  un- 
juft  in  God,  to  require  any  Thing  of  us  beyond  our  prefent 
rower  and  Ability  to  perform  ;  and  alfo  hold,  that  we  are 
now  unable  to  perform  perfedl  Obedience,    and  that  Chrift 

X  died 


i^i      Of  the  LiSilily  of  Mkh  Mm.     Part  lit 

died  to  fa'tisfy  for  the  Imperfedio7is  of  cur  Obedience,  and  has 
made  Way  that  our  imperfect  Obedience  might  be  accepted  in- 
ftead  of  perfed :  Wherein  they  feem  infenlibly  to  run  thera- 
felves  into  the  groffell  Inconfiftences.  For,  (as  I  have  obferv- 
ed  elfe where)  "  They  held  that  God  in  Mercy  to  Mankind 
*'  has  abclilhed  that  rigorous  ConftitutioA  or  Law,  that  they 
"  were  under  originally ;  and  inftead  of  it,  has  introduced  a 
"  more  mild  ConlHtution,  and  put  us  under  a  new  Law,  which 
'"'  requires  no  more  than  imperfect  nncere  Obedience,  in  Com- 
♦*  pliancc  with  OLir  poor  infum  iinpoti-nt  Circumftances  fines 
"  the  Fall." 

Now,  how  can  thefe  Things  be  made  cofiftent  ?  I  would 
aik  what  Law  thefe  Imperfetflions  of  our  Obedience  are  a 
Breach  cf  ?  If  they  are  a  Breach  of  no  Law  that  we  were 
ever  under,  then  they  are  not  Sins.  And  if  they  be  not 
Sins,  what  need  of  Chrift's  dying  to  fatisfy  for  them  ?  But 
if  they  are  Sins,  and  the  Ereach  of  fome  Law,  what  Law  is 
jt  ?  They  cafi't  be  a  Breach  of  their  new  Law  ;  for  thsft 
requires  no  other  than  imperfeft  Obedience,  or  Obedience 
with  Imperfections  :  And  therefore  to  have  Obedience  attend- 
ed with  Imperfedions,  is  no  Breach  of  it ;  for  'tis  as  much 
as  it  requires.  Amd  they  can't  be  a  Breach  of  their  old  Law  ; 
for  that,    they  fay,    is  entirely  aboliflied,  and  we  never  were 

itnder  it. They  fay,  it  would  not  be  juft  in  God  to  require 

of  us  perfed  obedience,  becaufc  it  would  not  be  jult  to  re- 
quire niore  than  we  can  perform,  or  to  punifh  us  for  failing 
of  if.  And  therefore,  by  their  own  Scheme,  the  imper- 
fections of  our  Obedience  don't  defer ve  to  be  punilhed. 
VvTiat  need  therefore  of  Chrift's  dying,  to  fatisfy  for  them  ? 
What  need  of  his  Suffering,  to  fatisfy  for  that  which  is  no 
Fault,  and  in  its  own  Nature  deferves  no  fuffering  /*  What 
need  of  Chrift's  dving,  to  purchafe,  that  our  imperfeSl  Obedi- 
ence fhould  be  accepted,  when  according  to  their  Scheme, 
it  v/ould  be  unjuft  in  itfelf,  that  any  other  Obedience  than 
imperfeSl  fnould  be  required  ?  What  need  of  Chrift's  dying 
to  make  Way  for  God's  accepting  fuch  an  Obedience,  as 
it  would  be  unjuft  in  Him  not  to  accept  ?  Is  there  any 
Need   of  Chrift's   dying,   to   prevail  with  God  not  to  do  un- 

righteoufty  ? If  it   be  faid,  that  Chrift  died  to  fatisfy  that 

old  Law  for  us,  that  fo  we  might  not  be  under  it,  but  that 
lliere  might  be  Room  for  our  being  under  a  more  mild  Law  ; 
fdll  I  would  inquire,  what  Need  of  Chrift's  dying  that 
we  might  not  be  under  a  Law,  which  (by  their  Principles) 
it  woaid  be  in  itfelf.  unjuft  that  we  fliould  be  under,  whe- 
ther 


Sect.  IV .        Of  Inability,  mid  Obligation.        1 5.9 

ther  Chrift  had  died  or  no,    becaufe  in  our  prefent  State  wc 
are  not  able  to  keep  it  ? 

So  the  Arminians  are  inconfiftent  with  thcmfelves,  not 
only  in  what  they  fay  of  the  Need  of  Chriu's  Satisfac- 
tion to  attone  for  thofe  Imperfeftions  which  we  cannot 
avoid,  but  alfo  in  what  they  fay  of  the  Grace  of  God, 
granted  to  enable  Men  to  perform  the  fmcere  Obedience  of 
the  new  Law.  "  I  grant  {fays  Dr.  Stehhing  ^')  indeed,  that 
"  by  Reafon  of  original  Sin,  we  are  utterly  dlfabled  for  the 
"  Performance  of  the  Condition,  without  new  Grace  fronj 
*'  God.  But  I  fay  then,  that  Fie  gives  fuch  Grace  to  all  of 
'•  us,  by  which  the  Performance  of  tbje  Condition  is  truly 
•'  pofiible :  And  upon  this  Ground  he  may,  and  doth  moft 
*'  righteoufly  require  it,"  If  Dr.  Slehhing  intends  io  fpcak 
properly,  by  Grace  he  muft  mean,  that  Aliiflance  which  is  of 
Grace,  or  of  free  Favour  and  Kindnefs.  But  yet  in  the  fame 
Place  he  fpeaks  of  it  as  very  unreafonchle,  Mijvft  and  cruel,  for 
God  to  require  that,  as  the  Condition  of  Pardon,  that  is  be- 
come impoffible  by  original  Sin.  If  it  be  fo,  what  Grace  is 
there  in  giving  Affiftance  and  Ability  to  perform,  the  Condition 
of  Pardon  ?  Or  why  is  that  called  by  the  Name  of  Grace, 
that  is  an  abfolute  Debt,  which  God  is  bound  to  beftow,  and 
which  it  v/ould  be  unjuft  and  cruel  in  him  to  with-hold, 
feeing  he  requires  that,  as  the  Condition  of  Pardon,  which  we 
cannot  perform  without  it  ? 


Section     IV. 

Command,    and  Obligation  to  Obedience,    con^ 
fiftent  zvith  moral  Inability  to  obey. 

IT  being  ^o  much  infilled  on  by  Arminian  Writers,  that 
Neceflity  is  inconfiftent  with  Law  or  Command,  and 
particularly,  t!^at  it  is  -abfurd  to  fuppofe  God  by  his 
Command  fhould  require  that  of  Men  which  they  are  unable 
to  do  ;  not  allowing  in  this  Cafe  for  any  DiiFerence  that  there 
is  between  natural  and  moral  Inability;  I  would  therefore  now 
particularly  confider  this  Matter. 

X  3  And 

t  Treatife  of  the  Operations  of  the  Spirit.    2  Edit.  P.   na,   113- 


l6o  Commands  conjlflenl  Part  III. 

And  for  the  greater  Clearnefs,    I  would  diiliiif^ly  lay  dow  n 
the  following  Ihings.  , 

I.  The  Will  itfelf,  and  not  only  thofe  Action?  which  are 
the  EfFcfts  of  the  Will,  is  the  proper  Objetl  of  Precept  of 
Command.  That  is,  fuch  or  fuch  a  State  or  Afts  of  Men's 
Wills,  is  in  many  Cafes,  properly  required  of  them  bv 
Command ;  and  not  only  thofe  Altemtions  in  the  State  of 
their  Bodies  or  Minds  that  are  the  Confequences  of  Volition. 
This  is  mod  manifeft  ;  for  'tis  the  Soul  only,  that  is  properly 
and  direftly  the  Subjeft  of  Precepts  or  Commands ;  that 
only  being  capable  of  receiving  or  perceiving  Corf;mands. 
The  Motions  or  State  of  the  Body  are  Matter  of  Command, 
only  as  they  are  Subjeft  to  the  Soul,  and  connefted  with 
its  A6ls.  But  now  the  Soul  has  no  other  Faculty  whereby 
it  can,  in  the  moft  direft  and  proper  Senfe,  confenC,  yield  to, 
or  comply  with  any  Command,  but  the  Faculty  of  the  Will  r 
and  'tis  by  this  Faculty  only,  that  the  Soul  can  dire<ftly  dif- 
obey,  or  refufe  Compliance :  For  the  very  Notions  of 
ConfcntingPCielding,  Accepting,  Complywg,  Refujing,  RejeSIing,  See. 
are,  according  to  the  Meaning  of  the  Terras,  Nothing  but 
certain  Ads  of  the  Will.  Obedience,  in  the  primarj'  Na- 
ture of  it,  is  the  fubmitting  and  yielding  of  the  Will  of  one 
to  the  Will  of  another,  Difobedience  is  the  ri9t  confent- 
jng,  not  complying  of  the  Will  of  the  commanded  to  the 
it^anifefted  Will  of  the  Commander.  Other  Adls  that  are 
r.ct  the  Afts  of  the  Will,  as  certain  Motions  of  the  Body 
and  Alterations  in  the  Soul,  are  Obedience  or  Difobedience 
only  indiredtly,  as  they  are  ccnneSed  with  the  State  or 
Aftions  of  the  Will,  according  to  an  eftablilhed  Law  of 
Nature.  So  that  'tis  manifeft,  the  Will  itfelf  may  be  re- 
quired:  And -the  Being  of  a  goodwill  is  the  moit  proper, 
direct  and  immediate  Subjeft  of  Command ;  and  if  this 
can't  be  prefcribed  or  required  by  Command  or  Precept,  no- 
thing can ;  For  other  Things  can  be  required  no  otherwife 
than  as  they  depend  upon,   and  are  the  Fruits  of  a  Good  Will, 

Carol.  I.  If  there  be  feveral  Afts  of  the  Will,  or  a  Series 
of  Afts,  one  following  another,  and  one  the  Efteft  of  ano- 
ther, the  Jirji  and  determining  A3  is  properly  the  Subjeft  of 
Command,  and  not  only  the  confequent  Adts,  which  are  de- 
pendent upon  it.  Yea,  'tis  this  more  efpecially  which  is  that 
v.hich  Command  or  Precept  has  a  proper  Refpeft  to ;  be- 
caufe  'tis  this  Aft  that  determines  the  whole  Affair :  In  this 
/\ft  the  Obedience  or  Difobedience  lies,  in  a  peculiar  Manner ; 

thQ 


Sed.  IV.  'with  nioral  Inability.'  161 

the  confequent  Afts  being  all  fubjeft  to  it,  and  governed  and 
determined  by  it.  This  determining  governing  Aft  muft  be 
the  proper  Subjcft  of  P»ecept,  or  none. 

Carol.  2.  It  alfo  follows  from  what  has  been  obferved. 
That  if  there  be  any  Sort  of  Act,  or  Exertion  of  the  Soul, 
prior  to  all  free  Afts  of  the  Will  or  Ads  of  Choice  in  the  Cafe, 
direding  and  determining  what  the  Ads  of  the  Will  fliall  be  ; 
that  Adt  or  Exertion  of  tlie  Soul  csn't  properly  be  fubjeft 
to  any  Command  or  Precept,  in  any  Refpeft  whatfoever, 
either  diredly  or  indirectly,  immediately  or  remotely.  Such 
Afts  can't  be  fubjeft  to  Commands  dire£tly,  becaufe  they  are 
no  Aifls  of  the  Will ;  being  by  the  Suppofition  prior  to  all 
Atts  of  the  Will,  determining  and  giving  F<.ire  to  fill  its  Afts  : 
They  not  being  Afts  of  tl.^e  Will,  there  can  be  in  them  no 
Confent  to,  or  Compliance  with  any  Command.  Neither  can 
they  be  fubjeft  to  Command  or  Precept  indireBly  or  remotely  ; 
for  they  are  not  fo  much  as  the  EJ^efls  or  Conjtqtiences  of  the 
Will,  being  prior  to  all  its  Afts.  So  that  if  there  beany 
Obedience  in  that  original  Aft  of  the  Soul,  determining  all 
Volitions,  it  is  an  Aft  of  Obedience  wherein  the  Will  has  no 
Concern  at  all ;  it  preceding  every  Aft  of  Will.  And  there- 
fore, if  the  Soul  eitlier  obeys  or  difobeys  in  this  Aft,  it  is 
wholly  involuntarily  ;  there  is  no  willing  Obedience  or  Rebel- 
lion, no  Compliance  or  Oppofition  of  the  Will  in  the  Affair  : 
and  what  Sort  of  Obedience  or  Rebellion  is  this ! 

And  thus  the  Armhiian  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Will 
confiding  in  the  Soul's  determining  its  own  Afts  of  Will, 
inftead  of  being  effential  to  moral  Agency,  and  to  Men's 
being  the  Subjefts  of  moral  Government,  is  utterly  incon- 
fiftent  with  it.  For  if  the  Soul  determines  all  its  Afts  of 
Will,  it  is  therein  fubjeft  to  no  Command  or  moral  Govern- 
ment, as  has  been  now  obferved  ;  becaufe  its  original  deter- 
mining Aft  is  no  Aft  of  Will  or  Choice,  it  being  prior,  by  the 
Suppofition,  to  e'very  ASi  of  Will.  And  the  Soul  can't  be  the 
Subjeft  of  Command  in  the  Aft  of  the  Will  itfelf,  which 
depends  on  the  foregoing  determining  Aft,  and  is  determined 
by  it ;  in  as  much  a?  this  is  necefiary,  being  the  neceffary 
Confequence  and  Effeftofthat  prior  determining.  Aft,  which 
is  not  voluntary.  Nor  can  the  Man  be  the  Subjeft  of  Com- 
mand or  Government  in  his  external  Aftions ;  becaufe  thefe 
are  all  neceifAry,  being  the  necefiary  Effefts  of  the  Afts  of  the 
Will  themfelves.  So  that  Mankind,  according  to  this  Scheme, 
^re  Subjefts  of  Command  or  moral  Government  in  nothiiig 

at 


l()2  Commands  cofiJ/JIepJ  Part  III. 

p.t  all ;  and  all   their  moral  Agency  is  entirely  excluded,  and 
no  Room  left  for  Virtue  or  Vice  in  the  World. 

So  that  'tis  the  Jr/ninian  Scheme,  and  not  the  Scheme  of 
the  Cal^inifis,  that  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  moral  Govern- 
ment, and  with  all  Ufe  of  Laws,  Precepts,  Prohibitions,  Pro- 
mifes,  or  Threatnings.  Neither  is  there  any  Way  whatfoever, 
to  make  their  Principles  confift  with  thefe  Things.  For  if 
it  be  faid,  that  there  is  no  prior  determining  Ad  of  the  Soul,, 
preceding  the  Afts  of  the  Will,  but  that  Volitions  are  Events 
that  come  to  pafs  by  pure  Accident,  without  any  determining 
Caufe,  this  is  moft  palpably  inconfiftent  with  aJl  Ufe  of  Laws 
and  Precepts ;  for  nothing  is  more  plain  than  that  Laws  can 
be  of  no  Ufe  to  diredt  and  regulate  perfeft  Accident ;  whicl^ 
by  the  Suppofition  of  its  being  pure  Accident,  is  ic  no  Cafe 
regulated  by  any  Thing  preceding ;  but  happens  this  Way 
or  that  perfeftly  by  Chance,  without  any  Caufe  or  F.ule.  The 
perfedt  Ufelefnefs  of  Laws  and  Precepts  alfo  follov»s  from  the 
Arminiati  Notion  of  Indifference,  as  effential  to  that  Liberty 
which  is  requifite  to  Virtue  or  Vice.  For  the  End  cf  Laws  is 
to  hind  to  one  Side  ;  and  the  End  of  Commands  is  to  turn  tiie 
Will  one  Way  :  and  therefore  they  are  of  no  Ufe  unlefs  they 
turn  or  bias  the  Will  that  Way,  But  if  Liberty  confifts  in 
Indifference,  then  their  biaffing  the  Will  one  VVay  only,  de- 
ftroys  Liberty  ;  as  it  puts  the  Will  out  of  Equilibrium.  So, 
that  the  Will,  having  a  Bias,  thro'  the  Influence  of  binding 
Law,  laid  upon  it,  is  not  wholly  left  to  itfelf,  to  determine 
itfelf  which  Way  it  will,  without  Influence  from  without, 

II.  Having  fhewn  that  the  Will  itfelf,  efpecially  in  thofe 
Afts  which  are  original,  leading  and  determining  in  any  Cafe, 
is  the  proper  Subjedl  of  Precept  and  Command,  and  not  only 
thofe  Alterations  in  the  Body,  &c.  which  are  the  EfFedts  of  the 
Will ;  I  novv  proceed  in  the  fecond  Place,  to  obfcrve  that  the 
very  Oppofition  or  Defeft  of  the  Will  itfelf,  in  that  Aft  which 
3s  its  original  and  determining  A3  in  the  Cafe,  I  fay  the  Will's 
Oppofition  in  this  AB  to  a  Thing  propofed  or  commanded,  or 
its  failing  of  Compliance,  implies  a  moral  Inability  to  that 
Thing  :  Or  in  other  Words,  whenever  a  Command  requires  a 
certain  State  or  Aft  of  the  Will,  and  the  Perfon  commanded, 
notwithftanding  the  Command  ,and  the  Circumftances  undeif 
which  it  is  exhibited,  ftill  finds  his  Will  oppofite  or  wanting, 
in  that,  belonging  to  its  State  or  Afts,  <which  is  original  and 
determining  in  the  Affair^  that  Man  is  morally  unable  to  obey 
that  Command. 

Thia 


S'edl.  IV.  with  ?noral Inahility,  itf 

This  is  nianifeft  from  wliat  was  obferved  in  the  firft  Parv 
concerning  the  Nature  of  w.om/  Inability,  as  diftirtguilhed  from 
jiatural :  where  it  was  obferved.  That  a  Man  may  then  be  faid 
io  be  morally  unable  to  do  a  1  hing,  when  He  is  under  the 
Influence  cr  Prevalence  of  a  contrary  Inclination,  or  has  a 
Want  of  Inclination,  under  fuch  Circumftances  and  Views. 
"Tis  alfo  evident  from  what  has  been  before  proved,  that  the 
Will  is  always,  and  in  every  individual  Ad,  neceffarily  deter- 
mined by  the  ftrongeft  Motive  ;  and  fo  is  always  unable  to  gO 
acrainft   the  Motive,    which   all  Things   confidered,    has   now 

the   ■■'^reatell  Strength  and  Advantage    to  move  the  Will. ; 

But  not  further  to  infift  on  thele  Things,  the  Truth  of 
the  Pcfition  now  laid  down,  'viz.  That  when  the  Will  is  op- 
pofite  to,  or  failing  of  a  Compliance  with  a  Thing  in  its 
original  determhiing  Inclination  or  A£i,  it  is  not  able  to  corKply, 
appears  by  the  Confideration  of  thefe  two  Things. 

1 .  The  Will  in  the  Time  of  that  diverfe  or  oppofite  leading. 
Aft  or  Inclination,  and  when  aftually  under  the  Influence  of 
it,  is  not  able  to  exert  itfelf  to  the  contrary,  to  make  an  Alte- 
ration, in  order  to  a  Compliance.  The  Inclination  is  unable 
to  change  itfelf  j  and  that  for  this  plain  Reafon,  that  it  is 
unable  to  incline  to  change  itfelf.  Prefent  Choice  can't  at 
prefent  chufe  to  be  othcrwife  :  for  that  would  be  at  prefcT^t 
to  chufe  fomething  diverfe  from  what  is  at  prefent  chcfen.  If 
the  Will,  all  Things  now  confidered,  inclines  or  chufes  to  go 
that  Way,  then  it  can't  chufe,  all  I'liings  now  confidered,  to 
go  the  other  way,  and  io  can't  chufe  to  be  made  to  go 
the  other  Way.  To  fuppofe  that  the  Mind  is  now  fincerely 
incliiieJ  to  change  itfelf  to  a  diflerent  Inclination,  is  to  fup- 
pofe the  Mind  is  now  truly  inclined  otherwife  than  it  is  now 
inclined.  The  V/ili  may  oppofe  fome  future  remote  A.ft  thiit 
it  is  expofed  to,  but  not  its  own  prefent  Aft. 

2.  As  it  is  impoiLble  that  the  Will  fhould  comply  with  the 
Thing  commanded  with  Refpeft  to  its  leading  A8,  by  an  Aft 
of  its  own,  in  the  Time  of  that  diverfe  or  oppofite  leading  and 
original  ASi,  or  after  it  is  aftually  come  under  the  Influence  of 
that  determining  Choice  or  Inclination  ;  fo  'tis  impoffible  it  fhould 
be  determined  to  a  Compliance  by  any  foregoing  Aft  ;  for  by 
the  very  Suppofition,  there  is  no  foregoing  Aft ;  the  oppolii'e 
or  non-complying  Aft  being  that  Aft  which  is  original  anJ 
determining  in  the  Cafe.  Therefore  it  muft  be  fo,  that  if  this. 
^r/i  determining  Ad  be  found  non-complying,  on  the  Propofal 
of  the  Command,  the  Mind  is  morally  unable  to  obey.  Foe 
to  fuppofe  it  to  be  able  to  obey,  is  to  fuppofe  it  to  be  able  to 
determine  and  caufe  its  frji  'determining  Aii  to  be  otherwife. 


164  Commands  t(9;£/'^?r7//  Part  II L 

and  that  it  has  Power  better  to  govern  and  regulate  its  firfi 
governing  and  regulating  ASl,  which  is  abfurd  ;  Yot  it  is  to  iup- 
pofe  a  prior  Aft  of  the  Will,  determining  its  firft  determining 
Aft  ;  that  is,  an  Aft  prior  to  the  firft,  and  leading  and  govern- 
ing the  original  and  governing  Aft  of  all;  which  ie  a 
Contradiftion. 

Here  if  it  fhould  be  faid,  that  altho'  the  Mind  has  not 
any  Ability  to  will  contrary  to  what  it  does  will,  in  the 
original  and  leading  Aft  of  the  Will,  becaufe  there  is  fup- 
pofed  to  be  no  prior  Aft  to  determine  and  order  it  otherv/ife, 
and  the  Will  can't  immediately  change  itfelf,  becaufe  ic 
can't  at  prefent  incline  to  a  Change  ;  yet  the  Mind  has  an 
Ability  for  the  prefent  to  forbear  to  proceed  to  Aftion,  and 
take  Time  for  Deliberation ;  which  may  be  an  Occafion  of  the 
Change  of  the  Inclination. 

I  anfvver,  (i.)  In  this  Objeftion  that  feems  to  be  for- 
gotten which  was  obferved  before,  'viz.  that  the  determining 
to  take  the  Matter  into  Confideration,  is  itfelf  an  Aft  of  the 
Will  :  And  if  this  be  all  the  Aft  wherein  the  Mind  exercifes 
Ability  and  Freedom,  then  this,  by  the  Suppofition,  muft  be 
all  that  can  be  commanded  or  required  by  Precept.  And  if 
this  Aft  be  the  commanded  Aft,  then  all  that  has  been  obfer- 
ved concerning  the  commanded  Aft  of  the  Will  remains  true, 
that  the  very  Want  of  it  is  a  moral  Inability  to  exert  it,  &c. 
(2.)  Wc  are  fpeaking  concerning  the  firft  and  leading  Aft  of 
the  Will  in  the  Cafe,  or  about  the  Affair  ;  And  if  a  Determin- 
ing to  deliberate,  or  on  the  contrary,  to  proceed  immed'ately 
without  deliberating,  be  the  firft  and  leading  Aft ;  or  whe- 
ther it  be  or  no,  if  there  be  another  Aft  before  it,  which 
determines  that ;  or  whatever  be  the  original  and  leading 
A-ft;  ftill  the  foregoing  Proof  ftands  good,  that  the  Non- 
compliance of  the  leading  Act  implies  moral  Inability  to 
comply. 

If  it  fhould  be  objected,  that  thgfe  Things  make  all  moral 
Inability  equal,  and  fuppofe  Men  morally  unable  to  will 
otherwife  than  they  actually  do  will,  in  ail  Cafes,  and  equally 
fo,  in  every  Inftance. 

In  anfvver  to  this  Objection,  I  defire  two  Things  may  be 
obferved.  Firfi ^  That  if  by  being  equally  unable,  be  meant 
as  really  unable;  then  fo  far  as  the  Inability  is  merely  mo- 
ral,  'tis  true,   the  Will,   in  every  Inftance,  acts  by  moral  Ne- 

cellity* 


Sefb.  IV.  wttb  moral  Inalility.  165 

ceffity,  and  is  morally  unable  to  afl  otherwire,  as  truly  and 
properly  in  one  Cafe  as  another;  as,  I  humbly  conceive, 
has  been  perfedHy  and  abundantly  demonftrated  by  what 
has  been  faid  in  the  preceding  Part  of  this  Effay.  But  yet, 
in  fome  RelpsCt,  the  Inability  may  be  Aiid  to  be  greater  la 
fome  Inltances  th?.n  others  :  Tho'  the  Man  may  be  truly  un- 
able, (if  moral  Inability  can  truly  be  called  Inability)  yet 
he  may  be  further  from  being  able  to  do  fome  'Ihings  than 
others-^  As  it  is  in  Things  which  Men  are  naturally  unable 
to  do.  A  Perfon  whofe  Strength  is  no  more  than  fufficient 
to  lift  the  Weight  of  one  Hundred  Pounds,  is  as  truly  and 
really  unable  to  lift  one  Hundred  and  one  Pounds,  as  tea 
Thoufand  Pounds ;  but  yet  he  is  further  from  being  able  to 
lift  the  latter  Weight  than  the  former ;  and  fo,  according  to 
common  Ufe  of  Speech,  has  a  greater  Inability  for  it.  So 
it  is  in  moral  Inability.  A  Man  is  truly  morally  unable  to 
chufe  contrary  to  a  prefent  Inclination,  which  in  the  leaft 
Degree  prevails ;  or  coritrary  to  that  Motive,  which,  all 
Things  confidered,  has  Strength  and  Advantage  nov/  to 
move  the  Will,  in  the  leaft  Degree,  fuperiour  to  all  othec 
Motives  in  View  :  But  yet  he  is  further  from  Ability  to  refift: 
a  very  ftrong  Habit,  and  a  violent  and  deeply  rooted  Incli- 
nation, or  a  Motive  vattly  exceeding  all  others  in  Strength. 
And  again,  the  Inability  may  in  fome  Refpefls  be  called 
greater,  in  fome  Inltances  than  others,  as  it  may  be  more 
g.;tieral  and  extetiji've  to  all  ABs  of  that  Kind.  So  Men  may  be 
fuid  to  be  unable  in  a  diSerent  Senfe,  and  to  be  further  from 
moral  Ability,  who  have  that  moral  Inability  vi'hich  is  ^f«^- 
ral  and  habitual^  than  they  who  have  only  that  Inability  which 
\%occaJional  z\\i^  portiailar.  *  Thus  in  Cafes  of  natural  Inability; 
he  that  is  born  blind  may  be  faid  to  be  unable  to  fee,  in  a 
different  Manner,  and  is  in  fome  Rcfpefts  further  from  being 
able  to  fee,  than  He  whofe  Sight  is  hinder'd  by  a  tranfienc 
Cloud  cr  Milf. 

And  befides,  that  which  was  obferved  in  the  fvrft  Part  of 
this  Difcourfe  concerning  the  Inability  which  attends  a  Jlrong 
and  fettled  Habit,  fhould  be  here  remember 'd  ;  njisz.  That  fix'd 
Habit  is  attended  with  this  peculiar  moral  Inability,  by  which 
it  is  diftinguHhed  from  occafioitnl  VoUtirai,  namely,  that  En- 
deavours to  avoid  future  Volitions  of  that  Kind,  which  are 
agreeable  to  fuch  a  Habit,  much  more  frequently  and  com- 
monly prove  vain  and  infufficient.     For  tho'  it  is  impoflible 

Y  there 

*  See  this  Diftinftion  of  moral  Inability  cxplain'd  in  Part  I.  SeEl,  IV, 


1 66  Gammands  confjhnf  Part  IIL 

there  (hould  be  any  true  fincere  Defires  and  Endeavours  againft 
a  prefent  Volition  or  Choice,  yet  there  may  be  againft  Voli- 
tions of  that  Kind,  when  view'd  at  a  Diftance.  A  ferfon  may 
deiire  and  ufe  Means  to  prevent  future  Exercifes  of  a  certain 
Inclination  ;  and  in  order  to  it,  may  wiQi  the  Kabit  might  be 
jremoved  ;  but  his  Defires  and  Endoavours  may  be  inetie(5tual. 
The  Man  may  be  (aid  in  fome  8enfe  to  be  unable  ;  yea,  evea 
as  the  Word  unable  is  a  relative  Term,  and  has  Relation  to  in- 
effeftual  Endeavours ;  yet  not  vifith  Regard  to  prefent,  but  re- 
mote  Endeavours. 

Secondly,  It  muG:  be  borne  in  Mind,  according  to  what  wm 
cbfcrv'd  before,  that  indeed  na  Inability  whatfoever  which  is 
merely  moral,  is  properly  called  by  the  Name  of  Inability  ; 
and  that  in  the  urictell  Propriety  of  Speech,  a  Man  may  b& 
faid  to  have  a  Thing  in  his  Power,  if  he  has  it  at  his  Eledion  j 
and  He  can't  be  faid  to  be  unable  to  do  a  Thing,  when  He 
can  if  He  now  pleafes,  or  whenever  he  has  a  proper,  dired: 
and  immediate  Defire  for  it.  As  to  thofe  Defires  and  Endea- 
vours that  may  be  againft  the  Exercifes  of  a  ftrong  Habit, 
with  Regard  to  which  Men  may  be  faid  to  be  unable  to 
avoid  thofe  Exercifes,  they  are  remote  Defires  and  Endea- 
vours in  two  Refpefts.  i'Vjy?,  as  to  Time ;  they  are  never 
againft  prefent  Volitions,  but  only  againft  Volitions  of  fuch  a 
Kind,  when  view'd  at  a  Diftance.  Secondly,  as  to  theif  Nature  ; 
tliefe  oppofite  Defires  are  not  direftly  and  properly  againft  the 
Habit  and  Inclination  itfelf,  or  the  Volitions  in  which  it  is 
exercifed  ;.  for  thcfe,  in  themfelves  confidered,  are  agreeable  ; 
but  againft  fomething  elfe,  tnat  attends  them,  or  is  their  Con- 
fequence  ;  the  Oppofition  cf  the  Mind  is  levelled  entirely 
againft  this ;  the  Inclination  or  Volitions  themfelves  are  not 
at  all  oppofed  direcllv,  and  for  their  ov/n  Sake ;  but  only 
indireftly,  and  remotely  on  the  Account  of  Something  aliea 
and  foreign. 

HI.  Tho'  the  Cppofition  of  the  Will  itfelf,  or  the  very  want 
of  W^ill  to  a  Thing  commanded,  implies  a  moral  Inability  to 
that  Thing;  yet,  if  it  be  as  has  been  already  (hewn,  that  the 
Being  cf  a  good  State  or  Adt  of  Will,  is  a  Thing  moft  pro- 
perly required  by  Command  ;  then,  in  fome  Cafes  fuch  a  State 
or  Aft  of  Will  may  properly  be  required,  which  at  prefent  is 
not,  and  which  may  alfo  be  wanting  after  it  is  commanded  t 
And  therefore  thofe  Things  may  properly  bs  commanded,  which 
Men  have  a  moral  Inability  for. 

Such 


Sc(5l.  IV.  with  mora!  Inahility.  ■  167 

Such  a  State  or  Act  of  the  Will,  may  be  required  by  Com- 
mand, as  does  not  already  exift.  For  if  that  Volition  only 
may  be  commanded  to  be  which  already  is,  there  could  be 
no  Ufe  of  Precept ;  Commands  in  all  Cafes  would  be  per- 
fectly vain  and  impertinent.  And  not  only  may  fuch  a  Will 
be  required  as  is  wanting  before  the  Command  is  given,  but 
alfo  fuch  as  may  pofiibly  be  wanting  afterwards ;  fuch  as  the 
Exhibition  of  the  Command  may  not  be  etlectual  to  produce 
or  excite.  Otherwife,  no  fuch  Thing  as  Diibbedience  to  a 
proper  and  rightful  Command  is  poflible  in  any  Cafe-;  and 
there  is  no  Cafe  fuppofable  or  poiTible,  wterem  there  can 
be  an  ine^cufable  or  faulty  Difobedienee  :  Which  Armimnns 
cannot  affirm,  confiftently  with  their  Principles  ;  for  this  makes 
Obedience  to  juft  and  proper  Commands  always  necejjhry,  and 
Difobedienee  impoffible.  And  fo  the  Arminian  would  over- 
throw Himfelf,  yielding  the  very  Point  we  are  upon,,  which 
He  fo  ftreauoufly  denies,  wa.  that  Law  and  Commaad  are 
confiftent  with  JNeceifity. 

If  merely  that  Inability  will  excufe  Difobedienee,  which  Is 
implied  in  the  Oppofition  or  Defect  of  Inclination,  remaining 
after  the  Command  is  exhibited,  then  Wickednefs  always 
carries  that  in  it  which  excufes  it.  'Tis  evermore  fo,  that  by 
how  much  the  more  Wickednefs  there  is  in  a  Man's  Heart, 
by  fo  much  is  his  Inclination  to  Evil  the  ftronger  ;  and  by  fo 
much  the  more  therefore  has  he  of  moral  Inability  to  the 
Good  required.  His  moral  Inability,  confiding  in  the 
Strength  of  his  evil  Inclination,  is  the  very  Thing  wherein 
his  Wickednefs  confifts ;  and  yet  according  to  Armin'uin  Prin- 
ciples, it  muft  be  a  Thing  inconfiftent  with  Wickednefs ;  and 
by  how  much  the  more  he  has  of  it,  by  fo  much  ii  he  the 
further  frQra  Wickednefs. 

Therefore,  on  the  Whole,  it  is  manifeft,  that  mord  Inability 
alone  (which  confifts  in  Difinclination)  never  renders  any 
Thing  improperly  the  Subject-matter  of  Precept  or  Command, 
and  never  can  excufe  any  Perfon  in  Difobedienee,  or  Wani 
of  Conformity  to  a  Command. 

Natural  Inability,  arifing  from  the  Want  of  natural  Capa- 
city, or  external  Hindrance  (which  alone  is  properly  called 
Inability)  without  doubt  wholly  excufes,  or  makes  a  Thing 
improperly  the  Matter  of  Command.  If  Men  are  excufed 
from  doing  or  acting  any  good  Thing,  fuppofed  to  be  com- 
fijanded,   it  rauft  be  through  fome  Defect  or  ObUacle  that  is 

Y  ^  HOC 


1 68         Commands  <^;/^  Invitations         Part  ill., 

not  in  the  Will  itfelf,  but  extrinfic  to  it ;  either  in  the  Capaci- 
ty of  Underftanding,  or  Body,  or  outward  Circuniftances. 


Here  two  or  three  Things  may  be  obferved. 

1.  As  to  fpiritual  Duties  or  Acts,  or  any  good  Thing  in  the 
State  or  immanent  Acts  of  the  Will  itfelf,  or  of  the  Altections 
(which  are  onlv  certain  Modes  of  the  Exercife  of  the  Will) 
if  Peifons  are  juftly  excufeds  it  muft  be  thro'  want  of  Capacity 
in  the  natural  i  acuity  of  Underftanding.  Thus  the  fame  fpi- 
ritual Duties,  or  holy  Affections  and  Exercifes  of  Heart,  can't 
be  required  of  Men,  as  may  be  of  Angels ;  the  Capacity  of  Ua- 
derlhanding  being  fo  much  infenoi.  So  Men  can't  be 
required  to  love  thofe  arjiiable  Perfons  whom  they  have 
liacl  no  Opportunity  to  fee,  or  hear  of,  or  come  to  the  Know- 
ledge of,  in  any  Way  agreeable  to  the  Natural  State  and  Capa- 
city of  the  human  Underitanding.  But  the  Infufficiency  of 
Motives  will  not  excufe;  unlefs  their  being  infufficient  arifes 
not  from  the  moral  Stace  of  the  Will  or  Inclination  itfelf,  but 
from  the  State  of  the  natural  Underitanding.  The  greais 
ICindnefs  and  Generofity  of  another  may  be  a  iVlctive  infuffi- 
cient to  excite  Gratitude  in  the  Perfon  that  receives  the 
Kindnefs,  thro'  his  vile  and  ungrateful  Temper  :  In  this  Cafe, 
the  Infufficiency  of  the  Motive  arifes  from  the  State  of  the 
Will  or  Inclination  of  Heart,  and  don't  at  all  excufe.  But  if 
this  Generolity  is  not  fufficient  to  excite  Gratit;ude,  being  un- 
known, there  being  no  Means  of  Information  adequate  to  the 
State  and  Meal  are  of  the  Perfon's  Faculties,  this  Infufficiency 
is  attended  with  a  natural  Inability,  which  entirely  excufes, 

2.  As  to  fuch  Motions  of  Body,  or  Exercifes  and  Alterati- 
ons of  Mind,  which  don't  confift  in  the  immanent  Afts  or  State 
of  the  Will  itfelf,  but  are  fuppofed  to  be  required  as  Effects 
of  the  Will ;  I  fay,  in  fuch  fuppofed  EiFects  of  the  Will,  in 
Cafes  wherein  there  is  no  Want  of  a  Capacity  of  Underftand- 
ing  ;  that  Inability,  and  that  only  excufes,  which  confifts  in 
Want  of  Connection  between  them  and  the  Will.  If  the  Will 
fully  complies,  and  the  propofed  EfFeifl  don't  prove,  according 
to  the  Laws  of  Nature,  to  be  connefted  with  his  Volition, 
the  Man  is  perfectly  excufed  ;  he  has  a  natural  Inability  to  the 
Thing  required.  For  the  Will  itfelf,  as  has  been  obferved,  is 
all  that  can  be  directly  and  immediately  required  by  Command  ; 
and  other  Things  only  indirectly,  as  connected  with  the  Will. 
If  therefore  there  be  a  full  Compliance  of  Will,   the  Perfoa 


Sedt.  IV.      confiflent  with  moral  Inability.  1 69 

'has  done  his  duty ;  and  if  other  Things  don't  prove  to  be  con* 
necled  with  his  VoHtion,  that  is  not  owing  to  him. 

3.  Both  thefc  Kinds  of  natural  Inability  that  have  been 
mentioned,  and  fo  all  Inabihty  that  excufes,  may  be  refolved 
into  one  Thing;  naniely,  Vvant  of  natural  Capacity  or  Streno-th; 
either  Capacity  of  Underltanding,  or  external  Strength.  For 
when  there  are  external  Defefts  and  Obftacles,  they  would  be 
po  Obftacles,  were  it  not  for  the  Imperfedion  and  Limitations 
of  Underltanding  and  Strength. 

Corel.  If  Things,  for  which  Men  have  a  moral  Inability,  may 
properly  be  the  Matter  of  Precept  or  Command,  then  they  may 
alfo  of  Invitation  and  Counfel.  Commands,  and  Invitations 
come  very  much  to  the  fame  Thing ;  the  Difference  is  only 
circumftantial  :  Commands  are  as  much  a  Manifeftation  of  the 
Will  of  him  that  fpeaks,  as  Invitations,  and  as  much  Teftimo- 
nies  of  Expectation  of  Compliance.  The  Difference  between 
them  lies  in  nothing  that  touches  the  Affair  in  Hand.  The 
main  Difference  between  Command  and  Invitation  confiils  in 
the  Enforcement  of  the  Will  of  Him  who  commands  or  invites. 
In  the  latter  it  is  h  s  Kindnefs,  the  Goodnefs  whicli  his  Will 
arifes  from  :  in  the  former  it  is  his  Authority.  But  .vhatever  be 
the  Ground  of  the  Will  of  him  that  fpeaks,  or  the  Enforce- 
ment of  what  he  fays,  3'et  feeing  neitlier  his  Will  nor  Expec- 
tation is  any  more  telllfied  in  the  one  Cafe  than  the  other; 
therefore  a  Perfon's  being  known  to  be  morally  unable  to  do 
the  Thing  to  which  he  is  directed  by  In'vitation,  is  no  more  an 
Evidence  of  Infincerlty  in  him  that  directs,  in  manifeltincr  either 
a  Will,  or  Expedation  which  he  has  not,  than  his  being  known 
to  be  morally  unable  to  do  what  he  is  direiRed  to  by  Command. 

So  that  all  this  grand  Objeftion  of  Arminians  againfl;  the 

Inability  of  fallen  Men  to  exert  faith  in  Chrifl,  or  to  perform 
other  fpiritual  Gofpel-Duties,  from  the  Sincerity  of  God"s 
Counfels  and  Invitations,  muft  be  without  Force, 


$  E   C   T   I   O  If 


■I'JO  What  Willingnefs  and  Part  IIL 

Section   V. 

That  Sincerity  of  Defires  and  Endeavours,  which 
is  Juppojed  to  excufe  in  the  Nonperformance  of 
Things  in  themfelves  goody  particularly  confidered. 

9'"  I  ""  I  S  what  is  much  infifted  on  by  many,  that  fome  Men, 
X  tho'  they  are  not  able  to  perform  fpirituai  Duties,  fuch 
as  Repentance  of  Sin,  Love  to  God,  a  cordial  Acceptance  of 
Chrift  as  exhibited  and  offer'd  in  the  Gofpel,  Sic.  yet  they  may 
fmcerely  defire  and  endeavour  thefe  Things ;  and  therefore  muft 
be  excufed ;  it  being  unreafonable  to  blame  them  for  the  Omiffion 
of  thofe  Things  which  they  fincerely  defire  and  endeavour  to  do, 
but  can't  do. 

Concerning  tliis  Matter,  the  following  Things  may  be  ob. 
ferved. 

I.  What  is  here  fuppofed,  is  a  great  Miftake,  and  grofs 
Abfardity ;  even  that  Men  may  fincerely  chufe  and  defire  ihofc 
fpirituai  Duties  of  Love,  Acceptance,  Choice,  Rejecl;ion,  &c, 
confifling  in  the  Exercife  of  the  Will  itfelf,  or  in  the  Difpofition 
and  Inclination  of  the  Heart ;  and  yet  not  be  able  to  perform 
or  exert  them.  This  is  abfurd,  becaufe  'tis  abfurd  to  fuppofe 
that  a  Man  ftiould  direftly,  properly  and  fincerely  incline  to 
have  an  Inclination,  which  at  the  fame  Time  is  contrary  to  his 
Inclination  :  for  that  is  to  fuppofe  him  not  to  be  inclined  to 
that  which  he  is  inclined  to.  If  a  Man,  in  the  State  and  Ads 
of  his  Will  and  Inclination,  does  properly  and  directly  fall  in 
with  thofe  Duties,  he  therein  performs  them  :  For  the  Duties 
themfelves  confift  in  that  very  Thing  ;  they  confift  in  the  State 
and  Acts  of  the  Will  being  fo  formed  and  directed.  If  the  Soul 
properly  and  fmcerely  falls  in  with  a  certain  propofed  Act  of 
Will  or  Choice,  the  Soul  therein  makes  that  Choice  its  own. 
Even  as  when  a  moving  Body  falls  in  with  a  propofed  Direction 
of  its  Motion,  that  is  the  fame  Thing  at  to  move  in  that  Direc- 
tion. 

2.  That 
\ 


Sed.V.  Sincerity  is  no  Excufe.  371 

2.  That  which  is  called  a  Defire  and  Willingnefs  for  thofe 
inward  Duties,  in  fuch  as  don't  perform  them,  has  refpeft  to 
thefe  Duties  only  indirtdly  and  remotely,  and  is  improperly 
reprefented  as  a  Willingnefs  for  them  ;  not  only  becaufe  (as 
was  cbferved  before)  it  refpefts  thofe  good  Volitions  only  in  a 
diftant  View,  and  with  refpeft  to  future  Time  ;  but  alfo  be- 
caufe evermore,  not  thefe  Things  themfelves,  bur  fomething 
elfe,  that  is  alien  and  foreign,  is  the  Objed  that  terminates 
thefe  Volitions  and  Defires. 

A  Drunkard,  who  continues  in  his  Drunkennefs,  being  urv-* 
der  the  Power  of  a  Love,  and  A^iolent  Appetite  to  ftrong  Drink, 
and  without  any  Love  to  Virtue  ;  but  being  alfo  extreamly 
covetous  and  clofe,  and  very  much  exercifed  and  grieved  at 
the  Diminution  of  his  Eftate,  and  Profpeft  of  Poverty,  may  in 
a  Sort  dejire  the  Virtue  of  Temperance :  and  tho'  his  prefenf 
Will  is  to  gratify  his  extravagant  Appetite,  yet  he  may  wife 
he  had  a  Heart  to  forbear  future  Ads  of  Intemperance,  and 
forfake  his  Exceffes,  thro'  an  Unwillingnefs  to  part  with  his 
Money  :  But  ftill  he  goes  on  v,  ith  his  Drunkennefs ;  his 
Wilhes  and  Endeavours  are  infufficient  and  inefFedual :  Such 
a  Man  has  no  proper,  dired,  fincere  Willingnefs  to  forfake 
this  Vice,  and  the  vicious  Deeds  which  belong  to  it :  for  He 
afts  voluntarily  in  continuing  to  drink  to  cxcefs :  His  Defire 
is  very  improperly  called  a  Willingnefs  to  be  temperate  ;  it  is 
no  true  Defire  of  that  Virtue  ;  for  it  is  not  that  Virtue  that 
terminates  his  Wiflies  ;  nor  have  they  any  direft  Refpeft  at 
all  to  it.  'Tis  only  the  fauing  his  Money,  and  avoiding  Poverty, 
that  terminates,  and  exbaufts  the  whole  Strength  of  his  Defire, 
The  Virtue  of  Temperance  is  regarded  only  very  indiredly  . 
smd  improperly,  even  as  a  neceffary  Means  of  gratifying  the 
Vice  of  Covetoufnefs. 

So,  a  Man  of  an  exceeding  corrupt  and  wicked  Heart, 
who  has  no  Love  to  God  and  Jefus  Chrift,  but  on  the  con- 
trary, being,  very  profanely  and  carnally  inclined,  has  the 
greateit  Diltafte  of  the  Things  of  Religion,  and  Enmity  againft 
them ;  yet  being  of  a  Family,  that  from  one  Generation  to 
another,  have  moft  of  them  died  in  Youth  of  an  hereditary  Con- 
fumption ;  and  fo  having  little  Hope  of  living  long;  and  having 
been  inftruded  in  the  Neceflity  of  a  fupreme  Love  to  Chrift, 
and  Gratitude  for  his  Death  and  Suiferings,  in  Order  to  his 
Salvation  from  eternal  Mifery ;  if  under  thefe  Circumftances. 
he  (hould,  thro'  Fear  of  eternal  Torments,  wifh  he  had  fuch  a. 
Difpofition  j  but  his  profane  and  carnal  Heart  remaining,    He- 

continued 


f^l  What  Willingnefs  and  Part.  IlL 

continues  ftill  in  his  habitual  DIRafte  of,  and  Enrtiity  to  God 
and  Rehgion,  and  wholly  without  any  Exercife  of  that  Love 
and  Graotude;  (as  doubtlefs  the  very  Devils  themfelves,  not- 
withftanding  all  the  Deviliftnefs  of  their  Temper,  would  wifli 
for  a  holy  Heart,  if  by  that  Means  they  could  get  out  of  Hell :} 
In  this  Cafe,  there  is  no  fmcere  Wiilingnefs  to  love  Chrift 
and  cliufe  him  as  his  chief  Good.  Thefe  holy  Difpofitions 
and  Exercifes  are  not  at  all  the  direft  Objedl  of  the  Will  : 
they  truly  fhare  no  Part  of  the  Inclination  or  Defire  of  the 
Soul ;  but  all  is  terminated  en  Deliverance  from  Torment : 
and  thefe  Graces  and  pious  Volitions,  notwithftanding  this 
forced  Confent,  are  looked  upon  undefirable ;    as  v/hen  a  fick 

Man  defires  a  Dofe  he  greatly  abhors,  to  fave  his  Life. 

From  thefe  Things  it  appears* 

3.  That  this  indireft  Willingnefs  which  has  been  fpoken  of, 
is  not  that  Exercife  of  the  Vv  ill  which  the  Command  requires  ; 
but  is  entirely  a  different  one;  being  a  Volition  of  a  ditterent 
Nature,  and  terminated  altogether  on  different  Objefts ;  wholly 
falling  fnort  of  that  Virtue  of  Will,  which  the  Command  has 
refpedt  to. 

4.  This  other  Volition,  which  has  only  forae  indireft  Con- 
cern with  the  Duty  required,  can't  excufe  for  the  V/ant  of  that 
good  Will  itfelf,  which  is  commanded  ;  being  not  the  Thing 
which  anfwers  and  fulfils  the  Command,  and  being  wholly  de- 
Ilitute  of  the  Virtue  which  the  Command  feeks. 

Further  to  illiiftrate  this  Matter, If  a  Child  has  a  moft 

excellent  Father,  that  has  ever  treated  him  v/ith  fatherly 
Kindnefb  and  Tendernefs,  and  has  every  Way  in  the  highelt 
Degree  merited  his  Love  and  dutiful  Regard,  being  withal 
very  wealthy ;  but  the  Son  is  of  fo  vile  a  Difpofition,  that  He 
inveterately  hates  his  Father ;  and  yet,  apprehending  that  his 
Hatted  of  Him  is  like  to  prove  his  Ruin,  by  bringing  Him 
finally  to  Poverty  and  abjeft  Circumflances,  thro' his  Fatlier's 
diiinheriting  Him,  or  othervvife  ;  which  is  exceeding  crofs  to 
his  Avarice  an<J  Am.bition ;  He  therefore  wifhes  it  were  other- 
wife  :  but  yet  remaining  under  the  invincible  Power  of  his  vile 
and  malignant  Difpofition,  He  continues  ftill  in  his  fettled 
Hatred  of  his  Father.  Now  if  fuch  a  Son's  indirect  Willing- 
nefs to  have  Love  and  Honour  towards  his  Father,  at  all  ac- 
quits or  excufes  before  God,  for  his  failing  of  aftually  exer- 
cifing  thefe  Difpofitions  towards  Him  which  God  requires, 
it  muil  be  on   one  of  thefe  two  Accounts,     (i.)  Either  that 

it 


Secfl.  V.  Sihctnty  is  no  Excp/e.  173 

it  anfwers  and  fiVifils  the  Command.  But  this  it  does  not,  by 
the  Suppofition  ;  becaufe  the  Thing  commanded  is  Love  ai!d 
Honour  to  his  v/orthy  Parent.  ]t'  the  Command  be  proper 
andjuft,  as  is  fuppofed,  then  it  obliges 'to  the  Thing  com- 
"manded ;  and  fo  nothing  elfe  bnt  that  can  anfwer  the  Obh'gati- 
on.  Or,  (2.)  It  mull  be  at  leaA  becaufe  there  is  that  Virtue 
or  Gocdnels  in  his  indireft  "Willingnefs,  that  is  equivalent  to 
the  Virtue  required  ;  and  fo  balances  or  countervails  it,  and 
makes  up  for  the  Want  of  it.  But  that  alfo  is  contrary 
to  the  Suppofition.  The  Willingnefs  the  Son  has  merely 
from  a  Regard  to  Money  and  Honour,  has  no  Goodnefs 
in  it,  to  countervail  the  Want  of  the  pious  filial  Refpeft 
lequired. 

Sincerity  and  Reality,  in  that  indirect  Willingnefs  which 
lias  been  fpoken  of,  don't  make  it  the  better.  That  which 
is  real  and  hearty  is  often  called  fmcere ;  v/hether  it  be  in 
Virtue  or  Vice.  Some  Perfons  are  iincerely  had ;  otkers  are 
fincereiy  good;  and  others  may  be  fincere  and  hearty  in 
Things  v/hich  are  in  their  cvv'n  Nature  indifferent ;  as  a  Man 
may  be  fincereiy  deurous  of  eating  when  he  is  hungry.  >  But  a 
being  fincere,  hearty  and  in  good  Earnell,  is  no  Virtue,  un- 
iefs  it  be  in  a  Thing  that  is  virtuous.  A  Man  may  be  fin- 
cere and  hearty  in  joining  a  Crew  of  Pirates,  or  a  Gang  of 
Robbers.  When  the  Devils  cried  out,  and  befought  Chrilt 
mot  to  torment  them,  it  was  no  mere  Pretence ;  they  were 
very  hearty  in  their  Defires  not  to  be  tormented :  but  thii 
did  liot  make  their  Will  or  Defires  virtuous.  And  if  Men 
have  finccie  Defires,  which  are  in  their  Kind  and  Nature  no 
better,  it  can  be  no  Excufe  for  the  Want  of  any  required 
Virtue. 

And  as  a  Man's  being  fincere  in  fuch  an  indirect  Defire  oc 
Willingnefs  to  do  his  Duty,  as  has  been  mentioned,  can't  ex- 
cufe for  the  want  of  Performance  ;  fo  it  is  with  Endea^jours 
arifing  from  fnch  a  Willinijnefs.  The  Endeavours  can  have 
no  more  Goodnefs  in  them,  than  the  Will  which  they  are  the 
Effect  and  Expreffion  of.  And  therefore,  however  fincere  and 
real,  and  however  great  a  Perfon's  Endeavours  are  ;  yea,  tho* 
they  fhould  be  to  the  utmoft  of  his  Ability  ;  unlefs  the  Will 
which  they  proceed  from  be  truly  good  and  virtuous,  they 
can  be  of  no  Avail,  Influence  or  Weight  to  any  Purpofe  what- 
foever,  in  a  moral  Senfe  or  Refpect.  That  which  is  not  truly 
virtuous  in  God's  Sight,  is  looked  upon  by  Him  as  good  for 
Kothing :    and  fo  can  be  of  no  Value,    Weight  or  Influence 

Z  iij 


174      lVl:)at  Sincerity  of  Endeavours       Part  IlL 

in  his  Account,  to  recommend,  fatisfy,  excufe  or  make  up  foe 
aay  moral  Defect.  For  Nothing  can  counter-balance  Evil,  but 
Good.  If  Evil  be  in  one  Scale,  and  we  put  a  great  deal  into 
the  other,  fincere  and  earneft  Defires,  and  many  and  great  En- 
deavours ;  yet  if  there  be  no  real  Goodnefs  in  all,  there  is  no 
Weight  in  it ;  and  fo  it  does  nothing  towards  balancing  the 
real  Weight  which  is  in  the  oppofite  Scale.  'Tis  only  like  the 
fubltracting  a  Thoufand  Noughts  trora  before  a  real  Number, 
which  leaves  the  Sum  juil  as  it  was. 

Indeed  fuch  Endeavours  may  have  a  vegat'i'vely  good  Influ- 
ence.- Thofe  Things  which  have  no  pofitive  Virtue,  have  no 
pofltive  moral  Influence ;  yet  they  may  be  an  Occafion  of 
Perfons  avoiding  fome  pofitive  Evils.  As  if  a  Man  were  in 
the  Wattr  with  a  Neighbour  that  he  had  ill-will  to,  who 
could  not  fwim,  holding  him  by  his  Hand ;  which  Neigh* 
hour  was  much  in  Debt  to  Him  ;  and  ihould  be  tempted  to  let 
him  link  and  drown  ;  but  fhould  refufe  to  comply  with  the 
Temptation  ;  not  from  Love  to  his  Neighbour,  but  from  the 
Love  of  Mon?y,  and  becaufe  by  his  drowning  He  flioiild  lofe 
his  Debt  ;  that  which  he  does  in  preferving  his  Neighbour 
from  drowning,  is  nothing  good  in  the  Sight  of  God:  Yet 
hereby  he  avoids  the  greater  Guilt  that  would  have  been 
contrafted,  if  he  had  defignedly  let  his  Neighbour  fink  and 
perifti.  But  when  Arminians  in  their  Difputes  v\ith  Cal'vlnijis 
infill  fo  much  on  fincere  Defires  and  Endeavours,  as  what 
muft  excufe  Men,  rauft  be  accepted  of  God,  &c.  'tis  manifett 
they  liavc  Refpesfl  to  fome  pofitive  moral  Weight  or  Influence 
of  thofe  Defires  and  Endeavours.  Accepting,  juftifying,  or 
excufing  on  the  Account  of  fincere  honell  Endeavours  (as 
they  are  called)  and  Men's  doing  what  they  can,  &c.  has  Re- 
lation to  fome  moral  Value,  fomething  that  is  accepted  as 
Good,  and  as  fuch,  countervailing  fome  Defeft* 

Eat  there  is  a  great  and  unknown  Deceit,  arifing  from  the 
Ambioruity  of  the  Phrafe,  Jineere  Etjdea^oours.  Indeed  there  i^ 
a  vaft  Indiftinftnefs  and  LTnfixednefs  in  moll:,  or  at  leafl:  very  ma- 
ny of  the  Terras  ufed  to  exprefs  Things  pertaining  to  moral  and 
fpiritual  Matters.  Whence  arife  innumerable  Miftakes,  ftrong 
Prejudices,    inextricable  Confufion,    and   endlefs  Controverfy. 

The  W'ord  fincere  is  moft:  commonly  ufed  to  fignify  fome- 
thing that  is  good:  Men  are  habituated  to  underfl:and  by'it 
the  fame  as  hojicft  zxi\  upright ;  which  Terms  excite  an  Idea 
of  fomething  good  in  the  itrideft  and  higheft  Senfe  j   good  in 

the 


Sc6t.  V.  is  no  Excufe.  27^ 

the  Sight  of  Him  who  fees  not  only  the  outward  Appearance, 
but  the  Heart.  And  therefore  Men  think  that  if  a  Perfon  be 
Jincere,  he  will' certainly  be  accepted.  If  it  be  faid  that  any 
one  is  finceye  in  his  Endeavours,  this  fuggefts  to  Men's  Minds 
as  much,  as  that  his  Heart  and  Will  is  good,  that  there  is  no 
Defect  of  Duty,  as  to  virtuous  Inclination  ;  he  horicjily  and 
uprightly  defires  and  endeavours  to  do  as  he  is  required ;  and 
this  lead's  them  to  fuppofe  that  it.would  be  very  hard  and  unrea- 
fonable  to  punifh  him,  only  becaufe  he  is  unfuccefsful  in  his 
Endeavours,    the  Thing  endeavoured  being  beyond  his  Power. 

Whereas  it  ought  to  be  obferved,    that  the  Word  f.ncere 

has  thefe  diiferent  Significations. 

I.  Shcei-ity,  as  the  Word  is  foraetimes  ufcd,  lignifies  no. 
vc\ox&  \.\\?^Ti  Reality  of  Will  arid  Endeavour,  with  refpett  to  any 
Thing  tb.at  is  profeiTed  or  pretended  j  without  any  Coniidera- 
tion  of  the  Nature  of  the  Principle  or  Aim,  whence  this  real 
Will  and  true  Endeavour  arifes.  If  a  Man  has  feme  real  De- 
foe to  obtain  a  Thing  either  direft  or  indirect,  or  does  really 
endeavour  after  a  Thing,  he  is  faid  lincerely  to  dpfire  or  endea-' 
vour  it  ;  without  any  Conlideraticn  of  the  Goodnefs  or  Virtu- 
oufnefs  of  the  Principle  he  ads  from,  or  any  Excellency  or 
Worthinefs  of  the  End  he  ads  for.  Thus  a  Man  that  is  kind 
to  his  Neighbour's  Wife,  who  is  fick  and  l?nguifhing,  and 
very  Iielpful  in  her  Cafe,  makes  a  Shew  of  defiring  and  endea- 
vx)uring  her  Reiloration  to  Health  and  Vigour;  and  not  only 
makes  fuch  a  Shew,  but  there  is  a  Reality  in  his  Pretence,  he 
does  heartily  and  earneftly  defire  to  have  her  Health  retlored, 
c^nd  ufes  his  true  and  utmoit  Endeavours  for  it;  He  is  faid  lin- 
cerely to  delire  and  endeavour  it,  becaufe  he  does  fo  truly  or 
really ;  tho'  perhaps  the  Principle  he  ads  from,  is  no  other 
than  a  vile  and  fcandalous  Paffion  ;  having  lived  in  Adultery 
•with  her,  he  earneftly  defires  to  have  her  Health  and  Vigour 
reftored,  that  he  may  return  to  his  criminal  Pleafures  with 
her.      Or, 

±.  By  Sincerity  is  meant,  not  merely  a  Reality  of  Will  and 
Endeavour  of  fome  Sort  or  other,  and  from  fome  Confiderati- 
on  or  other,  but  a  njirtuous  Sincerity.  That  is,  that  in  the  Per- 
formance of  thofe  particular  Ads  that  are  the  Matter  of  Vir- 
tue or  Duty,  there  be  not  only  the  Matter,  but  the  Form  and 
EfTence  of  Virtue,  confuting  in  the  Aim  that  governs  the  Ad, 
and  the  Principle  exercifed  in  it.  There  is  not  only  the  Reali- 
ty of  the  Ad,  that  is  as  it  were  the  Body  of  the  Duty  ;  but  al- 
fo  the  Soiili  which  Ihould  properly  belong  to  fuch  a  Body.     In 

Z  3  thi& 


176  O/Promifes.  Part  IIL 

this  Senfe,  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fincere,  vvhenhe  a(fis  with  & 
fure  Intention ;  not  from  finifter  Views,  or  bye-Ends  :  He  . 
not  only  in  Reality  defires  and  fceks  the  Thing  to  be  done, 
or  Qualification  to  be  obtain'd,  for  feme  End  or  other  ; 
But  he  wills  the  Thing  diredly  and  properly,  as  neither  forced 
nor  bribed ;  the  Virtue  of  the  Thing  is  properly  the  Obje»ft  of 
the  Will. 

In  the  former  Senfe,  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fmcere,  in  Oppofi- 
tion  to  a  mere  Pretence,  and  Shenu  of  the  particular  Thing  to  be 
done  or  exhibited,  without  any  real  Deiire  or  Endeavour  at  all. 
In  the  latter  Senfe,  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fmcere  in  Oppofition  to 
that  She-iV  of  Virtue  there  is  in  merely  doing  the  Matter  of  Duty, 
without  the  Reality  of  the  Virtue  itfelf  in  the  boul,  and  the 
Effence  of  it,  wriich  there  is  a  Shew  of.  A  Man  may  be  fin- 
cere  in  the  former  Senfe,  and  yet  in  the  latter  be  in  the  Sight 
of  God,  who  fearches  the  Heart,  a  vile  Hypocrite. 

In  the  latter  Kind  of  Sincerity,  only,  is.  there  any  Thing 
truly  valuable  or  acceptable  in  the  Sight  of  God.  And  this  is 
the  Thing  which  in  Scripture  is  called  Sincerity,  Uprightnefs, 
Integrity,  Truth  in  the  intvard  Parts ,  and  a  being  of  a  perfe^  Heart, 
And  if  there  be  fuch  a  Sincerity,  and  fuch  a  Degree  of  it  as 
there  ought  to  be,  and  there  be  any  Thing  further  that  the 
Man  is  not  able  to  perform,  or  which  don't  prove  to  be  con- 
nected with  his  fincere  Defires  and  Endeavours,  the  Man  is 
wholly  excufed  and  aquitted.  in  the  Sight  of  God ;  His  Will 
ihall  iurely  be  accepted  for  his  Deed :  And  fuch  a  fincere 
Will  and  Endeavour  is  all  that  in  Striftnefs  is  required  of  him, 
by  any  Command  of  God.  But  as  to  the  other  Kind  of 
Sincerity  of  Defires  and  Endeavours,  it  having  no  Virtue  in 
it,  (as  was  obferved  before)  can  be  of  no  Avail  before  God, 
in  any  Cafe,  to  recommend,  fatisfy,  or  excufe,  and  has  no  po- 
iitive  moral  Weight  or  Influence  whatfoevei;. 

CoroL  I.  Hence  it  may  be  infer'd,  that  Nothing  in  the  Rea- 
fon  and  Nature  of  Things  appears,  from  the  Confideration  of 
any  moral  Weight  of  that  former  Kind  of  Sincerity,  which 
has  been  fpoken  of,  ■  at  all  obliging  us  to  believe,  or  leading 
us  to  fuppofe,  that  God  has  made  any  pofitive  Promifes  of 
Salvation,  or  Grace,  or  any  faving  Afliftance,  or  any  fpiritual- 
Benefit  whatfoever,  to  any  Defires,  Prayers,  Endeavours, 
Striving,  or  Obedience  of  thofe,  who  hitherto  have  no  true. 
Virtue  or  Holinefs  in  their  Hearts ;    the'  \ye  ihould  fuppofe 


I 


Sect.V.  to  graceiefs  Eiideavour-s.  fy/^ 

all  the  Sincerity,  and  the  utmoft  Degree  of  Endeavour,  that  ig 
poiuble  to  be  in  a  Perfon  without  Holinefs. 

Some  objedl  againil  God's  requiring,  as  the  Condition  of 
Salvation,  thofe  holy  Exercifes,  which  are  the  Refult  of  a  fu- 
pernatural  Renovation  ;  fuch  as  a  fupreme  Refped  to  Chrift, 
Love  to  God,  loving  Holinefs  for  its  own  Sake,  Hzc.  that  thefe 
inv/ard  Difpolitions  and  Exercifes  are  above  iVIen's  Power,  as 
they  are  by  Nature  ;  and  therefore  that  we  ipay  conclude,  that 
when  Men  arc  brought  to  be  fincere  in  their  Endeavours,  and 
do  as  well  as  they  can,  they  are  accepted  ;  and  that  this  mud 
be  all  that  God  requires  in  order  to  Men's  being  received  as 
the  Objects  of  his  Favour,  and  mull  be  what  God  has  ap- 
pointed as  the  Condition  of  Salvation. — Concerning  which  I 
would  obferve,  that  in  fuch  a  Manner  of  Speaking  of  Men's 
oeing  accepted,  becaufe  they  are  Jirtcere ,  and  do  as  luell  as  they  can, 
there  is  evidently  a  Suppofition  of  fome  Virtue,  fome  Degree 
ct  that  which  is  truly  Good;  tho'  it  don't  go  fo  far  as  were 
to  be  wifti'd.  For  if  Men  do  ^uuhat  ihey  can,  unlefs  their  fo 
doing  be  from  fome  good  Principle,  Difpofition,  or  Exercife  of 
Heart,  fome  virtuous  Inclination  or  Aft  of  the  Will ;  their 
fo  doing  what  thev  can,  is  in  fomg  Refpefts  not  a  Whit  bettei* 
than  if  they  did  Nothing  at  all.  In  fuch  a  Cafe,  there  is  nq 
more  pofitive  moral  Goodnefs  in  a  Man's  doing  what  he  can, 
than  in  a  Wind-mill's  doing  what  it  can  j  becaufe  the  Aftion 
does  no  more  proceed  from  Virtue  ;  and  there  is  Nothing  in 
fuch  Sincerity  of  Endeavour,  or  doing  what  we  can,  that  Ihould 
render  it  any  more  a  proper  or  fit  Recommendation  to  pofitive 
Favour  and  Acceptance,  or  the  Condition  of  any  Reward  or 
a.ftual  Benefit,  th-n  doing  Nothing  ;  for  both  the  one  and  the 
other  are  alike  Nothing,  as  to  any  true  rnoral  Weight  or  Value. 

Carol.  2.  Hence  alfo  it  follows,  there  is  Nothing  that  appears 
in  the  Reafon  and  Nature  of  Things,  which  can  juftly  lead  us  to 
determine,  that  God  will  certainly  give  the  neceffary  Means  of 
Salvation,  or  fome  Way  or  other  beftow  true  Holinefs  and 
eternal  Life  on  thofe  Heathen,  who  are  fincere  (in  the  Senfe 
above  explained)  in  their  Endeavours  to  find  out  the  W^ill  of 
the  Deity,  and  to  pleafe  Him,  according  to  their  Light,  that 
they  may  efcape  his  future  Difpleafure  and  Wrath,  and  obtain 
j-Iappinefs  in  their  future  State,  through  his  Favour. 


4SS'(>Oce>4OQO3OWcxioeaopoaO9(oeeoq«sc0MaMO(^MOogoocQ9Osqo!)po99cqac!Cc^oaoqeoa^ 

Section 


17^  Indifference  inconfifient         Part  III. 

4bjJ*oOflfiaOMa#6ei56<id3WOOfiioooooo40ooooowc(*s4»oooooooeoooc'Odffbooo6o5ocoooooooco30ooooo*^^ 

Section     VI. 

Liberty  of  Indifference,  not  only  not  necejjary  to 
Virtue,  but  utterly  hiconfijient  with  it:.  And  ally 
either  virtuous  or  vicious  Habits  or  Inclinations, 
inconjijient  with  Arminian  Notions  of  Liberty  and 
moral  Agency, 

TO  fuppofe  fuch  a  Freedom  of  Will,  as  Aminlaus  talk  of 
to  be  requilite  to  Virtue  arid  Vice,  is  many  Waj's  contrary 
to  common  Senfe. 

If  Indifference  belongs  to  Liberty  of  Will,  as  Arm'imam  fup* 
pofe,  and  it  be  effential  to  a  virtuous  Adlion  that  it  be  perform-, 
ed  in  a  State  of  Liberty,  as  they  alfo  fuppofe ;  it  will  follow, 
that  it  is  effential  to  a  virtuous  Aftion  that  it  be  performed  in 
a  State  of  Indifference  :  And  if  it  be  performed  m  a  State  of 
Indifference,  then  doubtlefs  it  muft  be  performed  in  the  Time 
of  Indifference.  And  fo  it  will  follow,  that  in  order  to  the 
Virtuoufnefs  of  an  Aft,  the  Heart  muft  be  indifferent  in  the 
Time  of  the  Performance  of  that  Aft,  and  the  more  indiffer- 
ent and  cold  the  Heart  is  with  Relation  to'  the  Aft  which  is 
performed,  fo  much  the  better  ;  becaufe  the  Aft  is  performed 
with  io  much  the  greater  Liberty.  But  is  this  agreeable  to  the 
Light  of  Nature  ?  Is  it  agreeable  to  the  Notions  v/hich  Man- 
kind, in  all  Ages,  have  of  Virtue,  that  it  ligs  in  that  which  is 
contrary  to  Indifference,  even  in  the  Tendency  and  Inclination  of 
the  Heart  to  virtuous  Aftion  ;  and  that  the  ftronger  the  Incli- 
nation, and  fo  the  further  from  Indifference,  the  more  virtuous 
the  Heart,  and  fo  much  the  more  praife-worthy  the  A^  whicf\ 
proceeds  from  it  ? 

If  we  fhould  fuppofe  (contrary  to  what  has  been  before  dfe- 
monftrated)  that  there  may  be  an  Aft  of  Will  in  a  State  of 
Indifference ;  for  Inftance,  this  Aft,  ^iz..  The  Will's  deteir 
mining  to  put  itfelf  out  of  a  State  of  Indifference,  and  give  it- 
felf  a  Preponderation  one  Way,  then  it  would  follow,  on  Armi- 

niaTi 


Sed.VI.  ^C'VV/j  Virtue.  lyc^ 

man  Principles,  that  this  Aft  or  Determination  of  the  Will  i» 
that  alone  wherein  Virtue  confifts,    becaufe  this-  only  is  per- 
formed while  the  Mind  remains  in  a  State  of  Indifference,    and 
io  in  a  State  of  Liberty  :   For  when   once   the  Mind  is  put  out 
of  its  Equilibrium,    it  is  no  longer  in  fuch  a  State  ;    and  there- 
fore all   the  Ads  which  follow    afterwards,  proceeding  from 
Bias,  can  have  the  Nature   neither  of  Virtue  nor  Vice.     Or  if" 
the  Thing  which   the   Will   can   do,    while   yet  in  a  State  of 
Indifference,  and  fo  of  Liberty,  be  only  to  fufpend  adding,  and 
determine  to   take   the  Matter  into  Confideration,   then   this 
Determination   is  that    alone   wherein  Virtue  confills,  and  not 
proceeding  to  Aftion  after  the  Scale  is  turned  by^  Confideration. 
So  that   it    will  follow  from  thefe  Principles,  ?.ll  that  is  done 
after  the  Mind,  by  any  Means,  is  once  out  of  its  Equilibrium 
and   already  poflelTed  by  an  Inclination,  and  arifing  from  that 
inclination,  has  nothing  of  the  Nature  of  Virtue  or  Vice,   jttid 
is  worthy  of  neither  Elame  nor  Praife.     But  how  plainly  con- 
trary is  this  to  the  univerfal  Senfe  of  Mankind,  and  to  the  No- 
tion they  have  of  fincerely  virtuous  Aftions  ?  Which  is,  that 
they  are  Aftions  which  proceed  from  a  Heart  ivell  difpojed  and 
inclined ;   and  i\-\e,Jifo?/ger,  and  the  move  j^x'd  and  determined  the 
good  Difpofition  of  the  Heart,    the  greater  the   Sincerity  of 
Virtue,  and  fo  the  more  of  the  Truth  and  P>.eality  of  it.     But 
if  there  be  any  Afts  which  are  done  in  a  State  of  Equilibrium, 
or  fpring  immediately  from   perfeft  Indifference  and  Coldnefs 
of  Heart,  they  cannot  arife  from  any  good  Principle  or  Dif- 
pofition in  the  Lleart ;  and  confequently,  according  to  common 
Senfe,  have  no  uncere  Goodnefs  in  them,  having  no  Virtue  of 
Heart  in  them.     To  have  a  virtuous  Heart,  is  to  have  a  Heart 
that  favours  Virtue,  and  is  friendly  to  it,  and  not  one  perfeft- 
ly  cold  and  indifferent  about  it. 

And  befides  the  Aftions  that  are  done  in  a  State  of  Indiffer- 
ence, or  that  arife  immediately  out  of  fuch  a  State,  can't  be 
virtuous,  becaufe,  by  the  Suppofition,  they  are  not  determined 
by  any  preceding  Choice.  For  if  there  be  preceding  Choice, 
then  Choice  intervenes  between  the  Aft  and  the  State  of  In- 
diiFerence  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition  of  the  Aft's 
arifing  immediately  out  of  Indifference.  But  thofe  Afts  which 
are  not  determined  by  preceding  Choice,  can't  be  virtuous  or 
vicious  by  y!?r/«/«/<z«  Principles,  becaufe  they  are  not  determined 
by  the  Will.  '  So  that  neither  one  Way,  nor  the  other,  can  any 
Aftions  be  virtuous  or  vicious  according  to  Arminian  Principles. 
If  the  Aftion  he  determined  by  a  preceding  Aft  of  Choice  it  can't 
be  virtuous ;   becaufe  the  Aftion  is  not  done  in  a  State  of  la- 

difference. 


186   Indifference /;^^o;zy?//^;;/ zc;///?>  Virtue.  Part  llf  ; 

difference,  nor  does  immediately  arife  from  fuch  a  State  ;  and 
fo  is  not  done  in  a  State  of  Liberty.  If  the  Aftion  be  not  de- 
teymined  by  a  precedmg  Aft  of  Choice,  then  it  can't  be  vir- 
tuous ;  becaufe  then  the  Will  is  not  Self-determin'd  in  it.  So 
/that  'tis  made  certain,  that  neither  Virtue  nor  Vice  can  ever 
find  any  Place  in  the  Univerfe. 

Moreover,  that  it  is  neceflary  to  a  virtuous  Aftioa  that  it 
be  performed  in  a  State  of  Indifference,  under  a  Notion  of 
that's  being  a  State  of  Liberty,  is  contrary  to  common  Senfe  ; 
as  'tis  a  Didate  of  Common  Senfe,  that  Indifierence  itfelf,  in 
many  CafeSj  is  vicious,  and  fo  to  a  high  Degree.  As  if  when 
I  fee  my  Neighbour  or  near  Friend,  and  one  who  has  in  the 
highefl  Degree  merited  of  me,  in  extreme  Diftrefs,  and  ready 
io  perifh,  I  find  an  Indifference  in  my  Heart  with  Refpeft  to 
ariy  Thing  propofed  to  be  done,  which  I  can  eafily  do,  for  his 
Relief  :  So  if  it  fhould  be  propofed  to  me,  toblafpheme  God, 
or  kill  my  Father,  of  to  do  numberlefs  other  Things  which 
might  be  mentioned ;  the  being  indifferent,  for  a  Momentj 
would  be  highly  vicious  and  vile. 

And  it  may  be  further  obferved,  that  to  fuppofe  this  Liberty 
of  Indifference  is  effential  to  Virtue  and  Vice,  deitroys  the 
great  Difference  of  Degrees  of  the  Guilt  of  different  Crimes, 
and  takes  avvay  the  Heinoufnefs  of  the  mofl  flagitious  horrid 
Iniquities ;  fuch  as  Adultery  Befliality,  Murder,  Perjury,  Blaf- 
phemy,  &c.  For  according  to  thefe  Principles,  there  is  no 
Harm  at  all  in  having  the  Mind  in  a  State  of  perfeft  Indiffer- 
ence with  Rcfpedl  to  thefe  Crimes;  nay,  'tis  abfolutely  neceffary 
in  order  to  any  Virtue  in  avoiding  them,  or  Vice  in  doing 
them.  But  for  the  Mind  to  be  in  a  State  of  Indifference 
with  Refpeft  to  them>  is  to  be  next  Door  to  doing  them  :  It  is 
then  infinitely  near  to  chufing,  and  fo  committing  the  Faft  : 
For  Equilibrium  is  the  next  Step  to  a  Degree  of  Prepondera- 
tion  ;  and  one,  even  the  leafl  Degree  of  Preponderation  (all 
Things  conlidered)  is  Choice.  And  not  only  {o,  but  for  the 
Will  to  be  in  a  State  of  perfeft  Equilibrium  with  Refpeft  to 
fuch  Crimes,  is  for  the  Mind  to  be  in  fuch  a  State,  as  to  be 
full  as  likely  to  chufe  them  as  to  refufe  them,  to  do  them  as  td 
omit  them.  And  if  our  Minds  mufl  be  in  fuch  a  State 
wherein  it  is  as  near  to  chufing  as  refufing,  aind  wherein  it 
muft  of  Ncceffity,  according  to  the  Nature  of  Things,  be  as 
likely  to  commit  them,  as  to  refrain  from  them  ;  where  is  the 
exceeding  Heinoufnefs  of  chufing  and  committing  them  ?  If 
there  be  no  Harm  in  often  being  in  fuch  a  State,  wherein  the 

Probability 


Seel.  Vi.       O/*  vir/uous  and  vicious  Habits.       1 8i 

Probability  cf  doing  and  forbearing  are  exadly  equal,  there 
being  an  Equillbriun-,,  and  r,o  more  Tendency  to  one  trian  the 
other ;  then  according  to  the  Nnture  and  Laws  of  fuch  a  Con- 
tingcnce,  it  may  be  expeded,  as  an  inen:itable  Confequence  of 
jfuch  a  Difpoiition  of  Things,  that  we  fhould  chufe  them  as 
often  ss  rejedt  them  :  That  it  fhould  generally  fo  fall  out  is  ne- 
ceflary,  as  Equality  in  the  Effefl  is  the  natural  Confequence 
of  the  equal  Tendency  of  the  Caufe,  or  of  the  antecedent 
State  of  Things  from  which  the  EfFeft  arifes :  Why  then 
fnould  we  be  fo  exceedingly  to  blame,    if  it  does  fo  fall  out  ? 

'Tis  many  V\"ays  apparent,  that  the  Arminiait  Scheme  of  Li- 
berty is  utterly  inconhflent  v.-ith  the  being  of  any  fuch  Things 
as  either  virtuous  or  vicious  Habits  or  Difpofitions.  If  Liberty 
of  Indifference  be  eflential  to  moral  Agency,  then  there  can  be 
no  Virtue  in  any  habitual  Inclinations  of  the  Heart ;  which 
are  contrary  to  Indifference,  and  implj^  in  their  Nature  the 
very  Deilruclion  and  Exclufion  cf  it.  They  fuppofc  nothing 
tan  be  virtuous,  in  which  no  Liberty  is  exercifed ;  but  how 
abfurd  is  it  to  talk  of  exercifmg  Indifference  under  Bias  end 
Prepondcration  ! 

And  \'i  fclf-dctermini7ig  Povjer  in  the  Will  be  necefTar)''  to 
nioral  Agency,  Praife,  Blame,  &c.  then  nothing  done  by  the 
Will  can  he  any  further  Praife  or  Blame-worthy,  than  fo  far  as 
the  Will  is  moved,  fwayed  and  determined  by  itfelf,  and  the 
ijcales  turned  by  the  fovereign  Power  the  Wili  has  over  itfeif. 
And  therefore  the  Will  mull  not  be  put  out  of  its  Balance  alrea- 
dy, the  Preponderation  muff  not  be  determined  and  efTecled  be- 
fore-hand ;  and  fo  the  felf-determining  Aft  anticipated.  Thus 
it  appears  another  Way,  that  habitual  Bias  is  inconfiilent  with 
that  Libert)^  which  Arminians  fuppofe  to  be  necefTary  to  Virtue 
or  Vice ;  and  fo  it  follows,  that  habitual  Bias  itfelf  cannot  be 
cither  virtuous  or  vicious. 

The  fame  Thing  follows  from  their  Doflrine  concerning 
thclnconfirtence  of  iV^-tYj^/y  with  Liberty,  Praife,  Difpraife,  &c. 
Kone  will  deny,  that  Bias  and  Inclination  riiay  be  fo  ftrong  as 
to  be  invincible,  and  leave  no  FoiTibility  of  the  Will's  determin- 
ing contrary  to  it ;  and  fo  be  attended  with  Neceffity.  This 
Dr.  Whitby  allows  concerning  the  Will  of  God,  Angels  and 
glorified  Saints,  with  Refpeft  to  Good ;  and  the  Will  of 
Devils  with  Refpcd  to  Evil.  Therefore  if  NecefTity  be  incon- 
fiftent  with  Liberty  ;  then  when  fix'd  Inclination  is  to  fuch  a 
Degree  of  Strength,  it  utterly  excludes  all  Virtue,  Vice,  Psaife, 

A  a  oc. 


1 82  Of  virtuous  P^rt  IlL 

©r  Blame.  And  if  fo,  then  the  nearer  Habits  are  to  this 
Strength,  the  more  do  they  impede  Liberty,  and  fo  diminifh 
Praife  and  Blame.  .  If  very  ftrong  Habits  deftroy  Liberty,  the 
lefier  Ones  proportionably  hinder  it,  according  to  their  Degree 
of  Strength.  And  therefore  it  will  follow,  that  then  is  the 
Aft  moil  virtuous  or  vicious,  when  performed  without  any 
Inclination  or  habitual  Bias  at  all ;  becaufe  it  Is  then  perform- 
ed with  moft  Liberty. 

Every  pre-pofleffing  fix'd  Bias  on  the  Mind  brings  a  Degree 
of  moral  Inability  for  the  contrary  ;  becaufe  fo  far  as  the  Mind 
rs  biafled  and  pre-pofleffed,  fo  much  Hindrattce  is  there  of  the 
contrary.  And  therefore  if  moral  Inability  be  inconfiftent  with 
moral  Agency,  or  the  Nature  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  then  fo  far 
as  there  is  any  fuch  Thing  as  evil  Difpcfition  of  Heart,  ot  ha; 
bitual  Depravity  of  Inclination  j  whether  Covetoufnefs,  Pride, 
Malice,  Cruelt)^  or  whatever  elfe ;  fo  much  the  more  excuf- 
able  Perfons  are  ;  fo  much  the  lefs  have  their  evil  Afts  of  thi^ 
Kind,  the  Nature  of  Vice.  And  on  the  contrary,  whatever 
excellent  Difpofitions  and  Inclinations  they  have,  fo  much  are 
they  the  lefs  virtuous. 

'Tis  evident,  that  no  habitual  IMfpofition  of  Heart,  whether 
it  be  to  a  greater  or  leffer  Degree,  can  be  in  a7iy  Degree  \\r>- 
tuous  or  vicious  ^  or  the  Adions  which  proceed  from  them 
ai  all  Praife  or  Blame-worthy.  Becaufe,  tho'  we  fhould  fup- 
pofe  the  Habit  not  to  be  of  fuch  Strength  as  wholly  to  take 
away  all  moral  Ability  and  "felf-determining  Power  ;  or  hin- 
der but  that,  altho'  the  Aft  be  partly  from  Bias,  yet  it  may 
be  in  Part  from  Self-determination  ;  yet  in  this  Cafe,  all  that 
is  from  antecedent  Bias  muft  be  fct  afiJe,  as  of  no  Confidera^ 
tion  ;  and  in  eftimating  the  Degree  of  Virtue  or  Vice,  no 
more  muft  be  confidered  than  what  arifes  from  felf- determin- 
ing Pov.'er,  without  any  Influence  of  that  Bias,  becaufe  Liberty 
is  exercifed  in  no  more  :  So  that  all  that  is  the  Exercife  of 
lia:bitual  Inclination,  is  thrown  away,  as  not  belonging  to  the 
Morality  of  the  Aftion.  By  which  it  appears,  that  no  Exer- 
cife of  thefe  Habits,  let  them  be  ftronger  or  weaker,  can  ever 
have  any  Thing  of  the  Nature  of  either  Virtue  or  Vice. 

Here  if  any  one  (hould  fay,  that  notwithftanding  all  thefe 
Things,  there  may  be  the  Nature  of  Virtue  and  Vice  in  Habits 
of  the  Mind ;  becaufe  thefe  Habits  may  be  the  EfFefts  of 
thofe  Afts  wherein  the  Mind  exercifed  iLiberty ;  that  how- 
ever the  forementioii'd  Reafons  will   prove  that  no   Habits 


Sc(5i.  VI.  iind  vicious  "Hiihits.  iSj 

v/hich  are  natural,  or  that  any  are  born  or  created  with  us,  can 
be  either  virtuous  or  vicious  ;  yet  they  will  not  prove  this  of 
Habits,  which  have  been  acquired  and  eftablifti'd  by  repeated 
free  Ads. 

To  fuch  an  Objeftor  I  would  fay,  that  this  Evafion  will  not 
at  all  help  the  Matter.  For  if  Freedom  of  Will  be  eflential  to 
the  very  Nature  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  then  t  lie  re  is  no  Virtue 
or  Vice  but  only  in  that  very  Thing,  wherein  this  Liberty  is 
exercifed.  If  a  Man  in  one  or  more  Things  that  he  does,  ex- 
ercifes  Liberty,  and  then  by  thofe  Afts  is  brought  into  fuch 
Circumltances,  that  his  Liberty  ceafes,  and  there  follows  a 
long  Series  of  A&s  or  Events  that  come  to  pafs  neceffarily  ; 
thofe  confequeni:  AQs  are  not  virtuous  or  vicious,  rewardable 
or  punil-hable  ;  but  only  the  free  Ads  that  eftablifh'd  this  Ne- 
eeffity  ;  for  in  them  alone  was  the  Man  free.  The  following 
EtFeds  that  are  neceffary,  have  no  more  of  the  Naiure  of  Vir- 
tue or  Vice,  than  Health  or  Sicknefs  of  Body  have  properly 
the  Nature  of  Virtue  or  Vice,  being  the  EfFeds  of  a  Courfe  of 
free  Ads  of  Temperance  or  Intemperance  ;  or  than  the  good 
Qualities  of  a  Clock  are  of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  which  are 
the  Effeds  of  free  Ads  of  the  Artificer  ;  or  the  Goodnefs  and 
Sweetnefs  of  the  Fruits  of  a  Garden  are  moral  Virtues,  being 
the  Efieds  of  the  free  and  faithful  Ads  of  the  Gardener.  If 
Liberty  be  abfolutely  requifite  to  the  Morality  of  Adions,  and 
Neceifity  wholly  inconfiitent  with  it,  as  Arminiatn  greatly  in- 
fift  ;  then  no  7iecej[fary  Effeds  whatfoever,  let  the  Caule  be  never 
fo  good  or  bad,  can  be  virtuous  or  vicious ;  but  the  Virtue  or 
Vice  muft  be  only  in  the  free  Cartfe.  Agreeably  to  this.  Dr.' 
Whitby  fuppofes,  the  Neceffity  that  attends  the  good  and 
evil  Habits  of  the  Saints  in  Heaven,  and  Damned  in  Hell, 
which  are  the  Confequence  oi  their  free  Ads  in  their  State  of 
Probation,  are  not  rewardable  or  punifhabie. 

On  the  Whole,  it  appears,  that  if  the  Notions  of  Armintnns 
eoneerning  Liberty  and  moral  Agency  be  true,  it  will  follow 
that  there  is  no  Virtue  in  any  fuch  Habits  or  Qualities  as 
Humility,  Meeknefs,  Patience,  Mercy,  Gratitude,  Generofity, 
Heavenly-mindednefs  :  Nothing  at  all  Praife-worthy  in  loving 
Chrift  above  Father  and  Mother,  Vv^ife  and  Children,  or  our 
own  Lives  ;  or  in  Delight  in  Holinefs,  hungering  and  thirfting 
after  Righteoufnefs,  Love  to  Enemies,  univerfal  Benevolence 
to  Mankind.  And  on  the  other  Hand,  there  is  Nothing  at  all 
vicious,  or  worthy  of  Difpraife,  in  the  moft  fordid,  beaftly, 
ftialignant,  devilifh  Difpofuions ;  in  being  ungrateful,  profane, 

A  a  3  habitually 


1 84  Arminianifm  inconfiftcnt  Part  IIL^ 

habitually  hating  God,  and  Things  facred  and  holy  ;  or  in. 
being  mofl  treacherous,  envious  and  cruel  towards  Men.  For 
all  thefe  Things  are  Difpojitions  and  Inclhmtions  of  the  Heart. 
And  in  fnort,  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as  any  virtuous  or  vici^ 
pus  'Surdity  of  Mind ;  no  fuch  Thing  as  inherent  Virtue  and 
Holinefs,  or  Vice  and  Sin  :  And  the  ftronger  thofe  Habits  or 
Difpoiitions  are,  which  ufed  to  be  called  virtuous  and  vicious, 
the  further  they  are  from  being  fo  indeed ;  the  more  violent 
Men's  Lufts  are,  the  more  fix'd  their  Pride,  Envy,  Ingratitude 
and-Malicioufnefs,  ftill  the  further  are  they  from  being  blame- 
worthy. If  there  be  a  Man  that  by  his  own  repeated  Acls, 
or  by  any  other  Means,  is  come  to  be  of  the  raoft  hellifti 
i)ifpo(ition,  defperately  inclined  to  treat  his  Neighbours  with 
Injurioufncfs,  Contempt  and  Malignity ;  the  further  they 
ihould  be  from  any  Difpofition  to  be  angrv  with  Him,  or  in 
the  leaft  to  blame  Him.  So  on  the  other  iland,  if  there  be  a. 
Perfon,  who  is  of  a  moft  excellent  Spirit,  ftrcngly  inclining 
him  to  the  moft  amiable  Adtions,  admirably  meek,  benevolent, 
&c.  fo  much  is  he  further  from  any  Thing  rewardable  or  com- 
mendable. On  which  Principles,  the  Man  Jefus  Chrift  was 
very  far  from  being  Praife-worthy  for  thofe  Ads  of  Holinefs 
and  Kindnefs  which  He  performed,  thefe  Propenfities  being  fo 
ftrong  in  his  Heart.  And  above  all,  the  infinitely  holy  and 
gracious  God,  is  infinitely  remote  from  any  Thing  commend- 
able, his  good  Incbnations  being  infinitely  ftrong,  and  He 
therefore  at  the  utmoft  poiTible  Diftance  from  being  at  Liberty. 
And  in  all  Cafes,  the  ftronger  the  Inclinations  of  any  are  to 
Virtue,    and  the  more  they  love  it,    the  lefs  virtuous  they 

are ;  and  the  more  they  love  Wickednefs,  the  lefs  vicious.' • 

Whether  thefe  Things  are  agreeable  to  Scripture,  let  every 
Chriftian,  and  every  Man  who  has  read  the  Bible,  judge  :  and 
whether  they  are  agreeable  to  common  Senfe,  let  every  one 
judge,  that  have  human  Undcrftanding  in  Exercife. 

And  if  we  purfue  thefe  Principles,  we  fhall  find  that  Vir- 
tue and  Vice  are  wholly  excluded  out  of  the  World  ;  and  that 
there  never  was,  nor  ever  can  be  any  fuch  Thing  as  one  or 
tjie  other ;  either  in  God,  Angels  or  Men.  No  Propenfity, 
Difpofition  or  Habit  can  be  virtuous  or  vicious,  as  has  been 
Hiewn  ;  becaufe  they,  fo  far  as  they  take  Place,  deftroy  the 
Freedom   of  the  Will,    the  Foundation   of  all   moral  Agency, 

and  exclude   all  Capacity   of  either  Virtue   or  Vice. 

And  if  Habits  and  Difpofitions  themfelves  be  not  virtuous 
nor  vicious,  neither  can  the  Exercife  of  thefe  Difpofitions  be 
fo  :    For  the  Exercife  of  Bias  is  not  the  Exercife  oi  free /elf- 

determining 


Seel.  VII.    with  moral  Habits  and  Motives.       1 85 

ietcrminwg  Will,  and  fo  there  is  no  Exercife  of  Liberty  in  it. 
Confequently  no  Man  is  virtuous  or  vicious,  eitherjn  being  well 
or  ill  difpofed,  nor  in  aifting  from  a  good  or  bad  Difpofuion. 
And  wliether  this  Bias  or  Difpofitidn  be  habitual  or  not,  if  it 
cxifts  but  a  Moment  before  the  MX  of  Will,  which  is  the 
Effed  of  it,  it  alters  not  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  Neceffity  of  the 
Efieft.  Or  if  there  be  no  previous  Difpoiition  at  all,  either 
habitual  or  occafional,  that  determines  the  Aft,  then  it  is  not 
Choice  that  determines  it :  It  is  therefore  a  Contingence,  that 
happens  to  the  Man,  arifing  from  Nothing  in  him  ;  and  is 
necelTary,  as  to  any  Inclination  or  Choice  of  his;  and  there- 
fore can't  make  Him  either  the  better  or  worfe,  any  more  than 
a  Tree  is  better  than  other  Trees,  becaufe  it  oftener  happens 
to  be  lit  upon  by  a  Swan  or  Nightingale ;  or  a  Rock  more 
vicious  than  other  Rocks,  becaufe  Rattle-Snakes  have  happen'd 
ofrener  to  crawl  over  it.  So  that  there  is  no  Virtue  nor  Vice 
in  good  or  bad  Difpofitions,  either  fix'd  or  tranfient  ;  nor  any 
Virtue  or  Vice  in  afting  from  any  good  or  bad  previous  In- 
clination ;  nor  yet  any  Virtue  or  Vice  in  afting  wholly  with- 
out any  previous  Inclination.  Where  then  fball  wc  find  Room 
for  Virtue  or  Vice  ? 


j>0«k2>oO''0>0'0<0'0'^'0'><S>'>0'><5>>'0'»<S><kS)»o^ 


Section   VII. 

Arminian  Notions  of  moral  Agency  inconfiflent  with 
all  Influence  of  Motive  and  Inducement,  in  either 
virtuous  or  vicious  Anions. 

AS  Arminian  Notions  of  that  Liberty,  which  Is  eflential  to 
Virtue  or  Vice,  are  inconfiflent  with  common  Senfe,  in 
their  being  inconfiftent  with  all  virtuous  or  vicious  Habits  and 
Difpofitions ;  fo  they  are  no  lefs  fo  in  their  Inconfxftency  with 
-11  Influence  of  motives  in  moral  AAious, 


1 86    Motive  and  Induccmtnt  tnconJl^ent  Part  III. 

'Tis  equally  againft  thofe  Notions  of  Liberty  of  Will,  whe- 
ther there  be,  previous  to  the  Acl:  of  Choice,  a  Preponde- 
rancy  of  the  Inclination,  or  a  Preponderancy  of  thofe  Circum- 
ftances,  which  have  a  Tendency  to  move  the  Inclination : 
And  indeed  it  comes  to  juft  the  fame  Thing.  To  fay,  the  Cir- 
cumftances  of  the  Mind  are  fuch  as  tend  to  fvvay  and  turn  its 
Inclination  one  Way,  is  the  fame  Thing  as, to  fay,  the  Incli- 
nation of  the  Mind,  as  under  fuch  Circumftances,  tends  that 
Way. 

Or  if  any  think  it  moft  proper  to  fay,  that  Motives  do  alter 
the  Inclination,  and  give  a  new  Bias  to  the  Mind  ;  it  will  not 
alter  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  prefent  Argument.  For  if  Motives 
operate  by  giving  the  Mind  an  Inclination,  then  they  operate 
by  deftroying  the  Mind's  Indifference,  and  laying  it  under  a 
Bias.  But  to  do  this,  is  to  deftroy  the  Arminian  Freedom  :  It 
is  not  to  leave  the  Will  to  its  own  Self-determination,  but  to 
bring  it  into  Subjeftion  to  the  Power  of  fomething  extrinfick, 
which  operates  upon  it,  fways  and  determines  it,  previous  to 
its  own   Determination.     So  that  what  is  done  from  Motive, 

can't  be  either  virtuous  or  vicious. And  befides,  if  the  Atta 

of  the  Will  are  excited  by  Motives,  thofe  Motives  are  the 
Caufes  of  thofe  Afts  of  the  Will  :  which  makes  the  Ads  of 
the  Will  neceflary  ;  as  Efrefts  neceffarily  follow  the  Efficiency 
of  the  Caufe.  And  if  the  Influence  and  Power  of  the  Mo- 
tive caufes  the  Volition,  then  the  Influence  of  the  Motive 
determines  Volition,  and  Volition  don't  determine  itfelf; 
and  fo  is  not  free,  in  the  Senfe  of  Armlnians  (as  has  beei\^ 
largely  fhewn  already)  and  confequently  can  be  neither  virtu- 
ous nor  vicious. 

The  Suppofition,  which  has  already  been  taken  Notice  of  as 
an  infufficient  Evafion  in  other  Cafes,  would  be  in  like  Manner 
impertinently  alledged  in  this  Cafe  ;  namely,  the  Suppofition 
that  Liberty  confifts  in  a  Power  of  fufpending  AAion  for  the 
prefent,  in  order  to  Deliberation.  If  it  fliould  be  faid,  Tho* 
it  be  true,  that  the  Will  is  under  a  NecefTity  of  finally  follow- 
ing the  ftrongeft  Motive,  yet  it  may  for  the  prefent  forbear  to 
ad  upon  the  Motive  prefented,  till  there  has  been  Opportunity 
thoroughly  to  confider  it,  and  compare  its  real  Weight  with  thoi 
Merit  of  other  Motives.     I  anfwer,  as  follows : 

Here  again  it  muft  be  remember'd,  that  if  determining  thus 
to  fufpend  and  confidef,  be  that  Ad  of  the  Will  wherein  aloite 
Liberty  is  exercifed,    then  in  this  all  Virtue  and  Vice  mult 

confift  J 


Scd.  VII.     wilh  Arminian  Virtue  and  Vice.      1 87 

confift;  and  the  A(Ss  that  follow  this  Confxderation,  and  are 
the  Efteds  of  it,  being  necefiary,  are  no  more  virtuous  or 
vicious  than  fome  good  or  bad  Events  which  happen  when  they 
are  fall  afleep,  and  are  the  Confequences  of  what  they  did  when 
they  were  awake.  Therefore  I  would  here  obferve  two 
Things. 

1 .  To  fuppofe  that  all  Virtue  and  Vice,  in  every  Cafe,  con- 
fifts  in  determining  whether  to  take  Time  for  Confideration, 
or  not,  is  not  agreeable  to  common  Senfe.  For  according  to 
fuch  a  Suppofition,  the  moft  horrid  Crimes,  Adultery,  Murder, 
Buggery,  Blafphemy,  &c.  do  not  at  all  confift  in  the  horrid 
Nature  of  the  Things  themfelves,  but  only  in  the  Negleft  of 
thorough  Confideration  before  they  were  perpetrated  :  which 
brings  their  Vicioufnefs  to  a  fmall  Matter,  and  makes  all 
Crimes  equal.  If  it  be  faid,  that  Negleft  of  Confideration, 
when  fuch  heinous  Evils  are  propofed  to  Choice,  is  worfe  than 
in  other  Cafes :  I  anfwer,  this  is  inconfiftent,  as  it  fuppofes 
the  very  Thing  to  be,  which  at  the  fame  Time  is  fuppofed 
not  to  be ;  it  fuppofes  all  moral  Evil,  all  Vicioufnefs  and  Hei- 
noufnefs,  does  not  confift  merely  in  the  want  of  Confideration. 
It  fuppofes  fome  Crimes  in  them/el'ves,  in  their  oivn  Nature,  to 
be  more  heinous  than  others,  antecedent  to  Confideration  or 
Inconfideration,  which  lays  the  Perfon  under  a  previous  Obli- 
gation to  confider  in  fome  Cafes  more  than  others. 

2.  If  it  were  fo,  that  all  Virtue  and  Vice,  in  every  Cafe, 
confifted  only  in  the  A6t  of  the  Will,  whereby  it  determines 
whether  to  confider  or  no,  it  would  not  alter  the  Cafe  in  the 
leaft,  as  to  the  prefent  Argument.  For  ftill  m  this  Aft  of  the 
Will  on  this  Determination,  it  is  induced  by  fome  Motive,  and 
neceflarily  follows  the  ftrongeft  Motive ;  and  fo  is  neceflfary, 
even  in  that  Aft  wherein  alon^  it  is  either  virtuous  or  vicious. 

One  Thing  more  I  would  obferve,  concerning  the  Incon- 
fiftence  of  Arminian  Notions  of  moral  Agency  with  the  Influ- 
ence of  Motives. 1  fuppofe  none  will  deny,  that  'tispoflible 

for  Motives  to  be  fet  before  the  Mind  fo  powerful,  and  exhibit- 
ed in  fo  ftrong  a  Light,  and  under  fo  advantageous  Circumftances, 
as  to  be  invincible  ;  and  fuch  as  the  Mind  cannot  but  yield 
to.  In  this  Cafe,  Arminians  will  doubtlefs  fay,  Liberty  is  de- 
ftroyed.  And  if  fo,  then  if  Motives  are  exhibited  with  half 
fo  much  Power,  they  hinder  Liberty  in  Proportion  to  their 
Strength,  and  go  half  way  towards  deftroying  it.  If  a 
Thoufand  Degrees  of  Motive  abolidi   all  Liberty,  then  five 

Hundred 


l8S    Arm'inhn  Argmneni  fmn  f he  Sincerity  P.  Ill;: 

Hundred  take  it  half  away.  If  one  Degree  of  the  Influence 
bf  Motive  don't  at  all  infringe  or  diminiih  Liberty,  then  no 
more  do  two  Degrees  ;  for  Notiung  doubled,  is  ftill  Nothing. 
And  if  two  Degrees  don't  diminifh  the  Will's  Liberty,  no 
more  do  four,  eight,  fixteen,  or  fix  Thoufand.  For  Nothing 
multiplied  never  fo  much,  comes  to  but  Nothing.  If  there  be 
nothing  in  the  Nature  of  Motive  or  moral  Suafion,  that  is  at 
all  oppofite  to  Liberty,  then  the  greateft  Degree  of  it  can't 
hurt  Liberty,  But  if  there  be  any  Thing  in  the  Nature  of 
the  Thing,  that  is  againft  Liberty,  then  the  leaft  Degree  of  it 
hurts  it  in  fome  Degree ;  and  confequently  hurts  and  dirr.i- 
ni (lies  Virtue.  If  in\incible  Motives  to  that  Aftion  which  is 
good,  take  away  all  the  Freedom  of  the  Aft,  and  fo  all  the 
Virtue  of  it ;  then  the  more  forceable  the  Motives  are,  fo  much 
the  worfe,  fo  much  the  lefs  Virtue  ;  and  the  weaker  the  Mo- 
tives are,  the  better  for  the  Caufe  of  Virtue  ;  and  none  is  beft 
of  all. 

Now  let  it  be  confidered,  whether  thefe  Things  are  agreeable 
to  common  Senfe.  If  it  (hould  be  allowed,  that  there  are 
fome  Inftances  wherein  the  Soul  chufes  without  any  Motive^ 
what  Virtue  can  there  be  in  fuch  a  Choice  ?  I  am  fure,  there 
is  no  Prudence  or  Wifdom  in  it.  Such  a  Choice  is  mads  for 
no  good  End  ;  for  it  is  for  no  End  at  all.  If  it  were  for  any 
End,  the  View  of  the  End  would  be  the  Motive  exciting  td 
the  Aft  ;  and  if  the  Aft  be  for  no  good  End,  and  fo  from  no 
good  Aim,  then  there  is  no  good  Intention  in  it :  And  there- 
fore, according  to  all  our  natural  Notions  of  Virtue,  no  mor6 
Virtue  in  it  than  in  the  Motion  of  the  Smoke,  which  is  driven 
to  and  fro  by  the  Wind,  without  any  Aim  or  End  in  the  Thing 
moved,  and  which  knows  not  whether,  nor  why  and  wherefore, 
it  is  moved. 

Coral.  I.  By  thefe  Things  it  appears,  that  the  Argument 
againft  the  Cdl-vinifis,  taken  from  the  Ufeof  Coi;nfels,  Exhor- 
tations, Invitations,  Expoftulations,  &:c.  fo  much  infifted  on 
by  Arminians,  is  truly  againft  themfelves.  For  thefe  Things 
can  operate  no  other  Way  to  any  good  EfFeft,  than  as  in 
them  is  exhibited  Motive  and  Inducement,  tending  to  excite 
and  determine  the  Afts  of  the  Will.  But  it  follows  on  their 
Principles,  that  the  Afts  of  Will  excited  by  fuch  Caufes,  can't 
be  virtuous ;  becaufe  fo  far  as  they  are  from  thefe,  they 
are  not  from  the  Will's  felf-determining  Power.  Hence  it 
will  follow,  that  it  is  not  worth  the  while  to  offer  any  Argu- 
ments to  perfwade  Men  to  any  virtuous  Volition  or  voluntary 

Aftion  I 


Scd.Vii.  o/"lnvitations,^<:.  ^^-^//^/themfelves.  iSg 

Aftion  ;  '  "tis  in  vain  to  fet  before  them  the  Wifdom  and 
Amiablenefs  of  Ways  ©f  Virtue,  or  the  Odioufnefs  and 
Folly  ot  Ways  of  Vice.  This  Notion  of  Liberty  and  moral 
Agency  frulirates  all  Endeavours  to  draw  Men  to  Virtue 
by  Inftruflion,  or  Perfwafion,  Precept,  or  Example  :  For  tho* 
thefe  Things  may  induce  Men  to  what  is  materially  virtuous, 
yet  at  the  fame  Time  they  take  away  the  Form  of  Virtue, 
becaufe  they  deftroy  Liberty ;  as  they,  by  their  own  Power, 
put  the  Will  out  of  its  Equilibrium,  determine  and  turn  the 
i>cale,  and  take  the  Work  of  felf-determining  Power  out  of 
its  Hands.  And  the  clearer  the  Inftruftions  are  that  are  given, 
the  more  powerful  the  Arguments  that  are  ufed,  and  the  more 
moving  the  Perfwafions  or  Examples,  the  more  likely  they  are 
to  fruftrate  their  own  Defign  ;  becaufe  they  have  fo  much  the 
greater  Tendency  to  put  the  Will  out  of  its  Balance,  to  hinder 
its  Freedom  of  felf-detcrmination ;  and  fo  to  exclude  the 
very  Form  of  Virtue,  and  the  Effence  of  wbatfoever  is  Praife- 
n'orthy. 

So  it  clearly  follows  from  thefc  Principles,  that  God  has  no 
Hand  in  any  Man's  Virtue,  nor  does  at  all  promote  it,  eichec 
by  a  phyfical  or  moral  Influence ;  that  none  of  the  moral 
Methods  He  ufes  with  Men  to  promote  Virtue  in  the  Worlds 
have  Tendency  to  the  Attainment  of  that  End ;  that  all  the 
Inftruftions  which  He  has  given  to  Men,  from  the  Beginning 
of  the  World  to  this  Day,  by  Prophets,  or  Apoftles,  or  by  his 
Son  Jefus  Chrift  ;  that  all  his  Coanfels,  Invitations,  Promifes, 
Threatnings,  Warnings  and  Expoftulations ;  that  all  Means 
He  has  ufed  with  Men,  in  Ordinances,  or  Providences  j  yea, 
all  Influences  of  his  Spirit,  ordinary  and  extraordinary,  have 
had  no  Tendency  at  all  to  excite  any  one  virtuous  A<fl  of  the 
Mind,  or  to  promote  any  Thing  morally  good  and  commend- 
able,   in  any  Refped. For  theie  is  no  Way  that  thefe  or 

any  other  Means  can  promote  Virtue,  but  one  of  thefe  three. 
Either  (i.)  By  a  phyfical  Operation  on  the  Heart.  But  all 
EfFedls  that  are  wrought  in  Men  in  this  Way,  have  no  Virtue 
in  them,  by  the  concurring  Voice  of  all  Arminians,  Or  (z.) 
Morally,  by  exhibiting  Motives  to  the  Underftanding,  to  excite 
good  Afts  in  the  Will.  But  it  has  been  demonftrated,  that 
Volitions  which  are  excited  by  Motives,  are  neceflfary,  and  not 
excited  by  a  felf-moving  Power  ;  and  therefore,  by  their  Prin- 
ciples, there  is  no  Virtue  in  them.  Or  (3.)  By  merely  giving 
the  Will  an  Opportunity  to  determine  itfelf  concerning 
the  Objefts  propofed,  either  to  chufe  or  rcjed,  by  its  own 
Mncaufed,  umuoved,  uninfluenced  Self-determination,  And  if 

B  b  cttTa 


f9<>     Arminianifm  excludes  all  Virtue^      Part-  lit- 

diis  be  all,  then  ail  thofe  Means  do  no  more  to  promote  Vir- 
tue, than  Vice  :  For  they  do  Nothing  but  give  the  Will- 
Opportunity  to  determine  itfelf  either  Way,  either  to  Good 
dr  Bad,  without  laying  it  under  any  Bias  to  either  :  And  fo 
there  is  really  as  much  of  an  Opuortunity  given  to  determine 
sn  Favour  of  Evil,  as  of  Good. 

Thus  that  horrid  blafphemous  Confequence  will  certainly 
follow  from  the  Arminian  Doftrine,  which  they  charge  on 
others ;  namely,  that  God  afls  an  inconfiftent  Part  in  ufmg 
fo  many  Counfels,  Warnings,  Invitations,  Intreaties,  &c,  with 
Sinners,  to  induce  them  to  forfake  Sin,  and  turn  to  the  Ways  of 
Virtue ;  and  that  all  are  infincere  and  fallacious.  It  will  fol- 
low from  their  Doftrine,  that  God  does  thefe  Things  when.' 
He  knows  at  the  fame  Time,  that  they  have  no  Manner  of 
Tendency  to  promote  the  EfFeft  He  feems  to  aim  at ;  yea, 
knows  that  if  they  have  any  Influence,  this  very  Influence 
will  be  inconfiftent  with  fuch  an  EfFeft,  and  will  prevent  it. 
But  what  an  Imputation  of  Infincerity  would  this  fix  on  Him 
who  is  infinitely  holy  and  true  ! — So  that  their's  is  the  Doftrine 
which  if  purfued  in  its  Confequences,  does  horribly  reflefl:  on 
the  moft  High,  and  fix  on  Him  the  Charge  of  Hypocrify  ;  and 
HOt  the  Dottrine  of  the  CaWinifi ;  according  to  their  frequent, 
and  vehement  Exclamations  and  Invedives. 

Corol.  2.  From  what  has  been  obferved  in  this  Seftlon,  it 
again  appears,  that  Arminmn  Principles  and  Notions,  when- 
fairly  examined,  and  purfued  in  their  demonftrable  Confe- 
quences, do  evidently  fliut  all  Virtue  out  of  the  World,  and 
make  it  impoflible  that  there  fliould  ever  be  any  fuch  Thing,, 
in  any  Caie ;  or  that  any  fuch  Thing  Ihould  ever  be  conceiv'd 
of.  For  by  thefe  Principles,  the  very  Notion  of  Virtue  or 
Vice  implies  Abfurdity  and  Contradiction  :  For  it  is  abfurd  in 
kfelf,  and  contrary  to  common  Senfe,  to  fuppofe  a  virtuous 
A&  of  Mind  without  any  good  Intention  or  Aim.  And  by 
their  Principles,  it  i.s  abfurd  to  fuppofe  a  virtuous  Aft  with  a 
good  Intention  or  Aim  ;  for  to  aft  for  an  End,  is  to  aft  from 
a  Motive.  So  that  if  we  rely  on  thefe  Principles,  there  can 
be  no  virtuous  Aft  with  a  good  Defign  and  End ;  and  'tis 
lelf-evident,  there  can  be  none  without :  confequently  there 
can  be  no  virtuous  Aft  at  all. 

Carol.  3.  'Tis  manifeft,  that  Arminian  Notions  of  moral 
Agency,  and  the  Being  of  a  Faculty  of  Will,  cannot  confift  to>- 
gether  J  and  that  if  there  be  an/  fuch  Thing  as,  either  a  vi?- 

tUOUSj 


Sedt.VIL     andYiot.miofffjeJVorld.  191 

tuous,  or  vicious  Aft,  it  can't  be  an  Aft  of  Will;  no  Will  can 

be  at  all  concerned  in  it.     For  that  Aft  which  is  performed 

without  Inclination,    without  Motive,  without  End,  niuft  be 

performed  without  any  concern  of  the  Will.     To  fiippofe  an 

Aft  of  the  Will  without   thefe,  implies  a  Contradiftion.     If 

the  Soul  in  its  Aft  h?s  no  Motive  or  End ;  then  in  that  Aft 

(as  was  obferved  before)  it  feeks  Nothing,  goes  after  Nothing, 

exerts  no  Inclination  to  any  Thing ;    and  this  implies,    that  in 

that  Aft  it  defires  Nothing,  and^bufes  Nothing  ;  fothat  there 

is  no  Aft  of  Choice  in  the  Cafe  :  And  that  is  as  much  as  to  fay, 

there  is  no   Aft  of  Will  jniheCafe.     Which  very  efFeftually 

ihuts  out  all  vicious  and   virtuous   Afts  out  of  the  Univerfe^ 

in  as  much  as,  according  to   this,   there  can   be  no  vicious  or 

virtuous  Aft  wherein  the  Will  is  concerned  ;    and  according 

to  the  plaineft  Diftates  of  Reafon,  and  the  Light  of  Nature, 

and  alfo  the  Principles  of  Arminians   themfelves,  there  c^n  be 

no  virtuous  or  vicious  Aft  wherein  the  Will  is  not  concerned. 

And  therefore  there  is  no  Room  for  any  virtuous  or  vicious 

Afts  at  all. 

Carol.  4.  If  none  of  the  moral  Aftions  of  intelligent  Beings 
are  influenced  by  either  previous  Inclination  or  Motive,  ano- 
ther ftrange  Thing  will  follow  ;  and  this  is,  that  God  not  - 
only  can't  foreknow  any  of  the  future  moral  Aftions  of  his 
Creatures,  but  He  can  make  no  Conjefture,  can  give  no  pro- 
bable Guefs  concerning  them.  For,  all  Conjefture  in  Thi«gs 
of  this  Nature,  muft  depend  on  fome  Difcerning  or  Appre- 
henfion  of  thefe  two  Things,  prc'vio.us  Di/pojitio?!,  and  Moti've  ; 
which,  as  has  been  obferved,  Arminian  Notions  of  moraj 
Agency,  in  -thpir  real  Confequence,  altogether  exclude. 


g  b  I 


PART 


(    19^    ) 

PART      IV. 

Wherein  the  chief  Grounds  of  the 
Reafonings  oi  Arminians^  in  Sup- 
port and  Defence  of  the  foremen- 
tion'd  Notions  of  Liberty^  7noral 
Agency^  &^c.  and  againft  the  op^ 
pofite  Dodtrine,  are  confidered. 

Section     I. 

^je  ElTence  of  the  Virtue  and  Vice  of  Dijpofitions  of 
the  Hearty  and  A5ls  of  the  Willy  lies  not  in  their 
Caufe,  but  in  their  Nature. 

^•O*©*^  N  E  main  Foundation  of  the  Reafons,  which  are 
A  brought  to  eftablifh  the  foremention'd  Notions  of 
O  A  Liberty,  Virtue,  Vice,  &c.  is  a  Suppofition,  that 
^  the  Virtuoufncfs  of  the  Difpofitions  or  Ads  of  the 
^s£>«o<<^  Will  confifts  not  in  the  Nature  of  thefe  Difpofi- 
tions or  Adls,  but  wholly  in  the  Origin  or  Caufe  of  them:  ti% 
that  if  the  Difpofition  of  the  Mind  or  Aft  of  the  Will  be  never 
fo  good,  yet  if  the  Caufe  of  the  Difpofition  or  Aft  be  not  our 
Virtue,  there  is  nothing  virtuous  or  praife-worthy  in  it ;  and 
cn  the  contrary,  if  the  Will  iiv  its  Inclination  or  Afts  be  ne- 
ver 


SediA.     Of  the  "E^tnct  of  Virtue  and  Vice.        193 

yer  fo  bad,  yet  unlefs  it  arifes  from  fomething  that  is  our  Vice 
or  Fault,  there  is  Nothing  vicious  or  blame-worthy  in  it. 
Hence  their  grand  Objedlion  and  pretended  Demonftration,  or 
Self-evidence,  againft  any  Virtue  and  Commendablenefs,  or 
Vice  and  Blame-worthinefs,  of  thofe  Habits  or  Ads  of  the 
Will,  which  are  not  from  fome  virtuous  or  vicious  Determina- 
tion of  the  Will  itfelf. 

Now,  if  this  Matter  be  well  confidered,  it  will  appear  to  be 
altogether  a  Miftake,  yea,  a  grofs  Abfurdity ;  and  that  it  is 
moft  certain,  that  if  there  be  any  fuch  Things,  as  a  virtuous, 
or  vicious  Difpofition,  or  Volition  of  Mind,  the  Virtuoufnefa 
or  Vicioufnefs  of  them  confif^s  not  in  the  Origin  or  Caufe  of 
thefe  Things,  but  in  the  Nature  of  them. 

If  the  Kflence  of  Virtuonfrefs  or  Commendablenefs,  and 
of  Vicioufnefs  or  Fault,  don't  lie  in  the  Nature  of  the  Difpo- 
fitions  or  Afts  of  Mind,  which  are  faid  to  be  our  Virtue  or 
our  Fault,  but  in  their  Caufe,  then  it  is  certain  it  lies  no 
■where  at  all.  Thus,  for  Inftance,  if  the  Vice  of  a  'vkwus 
A&.  of  Will,  lies  not  in  the  Nature  of  the  Aft,  but  the 
Caufe;  fo  that  its  being  of  a  bad  Nature  will  not 
make  it  at  all  our  Fault,  unlefs  it  arifes  from  fome  faulty 
determination  of  our's  as  its  Caufe,  or  fomething  in  us  that 
is  our  Fault ;  then  for  the  fame  Reafon,  neither  can  the 
Vicioufnefs  of  that  Caufe  lie  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing  it- 
felf, but  in  its  Caufe  :  That  evil  Determination  of  our's  is  not 
our  Fault,  merely  becaufe  it  is  of  a  bad  Nature,  unlefs  it 
arifes  from  fome  Caufe  in  us  that  is  our  Fault.  And  when 
xvt  are  come  to  this  higher  Caufe,  fiill  the  Reafon  of  the 
Thing  holds  good  ;  tho'  this  Caufe  be  of  a  bad  Nature,  yet 
we  are  not  at  all  to  blame  on  that  Account,  unlefs  it  arifes 
from  fomething  faulty  in  us.  Nor  yet  can  Blame-worthinefs 
lie  in  the  Nature  of /^/>  Caufe,  but  in  the  Caufe  oi  that.  And 
thus  we  muft  drive  Faultinefs  back  from  Step  to  Step,  from 
a  lower  Caufe  to  a  higher,  in  infinitHm  ;  and  that  is  thoroughly 
to  banifh  it  from  the  World,  and  to  allow  it  no  poffibility  of 
Exiftence  any  where  in  the  Univerfality  of  Things.  On  thefe 
Principles,  Vice  or  moral  Evil  can't  confift  in  any  Thing 
that  is  znEfe^;  becaufe  Fault  don't  confift  in  the  Nature 
of  Things,  but  in  their  Caufe  ;  as  well  as  becaufe  Effeds 
are  neceffary,  being  unavoidably  connected  with  their  Caufe  : 
Therefore  the  Caufe  only  is  to  blame.  And  fo  it  follows,  that 
Faultinefs  can  lie  only  in  that  Caufe,  which  is  a  Cmjfe  o?ily,  and 
no  Effeft  of  any  Thing.  Nor  yet  can  it  lie  in  this ;  for  then 
^t  muft  lie  in  the  Nature  of  th$  Thing  itfelf]  not  in  its  be- 
ing" 


194        ^^^^  Eflence  of  Virtue  and  Pice,     Part  IV, 

ing  from  any  Determination  of  our's,  nor  any  Thing  faulty 
in  us  which  is  the  Caufe,  nor  indeed  from  any  Caufe  at  all, 
for  by  the  Suppofition,  it  is  no  Effe^Tl,  and  has  710  Caufe. 
And  thus.  He  that  will  maintain,  it  is  not  the  Nature  of 
Habits  or  Ads  of  Will  that  makes  them  virtuous  or  faulty, 
but  the  Caufe,  muft  immediately  run  Himfelf  out  of  his 
own  AfTertion ;  and  in  maintaining  it,  will  infenfibly  .contradict 
and  deny  it. 

This  is  certain,  that  if  EiFej5ts  are  vicious  and  faulty,  not 
from  their  Nature,  or  from  any  Thing  inherent  in  them, 
but  becaufe  they  are  from  a  bad  Caufe,  it  muft  be  on  Ac- 
count of  the  Badnefs  of  the  Caufe  ;  and  fo  on  Account 
of  the  l>!ature  of  the  Caufe.  A  bad  Effefl  in  the  Will  muft 
be  bad,  becaufe  the  Caufe  is  bad,  or  oj  an  e'vil  Nature, 
or  has  Badnefs  as  a  Quality  inherent  in  it :  And  a  good  Efteft 
in  the  Will  muft  be  good,  by  Reafon  of  the  Goodnef  of  the 
Caufe,  or  its  h^va^  of  a  good  Kind  and  Nature.  And  if  this 
be  what  is  meant,  the  very  Suppofition  of  Fault  and  Praife 
lying  not  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  but  the  Caufe,  con- 
tradifts  itfelf,  and  does  at  leaft  refolve  the  Eflence  of  Virtue 
and  Vice  into  the  Nature  of  Things,  and  fuppofes  it  originally 

to  confift;  in  that. And  if  a  Caviller   has  a  Mind  to  rua 

from  the  Abfurdity,  by  faying,  ?'  No,  the  Fault  of  the 
•*  Thing  which  is  the  Caufe,  lies  not  in  this,  that  the  Caufe. 
••  itfelf  is  of  an  emil  Nature,  but  that  the  Caufe  is  evil  in 
"  that  Senfe,  that  it  is  from  another  bad  Caufe:"  Still  the 
Abfurdity  will  follow  him  ;  lor  if  fo,  then  the  Caufe  before 
charged  is  at  once  acquitted,  and  all  the  Blame  muft  be  laid 
to  the  higher  Caufe,  and  muft  confift  in  that's  being  Emil,  or 
of  an  evil  Nature.  So  now  we  are  come  again  to  lay  the  Blame 
of  the  Thing  blame-worthy,  to  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  and 
not  to  the  Caufe.  And  if  any  is  fo  foolifh  as  to  go  higher 
ftill,  and  afcend  from  Step  to  Step,  till  he  is  come  to  that 
•yvhich  is  the  firft  Caufe  concerned  in  the  whole  Affair,  and  will 
fay,  all  the  Blame  lies  in  that ;  then  at  laft  he  muft  be  forced 
to  own,  that  the  Faultinefs  of  the  Thing,  which  he  fuppofes 
alone  blame-worthy,  lies  wholly  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing, 
and  not  in  the  Original  or  Caufe  of  ii;  for  the  Suppofition 
is,  that  it  has  no  Original,  it  is  determined  by  no  Aft  of  our's, 
is  caufed  by  nothing  faulty  in  us,  being  abfolutely  nuithout  any. 
Cauje.  And  fo  the  Race  is  at  an  End,  but  the  Evader  is  taken, 
in  his  Flight. 

'Tis  agreeable  to  the  natural  Notions  of  Mankind,  that 
moral  Evil,  with  its  Defert  of  Diflike  and  Abhorrence,  and 
all  its  other  lU-defervings,   conlifts  'iv\  a  certain  Deformitji  in 

the 


Se6l.  I.  inthe^2it\xttofVolition^  Hot  intheCdtw^t.  195 

the  Nature  of  certain  Difpofitions  of  the  Heart,  and  Ads  of 
the  Wni ;  and  not  in  the  Deformity  o'i  fomethivg  elfe,  diverla 
from  the  very  Thing  itfelf,  which  deferves  Abhorrence, 
fuppofed  to  be  the  Caufe  of  it  :  Which  would  be  abfurd, 
becaufe  that  would  be  to  fuppofe,  a  Thing  that  is  in- 
nocent and  not  Evil,  is  truly  evil  and  faulty,  becaufe  another 
Thing  is  Evil.  It  implies  a  Contradiction  ;  for  it  would  be 
to  fuppofe,  the  very  Thing  which  is  morally  evil  and  blame- 
worthy, is  innocent  and  not  blame-worihy  ;  but  that  fomething 
elfe,  which  is  its  Caufe,  is  only  to  blame.  To  fay,  that  Vice 
don't  confift  in  the  Thing  which  is  vicious,  but  in  its  Caufe, 
is  the  fame  as  to  fay,  that  Vice  don't  confift  in  Vice,  but  in 
that  which  produces  it* 

'Tis  true,  a,  Caufe  may  be  to  blame,  for  being  the  Caufe 
of  Vice :  It  may  be  Wickednefs  in  the  Caufe,  that  it  pro- 
duces Wickednefs  :  But  it  would  imply  a  Contradiftion,  ta 
fuppofe  that  thefe  two  are  the  fame  individual  Wickednefs. 
The  wicked  Aft  of  the  Caufe  in  producing  Vvickednefs,  is 
one  Wickednefs ;  and  the  Wickednefs  produced,  if  there  be 
any  produced,  is  another.  And  therefore  the  Wickednefs  of 
the  latter  don't  lie  in  the  former,  but  is  diftind  from  it ;  and 
the  Wickednefs  of  both  lies  in  the  e-vil  Nature  of  the  Things 
tvhich  are  wicked. 

The  Thing  which  makes  Sin  hateful,    is  that  by  which  it 
deferves  Punifhment ;    which  is  but  the  Expreflion  of  Hatred. 
And  that  which  renders  Virtue  lovely,    is  the  fame  with  that, 
on  the  Account  of  which,    it  is  fit  to  receive  Praife  and  Re- 
ward ;    which   are  but    the  Expreflions  of  Efteem    and  Love. 
But  that  which  makes  Vice  hateful,  is  its  hateful  Nature ;  and 
that  which  renders  Virtue  lovely,   is  its  amiable  Nature.     'Tis 
a  certain  Beauty  or  Deformity  that  are  inherent  in   that  good 
or  evil  Will,    which  is  the  Soul  of  Virtue  and  Vice,   (and  not 
in  the  Occajion  of  it)   which   is  their  Worthinefs  of  Efteem  or 
Difeftecm,  Praife  or  Difpraife,  according  to  the  common  Senfc 
of  Mankind.     If  the  Caufe    or  Occafion    of  the  Rife    of  an 
hateful  Difpofition  or  Aft  of  Will,    be  alfo  hateful ;    fuppofe 
another    antecedent   evil  Will ;    that  is  entirely    another  Sirr, 
and  deferves  Punill\ment  by  itfelf,    under  a  diftinft  Confide- 
ration.     There  is  Worthinefs  of  Difpraife  in  the  Nature  of  an 
evil  Volition,    and  not  wholly  in  fome  foregoing  Aft  which 
is  its  Caufe ;    otherwife  the  evil  Volition  which  is  the  Efteft, 
39  no  moral  Evil,    any  more  than  Sicknefs,    or  fome  other  na- 
tural Calamity,  which  arifes  from  a  Caufe  morallj^  evii. 

Thus 


i  96      ^hi?  Erfence  of  Virtue  and  Vicey      Part  IV^ 

Thus,  for  Inflance,  Ingratitude  is  hateful  and  worthy  of 
Difpraife,  according  to  common  Senfe  ;  not  becaufe  foraething 
as  bad,  or  vvorfe  than  ingratitude,  was  the  Caufe  that  produced 
it;  but  becaufe  it  ia  hateful  in  itfeifj  by  its  own  inherent 
Deformity.  So  the  Love  of  Virtue  is  amiable,  and  worthy  of 
Praife,  not  merely  becaufe  fomething  elfe  went  before  this 
Love  of  Virtue  in  our  Minds,  which  caufed  it  to  take  Place 
there  ;  for  Inftance,  our  own  Choice  ;  we  chofe  to  love  Virtue, 
and  by  fome  Method  or  other  wrought  ourfclves  into  the 
Love  of  it ;  but  becaufe  of  the  Amiabknefs  and  Condecency 
of  fuch  a  Difpofition  and  Inclination  of  Heart.  If  that  'was 
the  Cafe,  that  we  did  chufe  to  love  Virtue,  and  fo  produce*! 
that  Love  in  ourfelves,  this  Choice  it/elf  could  be  no  other- 
wife  amiable  or  praife-worthy,  than  as  Love  to  Virtue,  or 
fome  other  amiable  inclination,  was  ex.ercifed  and  implied  in 
it.  If  that  Choice  was  amiable  at  all,  it  mult  be  fo  on  Ac- 
count of  fome  amiable  Quality  in  the  Nature  of  the  Choice; 
If  we  chofc  to  love  Virtue,  not  in  love  to  Virtue,  or  any 
Thing  that  was  goad,  and  exercifed  no  Sort  of  good  Difpofi- 
tion in  the  Clioice,  the  Choice  itfelf  was  not  virtuous,  nor 
worthy  of  any  Praife,  according  to  common  Senfe,  becaufe 
the  Choice  was  not  of  a  gaod  Nature, 

It  may  not  be  improper  here  to  take  Notice  of  fomething 
faid  by  an  Author,  that  has  lately  made  a  mighty  Noife  in  Ame- 
rica.    "   A  neceiTary  Holinefs  (fays  He*)  is  r>o  Holinefs. 

*'  Adam  could  not  be  originally  created  in  Righteoufnefs  and 
"  true  Holinefs,  becaufe  He  muft  chufe  to  be  righteous,  before 
•'  He  could  be  righteous.  And  therefore  He  muft  exift.  He 
•'  muft  be  created,  yea  He  he  muft  exercife  Thought  and  Re- 
"  flection,  bei'bre  he  was  righteous."  There  is  much  more 
to  the  fame  Effeft  in  that  Place,  and  alfo  in  P.  437,  438,  439,^ 
440.  If  thefe  Things  are  fo,  it  will  certainly  follow,  that  the 
firft  chufmg  X.0  be  righteous  is  no  righteous  Choice ;  there 
is  no  Righteoufnefs  or  Holinefs  in  it ;  becaufe  no  chufing  to 
be  righteous  goes  before  it.  For  He  plainly  fpeaks  of  chufing 
to  he  righteous f  as  what  mufi  go  before  Righteoufnefs  :  And  that 
which  follows  the  Choice,  being  the  Effeft  of  the  Choice, 
can't  be  Righteoufnefs  or  Holinefs :  For  an  Effecl  is  a  Thing 
neceffary,  and  can't  prevent  the  Influence  or  Efficacy  of  its 
Caufe ;  and  therefore  is  unavoidably  dependent  upon  the 
Caufe  :  And  He  fays,  A  neceffary  Holinefs  is  no  Holinefs,  So 
that  neither  can  a  Choice  of  Righteoufnefs  be  Righteoufnefs  or 

Holine{s> 

*  Scrip.  D»c,  of  Original  Sin,  P,  180.  jd  Edit* 


Sec.  I.  in  the  Nature  of  Volition,  not  in  the  Caufe.    197 

Kolinefs,  not  can  any  Thing  that  is  confequent  on  that  Choice> 
and  the  Effecft  of  it,  be  Righteoufncfs  or  Holinefs  ;  nor  caa 
any  Thing  thnt  is  without  Choice,  be  Righteoufncfs  or  Holi- 
nefs. So  that  by  his  Scheme,  all  Righteoufncfs  and  Kolinefs 
is  at  once  fhut  out  of  the  World,  and  no  Door  left  open,  by 
which  it  can  ever  pofFibly  enter  into  the  World. 

I  foppofe,  the  V7ay  that  Men  came  to  entertain  this  abfurd 
inconfment  Notion,  with  Refped  to  ijitemal  Inclinations  and 
Volitiotis  themfelves,  (or  Notions  that  imply  it)  njiz.  that  the 
Eflence  of  their  moral  Good  or  Evil  lies  not  in  their  Nature, 
"bat  their  Caufe,  was,  that  it  is  indeed  a  very  plain  Didlate 
of  common  Senfe,  that  it  is  fo  with  Refpeft  to  all  outnuari 
Anions,  and  fenfible  Motions  of  the  Body ;  that  the  moral 
Good  or  Evil  of  them  don't  lie  at  all  in  the  Motions  them- 
felves;  which  taken  by  themfelves,  are  nothing  of  a  moral 
Nature ;  ard  the  EiTcnce  of  all  the  moral  Good  or  Evil  that 
concerns  them,  lies  in  thofe  internal  Difpofitions  and  Volitions 
which  are  the  Caufe  of  them.  Now  being  always  ufed  to  de- 
termine this,  without  Hefitation  or  Difpute,  concerning  external 
Aaions ;  which  are  the  Things  that  in  the  common  Ufe  of 
Language  are  fignified  by  fuch  Phrafes,  as  Men's  Anions,  or 
their  Doings :  Hence  when  they  came  to  fpeak  of  Volitions, 
and  internal  Exercifes  of  their  Inclinations,  under  the  fame  De- 
nomination of  their  Anions,  or  'vjkat  they  do,  they  unwarily  de- 
termined the  Cafe  muft  alfo  be  the  fame  with  thefe,  as  with 
external  Anions ;  not  confidering  the  vaft  Difference  in  the  Na- 
ture of  the  Cafe. 

If  any  fliall  ftill  obje^  an(3  fay,  "Why  is  it  not  neceffary  that 
the  Caufe  fhould  be  confidered,  in  order  to  determine  whether 
any  Thing  be  worthy  of  Blame  or  Praife  ?  Is  it  agreeable  to 
Reafon  and  common  Senfe,  that  a  Man  is  to  be  praifed  or 
blamed  for  that  which  he  is  not  the  Caufe  ox  Author  of,  and 
has  no  Hand  in  ? 

I  anfwer,  fuch  Phrafes  as  being  the  Cavfe,  being  the  Author , 
harving  a  Hand,  and  the  like  are  ambiguous.  They  are  moft 
vulgarly  underftood  for  being  the  defigning  voluntary  Caufe, 
or  Caufe  by  antecedent  Choice  :  And  it  is  molt  certain  that 
Men  are  not  in  this  Senfe  the  Caufes  or  Authors  of  the  firft 
Aft  of  their  Wills,  in  any  Cafe  ;  as  certain  as  any  Thing  is, 
or  ever  can  be  ;  for  nothing  can  be  more  certain,  than  that  a 
Thing  is  not  before  it  is,  nor  a  Thing  of  the  fame  Kind  be- 
fore the  firft  Thing  of  that  Kind ;    and  fo  no  Choice  before 

C  c  the 


v^t      The  Armrniart  Notion  of  A6lion,      Part  Vfo 

x\t  firft  Choice. As  the  Phrafe,  being  the  Author,  may  be  un- 

derftood,  not  of  being  the  Producer  by  an  antecedent  Aft  of 
Will ;  but  as  a  Perfon  may  be  faid  to  be  the  Author  of  the 
Aft  of  Will  itfelf,  by  his  being  the  immediate  Agent,  or  the- 
Being  that  is  ading,  or  in  Exercife  in-  that  Aft  :  If  the  Phrafe 
of  being  the  Author ,  is  ufed  to  lignify  this,  then  doubtlefs  com- 
mon Senfe  requires  Men's  being  the  Authors  of  their  own  Afts 
of  Will-,  in  order  to  their  being  efteemed  worthy  of  Praife  or 
I)ifpraife  on  Account  of  them.  And  common  Senfe  teaches,, 
that  they  muft  be  the  Authors  q{ external  Adions,  in  theformer 
Senfe,  namely,  their  being  the  Caufes  of  them  by  an  Aft  of 
Will  or  Choice,  in  order  to  their  being  juftly  blamed  or  praifed: 
But  it  teaches  no  fuch  Thing  with  Rcfpeft  to  the  Afts  of  the 

Will  themfelves. But  this  may  appear  more  manifeft  by  the- 

Things  which  will  be  obferved  in  the  following  Seftion. 


•&ooo6oaoro3oeooasooocio09Sooooooo«c»ooa<x!l  <M«oooec3oocoooeo«3eooocoo9caooeooocosoooo»e  iS» 


Section     IL 

The  Falfenefs  and  Inconfijience  of  that  metaphvfical  No- 
tion of  Adlion,  and  Agency,  which  feems  to  he 
generally  entertained  by  the  Defenders  of  the  Armi- 
nian  Do^rine  concerning  Liberty  ^  moral  Agency^  isc.^ 

ON  E  Thing  that  is  made  very  much  a  Ground  of  Argu- 
ment and  fuppofed  Demonftration  hy  Arminians ,  in  De- 
fence of  the  fore- mentioned  Principles,  concerning  moral 
Agency,  Virtue,  Vice,  &c.  is  their  metaphyfical  Notion  of 
Agency  and  ASiion^-  They  fay,  unlefs  the  Soul  has  a  Self-deter- 
mining Power,  it  has  no  Power  of  Adion  :  If  its  Volitions  be 
not  caufed  by  itfelf,  but  are  excited  and  determined  by  fome 
extrinfic  Caufe,  thy  can't  be  the  Soul's  own  A&s;  and  that  the 
Soul  can't  be  a£live,  but  muft  be  wholly  pajji've,  in  thofe  Ef- 
fefts  which  it  is  the  Subjeft  of  neceflarily,  and  not  from  its  own< 
free  Determination, 

Mr.. 


'Secft.  IL  falje  and  inconfifient .  j^-^ 

Mr.  Chubb  lays  the  Foundation  of  his  Scheme  of  Liberty^ 
.ind  of  his  Arguments  to  fupportit,  very  much  in  this  Pofitionj 
That  Man  is  an  Agent,  aji a  capable  of  ASion.  Which  doubtlefs 
is  true  :  But  Self-determination  belongs  to  his  Notion  o{  Adion^ 
and  is  the  very  Eflencc  of  it.  Whence  he  infers  that  it  is  impoffi- 
ble  for  a  Man  to  aft  and  be  afted  upon,  in  the  fame  Thing, 
.at  the  fame  Time  ;  and  th:it  nothing  that  is  an  Aclion,  can  be 
-the  Effefl:  of  the  Adtion  of  another :  And  he  iafuls,  that  a  ?:e- 
jrejpirj  Agent,  or  an  Agent  that  is  neccffarily  determined  to  Ad,, 
is  a  plain  Contradiction, 

But  tiiofe  are  a  precarious  Sxsrt  of  Demonftratiotis,  which 
Men  build  on  the  Meaning  that  they  arbitrarily  affix  to  a  Word; 
efpecially  when  that  Meaning  is  abftrufc,  inconfdtent,  and  en- 
tirely diverfe  from  the  original  Senfe  of  the  Word  in  commca 
Speech. 

That  the  Meaning  of  the  Word  Adion,  as  Mr.  Chubb  and 
many  others  ufe  it,  is  utterly  unintelligible  and  inconfiftent,  is 
manifeft,  becaufe  it  belongs  to  their  Notion  of  an  Adtion,  that 
'tis  fomething  wherein  is  no  Paffion  or  Paffivcnefs ;  that  is, 
.^according  to  their  Senfe  of  Paffivenefs)  it  is  under  the 
Power,  Influence  or  Aftion  ofnoCaufe,  And  this  im.plies, 
that  Adlloa  has  no  Cauie,  and  is  no  EiFe6t  :  for  to  be  an 
EfFeft  implies  Paffroemjs,  or  the  being  fubjeft  to  the  Power  and 
Adion  of  its  Caufe.  And  yet  they  hold,  that  the  Mind's 
ABion  is  the  Effeft  of  its  own  Determination.,  yea,  the  Mind's 
free  and  voluntary  Determination ;  which  is  the  fame  with 
free  Choice.  So  that  Aftion  is  the  EfFed  of  fomething  pre- 
ceding, even  a  preceding  Adl  of  Choice  :  And  confequentiy, 
in  this  Efreft  the  Mind  is  paffive,  fubjedl  to  the  Power  and 
Action  of  the  preceding  Caufe,  which  is  th?  foregoing  Choice, 
and  therefore  can't  be  active.  So  that  here  we  have  this  Con- 
tradiction, that  Action  is  always  the  Effect  of  foregoing  Choice; 
and  therefore  can't  be  Action  ;  becaufe  it  is  pajjiue  to  the 
Power  of  that  preceding  caufal  Choice  ;  and  the  Mind  can't 
be  active  and  paffive  in  the  fame  Thing,  at  the  fame  Time. 
Again,  they  fay,  Neceffity  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  Action, 
and  a  neceftary  Action  is  a  Contradiction  ;  and  fo  their  Notion 
of  Action  implies  Contin^ence,  and  excludes  all  Neceffity : 
And  therefore  their  Notion  of  Action  implies,  that  it  has  no 
necefTary  Dependence  or  Connection  with  any  Thing  forego- 
ing ;  for  fuch  a  Dependence  or  Connection  excludes  Contin- 
^ence,  and  implies  Neceffity.  And  yet  their  Notion  of  Action 
implies  Neceffity,  and  fuppofes  that  it  is  neceflary,  and  can't  be 
C  c  3  contingent. 


200        The  Arminian  iVo/m  '/Aclion,     Fart  IV. 

contingent.  For  they  fuppofe,  that  whatever  is  properly  called 
Aftion,  mull  be  determined  by  the  Will  and  fiee  Choice  ; 
and  this  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  that  it  mtill  be  neceffary,  being 
dependent  upon,  and  dete;  mined  by  foinething  toregcing ; 
namely,  a  foregoing  Aft  ot  Choice,  Again,  it  belongs  to  their 
Notion  of  Adion,  of  that  which  is  a  proper  and  mere  Aft, 
that  it  is  the  Beginning  of  Motion,  or  of  Exertion  of  Power  ; 
but  yet  it  is  implied  in  their  Notion  of  Aifrion,  that  it  is  not 
the  Beginning  of  Motion  or  Exertion  of  Power,  but  is  confe- 
quent  and  dependent  on  a  preceding  Exertion  of  Power,  f /z. 
the  Power  of  Will  and  Choice  :  For  they  fay  there  is  no  pro- 
per Aflion  but  what  is  freely  cho/cu ;  or,  which  is  the  fame 
Thing,  determined  by  a  foregoing  Ad  of  free  Choice.  But 
if  any  of  them  (hall  fee  Caufe  to  deny  this,  and  fay  they  hold 
no  fuch  Thing  as  that  every  Adlion  is  chofen,  or  determined  by 
a  foregoing  Choice ;  but  that  the  very  firft  Exertion  of  Will 
only,  undetermined  by  any  preceding  Aft,  is  properly  called 
■Aftion  ;  then  I  fay,  fuch  a  Man's  Notion  of  Action  implies 
'Necelfity  :  For  what  the  Mind  is  the  Subjeft  of  without  the 
Determination  of  its  ovvn  previous  Choice,  it  is  the  Subjeft  of 
neceffarily,  as  to  any  Hand  that  free  Choice  has  in  the  Affair  ; 
and  without  any  Ability  the  Mind  has  to  prevent  it,  by  any 
Will  or  Eleftion  of  its  ovvn  :  Becaufe  by  the  Suppofition  it 
precludes  all  previous  Afts  of  the  Will  or  Choice  in  the  Cafe, 
which  might  prevent  it.  So  that  it  is  again,  in  this  other 
•Way,  implied  in  their  Notion  of  Aft,  that  it  is  both  neceffary 
and  not  neceffary. — Again,  it  belongs  to  their  Notion  of  an  A£f, 
that  it  is  no  E^ect  of  a  pre-determining  Bias  or  Preponderation, 
but  fprings  ijnmediately  out  of  Indifference;  and  this  implies 
that  it  can't  be  from  foregoing  Choice,  which  is  foregoing  Pre- 
ponderation  :  If  it  be  not  habitual,  but  occalional,  yet  if  it 
caufes  the  Aft,  it  is  truly  previous,  efficacious  and  determining. 
And  yet,  at  the  fame  Timx,  'tis  effential  to  their  Notion  of  an 
Aft,  that  it  is  what  the  Agent  is  the  Author  of  freely  and  vo- 
luntarily, and  that  is,  by  previous  Choice  and  Defign. 

So  that  according  to  their  Notion  of  an  Act,  confidered  with 
Regard  to  its  Confequences,  thefe  following  Things  are  all 
effential  to  it ;  n:iz.  That  it  (hould  be  neceffary,  and  not  ne- 
ceffary ;  that  is  fhould  be  from  a  Caufe,  and  no  Caufe  ;  that  it 
Should  be  the  Fruit  of  Choice  and  Defign,  and  not  the  Fruit  of 
Choice  and  Defign  ;  that  it  Ihould  be  the  Beginning  of  Motion 
or  Exertion,  and  yet  confequent  on  previous  Exertion ;  that 
it  Ihould  be  before  it  is ;  that  it  Ihould  fpring  immediately 
out  of  Indifference  and  Equilibrium,  and  yet  be  the  Effect  of 

Preponderation  j 


Sect  II.  falfe  and  mconf/flmt,  201 

Prcponderation  ;  that  it  Ihould  be  felf-originated,  and  alfo 
have  its  Original  from  fomething  elfe  ;  that  it  is  what  the 
Mind  caufes  itfelf,  of  its  own  W'ill,  and  can  produce  or  pre- 
■vent,  according  to  its  Choice  or  Pleafure,  and  yet  what  the 
Mind  has  no  Power  to  prevent,  it  precluding  all  previous 
Choice  in  the  Aftair. 

So  that  an  Aft,  according  to  their  metapliyfical  Notion  of 
it,  is  fomething  of  which  there  is  no  Idea ;  'tis  nothing  bat 
a  Confufion  of  the  Mind,  excited  by  Words  without  any 
diftindl  Meaning,  and  is  an  abfolute  Non-entity  ;  and  that  in 
two  Refpefts :  (i.)  There  is  nothing  in  the  World  that  ever 
was,  is,  or  can  he,  to  anfwer  the  Things  which  muil  belong  to 
its  Defcription,  according  to  what  they  fuppofe  to  be  effential 
to  it.  And,  (2.)  There  neither  is,  nor  ever  was,  nor  can  be^ 
any  Notion  or  Idea  to  anfwer  the  Word,  as  they  ufe  and  ex- 
plain it.  For  if  we  fliould  fuppofe  any  fuch  Notion,  it  would 
many  Ways  deftroy  itfelf.  But  'tis  impoffible,  any  Idea  or 
Notion  fiiould  fubfift  in  the  Mind,    whofe  very  Nature   and 

Eflence,    which  conilitutes  it,    dcftroys  it, -If  fome  learned 

Philofopher,  who  had  been  abroad,  in  giving  an  Account  of 
the  curious  Obfervations  he  had  made  in  his  Travels,  (hould 
fay,  *«  He  had  been  in  Terra  del  Fuego,  and  there  had  feen  an 
"  Animal,  which  he  calls  by  a  certain  Name,  that  begat  and 
*'  brought  forth  itfelf,  and  yet  had  a  Sire  and  a  Dam  dillindl 
*'  from  itfelf;  that  it  had  an  Appetitp,  and  was  hungry  before 
"  it  had  a  Being  ;  that  his  Mailer,  who  led  him,  and  govern- 
"  ed  him  at  his  Pleafure,  vvas  ;hvays  governed  by  him,  and 
**  driven  by  him  where  he  pleafed  ;  that  when  ha  moved,  he 
"  ahvay§  took  a  Step  before  the  firft  Step  ;  that  he  went  with 
*'  his  Head  firft,  and  yet  always  went  Tail  foremoft  ;  and  this, 
"  tho'  he  had  neither  Head  nor  Tail."  It  would  be  no  Impu- 
dence at  all,  to  tell  fuch  a  Traveller,  tho'  a  learned  Man,  that 
He  himfelf  had  no  Notion  or  Idea  of  fuch  an  x^nimal  as  he 
gave  an  Account  of,  and  never  had,  nor  never  vvould  have. 

As  the  foremention'd  Notion  of  Aftion  is  very  inconfiftent, 
Co  it  is  wholly  diverfe  f.T>m  the  original  Meaning  of  the  Word. 
The  more  ufual  Signification  of  it  in  vulgar  Speech,  feeras  to 
be  fome  Motion  or  Exeriio?i  of  Poiver,  that  is  voluntary,  or  that 
is  the  Effe^  of  the  Will ;  and  is  ufed  in  the  fame  Senfe  as  doing  : 
And  moft  commonly  'tis  ufed  to  fignify  oiiiti.vard  Anions.  So 
Thinking  is  often  diilinguillied  from  Ailing ;  and  Defying  and 
Willingy  from  Doing, 

Befides 


202      The  Arminian  Notion  of  Adion,     Part  IV. 

Befides  this  more  ufual  and  proper  Signification  of  the  Word 
Adion,  there  are  other  Ways  in  which  the  Word  is  ufed  that 
are  lefs  proper,  which  yet  have  Place  in  common  Speech, 
Oftentimes  'tis  ufed  to  fignify  fome  Motion  or  Alteration  in 
inanimate  Things,  with  Relation  to  fome  Objeft  and  Effeft. 
So  the  Spring  of  a  Watch  is  faid  to  a£l  upon  the  Chain  and 
Wheels ;  the  Sun-beams,  to  aft  upon  Plants  and  Trees ; 
and  the  Fire,  to  aft  upon  Wood.  Sometimes  the  'V^'^ord  is  ufed 
to  fignify  Motions,  Alterations,  and  Exertions  of  Power,  which 
are  feen  in  corporeal  Things,  conjidered  abfolutely  ;  efpecially 
when  thefe  Motions  feem  to  arife  from  fome  internal  Caufe 
which  is  hidden  ;  fo  that  they  have  a  greater  Refemblance  of 
thofe  Motions  of  our  Bodies,  which  are  the  Effeds  of  internal 
Volition,  or  invifible  Exertions  of  Will.  So  the  Fermentation 
of  Liquor,  tiie  Operations  of  the  Loadftone,  and  of  eleftrical 
Bodies,  are  called  the  ASiion  of  thefe  Things.  And  fometimes 
the  Word  Anion  is  ufed  to  fignify  the  Exercife  of  Thought, 
or  of  Will  and  Inclination ;  fo  meditating,  loving,  hating,  in- 
clining, difinclining,  chafing  and  refufing,  may  be  fometimes 
called  afting;  tho'  more  rarely  (unlefs  it  be  by  Philofophers 
and  Metaphyficians)  than  in  any  of  the  other  Senfes, 

But  the  Word  is  never  ufed  in  vulgar  Speech  in  that  Sen{e 
which  Arminian  Divines  ufe  it  in,  namely,  for  the  felf-deter- 
minate  Exercife  of  the  Will,  or  an  Exertion  of  the  Soul  that 
arifes  without  any  neceffary  Connexion  with  any  Thing  fore- 
going. If  a  Man  does  fomething  voluntarily,  or  as  the  EfFeft 
of  his  Choice,  then  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe,  and  as  the  Word 
is  moft  originally  and  commonly  ufed,  he  is  faid  to  act :  But 
whether  that  Choice  or  Volition  be  felf-determined,  or  no, 
whether  it  be  connefted  with  foregoing  habitual  Bias,  whether 
it  be  the  certain  Effect  of  the  ftrongeft  Motive,  or  fome  extrin- 
fick  Caufe,  never  comes  into  Confidcration  in  the  Meaning  of 
the  Word.  ^ 

And  if  the  Word  Action  Is  arbitrarily  ufed  by  fome  Men 
otherwife,  to  fuit  fome  Scheme  of  Metaphyficks  or  Morality, 
no  Argument  can  reafonably  be  founded  on  fuch  a  Ufe  of  this 
Term,  to  prove  any  Thing  but  their  own  Pleafure.  For  Di- 
vines and  Philofophers  ftrenuoufly  to  urge  fuch  Arguments,  as 
tho'  they  were  fufficient  to  fupport  and  demonftrate  a  whole 
Scheme  of  moral  Philofophy  and  Divinity,  is  certainly  to  ereft 
a  mighty  Edifice  on  the  Sand,  or  rather  on  a  Shadow.  And 
tho'  it  may  now  perhaps,  through  Cuftom,  have  become  natural 
for  them  to  ufe  the  Word  in  this  Senfe,  (if  that  may  be  called  a 

Senfe 


Se6l:.  It.  falfe  and  inconfjfent.  10% 

Senfe  or  Meaning,  which  is  fo  inconfiftent  with  itfelf)  yeC 
this  don't  prove  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  natural  Notions  Men 
have  of  Things,  or  that  there  can  be  any  Thing  in  the  Creation 
that  fhould  anfwer  fuch  a  Meaning.  And  tho'  they  appeal  ta 
Experience,  ytt  the  Truth  is,  that  Men  are  fo  far  from  expe- 
riencing any  fuch  Thing,  that  it  is  impoffible  for  them  to  have 
any  Conception  of  it. 

If  it  (hould  be  objefted,  that  Aaion  and  Pa_ffion  are  doubtlefs 
Words  of  a  contrary  Signification  ;  but  to  fuppofe  that  th& 
Agent,  in  its  Adion,  is  under  the  Power  and  Influence  of 
fomething  extrinfick,  is  to  confound  Adion  and  Paffion,  aad 
make  them  the  fame  Thing. 

I  anfwer.  That  Adion  and  Paifion  are  doubtlefs,  as  they  arc 
fometimes  ufcd.  Words  of  oppofite  Signification  j   but  not  as 
fignifying  oppofite  Ex:Jietices,  but  only  oppofite  Relations.    The 
Words  Caiife  and  Effeii  are  Terms  of  oppofite  Signification  ; 
but  neverthelefs,  if  I  affert  that  the  fame  Thing  may  at  the  fame 
Time,  in  different  Refpefts  and  Relations,  be  both  Cavfe  and 
Effeif,  this   will  not    prove  that  I  confound  the  Terms.  ^   Tfe 
Soul  may  be  both  a^l-ve  and  paffi--ve  in  the  fame  Thing  in  dif- 
ferent Refpefts,  aiiit'e  with  Relation  to  one  Thing,  and  pajjl've 
with  Relation  to  another.     The  Word  PaJJion  when  fet  in  Op- 
pofition  toAdion  or  rather  JSimenefs,  is  merely  a  relative  Term  : 
It  fignifies  no  Effeft  or  Caufe,  nor  any  proper  Exiftence  ;  but  is 
the  fame  with  Paffi'venefs,  or  a  being  pafiive,  or  a  being  afted  up  - 
on  by  fomething  :  Which  is  a  mere  Relation  of  a  Thing  to  fome 
Power  or  Force  exerted  by  fome  Caufe,  producing  fome  Effect 
in  it,  or  upon  it.    And  ABion,  when  fet  properly  in  Oppofitiom 
to  Pajfwn,  or  Pajfinjenefs,  is  nO  real  Exiftence ;  it  is  not  the  fame 
with  A'N  ABion,  but  is  a  mere  Relation  :  'Tis  the  ASii'venefs  of 
fomething  on  another  Thing,    being  the  oppofite  Relation  to 
the  other,  'viz.  a  Relation  of  Power,  or  Force  exerted  by  fome 
Caufe,  towards  another  Thing,    which   is  the  Subjeft  of  the 
Effeft  of  that  Power.     Indeed   the  Word  A^ioa  is  frequently 
ufed  to  fignify  fomething  not  merely  relati've,  but  more  abfolute, 
and  a  real   Exiftence  ;    as  when  we  fay  ^n  ABion ;  when  the 
Word  is  not  ufed  ttanfitively,.  but  abfolutely,  for  fome  Motioii 
or  Exercife  of  Body  or  Mind,  without  any  Relation  to  any 
Objeft  or  Effeft  :  And  as  ufed  thus,  it  is  not  properly  the  op- 
pofite of  Pajp^on ;  which  ordinarily  fignifies  nothing  abfolute, 
but  merely  the  Relation  of  being  aBed  upon.     And  therefore  i€ 
the  Word  ABion  be  ufed  in  the  like  relative  Senfe,  then  Adioa 
and  Paffion  are  only  two  contrary  P.elations,     And  'tis  no  Ab- 

furditjr 


264.         i'iozv  this  Arminian  Notion        Part  IV, 

furdity  to  fuppofe,  that  conti-ary  Relations  may  belong  to  the 
fame  Thing,  at  the  fame  Time,  with  Refpeft  to  difFerent  Things. 
So  to  fuppofe,  that  there  are  Ads  of  the  Soul  by  which  a  Man 
voluntarily  moves,  and  Ai^ts  upon  Obje«fts,  and  produces  Effefts^ 
which  yet  themfelves  are  Efeds  of  fomething  elfe,  and  wherein 
the  Soul  itfelf  is  the  Object  of  fomething  acfting  upon,  and 
influencing  that,  don't  at  all  confound  Aftion  and  Paffion, 
The  Words  may  neverthelefs  be  properly  of  oppcfite  Signifi- 
cation :  There  may  be  as  true  and  real  a  Difference  between 
aclhig  and  being  cauj'ed  to  ad,  tho'  we  ihould  fuppofe  the  Soul 
to  be  both  in  the  fame  Volition,  as  tliere  is  between  li'ving,  and 
hebig  quicken  d,  or  made  to  li've.  'Tis  no  more  a  Contradidion,  to 
fuppofe  that  Aftion  may  be  the  Effeft  of  fome  other  Caufe, 
befides  the  Agent,  or  Being  that  ads,  than  to  fuppofe  that  Life 
may  be  \\\t  EiFed  of  fome  other  Caufe,  befides  the  Liver,  or 
the  Being  that  lives,  in  whom  Life  is  caufed  to  be. 

The  Thing  which  has  led  Men  into  this  inccnfiftent  No- 
tion of  Adion,  when  applied  to  Volition,  as  tho'  it  were 
effchtial  to  this  internal  Adion,  that  the  Agent  fliould  be  felf- 
determined  in  it,  and  that  the  Will  fliould  be  the  Caufe  of  xx, 
was  probably  this ;  that  according  to  the  Senfe  ot  Mankind, 
and  the  common  ufe  of  Language  it  is  fo,  with  refped  to 
Men's  external  Adions  ;.  which  are  what  originally,  and  ac- 
cording to  the  vulgar  ufe  and  moft  proper  Senfe  of  the  Word, 
are  called  4^ions.  Men  in  thefe  are  felf-direded,  felf-deter- 
mined,  and  their  W^ill's  are  the  Caufe  of  the  Motions  of  their 
Bodies,  and  the  external  Things  that  are  done  ;  fo  that  unlefs 
Men  do  them  voluntarily,  and  of  Choice,  and  the  Action  be  de- 
termined by  their  antecedent  Volition,  it  is  no  Action  or  Doing 
of  theirs.  Hence  fome  Metaphyficians  have  been  led  unwarily, 
but  exceeding  ahfurdly,  tofuppofe  the  fame  concerning  Volition 
itfell,  that  That  alfo  muft  be  determined  by  the  Will ;  which 
is  to  be  determin'd  by  antecedent  Volition,  as  the  Motion  of 
the  Body  is  ;  not  confidering  the  Contradiction  it  implies. 

But  'tis  very  evident,  that  in  the  metaphyfical  Diftinction  be- 
tween Action  and  Paffion,  (tho'  long  fince  become  common  and 
the  general  Vogue)  due  Care  has  not  been  taken  to  conform 
Language  to  the  Nature  of  Things,  or  to  any  diftinct  clear 
Ideas.  As  it  is  in  innumerable  other  Philofophical,  Metaphy- 
fical Terms,  ufed  in  thefe  Difputes  ;  which  has  occafion'd  in- 
expreiSble  Difficulty,  Contention,  Error  and  Confufion. 

And 


Sfed.  II.  prohably  arofe,  205 

And  thus  probably  it  came  to  be  thought,  \\\iX  Neceliity  was 
jnconliftent  with  Action,  as  thefe  Terms  are  applied  to  Vo- 
lition. Firfl,  thefe  Terms  ABion  and  Necejfity  are  changed  from 
their  original  Meaning,  as  l:gnif;^ing  external  voluntary  Action, 
and  Conltraint,  (in  which  Meaning  they  are  evidently  incon- 
liftent)  to  fignify  quite  other  Things,  'viz.  Vc)lition  itfelf,  and 
Certainty  of  Exiftence.  And  when  the  Chang"<i  of  Signification 
is  madcj  Care  is  not  taken  to  make  proper  Allowances  and 
Abatements  for  the  DiiFerence  of  Senfe  ;  but  itill  the  fame 
Things  are  unwarily  attributed  to  Action  and  Necrjjity,  in  the 
new  Meaning  of  the  Words,  which  plainly  belonged  to  them  in 
their  firft  Senfe  ;  and  on  this  Ground,  Maxinis  are  eftabliftied 
without  any  real  Foundation,  as  tho'  they  were  the  moft  cer- 
tain Truths,  and  the  moft  evident  Dictates  of  Reafon. 

But  however  ftrenuouily  it  is  maintain'd,  that  what  is  necef^ 
fary  can't  be  properly  called  Action,  and  that  a  neceflary 
Action  is  a  Contradiction,  yet  'tis  probable  there  are  few  Armi- 
nian  Divines,  who,  if  thoroughly  tried,  would  ftand  to  thefe 
Principles.  They  will  ailow,  that  God  is  in  the  higheft  Senfe^ 
^n  active  Being,  and  the  higheft  Fountain  of  Life  and  Action  ; 
and  they  would  not  probably  deny,  that  thofe  that  are  called 
God's  Acts  of  Righteoufnefs,  Holinefs  and  Faithfulnefs,  are 
truly  and  properly  God's  Acts,  and  God  is  reaJly  a  holy  Agent 
in  them  :  and  yet  I  truft,  they  will  not  deny,  that  God  necef- 
farily  acts  juftly  and  faithfully,  and  that  it  is  impoffible  for 
Him  to  act  unrighteoufly  and  unholily. 


baoeoaoeeao«eoaoooeee9eeBssowoaBseeeaooo^iaeeoo«oa9oeaeoeseiX>aeeeoewoeeedeeBoeeei;Sfi 


Dd  SsCTIOlt 


CLO&      ,       Why  Calvinifm  is  fappofed      Part  IT., 

Section   III. 

The  Reafons  why  fome  think  it  contrary  to  com- 
mon Senfc,  to  fnppofe  thofe  Things  which  are 
neceflary,  to  be-  worthy  of  either  Praife  or  Blame. 

V  I  '  I  S  abundantly  aiErmed  and  urged  by  ^://--^/«/««  Writers, 
X  that  it  is  contrary  to  commofi  Seiife,  and  tlie  natural  No- 
tions and  Apprehenfions  of  Mankind,  to  fuppofe  other  wife  than 
that  Neceility  (making  no  Diftinftion  between  natural  and  mo- 
ral Neceflity).  ii  inconliitent  with  Virtue  and  Vice,  Praife  and 
Blame,  Reward  and  Punifhment,  And  their  Arguments  from 
hence  have  been  greatly  triumphed  in  ;  and  have  been  not  a 
little  perplexing  to  many  who  have  been' friendly  to  the  Truths 
as  clearly  revealed  in  the  holy  Scriptures :  It  has  feem'd  to  them 
indeed  difficult,  to  reconcile  Cal-viniftic  Doftrines  with  the 
Notions  Men  commonly  have  of  Juftice  and  Equity.  And  the- 
true  Reafons  of  k  feem  to  be  thefe  that  follow  : 

I.  'Tis  indeedia  very  plain  Didate  of  common  Senfe,  that 
natural  Neceffity  is  wholly  inconfiftent  with  juil  Praife  or 
Blame.  If  Men,  do  Things  which  in  themfelves  are  very 
good,  fit  to  be  brought  to  pafs,  and  very  happy  EfFeds,  pro- 
perly againft  their  Wills,  and  can't  help  it ;  or  do  them  from 
a  Neceffity  that  is  without  their  Wills,  or  with  which 
their  Wills  have  no  Concern  or  Connexion ;  then  'tis 
a  plain  Diclate  of  common  Senfe,  that  its  none  of  their 
Virtue,  nor  any  moral  Good  in  them  ;  and  that  they  are 
liot  worthy  to  be  rewarded  or  praifed  ;.  or  at  ail  efteemed, 
honoured  or  loved  on  that  "Account.  And  on  the  other 
Pland,  that  if  from  like  Neceffity  they  do  thofe  Things  which 
in  Themfelves  are  very  unhappy  and  pernicious,  and  do  them 
becaufe  they  can't  help  it ;  the  Neceffity  is  fuch,  that  it  is 
all  one  whether  they  will  them,  or  no ;  and  the  Reafon  why 
they  are  done,  is  from  Neceffity  only,  and  not  from  their 
Wills ;  'Tis  a  very  plain  Didlate  of  common  Senfe  that  they 
are  not  at  all  to  blame  ;  there  is  no  Vice,  Fault,  or  moral 
Evii  at  alli  iu  the  EiFeft  dong.;.  por  are  they  vvho  are  thus 

ncceflitated. 


Scdt.  III.  {-onirary  to  common  ScnCe.  207 

-necelFitated,    in  any  wife  worthy   to  be  piinifhed,   hated,    or 
in  the  leaft  difrefpefted,  on  that  Account. 

In  like  Manner,  if  Things  in  themfclves I  good  and  defira- 
b]e  are  abfolutely  impoffible,  vvith  a  natiiral  Impoffibility, 
the  univerfal  Reafcn  of  Mankind  teaches,  tliat  this  'vjholly  and 
ferf.-cilj  excufes  Perfons  in  their  not  doing  them. 

And  't's  alfo  a  plain  Dictate  cf  common  Senfe,  that  if  the 
rloing  Tilings  in  ihemfelves  Good,  or  avoiding  Things  ia 
themfelves  Lvil,  is  not  abfolutely  impoffible.  With  fiich  a  natural 
Impoffibility,  but  very  difficult,  with  a  natural  Difficulty;  that 
is,  a  Difficulty  prior  to,  and  not  at  all  conGding  in  Will  and 
inclination  itfelf,  and  which  would  remain' the  fame,  let  the 
Inclination  be  what  it  will ;  tlien  ii  Perfcn's  Negleft  or  O- 
miffion  is  excufed  inform  Meafire,  tho'  not  Wholly  ;  his  Sin  is 
kfs  aggravated,  than  if  the  Thing  to  be  donel  v/ere  eafy.  And 
if  inltead  of  Difficulty  and  Hindrance,  there  be  a  contrary  na- 
tural Propenfity  in  the  State  of  Things,  to  the  filing  to  be  done, 
or  Effed  to  be  brought  to  pafs,  abftra(fted  from  any  Coniidera- 
tion  of  the  Inclination  of  the  Heart  ;  tho'  the  Propenfity  be 
not  fo  great  as  to  amoant  to  a  natural  Necqffity;  yet  being 
fome  Approach  to  it,  fo  that  the  doing  the  good  Thing  be 
very  much  from  this  natural  Tendency  in  the  State  of  Things, 
and  but  little  from  a  good  Inclination  ;  then  it  is  a  Diftate 
of  common  Scnfe,  that  there  is  fo  much  the  lefs  Virtue  in 
what  is  done ;  xmd  fo  it  is  lefs  Praifc-worthj'  and  rewarda^ 
ble.  The  Reafon  is  eafy,  hjIz.  becaufe  fach  a  r.atural  Propen- 
fity or  Tendency  is  an  Approach  to  natural  Neceffity  ;  and  the 
greater  the  Propenfity,  ftill  fo  much  the  nearer  is  the 
Approach  to  Neceffity.  And  therefore  as  natural  Neceffity 
takes  away  or  fhuts  out  all  Virtue,  fo  this  Propenfity  ap- 
proaches to  an  Abolition  of  Virtue  ;  that  is,  it  dimirsiffies  it. 
And  on  the  other  Hand,  natural  Difficulty, iri  the  State  of 
Things  is  an  Approach  to  natural  Impoffibility.  And  as  the 
Jatter,  when  it  is  complete  and  abfoiute,  'wholly  takes  away 
£lame  ;  fo  fach  Difficulty  takes  away  fome  Blaipe,,  or  dimi- 
nifhes  Blame;  and  makes  the  Thing  done  to  bei  lefs  vvorthj^ 
of  Punifhment. 

IL  Men  in  their  firft  Ufc  of  fuch  Phrafes  'as  Ihefe,  Muffi, 
can't,  catit  help  it,  can't  avoid  it,  neceffiary,  nnabk,  impoffible, 
unavyidahie,  irrefijiihle,  &c.  ufe  them  to  fignify  a  Neceffity  of 
Confiiaint  or  Reiftraint,  a  natural  Neceffity  or  Impopibility  ;  or 
fome  Neceffity   that '  the  Will  has   nothing  to  do  in ;    which 

D  d  3  may 


20Z  ffHoy  Calvinifm  is  fuppofed         Part  IV, 

xnay  be,  whether  Men  will  or  no ;  and  which  may  be  fup- 
pofed to  be  juft  the  fame,  let  Men's  Inclinations  and  Defires 
be  what  they  will.  Such  Kind  of  Terms  in  their  original 
Ufe,  I  fuppofe  aimong  all  Nations,  are  relative  ;  carrying  in 
their  Signification  (as  was  before  obferved)  a  Reference  or  Ke- 
fpeft  to  fome  contrary  Will,  Defire  or  Endeavour,  which,  it  is 
fuppofed,  is,  or  may  be  in  the  Cafe.  All  Men  find,  and  be- 
gin to  find  in  early  Childhood,  that  there  are  innumerable 
Things  that  can'c  be  done,  which  they  defire  to  do  ;  and  in- 
numerable 'Ihings.  which  they  are  averfe  to,  that  muft  be, 
they  can't  avoid  t.'liem,  they  will  be,  whether  they  chufe  them 
or  no.  'Tis  to  exprefs  this  Neceffity,  which  Men  fo  foon 
and  fo  often  find,  and  which  fo  greatly  and  fo  early  affects 
them  in  innumer^ible  Cafes,  that  fuch  Terms  and  Phrafes 
are  firit  formed  ;  and  'tis  to  fignify  fuch  a  Neceffity,  that 
they  are  firft  ufec'l,  and  that  they  are  moll  conftantly  ufed,  in 
the  common  AfF?iirs  of  Lifej  and  not  to  fignify  any  fuch  me^ 
taphylical,  fpecii  lative  and  abftraft  Notion,  as  that  Connedion 
in  the  Nature  or  Courfe  of  Things,  v/hich  is  between  the 
Subjed  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition,  and  which  is  the  Foun- 
dation of  the  certain  Truth  of  that  Propofition ;  to  fignify 
which,  they  who  employ  themfelves  in  Philofophical  Inqui- 
ries into  the  Eril  Origin  and  Metaphyfical  Relations  and 
Dependences  o  f  Things,  have  borrowed  thefe  Terms,  for 
want  of  others..  But  we  grow  up  from  our  Cradles  in  a  Ufe 
of  fuch  Terms  and  Phrafes,  entirely  different  from  this,  and 
carrying  a  Senf  e  exceeding  diverfe  from  that  in  which  they  are 
commonly  uftd  in  the  Controverfy  between  Arminians  and 
Caluinijis,  A  nd  it  being,  as  was  faid  before,  a  Diftate  of 
the  univerfal  Senfe  of  Mankind,  evident  to  us  as  foon  as  we 
begin  to  think.,  that  the  Neceffity  fignified  by  thefe  Terms,  in 
the  Senfe  in  ^vhich  we  firft  learn  them,  does  excule  Perfons, 
and  free  them  from  all  Fault  or  Blame  :  Hence  our  Idea's  of 
Hxcufablenef  J  or  Faultlefnefs  is  tied  to  thefe  Terms  and 
Phrafes  by  a.  ftrong  Habit,  which  is  begun  in  Childhood  as 
foon  as  we  !begin  to  fpeak,  and  grows  up  with  us,  and  is 
flrengthned  by  conftant  Ufe  and  Cuftom,  the  Conneftio^ 
growing  ftronger  and  ftronger. 

The  habitual  Connexion  which  is  in  Men's  Minds  be- 
tween Blanaelefnefs  and  thofe  loremention'd  Terms,  Muji, 
cannot,  unable,  necejfary,  impojjtble,  una'uoidahle ,  &c.  becomes  very 
ftrong ;  becaufe  as  foon  as  ever  Men  begin  to  ufe  Reafon 
and  Speech,  they  have  Occafion  to  excufe  themfelves,  from 
|jie  natural  Neceffity  figniiied  by  thefe  Terms,  in  numerous 

Infiances ; 


Sc(-l.  III.      contrary  to  common  Senfe.  209 

Inftances  :■■       /  can't  do  it 1  could  not  help  it, And  all 

Mankind  have  conilant  and  daily  Occafion  to  ufe  fuch  Phrafes 
in  this  Senfe,  to  excufe  thenjfelves  and  others  in  almoft  all  the 
Concerns  of  Life,  with  Refpedl  to  Difappointments,  and 
Things  that  happen  which  concern  and  affeft  us  and  others, 
that  are  hurtful,  or  difagreeable  to  us  or  them,  or  Things  de- 
iirable  that  we  or  others  fail  of. 

That  a  being  accuftomed  to  an  Union  of  different  Ideas, 
from  early  Childhood,  makes  the  habitual  Connexion  ex- 
ceeding ftrong,  as  tho'  fuch  Connection  were  owing  to  Nature, 
is  manifcft  in  innumerable  Inftances,  It  is  altogether  by  fuch 
an  habitual  Connection  of  Ideas,  that  Men  judge  of  the  Big- 
nefs  or  Diftance  of  the  Objeds  of  Sight  from  their  Appearance, 
Thus  'tis  owing  to  fuch  a  Connexion  early  ^ftablilhed,  and 
growing  up  with  a  Perfon,  that  he  judges  a  Mountain,  which 
he  fees  at  ten  Miles  diftance,  to  be  bigger  than  his  Nofe,  or 
further  off  than  the  End  of  it.  Having  been  ufed  fo  long  to 
join  a  confiderable  Diftance  and  Magnitude  with  fuch  an  Ap- 
pearance, Men  imagine  it  is  by  a  Dictate  of  natural  Senfe : 
Whereas  it  would  be  quite  otherwife  with  one  that  had  his  Eyes 
newly  opened,  who  had  been  born  blind  :  He  would  have  the 
fame  viiible  Appearance,  but  natural  Senfe  would  didate  no 
fuch  Thing  concerning  the  Magnitude  or  Diftanpe  of  what 
appeared. 

III.  When  Men,  after  they  had  been  fo  habituated  to  connedl 
Ideas  of  Innocency  or  Blaraelefnefs  with  fuch  Terms,  that  the 
Union  feems  to  be  the  Effeft  of  mere  Nature,  come  to  hear  the 
fame  Terras  ufed,  and  learn  to  ufe  them  themfelves  in  the  fore- 
mention'd  new  and  metaphyfical  Senfe,  to  fignify  quite  another 
Sort  of  Neceflity,  which  has  no  fuch  Kind  of  Relation  to  a 
contrary  fuppofable  Will  and  Endeavour  ;  the  Notion  of  plain 
and  manifeft  Blamelefnefs ,  by  this  Means,  is  by  a  ftrong  Pre- 
judice, infenfibly  and  unwarily  transfer'd  to  a  Cafe  to  which  it 
by  no  Means  belongs :  The  Change  of  the  Ufe  of  the  Terms, 
to  a  Signification  which  is  very  diverfe,  not  being  taken  No- 
tice of,  or  adverted  to.  And  there  are  feveral  Reafons  why  it 
is  not. 

I.  The  Terms,  as  ufed  by  Philofophers,  are  not  very  diftind 
and  clear  in  their  Meaning ;  few  ufe  them  in  a  fix'd  deter- 
mined Senfe.  On  the  contrary,  their  Meaning  is  very  vague 
»nd  confwfed.    Which  is  what  commonly  happens  to  the 

Word* 


0.10  ff^hy  Czlvlmitn  is  fiippdfcd        Part  IV, 

Words  ufed  to  fignify  Things  intelleftual  iind  moral,  and  to 
cxprefs  what  Mr.  Locke  calls  fnlxt  Modes.  If  Men  had  a  clear 
and  iliftind  Undef  ftanding  of  what  is  intended  by  thefe  meta- 
•phyfical  Terms,  they  would  be  able  more  eafily  to  compare 
,them  with  their  original  and  common  Senfe  ;  and  fo  would  not 
be  fo  eafily  cheated  by  them.  The  Minds  of  Men  are  fo  eafily 
Jed  into  Deluficn  by  no  Sort  of  Terms  in  the  World,  as  by 
Words  of  this  Sort. 

2.  The  Change  of  the  Signification  of  the  Terms  is  the 
more  infenfible,  becaufe  the  1  hings  fignified,  tho'  indeed  very 
different,  yet  do  in  fome  generals  agree.  In  NecpJJity,  that 
which  is  vulgarly  fo  called,  there  is  a  ftrong  Connection  be- 
tween the  Thing  faid  to  be  Neceflary,  and  fomething  antece- 
dent to  it,  in  the  Order  of  Nature  ;  fo  there  is  alfo  in  philo- 
fophkal  NeceJ/ity.  And  tho'  in  both  Kinds  of  Neceffity,  the 
Connexion  can't  be  called  by  that  Name,  with  Relation  to 
an  oppofite  Will  or  Endeavour,  to  which  it  h  /tiperiair ; 
which  is  the  Cafe  in  vulgar  Neceffity ;  yet  in  both;  the  Con- 
reftion  is  prior  to  Will  and  Endeavour,  and  fo  in  fome  Re- 
i^tdifuperiour.  In  both  Kinds  of  Neceffity  there  is  a  Foun- 
dation for  fome  Certainty  of  the  Propofition  that  affirms  the 

Event. The  Terms  ufed  being  the  fame,  and  the  Things 

fignified  agreeing  in  thefe  and  fome  other  general  Circumflances, 
and  the  Exprefilons  as  ufed  by  Philofophers  being  not  well  dcr 
figned,  and  fo  of  obfcure  and  loofe  Signification  ;  hence  Per- 
fons  are  not  aware  of  the  great  Difference  ;  and  the  Notions  of 
Innocence  or  Faultlefnefs,  which  were  fo  ftrongly  afl'ociated 
with  them,  and  were  flridly  united  in  their  Minds,  ever  fince 
they  can  remember,  remain  united  with  them  flill,  as  if  the 
Union  were  altogether  natural  and  neceffary  ;  and  they  that  go 
about  to  make  a  Separation,  feem  to  them  to  do  great  Violence, 
even  to  Nature  itfelf. 

IV.  Another  Reafon  why  it  appears  difficult  to  reconcile  it 
with  Reafon,  that  Men  fhould  be  blamed  for  that  which  is 
neceffary  with  a  moral  Neceffity  (which  as  was  obferved  before 
is  a  Species  of  Philofophical  Neceffity)  is,  that  for  want  of 
due  Confideration,  Men  inwardly  entertain  that  Apprehenfion, 
that  this  Neceffity  may  be  againfl  Men's  Wills  and  fincere  En- 
deavours. They  go  away  with  that  Notion,  that  Men  may  truly 
will  and  wifh  and  flrive  that  it  may  be  otherwife ;  but  that 
invincible  Neceffity  flands  in  the  Way.  And  many  think  thus 
concerning  themfelves  :  Some  that  are  wicked  Men  tliink  they 
svifti  that  they  were  good,  that  they  loved  God  and  Holinefs  ; 

but 


Seta.  III.       contrary  to  common  Senfc.  ^tt 

but  yet  don't  find  that  their  Wifhes  produce  the  Effeft 

The  Reafons  why  Men  think  thus,  are  as  foUovv's.   (i.)  They 
find  what  may  be  called  an  indirect  Willingnefs  to  have  a  better 
Will  in  the    Manner   before  cbferved  :    For  it  is  impollible, 
and  a  Contradiction  to  fuppofe  the  Will  to  be-  direttly  and 
properly  againft  itfelf.     And  they  don't  confider,  that   this  in- 
direct Willingnefs  is   entirely  a    different  Thing  from  properly 
willing  the  "1  hing  that  is  the  Duty  and  Virtue  required  ;  and 
that  there  is  no  Virtue  in  that  Sort  of  Willingnefs  which  they 
have.     They  don't  confider,  that  the  Volitions  which  a  wicked 
Man  may  have  that  lie  loved  God,    are  no  Acts  of  the  Will 
at  all  agamlt  the  moral  Evil  of  not  loving  God  ;    but  only 
fome  difagreeable  Confequences  :    But  the  making  the  requifite 
Diltinction  requires   more    Care   of  Reflection    and   Thought 
than  molt  Men  are  ufed  to.     And  Men  through  a  Prejudice  ia 
their  own   Favour,    are  difpofed  to  think  v»ell  of  their  own 
Defires   and    Difpofitions,  and  to  account  them  good  and  vir- 
tuous, tho'  their  Refpect  to  Virtue  be  only  indirect  and  remote^ 
and  'tis  nothing  at  all  that  is  virtuous  that  truly  excites  or  ter- 
minates their  Inclinations.      (2.)  Another  Thing  that  infenfibly 
leads    and  beguiles  Men   into  a  Suppofition    that  this  moral 
NecefTity  or  ImpoiTibility  is,    or  may  be  againft  Men's  Willi*, 
and  true  Endeavours,  is  the  Derivation  and  Formation  of  the 
Terms   themfelves,    that  are  often   ufed    to  exprefs  it,  which 
is  fuch  as  feems  directly  to  point  to,  and  hold  this  forth.  Such 
Words,    for  Inltance,    as  iinahle,  unanjoidable ,  i7npoJJible,  irre~ 
fjiibie-  which  carry   a  plain  Reference  to  a  fuppofable  Power 
exerted.  Endeavours  ufed,    RefiHance  made,  in  Oppofition  to 
the  Neceffity  :   And  the  Perfons  that  hear  them,  not  confiderins? 
nor  fufpecting  but  that  they  are  ufed  in  their  proper  Senfe  :  That 
Senfe  being  therefore  underftood,  there  does  naturally,  and  as 
it  were  necelfarily   arife  in   their  Minds   a  Suppofition  that  it 
may  be  fo  indeed,    that  true  Defires  and  Endeavours  may  take 
Place,    but  that  invincible   Neceffity  flands  in  the  Way,  and 
renders  them  vain  and  to  no  Effect. 

V.  Another  Thing  which  makes  Perfons  more  ready  to 
fuppofe  it  to  be  contrary  to  Reafon,  that  Men  fhould  be  ex- 
pofed  to  the  Punifhments  threaten'd  to  Sin,  for  doing  thofe 
Things  which  are  morally  neceffary,  or  not  doing  thofe 
Things  morally  impoffible,  is,  that  Imagination  ffrengthens  the 
Argument,  and  adds  greatly  to  the  Power  and  Influence  of 
the  feeming  Reafons  againit  it,  from  the  greatnefs  of  that 
Punifhment.  To  allow  that  they  may  be  juftly  expofed  to  a 
fmall  Punifhment,  would  not  be  fo  diffigult.  Whereas,  if  thett 

were 


il%  Necejfary  VirtuCy  &c.  Part  IV. 

were  any  good  Reafon  in  the  Cafe,  if  it  were  truly  a  Dictate  of 
Reafon  that  fuch  NeceiTity  was  inconfiftent  with  Faultinefs,  or 
juft  Puniftiment,  the  Demonftration  would  be  equally  certain 
with  refpect  to  a  fmall  Punifhment,  or  any  Punifhment  at  all, 
as  a  very  great  one  :  But  it  is  not  equally  eafy  to  the  Imagi- 
nation. They  that  argue  againft  the  Juftice  of  </«7OT«/«f  Men 
for  thofe  Things  that  are  thus  neceffary,  feem  to  make  their 
Argument  the  ftronger,    by  fetting  forth  the  Greatnefs  of  the 

Puniftiraent  in  ftrong  Expreffions : That  a  Manjhould  be  cajl 

into  eternal  Burnings,  that  he  Jhould  be  made  to  fry  in  Hell  to  all 
Eternity,  for  thofe  Things  ixthich  He  had  no  Ponver  to  avoid,  and 
*was  under  a  fatal,  unfriijlrahle ,  innjincible  Necejjity  of  doing,-— - 


Section     IV. 

//  is  agreeable  to  common  Senfe,  and  the  natu^ 
ral  Notions  of  Mankind,  to  Juppofe  moral  Ne- 
ceffity  to  be  confiftent  zvith  Praife  and  Blame, 
Reward  and  Ftinijhment. 

WHETHER  the  Reafons  that  have  been  given, 
T^hy  it  appears  difEcult  to  fomc  Perfons  to  reconcile 
with  common  Senip  the  praifing  or  blaming,  rewarding  or 
punifhing  thofe  Things  which  are  morally  neceffary,  ard 
thought  fatisfactory,  or  not ;  yet  it  moft  evidently  appears  by 
the  following  Things,  that  if  this  Matter  be  rightly  underftood> 
fetting  afide  all  Delufion  arifing  from  the  Impropriety  and 
Ambiguity  of  Terms,  this  is  not  at  all  inconfiftent  with  the 
natural  Apprehenfions  of  Mankind,  and  that  Senfe  of  Things 
which  is  found  every  where  in  the  common  People,  who  are 
furtheft  from  having  their  Thoughts  preverted  from  their  natu- 
ral Channel,  by  metaphyfical  and  philofophical  Subtilties  ;  but 
on  the  contrary,  altogether  agreeable  to,  and  the  very  Voice 
and  Dictate  o/this  natural  and  vulgar  Senfe. 

I.  This  will  appear  if  we  confider  what  the  vulgar  Notion  of 
Blame-'worthinefi  is.    The  Idea  which    the  common  People 

through 


Seft.  IV-.         agreeable  to  common  Senfe.         213 

through  all  Ages  and  Nations  have  of  Faultinefs,  I  fuppofe  to 
be  plainly  this  ;  A  Perfcns  being  or  doitig  lurottg,  'with  his  onvn 
T/ ill  and  Plfafum  ;  containing  thefe  two  Things  ;  i.  His  doing 
ivrjng,  'whcn  he  docs  as  he pleafes,  2.  His  Pleofure's  being  'wrong. 
Or  in  other  Words,  periiaps  more  intelligibly  exprefiing  their 
Notion  J  A  Per/oh's  han:ing  his  Heart  avrong,  a?!d  doing  ivrotig 
from  his  Heart.     And  this  is  the  Sum  total  of  the  Matter. 

The  common  People  don't  afcend  up  in  their  Reflexions  and 
Abftractions,  to  the  metaphyficaj  Sources,  Relations  and  De- 
pendences of  Things,  in  order  to  form  their  Notion  of  Faul- 
tinefs or  Blaiiie-worthinefs.  They  don't  wait  till  they  have 
decided  by  their  Refinings,  what  firft  determines  the  Will  ; 
\vhether  it  he  determined  by  fomething  extrinfic,  or  intrinfic  ; 
whether  Volition  determines  Volicion,  or  whether  the  Under- 
Handing  determines  the  Will ;  v/hether  there  be  any  fuch 
Thing  as  Metaphyficians  mean  by  Contingence,  (if  they  have 
any  Meaning ;)  whether  there  be  a  Sort  of  a  ftrange  unac- 
countable Sovereignty  in  the  Will,  in  the  Exercife  of  which* 
by  its  own  fovereign  Acts,  it  brings  to  pafs  ail  its  own  fove- 
reign  Acts.  They  don't  take  any  Part  of  their  Notion  of 
Fault  or  Blame  from  the  P.efolution  of  any  fuch  Queftions.  If 
this  were  the  Cafe,  there  are  Multitudes,  yea  the  tar  greater 
Part  of  Mankind,  nine  Hundred  and  ninety-nine  out  of  a 
Thoufand  would  live  and  die  v/ithout  having  any  fuch 
Notion  as  that  of  Fault  ever  entring  into  their  Heads,  or  with- 
out fo  much  as  once  having  any  Conception  that  any  Body 
was  to  be  either  blamed  or  commended  for  any  Thing.  To 
be  fure,  it  would  be  a  long  Time  before  Men  came  to  have 
fuch  Notions.  Whereas  'tis  manifeft,  they  are  fome  of  the  firft 
Notions  that  appear  in  Children ;  who  difcover  as  foon  as 
they  can  think,  or  fpeak,  or  act  at  all  as  rational  Creatures, 
a  Senfe  of  Defert.  And  certainly,  in  forming  their  Notion  of 
it,  they  make  no  ufe  of  Metaphyiicks.  All  the  Ground  they 
go  upon  coniiils  in  thefe  two  Things  ;  Experience,  and  a  natu- 
ral Scn/ation  of  a  certain  Fitnefs  or  Agreeablenefs  which  there  is 
iri  uniting  fuch  moral  Evil  as  is  above  defcribed,  'viz.  a  being 
or  doing  'wrong  tvith  the  Will,  and  Refentment  in  others,  and 
f'ain  inflicted  on  the  Perfon  in  whom  this  moral  Evil  is. 
Which  natural  Senfe  is  what  we  call  by  the  Name  of  Confcience. 

'Tis  true,  the  common  People  and  Children,  in  their  Notion 

of  a  faulty  Act  or  Deed  of  any  Perfon,    do  fuppofe  that  it  is 

the  Perfon's  o'wn  Act  and  Deed.     But  this  is  all  that  belongs  to 

what  they  underlland  by  a  Thing's  being  a  Perfon's  o'wn  Deed  or 

E  e  Action  ;  " 


•21-4  Neceffary  Virtue,  &c.  Pait  X^\, 

ABion ;  even  that  it  is  fomething  done  by  him  of  Choice- 
That  fome  Exercife  or  Motion  fhould  begin  of  itfelf,  don't 
belong  to  their  Notion  of  <7«  ^^/5»,  or  Doincr.  If  fo,  it  would 
belong  to  their  Notion  of  it,  that  it  is  fomething  which  is  the 
Gaufe  of  its  own  Beginning :  And  that  is  as  much  as  to  fay,, 
that  it  is  before  it  begins  to  be.  Nor  is  their  Notion  of  an 
ASlion  fome  Motion  or  Exercife  that  begins  accidentally,  with- 
out any  Caufe  or  Reafon ;  for  that  is  contrary  to  one  of  the 
prime  Diftates  of  common  Senfe,  namely,  that  every  Thing, 
that  begins  to  be,  has  fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  why  it  is. 

The  common  People,  in  their  Notion  of  a  faulty  or 
praife-worthy  Deed  or  Work  done  by  any  one,  do  fup- 
pofe  that  the  Man  does  it  in  the  Exercife  of  Liberty.  But 
then  their  Notion  of  Liberty  is  only  a  Perfon's  having  Oppor- 
tunity of  doing  as  he  pleafeS.  They  have  no  Notion  of  Liber- 
ty confining  in  the  Will's  firft  afting,  and  io  caufing  its  own- 
Afts;  and  determining,  and  fo  caufing  its  own  Determina- 
tions ;  or  chufing,  aaid  fo  caufing  its  own  Choice.  Such  a. 
Notion  of  Libeny  is  what  none  have,  but  thofe  that  have 
darken'd  t'aeir  own  Minds  with  confufed  metaphyfical  Specu- 
lation, and  abftrufe  and  ambiguous  Terms.  If  a  Man  is  not 
reftrain'd  from  adting  as  his  Will  determines,  or  conftrain'd  to 
adl  otherwife  ;  then  he  has  Liberty,  according  to  common  No- 
tions of  Liberty,  without  taking  into  the  Idea  that  grand  Con- 
tradiftion  of  all  the  Determinations  of  a  Man's  free  Will  being 

the  Eitedts  of  the  Determinations  of  ■  >.»    free  Will. Nor 

have  Men  commonly  any  Notion  of  freedom  confifting  in  In- 
difference. For  if  fo,  then  it  would  be  agreeable  to  their  No- 
tion, that  the  greater  Indifference  Men  aft  with,  the  more 
Freedom  they  aft  with  ;  whereas  the  Reverfe  is  true.  He  that 
in  afting,  proceeds  with  the  fuUeft  Inclination,  does  what  He 
does  with  the  greatcft  Freedom,  according  to  common  Senfe. 
And  fo  far  is  it  from  being  agreeable  to  common  ^'enfe,  that 
fuch  Liberty  as  confifts  in  Indifference  is  requifite  to  Fraife  or 
Blame,  that  on  the  contrary,  the  Diftate  of  every  Man's  natu- 
ral Senfe  thro'  the  World  is,  that  the  further  he  is  from  being 
indifferent  in  his  afting  Good  or  Evil,  and  the  more  he  does 
cipher  with  full  and  ftrong  Inclination,  the  more  is  he  efteemed 
or  abhorred,  commended  or  condemned. 

II.  If  it  were  inconfifcent  with  the  common  Senfe  of  Man- 
kind, that  Men  fnould  be  either  to  be  blamed  or  commend- 
ed in  any  Volitions  they  have  or  fail  of,  in  Cafe  of  moral 
Neceffity  or  Impoffibility  ;  then  it  would  furely  alfo  be  agreea- 
Wz  to  the  fame  Senfe  and  Reafon  of  Mankind,,  that  the  near- 
er 


Secfl.  IV.     agreeable  to  common  Senfe.  i\^ 

•er  the  Cafe  approaches  to  fuch  a  moral  Neceffity  or  Impofli- 
bility,  either  through  a  ftrong  antecedent  moral  Propenfity 
on  the  one  Hand,  *  or  a  great  antecedent  Oppofition  and 
Difficulty  on  the  other,  the  nearer  does  it  approach  to  a  being 
neither  blameable  nor  commendable  ;  fo  that  Atts  exerted 
with  fuch  preceding  Propcniity  would  be  worthy  of  propor- 
tionably  lefs  Praife  4  and  when  omitted,  the  Ad  being  attend- 
ed with  fuch  Difficulty,  the  Omiffion  would  be  worthy  of  the 
lefs  Blame.  It  is  fo,  as  was  obferved  before,  with  natural 
Neceffity  and  Impoffibility,  Propenfity  and  Difficulty  :  As  'ti,s 
a  plain  Diftate  of  the  Senfe  of  all  Mankind,  that  natural  Ne- 
ceffity and  Impoffibility  takes  away  all  Blame  and  Praife  ;  and 
therefore,  that  the  nearer  the  Approach  is  to  thefe  through 
previous  Propenfity  or  Difficulty,  fo  Praife  and  Blame  are 
■proportionably  diminiJhecL  And  if  it  were  as  much  a  Diftate 
of  common  Senfe,  that  moral  Neceffity  of  doing,  or  Impoffi- 
bility of  avoiding,  takes  away  all  Praife  and  Blame,  as  that 
natural  Neceffity  or  Impoffibility  does  this;  then,  by  a  perfe^i 
Parity  of  Reafon,  it  would  be  as  much  the  Diflate  of  commoii 
Senfe,  that  an  Approach  to  moral  Neceffity  of  doing,  or  Im- 
poffibility of  avoiding,  dhninijhes  Praife  and  Blame,  as  that 
an  Approach  to  natural  Neceffity  and  Impoffibility  does  fo. 
'Tis  equally  the  Voice  of  common  Senfe,  that  Perfons  are 
exatfable  in  Part,  in  neglecting  Things  difficult  againft  their 
Wills,  as  that  they  are  excujable  'wholly  in  neglefting  Things 
impoffible  againft  their  Wills.  And  if  it  made  no  Dilference, 
whether  the  Impoffibility  were  natural  and  againft  the  Will,  or 
moral,  lying  in  the  Will,  witli  regard  to  Excufablenefs  ;  fo 
neither  would  it  make  any  Difference,  whether  the  Difficulty, 
or  Approach  to  Neceffity  be  natural  againft  the  'Will,  or  moral, 
lying  in  the  Propenfity  of  the  Will. 

But  'tis  apparent,  that  the  Reverfe  of  thefe  Things  is  true. 
If  there  be  an  Approach  to  a  moral  Neceffity  in  a  Man's  Ex- 
ertion of  good  Ads  of  Will,  they  being  the  Exercife  of  a 
ftrong  Propenfity  to  Good,  and  a  very  powerful  Love  to  Vir- 
tue ;  'tis  fo  far  from  being  the  Dictate  of  common  Senfe,  that 
He  is  lefs  virtuous,  and  the  lefs  to  be  eiteem'd,  loved  and 
praifed  ;  that  'tis  agreeable  to  the  natural  Notions  of  all  Man- 
kind that  he  is  fo  much  the  better  Man,  worthy  of  greater 
Refped,  and  higher  Commendation.  And  the  ftronger  the 
Inclination  is,  and  the  nearer  it  approaches  to  Neceffity  iri  that 
E  e  3  Refped, 

*  'Tis  here  argued,  on  Suppofition  that  not  all  Propenfity  implies  mor^^l 
Neceffity,  but  only  fomc  rcry   high  Degrees ;  which  none  will  deny- 


21 6  Necejfary  Virtue^  &c.  Part  IV. 

Refpefl,  or  to  Impoffibility  of  negleding  the  virtuous  Aft,  or  of 
doing  a  vicious  one ;  ftill  the  more  virtuous,  and  worthy  of 
higher  Commendation.  And  on  the  other  Hand,  if  a  Man 
exerts  evil  Adts  of  Mind ;  as  for  Inftance,  Afts  of  Pride  or 
Malice,  from  a  rooted  and  ftrong  Habit  or  Principle  of  Haugh- 
tinefs  and  Malicioufnefs,  and  a  violent  Propenfity  of  Heart  to 
fuch  Acts;  according  to  the  natural  Senfe  of  all  Men,  he  is 
fo  far  from  being  the  lefs  hateful  and  blameable  on  that  Ac- 
count, that  he  is  To  much  the  more  worthy  to  be  detefted  and 
condemned  by  all  that  obferve  Him. 

Moreover,  'tis  manifeft  that  it  is  no  Part  of  the  Notion 
which  Mankind  commonly  have  of  a  blaraeable  or  Praife- 
•worthy  Adf  of  the  Will,  that  it  is  an  Aft  which  is  not  deter- 
mined by  an  antecedent  Bias  or  Motive,  but  by  the  fovereign 
Power  of  the  Will  itfelf ;  becaufe  if  fo,  the  greater  Hand 
fiich  Caufes  have  in  determining  any  Aft  of  the  Will,  fo  much 
the  lefs  virtuous  or  vicious  would  they  be  accounted ;  and 
the  lefs  Hand,  the  more  virtuous  or  vicious.  Whereas  the 
TReverfe  it  true  :  Men  don't  think  a  good  Aft  to  be  the  lefs 
praife-worthy,  for  the  Agent's  being  much  determined  in  it  by 
a  good  Inclination  or  a  good  Metive,  but  the  more.  And  if 
good  Inclination  or  Motive  has  but  little  Influence  in  deter- 
mining the  Agent,  they  don't  think  his  Aft  fo  much  the  more 
virtuous,  but  the  lefs.  And  fo  concerning  evil  Afts,  which  are 
determined  by  evil  Motives  or  Inclinations. 

Yea,  if  it  be  fuppofed  that  good  or  evil  Difpofitions  are  im- 
planted in  the  Hearts  of  Men  by  Nature  itfelf,  (which,  it  is 
certain,  is  vulgarly  fuppofed  in  innumerable  Cafes)  yet  it  is, 
not  commonly  fuppofed  that  Men  are  worthy  of  no  Praife  or 
Difpraife  for  fuch  Difpofitions  ;  altho'  what  is  natural  is  un- 
doubtedly neceffary.  Nature  being  prior  to  all  Afts  of  the  Will 
•whatfoever.  Thus  for  Inftance,  if  a  Man  appears  to  be  of  a 
A'ery  haughty  or  malicious  Difpofition,  and  is  fuppofed  to  be 
fo  by  his  natural  Temper,  'tis  no  vulgar  Notion,  no  Diftate  of 
the  common  Senfe  and  Apprehenfion  of  Men,  that  fuch  Dif:. 
pofitions  are  no  Vices  or  moral  Evils,  cr  that  fuch  Perfons  are 
not  worthy  of  Difeftcem,  Odium  and  Difhonour  ;  or  that  the 
proud  or  malicious  Afts  which  flow  from  fuch  natural  Difpo- 
fitions, are  v^orthy  of  no  Refentment.  Yea,  fuch  vile  na- 
tural Difpofitions,  and  the  Strength  of  them,  will  commonly  be 
mention'd  rather  as  an  Aggravation  of  the  wicked  Afts  that 
come  from  fuch  a  Fountain,  than  an  Extenuation  of  them. 
Its  being  natural  for  Men  to  aft  thus,  is  often  obferved  by 

•  Men 


Sefl.  IV.         agreeable  to  Gommon  Senfe.  217 

Men  in  the  Height  of  their  Indignation  :  They  will  fay,  "  'Tis 
"  his  very  Nature:  He  is  of  a  vile  natural  Temper ;  'tis  as 
"  natural  to  Him  to  aft  fo,  as  it  is  to  breathe  ;  He  can't  help 
"  ferving  the  Devil,  &:c."  But  it  is  not  thus  with  Regard  to 
hurtful  mifchievous  Things  that  any  ,nre  the  Subjefts  cr  Occa- 
fions  of  by  natural  Necc^/ity,  againft  tlieir  Inclinations.  In  fuch 
a  Cafe,  the  Necclfity,  by  the  common  Voice  of  Mankind,  will 

be  fpoken  of  as  a  full  Excufe. Thus  'tis  very  plain,  that 

common  Senfe  makes  a  vaft  Difference  betv/een  thefe  two  Kinds 
of  NecefTity,  as  to  the  Judgment  it  makes  of  their  Influence  on 
the  moral  Quality  and  Defert  of  Men's  Anions. 

And  thefe  Dictates  of  Men's  Minds  are  fo  natural  and  necef- 
fary,  that  it  may  be  very  much  doubted  whether  the  Ar-Tr.ijiians 
themfelves  have  ever  got  rid  of  them ;  yea,  their  greateft  Dodtors, 
that  have  gone  furthell  in  Defence  of  their  metaphyfical  No- 
tions of  Liberty,  and  have  brought  their  Arguments  to  their 
greateil  Strength,  and  as  they  fuppofe  to  a  Demonftration, 
againft  the  Confiftence  of  Virtue  and  Vice  with  any  Neceflity  : 
'Tis  to  be  queif  ion'd,  whether  there  is  fo  much  as  one  of  them, 
but  that  if  He  fuffered  very  nmch  from  the  injurious  Afts  of  a 
Man  under  the  Power  of  an  invincible  Haughtinefs  and  Malig- 
nancy of  Temper,  would  not,  from  the  foremention'd  natural 
Senfe  of  Mind,  refent  it  farotherwife,  than  if  as  great  Sufferings 
came  upon  Him  from  the  Wind  that  blows,  and  Fire  that 
burns  by  natural  NeceiTity  ;  and  otherwife  than  he  would,  if 
he  fuffered  as  much  from  the  Conduct  of  a  Man  perfectly  de- 
lirious ;  yea,  tho'  he  firft  brought  his  Diftraflion  upon  Him 
fome  Way  by  his  own  Fault, 

Some  feem  to  difdain  the  Diftinftion  that  we  make  between 
natural nnA  moral  NeceJ/liy,  as  tho'  it  were  altogether  impertinent 
in  this  Controverfy  :  "  That  which  is  neceffarv  (fay  they)  is 
"  neceffary  ;  it  is  that  which  muft  be,  and  can't  be  prevented. 
"  And  that  which  is  impoffible,  is  impoffible,  and  can't  be  done ; 
"  and  therefore  none  can  be  to  blame  for  not  doing  it."  And 
fuch  Comparifons  are  made  ufe  of,  as  the  commanding  of  a 
Man  to  walk  who  has  loft  his  Legs,  and  condemning  and  pu- 
niihing  Him  for  not  obeying  ;  inviting  and  calling  upon  a 
Man,  who  is  fhut  up  in  a  ftrong  Prifon,  to  come  forth,  &c. 
But  in  thefe  Things  Arminiatis  are  very  unreafonable.  Let 
common  Senfe  determine  whether  there  be  not  a  great  Differ- 
ence between  thofe  two  Cafes ;  the  one,  that  of  a  Man  who 
has  offended  his  Prince,  and  is  call  into  Prifon  ;  and  after  he 
^as  lain  there  a  wiiile,  the  King  comes  to  him,  calls  him  to 

comQ. 


21$  Calvinifm  confijlent  Part  IV. 

come  forth  to  him  ;  and  tells  him  that  if  he  will  do  fo,  and  will 
fall  down  before  Him,  and  humbly  beg  his  Pardon,  he  fhall 
be  forgiven,  and  fet  at  Liberty,  and  alfo  be  greatly  enrich'd,  and 
advanced  to  Honour :  The  Prifoner  heartily  repents  of  the 
Folly  and  Wickednefs  of  his  Offence  againft  his  Prince,  is 
thoroughly  difpofed  to  abafe  Himfelf,  and  accept  of  the  King's 
Ofter;  but  is  confined  by  ftrong  Walls,  vi^ith  Gates  of  Brafs, 
and  Barrs  of  Iron.  Tlie  other  Cafe  is,  that  of  a  Man  who 
is  of  a  very  unreafonable  Spirit,  of  a  haughty,  ungrateful, 
wilful  Difpofition ;  and  moreover,  has  been  brought  up  in 
traiterious  Principles ;  and  has  his  Heart  pofTeffed  with  an 
extream  and  inveterate  Enmity  to  hJs  lawful  Soveriegn ;  and 
for  his  Rebellion  is  caft  into  Prifon,  and  lies  long  there,  loaden 
with  heavy  Chains,  and  in  miferable  Circumftances.  At  length 
the  compailionate  Prince  comes  to  the  Prifon,  orders  his 
Chains  to  be  knocked  off,  and  his  Prifon-doors  to  be  fet  v/ide 
open;  calls  to  him,  and  tells  Him,  if  He  will  come  forth  to 
him,  and  fall  down  before  him,  acknowledge  that  he  has 
treated  him  unworthily,  and  aJk  his  Forgivenefs ;  He  fliall  be 
forgiven,  fet  at  Liberty,  and  fet  in  a  Place  of  great  Dignity  and 
Profit  in  his  Court.  But  He  is  fo  ttout  and  ftomachful,  and 
full  of  haughty  Malignity,  that  He  can't  be  willing  to  accept  the 
Offer  :  His  rooted  ftrong  Pride  and  Malice  have  perfed  Power 
over  him,  and  as  it  were  bind  him,  by  binding  his  Heart : 
The  Oppofition  of  his  Heart  has  the  Maftery  over  Him,  hav- 
ing an  Influence  on  his  Mind  far  fuperiour  to  the  King's  Grace 
and  Condefconfion,  and  to  all  his  kind  Offers  and  Promifes. 
Now,  is  it  agreeable  to  common  Senfe,  to  affert  and  ftand  to 
it,  that  there  is  no  Difference  between  thefe  two  Cafes,  as  to 
any  Worthinefs  of  Blame  in  the  Prifoners;  becaufe,  forfooth» 
there  is  a  Neceffity  in  both,  and  the  required  Aft  in  each  Cafe 
is  impoffible  ?  "T  is  true,  a  Man's  evil  Difpofitions  may  be  as 
ftrong  and  immovable  as  the  Barrs  of  a  Caftle.  But  who  can't 
fee,  that  when  a  Man,  in  the  latter  Cafe,  is  faid  to  be  unable 
to  obey  the  Command,  the  Expreffion  is  ufed  improperly,  and 
not  in  the  Senfe  it  has  originally  ahd  in  common  Speech  ?  And 
that  it  may  properly  be  faid  to  be  in  the  Rebel's  Power  to  come 
out  of  Prifon,  feeing  he  can  eafily  do  it  if  he  pleafes  ;  tho'  hy 
Reafon  of  his  vile  Temper  of  Heart  which  is  fix'd  and  rooted, 
'tis  impoffible  that  it  fhould  pleafe  Him  ? 

Upon  the  Whole,  I  prefume  there  is  no  Perfon  of  good  Un- 
derftanding,  who  impartially  confiders  the  Things  which  have 
been  obfcrvcd,  but  will  allow  that  'tis  not  evident  from  the 
Pictates  of  the  common  Senfe,   or  natural  Notions  of  Man- 

kindj 


Se(5l.  xV.  "^//jb  common  Senfc.  at^ 

kind,  that  moral  Neceffity  is  inconfiftent  with  Praife  and  Elame- 
And  therefore,  if  the  Armimans  would  prove  any  fuch  Ineon- 
fiftency,  it  muft  be  by  fome  philofophical  and  metaphyfical 
Arguments,  and  not  common  Senfe. 

There  is  a   grand  lUufion  in  the   pretended  Demonftratioa 
of  Artninians  from   common  Senfe.     1  he  main  Strength  of  all 
thefe  Demonftrations,  lies  in  that  Prejudice  that  arifes  thro'  the 
infenfible  Change  of  the  Ufe  and  Meaning  of  fuch  Terms    as 
Liberty,  able,  zcr.able,  Jieccffary,  impojjlble ,  unwyoidable ,  iti'vificibk^ 
ABion,    Sec.    from  their  original  and  vulgur  Senfe,    to  a  meta- 
phyfical Senfe  entirely  diverfe ;    and  the  ftrong  Conneftion  of 
the  Ideas  of  Blamelefnefs,  Sec.    with  fome  of  thefe  Terms,  by 
an  Habit  contracfted  and  eftablifli'd,    while  thefe  Terms  were 
ufed  in  their  firft  Meaning.     This  Prejudice  and  Delufion  is  the 
Foundation  of  all  thofe  Pofitions  they  lay  down  as  Maxims, 
by  which  moft  of  the  Scriptures,    which  they  alledge  in  this 
Controverfy,  are  interpreted,    and  on  which  all  their  pompous 
Demonftrations  from  Scripture  and  Reafon  depend.     From  this 
fecret  Delufion  and  Prejudice  they  have  almoft  all   their  Ad- 
vantages :    'Tis  the  Strength  of  their  Bulwarks,    and  the  Edge 
of  their  Weapons.     And  this  is  the  main  Ground  cf  all   the 
Right  they  have  to  treat  their  Neighbours  in  fo  afluming  a 
Manner,    and  to  infult  others,    perhaps  as  wife  and   good  as 
themfelves,  as  iveni  Bigots,  Men  that  d-juell  in  the  dark  Ca<-ces  of 
Superjiition,  periierjly  fct ,  objiiTiately  Jhutting  their  Eyes  agaitift  the 
Noo?i-day  Light,    Enemies  to  common  Senfe,    Tnaintainii: g  the  frf- 
horn  of  Abfurdities,  fire.  &c.   But  perhaps  an  impartial  Confide- 
ratioh  of  the  Things  which  have  been  obferved  in  the  precedmg 
Parts  of  this  Inquiry,    may  enable  the  lovers   of  Truth  better 
to  judge,  whofe  DoClrine  is  indeed  abfurd,  abftnfc,  f  If  contra- 
dihory,   and  inconfiftent  with  common  Senfe,    and  many  Ways 
repugnant  to  the  univerfal  Didates  of  the  Reafon  of  Mankind. 

Carol.  From  Things  which  have  been  obferved,  it  \vill  fol- 
low, that  it  is  agreeable  to  common  Senfe  to  fuppofe,  that  the 
glorified  Saints  have  not  their  Freedom  at  all  diminifh'd,  in 
any  Refpeft  ;  and  that  God  Himfelf  has  the  higheft  poffible 
Freedom,  according  to  the  true  and  proper  Meaning  of  the 
Term  ;  and  that  He  is  in  the  liigheft  polfible  refpeft  an  Agent, 
and  aftive  in  the  Exercife  of  his  infinite  Holinefs  ;  tho'  He 
afls  therein  in  the  higheft  Degree  necefiarily  :  and  his  Adions 
of  this  Kind  are  in  the  higheft,  moft  abfolutely  perfed  Man- 
ner virtuous  and  Praife-worthy  ;  and  are  fo,  for  that  very 
Jleafon,  becaufe  they  are  moft  perfedly  necelTary. 

Section 


2ii6       Endeavours  not  rendered  vain.        Part  IV. 

^>ex'0>e>«o<><s><'<s><>K2>=^><2><»o<o«>e>«<2>'>©»0'0^ 

Section     V. 

Concerning  thoje  Objections,  that  this  Scheme  of 
Necejf/iy  renders  all  Means  and  Endeavours 
for  the  avoiding  of  Sin,  or  the  obtaining  Virtue 
and  Holinefsy  vain,  and  to  no  Purpofe;  and 
that  it  makes  Men  no  more  than  mere  Machines 
in  Affairs  of  Morality  and  Religioni 

jJRMINI ANS  fay,  if  it  be  fo,  that  Sin  and  Virtue  come 
to  pafs  by  a  Neceflity  confifting  in  a  fure  Conneftion  of 
Caufes  and  EiFecls,  Antecedents  and  Confequents,  it  can  never 
be  worth  the  while  to  ufe  any  Means  or  Endeavours  to  obtain 
the  one,  and  a\'oid  the  otlier  ;  feeing  no  Endeavours  can  alter 
tlie  Futurit}'-  of  the  Event,  which  is  become  necefiary  by  a 
Connexion  already  eftablifhed. 

But  I  defire,  that  this  Matter  may  be  fully  confidered  ;  and 
that  it  may  be  examined  with  a  thorough  StricTinefs,  whether 
it  will  foUov/  that  Endeavours  and  Means,  in  order  to  avoid  or 
obtain  any  future  Thing,  muft  be  more  in  vain,  on  the  Sup- 
pofition  of  fuch  a  Connection  of  Antecedents  and  Confequents, 
than  if  the  contrary  be  fuppofed. 

For  Endeavours  to  be  in  vain,  is  for  them  not  to  be  fuccefs- 
ful ;  that  is  to  fay,  for  them  not  eventually  to  be  the  Means  of 
the  Thing  aimed  at,  which  can't  be,  but  in  one  of  thefe  two 
Ways ;  either,  Bhjl,  That  ailtho'  the  Means  are  ufed,  yet  the 
Event  aimed  at  don't  follow  :  Or,  Secondly,  If  the  Event  does 
.follow,  it  is  not  becaufe  of  the  Means,  or  from  any  Conneftion 
or  Dependence  of  the  Event  on  the  Means ;  the  Event  would 
have  come  to  pafs,  as  well  without  the  Means,  as  v/ith  them. 
Jf  either  of  thefe  two  Things  are  the  Cafe,  then  the  Means 
are  not  properly  fuccefsful,  and  are  truly  in  vain.  The  Suc- 
cefsfulnefs  or  Unfuccefsfulnefs  of  Means,  in  order  to  an 
EfFeft,  or  their  being  in  vain  or  not  in  vain,  confifts  in  thofe 
Means  being  connefted,    or  not  connected,    with  the  EfFeft  in' 

fuch 


Se5l.  V.  ^^  Calviniflic  Principles.  i2t 

fuch  a  Manner  as  this,  'viz.  That  the  EfFed  is  nx>ith  the  Means, 
and  not  ^without  them  ;  or,  that  the  Being  of  the  EfFeft  is,  on 
the  one  Hand,  connefted  with  the  Means,  and  the  Want  of 
"the  EfFe<5t,  on  the  other  Hand,  is  conneded  with  the  Want  of 
the  Means.  If  there  be  fuch  a  Connection  as  this  between 
Means  and  End,  the  Means  are  not  in  vain  :  The  more  there 
]3  of  fuch  a  Connexion,  the  further  they  are  from  being  in 
vain;  and  the  lefs  of  fuch  a  Conile<5^ion,  the  more  are  they 
in  vain. 

Now,  therefore,  the  Qiieftion  to  be  anfwered,  (in  order  to 
deteraiine,  whether  it  follows  from  this  Dodrine  of  the  ne- 
ceffary  Connection  between  foregoing  Things  and  confequent 
Ones,  that  Means  ufed  in  order  to  any  Effeft,  are  more  in 
Vain  than  they  would  be  otherwife)  is.  Whether  it  follows 
from  it,  that  there  is  lefs  of  the  forementioned  Conneftion 
between  Means  and  EfFefi:  ;  that  is.  Whether  on  the  Suppofi- 
tion  of  their  being  a  real  and  true  Connexion  between 
'antecedent  Things  and  confequent  Ones,  there  muft  be  lefs  of 
a  Conneftion  between  Means  and  EfFedt,  than  on  the  Suppo- 
lition  of  their  being  no  fix'd  Connection  between  antecedent 
Things  and  confequent  Ones  :  And  the  very  ftating  of  this 
Queftion  is  fufficient  to  anfwer  it.  It  muft  appear  to  every 
one  that  will  open  his  Eyes,  that  this  QuelHon  can't  be 
affirmed,  without  the  grofseft  Abfurdity  and  Inconfiftence, 
'Means  are  foregoing  Things,  and  Effects  are  following 
Things :  And  if  there  were  no  Connection  between  foregoing 
Things,  and  following  Ones,  there  could  be  no  Connection 
"between  Means  and  End  ;  and  fo  all  Means  would  be  wholly 
vain  and  fruitlefs.  For  'tis  by  Virtue  of  fome  Connection 
only,  that  they  become  fucceisful :  'Tis  fome  Connection 
"obferved,  or  revealed,  or  otherwife  known,  between  ante- 
cedent Things  and  following  Ones,  that  is  what  directs  in  the 
Choice  of  Means.  And  if  there  were  no  fuch  Thing  as  an 
cftablifh'd  Connection,  there  could  be  no  Choice,  as  to  Means; 
'one  Thing  would  have  no  more  Tendency  to  an  Effect,  than 
another  ;  there  would  be  no  fuch  Thing  as  Tendency  in  the 
Cafe.  All  thofe  Things  which  are  fuccefsful  Means  of  other 
Things,  do  therein  prove  connected  Antecedents  of  them  : 
And  therefore  to  affert,  that  a  fix'd  Connection  between  Ante- 
cedents and  Confequents  makes  Means  vain  and  ufelefs,  of 
Hands  in  the  Way  to  hinder  the  Connection  between  Means 
and  End,  is  juft  fo  ridiculous,  as  to  fay,  that  a  Connection 
between  Antecedents  and  Confequents  ftands  in  the  Way  to 
hinder  a  Connection  between  Antecedents  and  Confequents. 

F  f  Nor 


322     Means  and  Endeavours  made  vain.     Part  IV.- 

Nor  can  any  fuppofed  Connexion  of  the  Succeffion  or  Train 
of  Antecedents  and  Confequents  from  the  very  Beginning  of 
all  Things,  the  Connection  being  naade  already  fiire  and 
neceffary,  either  by  eftablifh'd  Laws  of  Nature,  or  by 
thefe  together  with  a  Decree  of  fovereign  immediate  Inter- 
pofitions  of  divine  Power,  on  fuch  and  fuch  Occafions,  or  any 
other  Way,:  (if  any  other  there  be  ;)  I  fay,  no  fuch  neceffary 
Conneflion  of  a  Series  of  Antecedents  and  Confequents  can 
in  the  leaft  tend  to  hinder,  but  that  the  Means  we  ufe  may 
belong  to  the  Series ;  and  fo'  may  be  fome  of  thofe  Antecedents 
which  are  connefted  with  the  Confequents  we  aim  at,  in  the 
eftablifh'd  Courfe  of  Things.  Endeavours  which  we  ufe,  are 
Things  that  exift ;  and  therefore  they  belong  to  the  general 
Chain  of  Events;  all  the  Parts  of  which  Chain  are  fuppofed 
to  be  conneded  :  And  fo  Endeavours  are  fuppofed  to  be  con- 
nedted  with  fome  EfFefts,  or  fome  confequent  Things,  or  other. 
And  certainly  this  don't  hinder  but  that  the  Events'  they  arc 
connefted  with,  may  be  thofe  which  we  aim  at,  and  which 
we  chufe,  becaufe  we  judge  them  moft  likely  to  have  a  Con- 
neftion  with  thofe  Events,  from  the  eftablifh'd  Order  and 
(l^ourfe  of  Things  which  we  obferve,  or  from  fomething  in 
divine  Revelation. 

Let  us  fuppofe  a  real  and  fu re  Connexion  between  a  Man's 
having  his  Eyes  open  in  the  clear  Day-light,  with  good  Organs 
oi  Sight,  and  Seeing ;  fo  that  feeing  is  connefted  with  his 
opening  his  Eyes,  and  not  feeing  with  his  not  opening  his 
Eyes ;  and  alfo  the  like  Connexion  between  fuch  a  Man's 
attempting  to  open  his  Eyes,  and  his  aftually  doing  it  :  The 
fuppofed  eftablifhed  Connection  between  thefe  Antecedents  and- 
Confequents,.  let  the  Connection  be  never  fo  fure  and  neceflTary,. 
certainly  don't  prove  that  it  is  in  vain,  for  a  Man  in  fuch  Cir- 
eumftances  to  attempt  to  open  his  Eyes,  in  order  to  feeing; 
His  aiming  at  that  Event,  and  the  Ufe  of  the  Means,  being 
the  Effect  of  his  Will,  don't  break  the  Connection,  or  hinder 
die  Succefs. 

So  that  the  Objection  we  are  upon,  don't  lie  agatnft  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Necelfity  of  Events  by  a  Certainty  of  Connec- 
tion and  Confequence  :  On  the  contrary,  it  is  truly  forcible 
againft  the  Armitiian  Doctrine  of  Contingence  and  Self-deter- 
mination ;  which  is  inconfiftent  with  fuch  a  Connection.  If 
there  be  no  Connection  between  thofe  Events  wherein  Virtue 
and  Vice  confift,  and  any  Thing  antecedent ;  then  there  is  no 
Connection  between  thefe  Events  and  any  Means  or  Endeavours 

ufed 


\ 


Secfl.V.         hy  the  Arminian  Scheme.  223 

ufed  in  order  to  them  :  And  if  fo,  then  thofe  Means  muft  be 
in  vain.  The  lefs  there  is  of  Connexion  betv/een  foregoing 
Things  and  following  Ones,  fo  much  the  lefs  there  is  between 
Means  and  End,  Endeavours  and  Succefs ;  and  in  the  fame 
Proportion  are  Means  and  Endeavours  inefFeftual  and  in  vain. 

It  will  follow  from  Arminian  Principles,  that  there  is  no 
Degree  of  Connexion  between  Virtue  or  Vice,  and  any 
foregoing  Event  or  Thing  :  Or,  in  other  Words,  That  the 
Determination  of  the  Exiftence  of  Virtue  or  Vice  don't  in  the 
lead  depend  on  the  Influence  of  any  Thing  that  comes  to 
pafs  antecedently,  from  which  the  Determination  of  its  Ex- 
jftence  is,  as  its  Caufe,  Means,  or  Ground  ;  becaufe,  fo  far  as 
it  is  fo,  it  is  not  from  Self-determination  :  And  therefore,  fo  far 
there  is  nothing  of  the  Nature  of  Virtue  or  Vice.  And  fo 
it  follows,  that  Virtue  and  Vice  are  not  at  all,  in  any  Degree, 
dependent  upon,  or  connefted  with  any  foregoing  Event  or 
Exiftence,  as  its  Caufe,  Ground,  or  Means.  And  if  fo,  then 
all  foregoing  Means  muft  be  totally  in  vain. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  there  cannot,  in  any  Confiftence  with 
the  Arminian  Scheme,  be  any  reafonable  Ground  of  fo  much 
as  a  Conjefture  concerning  the  Confequence  of  any  Means 
and  Endeavours,  in  order  to  efcaping  Vice  or  obtaining  Virtue, 
or  any  Choice  or  Preference  of  Means,  as  having  a  greater 
Probability  of  Succefs  by  fome  than  others ;  either  from  any 
natural  Connection  or  Dependence  of  the  End  on  the  Means, 
or  through  any  divine  Conftitution,  or  revealed  Way  of  God's 
beftowing  or  bringing  to  pafs  thefe  Things,  in  Confequence  of 
any  Means,  Endeavours,  Prayers  or  Deeds.  Conjefture  in 
"this  latter  Cafe  depends  on  a  Suppofition  that  God  himfelf  is 
the  Giver,  or  determining  Caufe  of  the  Events  fought :  But 
if  they  depend  on  Self  determination,  then  Ged  is  not  the 
determining  or  difpofing  Author  of  them  :  And  if  thefe  Things 
are  not  of  his  Difpofal,  then  no  Conjefture  can  be  made  from 
any  Revelation  he  has  given  concerning  any  Way  or  Method 
of  his  Difpofal  of  them. 

Yea,  on  thefe  Principles,  it  will  not  only  follow  that  Men 
can't  have  any  reafonable  Ground  of  Judgment  or  Conjecture, 
that  their  Means  and  Endeavours  to  obtain  Virtue  or  avoid 
Vice,  will  be  fuccefsful,  but  they  may  be  fure  they  will  not; 
they  may  be  certain,  that  they  will  be  in  vain ;  and  that  if 
ever  the  Thing  which  they  feek  comes  to  pafs,  it  will  not  be 
?t  all  owing  to  the  Means  they  ufe,  For  Means  and  En- 
s' f  3  deavours 


224     Calvinifm  dont  encourage  Sloth.     Part  IV. 

4eavours  can  have  no  Effeft  at  all,  in  Order  to  obtain  the 
End,  but  in  one  of  thefe  two  Ways  ;  either  (i.)  Through  a 
natural  Tendency  and  Influence,  to  prepare  and  difpofe  the 
Mind  more  to  virtuous  Ads,  either  by  caufing  the  Difpofition 
of  the  Heart  to  be  more  in  Favour  of  fuch  Afts,  or  by 
^ringing  the  Mind  more  in'co  the  View  of  powerful  Motives 
and  Inducements  :  Or,  (2.)  By  putting  Perfons  more  in  the 
Way  of  God's  Beftowment  of  the  Benefit.  But  neither  of 
thefe  can  be  the  Cafe.  Not  the  latter;  for  as  has  been  juft 
now  obferved,  it  don't  confift  with  the  ^■^r/Tz/Wa/?  Notion  of 
Self-determination,  which  they  fuppofe  eflential  to  Virtue, 
that  God  (hould  be  the  Beftower,  or,  (which  is  the  fame 
Thing)  the  determining,  difpofing  Author  of  Virtue.  Not 
the  former;  for  natural  Influence  and  Tendency  fuppofes 
Caufality  and  Connection  ;  and  that  fuppofes  Neceffity  of 
Event,  which  is  inconfiftent  with  Arminian  Liberty-  A  Ten- 
dency of  Means,  by  biafling  the  Heart  in  Favour  of  Virtue,  or 
by  bringing  the  Will  under  the  Influence  and  Power  of 
Motives  in  its  Determinations,  are  both  inconfiftent  with 
Arminian  Liberty  of  Will,  confifting  in  Indifference,  and 
fovereign  Sejf-determinatipn,  as  has  been  largely  demonftrated. 

But  for  the  more  full  Removal  of  this  Prejudice  againft  that 
Doftrine  of  Neceffity  which  has  been  maintain'd,  as  though  it 
tended  to  encourage  a  total  Negleft  of  all  Endeavours  as  vain  ; 
the  following  Things  may  be  ccnfldered. 

The  Queft;ion  is  not.  Whether  Men  may  not  thus  improve 
this  Doftrine  ;  We  know  that  many  true  and  wholefome 
Doftrines  are  abufed  :  But,  Whether  the  Doftrine  gives  any 
juft  Occafion  for  fuch  an  Improvement  ;  or  whether,  on  the 
Suppofition  of  the  Truth  of  the  Doftrine,  fuch  a  Ufe  of  it 
would  not  be  unreafonable  ?  If  any  ftiall  affirm,  that  it  would 
not,  but  that  the  very  Nature  of  the  Doftrine  is  fuch  as 
gives  juft  Occafion  for  it,  it  muft  be  on  this  Suppofition ; 
namely.  That  fuch  an  invariable  Neceffity  of  all  Things  already- 
fettled,  muft  render  the  Interpofition  of  all  Means,  Endea- 
vours, Conclufions  or  Aftions.  of  ours,  in  order  to  the  obtaining 
any  future  End  whatfoever,  perfeftly  infignjficant ;  bccaufe 
they  can't  in  the  leaft.  alter  or  vary  the  Courfe  and  Series  of 
Things,  in  any  Event  or  Circqmftance  j  all  being  already  fixed 
nnalteral^ly  by  Neceffity  :  And  that  therefore  'tis  Folly,  for 
Men  to  ufe  any  Means /or  any  End ;  but  their  Wifdom,  to  fave 
tljemfelves  the  Trouble  of  Endeavours,  and  take  their  Eafe. 
No  Perfon  can  draw  fuch  an  Inference  froqpi  this  Doftrine, 

and 


Sed.V.     Calvinifm  doiit  encourage  Sloth.         225 

and  come  to  fuch  a  Conclufion,  without  contradiding  himfelf, 
and  going  counter  to  the  very  Principles  he  pretends  to  aft 
upon :  For  he  comes  to  a  Conclufion,  and  takes  z  Courfe,  in 
order  to  an  End,  even  his  Eafe,  or  the  faving  himfelf  from 
Trouble  ;  he  feeks  fomething  future,  and  ufes  Means  in  Order 
to  a  future  Thing,  even  in  his  drawing  up  that  Conclufion^, 
that  he  will  feek  nothing,  and  ufe  no  Means  in  order  to  any 
Thing  future  ;  he  feeks  his  future  Eafe,  and  the  Benefit  and 
Comfort  of  Indolence.  If  prior  Neceffity  that  determines  all 
'rhino-s,  makes  vain  all  Aftions  or  Conclufions  of  ours,  iti 
order  to  any  Thing  future  ;  then  it  makes  vain  all  Conclufions 
and  Conduft  of  ours,  in  order  to  our  future  Eafe.  The  Mea- 
fure  of  our  Eafe,  with  the  Time,  Manner  and  every  Circum- 
ftance  of  it,  is  already  fix'd,  by  all  determining  Neceffity,  as 
much  as  any  Thing  elfe.  If  he  fays  within  himfelf,  "  What 
"  future  Happinefs  or*Mifery  I  Ihall  have,  is  already  in  EfFeft 
**  determined  by  the  neceffaty  Courfe  and  Conneftion  of 
"  Things ;  therefore  I  will  fave  myfelf  the  Trouble  of  Labour 
"  and  Diligence,  which  can't  add  to  my  determin'd  Degree 
*•  of  Kappinefs,  or  diminifh  my  Mifery  ;  but  will  take  my 
*'  Eafe,  and  will  enjoy  the  Comfort  of  SlotH  and  Negligence." 
Such  a  Man  contradifts  himfelf:  He  fays,  the  Meafure  of  his 
future  Happinefs  and  Mifery  is  already  fix'd,  and  he  won't 
try  to  diminifh  the  one,  nor  add  to  the  other  :  But  yet  in  his 
very  Conclufion,  he  contradids  this ;  for  he  takes  up  this 
Conclufion,  to  odd  to  his  future  Happinefs,  by  the  Eafe  and 
Comfort  of  his  Negligence ;  and  to  diminifh  his  future  Trou- 
ble and  Mifery,  by  faving  himfelf  the  Trouble  of  ufing  Means 
and  taking  Pains. 

Therefore  Perfons  can't  reafonably  make  this  Improvement 
of  the  Dotlrine  of  Neceffity,  that  they  will  go  into  a  voluntary 
Negligence  of  Means  for  their  own  Happinefs.  For  the 
Principles  they  muft  go  upon,  in  order  to  this,  are  inconfiftent 
with  their  making  any  Improvement  at  all  of  the  Doftrine  : 
For  to  make  fome  Improvement  of  it,  is  to  be  influenced  by 
it,  to  come  to  fome  voluntary  Conclufion,  in  Regard  to 
their  own  Conduft,  with  fome  View  or  Aim  :  But  this,  as 
has  been  (hown,  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Principles  they  pretend 
to  aft  upon.  In  (hort,  the  Principles  are  fuch  as  cannot  be 
afted  upon  at  all,  or  in  any  Refpedt,  confiftently  :  And  there- 
fore in  every  Pretence  of  afting  upon  them,  or  making  any 
Improvement  at  all  of  themj  there  is  a  Self-contradi(^ion, 

As 


§26  Calv'mitm  don' i  make  Men  Mzchines.  PairtIV, 

As  to  that  Objeftiop  againft  the  Doftrine  which  I  have 
jCndeavoured  to  prove,  that  it  makes  Men  no  more  than 
mere  Machines ;  I  would  fay,  that  notwithftanding  this  Doc- 
trine, Man  is  entirely,  perfeftly  and  unfpeakably  different  from 
^  mere  Machine,  in  that  he  has  Reafon  and  Underftanding, 
^nd  has  a  Faculty  of  Will,  and  fo  is  capable  of  Volition  and 
Choice  ;  and  in  that,  his  Will  is  guided  by  the  Dictates  or 
Views  of  his  Underftanding  ;  and  in  that  his  external  Adlion? 
and  Behaviour,  and  in  many  Refpefts  alfo  his  Thoughts,  and 
the  Exercifes  of  his  Mind,  are  fubjed  to  his  Will ;  fo  that 
he  has  Liberty  to  aft  according  to  his  Choice,  and  do  what  he 

fleafes ;  and  by  Means  of  thefe  Things,  is  capable  of  moral 
labits  and  moral  Adls,  fuch  Inclinations  and  Adlions  as 
according  to  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind,  are  worthy  of  Praife^ 
Efteem,  Love  and  Reward  ;  or  on  the  contrary,  ofDifefteem, 
Peteftation,  Indignation  and  Punilhment. 

In  thefe  Things  is  all  the  Difference  from  mere  Machines, 
as  to  Liberty  and  Agency,  that  would  be  any  Perfeftion,  Dig- 
nity or  Privilege,  in  any  Refpeft  :  All  the  Difference  that  can 
be  defired,  and  all  that  can  be  conceived  of;  and  indeed  all 
that  the  Pretenfions  of  the  j^rminians  themklyes  come  to,  as 
they  are  forced  often  to  explain  themfelves.  (Tho'  their  Expli- 
cations overthrow  and  abolilh  the  Things  afferted,  and  pre- 
tended to  be  explained:)  For  they  are  forced  to  explain  a  felf- 
determining  Power  of  Will,  by  a  Power  in  the  Soul,  to  deter- 
mine as  it  chufes  or  wills ;  which  comes  to  no  more  than  this, 
that  a  Man  has  a  Power  of  chufmg,  and  in  many  Inftances, 
can  do  as  he  chufes.  Which  is  quite  a  different  Thing  from  that 
Contradidlion,  his  having  Power  of  chufmg  his  firft  Aft  of 
Choice  in  the  Cafe.  ^ 

Or  if  their  Scheme  makes  any  other  Difference  than  this, 
between  Men  and  Machines,  it  is  for  the  worfe  :  It  is  fo  far 
from  fuppofing  Men  to '  have  a  Dignity  and  Privilege  above 
Machines,  that  it  makes  the  Manner  of  their  being  determined 
llill  more  unhappy.  Whereas  Machines  are  guided  by  an  un- 
derftanding Caufe,  by  the  fkilful  Hand  of  the  Workman  or 
Owner  ;  the  Will  of  Man  is  left  to  the  Guidance  of  nothing, 
but  abfolute  blind  Contingence. 


^occogoooseppsotogcoosooogooeeocescooaccoi&jccooeccMoogooesoooeoooooooooooooccooco.^ 

Section 


Sedl.  VI.  Of  the  Stoical  Fate.  22f 

<s&»eodeooco3oooococsocoooobooeooooooooooooo«^peeoooooo6oooooo»eo90eooeeeaoeoooecgooo«Jgi» 

Section     VI. 

Concerning  that  Objeclion  againft  the  Do&rin-e 
which  has  been  maintain  dy  that  it  agrees  with 
the  Stoical  Do^rine  of  Fate^  and  the  Opinions 
of  Mr.  Hobbes. 

WHEN  Caivinijis  oppofe  the  Arminian  Notvon  of  the 
Freedom  of  Will,  and  Contingence  of  Volition,  and 
infift  that  there  are  no  Ads  of  the  Will,  nor  any  other  Events 
whatfoever,  but  what  are  attended  with  fome  Kind  of  Neceffi- 
ty  ;  their  Oppofers  cry  out  of  them,  as  agreeing  with  the  an- 
tient  Stokks  in  their  Doftrine  of  Fate,  and  with  Mr.  Hobbes 
in  bis  Opinion  of  NeceJJtty. 

Irwould  not  be  worth  while,    to  take  Notice  of  fo  imperti- 
nent an  Objedion,  had  it  not  been  urged  by  fome  of  the  chief 

Arm'mian  Writers. — ■■ There  were  many  important  Truths 

maintain'd  by  the  antient  Greek  and  Roman  Philofophers,  and 
efpecially  the  Stoicks,  that  are  never  the  worfe  for  being  held  by 
them.  The  Stoick  Philofophers,  by  the  general  Agreement  of 
Chriftian  Divines,  and  even  Armir.imi  Divines,  were  the 
greateft,  wifeft  and  molt  virtuous  of  all  the  Heathen  Philofo- 
phers ;  and  in  their  Dodrine  and  Pradice  came  the  neareft 
to  Chriftianity  of  any  of  their  Sefts.  How  frequently  are  the 
Sayings  of  thefe  Philofophers,  in  many  of  the  Writings  and 
Sermons,  even  of  Arminian  Divines,  produced,  not  as  Argu- 
ments of  the  Falfenefs  of  the  Doftrines  which  they  delivered, 
but  as  a;  Confirmation  of  fome  of  the  greateft  Truths  of  the 
Chriftian  Religion,  relating  to  the  Unity  and  Perfections  of  the 
Godhead,  a  future  State,  the  Duty  and  Happinefs  of  Mankind, 
&c.  as  obferving  how  the  Light  of  Nature  and  Reafoh  in  the 
v/ifeft  and  beft  of  the  Heathen,  harmonized  with,  and  confirms 
the  Gofpel  of  Jefus  Chrift. 

And  it  is  very  remarkable  concerning  Dr.  Whitbj,  that  altho' 
He  alledges  the  Agreement  of  the  Stoicks  with  us,  wherein  He 
fuppofes  they  maintain'd  the  like  Doctrine  with  us,  as  an  Ar- 
gument againft  the  Truth  of  our  Doftrine;  yet  this  very  Dr. 
(Vbitbj  alledges  the  Agreement  of  the  Suiicki  with  ^tArminians^ 

whereia 


I  aih  Of  the  Stoical  Fate.  Part  IV; 

wherein  he  fuppoles  they  taught  the  fame  Doftrine  with  them, 
as  an  Argument  for  the  Truth  of  their  Dodrine.  *  So  that 
when  the  Stoicks  agrts. -with  them,  this,  [it  feems)  is  a  Confirma- 
tion of  their  Doftrihfe,  and  a  Confutation  of  ours,  as  {hewing 
that  our  Opinions  are  contrary  to  the  natural  Senfe  and  common 
Heafon  of  Mankind  :  Neverthelefs,  when  the  Stoicks  agree  with 
tis,  it  argues  no  fuch  Thing  in  our  Favour;  but  on  the  cori- 
trary,  is  a  great  Argument  againft  us,  and  fljews  our  Dbdtrine 
to  be  Heathenifh. 

It  is  obferved  by  fome  Ca/'vI»i^Ic  Wnttrs,  that  th&Armi/iiaKS 
fymbolize  with  the  Stoicks,  in  fome  of  thofe  Dosftrines  wherein 
they  are  oppofed  by  the  Cal-oimjh  ;  particularly  in  their  denying 
an  original,  innate,  total  Corruption  and  Depiravity  of  Heart; 
and    in   what    they   held    of  Man's  Ability   to    make  Himfelf 

truly  virtuous  and  conformed  to  God ; and  in  fome  other 

Doctrines. 

It  may  be  further  obferved,  'tis  certainly  no  better  Objeftion 
againft  our  Doflrine,  that  it  agrees  in  fome  Refpefts  with  th^ 
Doctrine  of  the  antient  Stoick  Philofophers,  than  it  is  againft 
theirs,  wherein  they  differ  from  us,  that  it  agrees  in  fome  Re- 
fpects  with  the  Opinion  of  the  very  worft  of  the  Heathen  Phi- 
lofopl'iers,  the  Followers  of  Epicurus,  that  Father  of  Atheifm 
and  Licentioufnefs,  and  with  the  Doctrine  of  the  Sadducees  and 
jfe/uits. 

I  am  not  much  concerned  to  know  precifely  what  the  antient 
Stoick  Philofophers  held  concerning  Fate,  in  order  to  determine 
what  is  Truth  ;  as  tho'  it  were  a  fure  Way  to  be  in  the  right; 
to  take  good  Heed  to  differ  from  them.  It  feems  that  they\ 
diifered  among  themfelves ;  and  probably  the  Dodtrine  of  Fate, 
as  maintain'd  by  moft  of  them,  was  in  fome  Refpects  erroneous; 
But  whatever  their  Doctrine  was,  if  any  of  them  held  fuch  a, 
Fate,  as  is  repugnant  to  any  Liberty  confifting  in  our  doin^ 
as  we  pleafe,  I  utterly  deny  fuch  a  Fate.  If  they  held  any 
fuch  Fate,  as  is  not  confiftent  with  the  common  and  univerfal 
Notions  that  Mankind  have  of  Liberty,  Activity,  moral  Agen- 
cy, Virtue  and  Vice  ;  I  difclaim  any  fuch  Thing,  and  think  I 
have  demonftrated  that  the  Scheme  I  maintain  is  no  fuch 
Scheme.  If  the  Stoicks  by  Fate  meant  any  Thing  of  fuch  a 
Nature,  as  can  be  fuppofed  to  ftand  in  the  Way  of  the  Advan- 
tage arid  Benefit  of  the  Ufe  of  Means   and  Endeavours,    or 

makc^ 

«  ;i^/V4>>  on  the  five  Points,  Edit:  3.  P.  345,  3z6,  3*7. 


Se(fl.Vi.  0/Hobbiftical  Necejfity.  229 

makes  it  l&k  worth  the  while  for  Men  to  defire,  and  feek  after 
any  'I'hing  wherein  their  Virtue  and  Happinefs  coniiits ;  I 
hold  no  Dodtrine  that  is  clog'd  with  any  fiich  Inconvenience, 
anymore  than  aily  other  Scheme  whaifoever;  and  by  no 
Means  {o  much  as  the  Arminian  Scheme  of  Contingence  ;  as 
has  been  (hewn.  If  they  held  any  fnch  Dodtrine  of  univerfal 
Fatality,  as  is  inconfiftent  with  any  Kind  of  Liberty,  that  is 
or  can  be  any  Perfedion,  Dignity,  Privilege  or  Benefit,  or 
any  Thing  defirablej  in  any  Refpeft,  for  any  intelligent  Crea- 
ture, or  indeed  with  any  Liberty  that  is  poffible  or  conceivable  ; 
I  embrace  no  fuch  Dodrine.  If  they  held  any  fuch  Dodrine 
of  Fate  as  Is  inconfiftent  with  the  World's  being  in  all  Things 
fubjeft  to  the  Difpofal  of  an  intelligent  wife  Agent,  that  pre- 
sides, not  as  the^'Wof  the  World,  but  as  the  fovereign  Zurd? 
of  the  Univerfe,  governing  all  Things  by  proper  Will,  Choicb 
and  Defign,  in  the  Exercife  of  the  mofl:  perfeft  Liberty  con- 
ceivable, without  Subjection  to  any  Conftraint,  or  being  pro- 
perly under  the  Power  or  Influence  of  any  Thing  before,  above 
or  without  himfelf ;  I  wholly  renounce  any  fuch  Doftrine. 

As  to  Mr.  Hobbes'i  maintaining  the  fame  Doftrine  concern- 
ing Neceffity  ; 1  confefs,  it  happens  I  never  read  Mr  Hobbes, 

Let  his  Opinion  be  what  it  will,  we  need  not  rejedt  all 
Truth  which  is  demonftrated  by  clear  Evidence,  merely  be- 
caufe  it  was  once  held  by  fome  bad  Man.  This  great  Truth, 
that  Je/us  is  the  Son  of  God,  was  not  fpoil'd  becaufe  it  was 
once  and  again  proclaimed  with  a  loud  Voice  by  the  Devil. 
If  Truth  is  fo  defiled  becaufe  it  is  fpoken  by  the  Mouth,  or 
written  by  the  Pen  of  fome  ill-minded  mifchievous  Man,  that 
it  muft  never  be  received,  we  fhall  never  know  when  we  hold 
any  of  the  moft  precious  and  evident  Truths  by  a  fure 
Tenure.  And  if  Mr.  Hobbes  has  made  a  bad  Ufe  of  this 
Truth,  that  is  to  be  lamented  :  But  the  Truth  is  not  to  be 
thought  worthy  of  P.ejeiflion  on  that  Account.  'Tis  common 
for  the  Corruptions  of  the  Hearts  of  evil  Men,  to  abufe  the 
belt  Things  to  vile  Purpofes. 

I  might  alfo  take  Notice  of  its  having  been  obferved,  that 
the  Arminians  agree  with  Mr.  Hobbes  +  in  many  more  Things 
than  the  Cal'vimjis.  As,  in  what  he  is  faid  to  hold  concerning 
Original  Sin,  in  denying  the  Neceffity  of  fupernatural  Illumi- 
nation, in  denying  infufed  Grace,  in  denying  the  Doftrine  of 
Juftification  by  Fgith  alone  ;  and  other  Things. 

+  Dr.  GUI,  in  his  Anfwer  to  Dr.  fVhithy.  Vol.  3.  P.  1^3.  &c, 

G2'  '         Sectiom 


I^o  Concerning  the  Neceffity         Part  IV. 

Section     VII. 
Concerning   the  Neceffity  of  the  Divine  V/ill. 

O  O  M  S  may  poffibly  objeft  againft  what  has  been  fuppofed 
»^  oF  the  Abi'urdity  and  Inconliftence  of  a  feif-determining 
Power  in  the  Will,  and  the  Impoffibility  of  its  being 
otherwife,  than  that  the  Will  fhould  be  determined  in  every 
Cafe  by  forne  Motive,  and  by  a  Motive  which  (as  it  ftands 
in  the  View  of  the  Underitanding)  is  of  fuperiour  Strength  to 
any  appearing  on  the  other  Side  :  That  if  thefe  Things  are 
true,  it  will  follow,  that  not  only  the  Will  of  created'Minds, 
but  the  Will  of  God  him/elf  is  necefiary  in  all' its  Determina- 
tions. Concerning  which  fays  the  Author  of  the  Ejpiy  on  the 
Freedom  of  Will  in  God  and  iu  the  Creature,  (Page  '6^,  86.) 
"  What  Itrange  Doctrine  is  this,  contrary  to  all  our  Ideas  of 
**  the  Dominion  of  God  ?  Does  it  not  deftroy  the  Glory  of 
"  his  Liberty  of  Choice,  and  take  away  from  the  Creator  and 
*■'  Governoi'  and  Benefaftor  of  the  World,  that  moft  free  and 
*'  fovereign  Agent,  all  the  Glory  of  this  Sort  of  Freedom  ? 
*'  Does  it  not  feem  to  make  Him  a  Kind  of  mechanical  Me- 
^'  dium  of  Fate,  and  introduce  Mr.  Hobbes's  Dodrine  of  Fata- 
**  lity  and  Neceffity,  into  all  Things  that  God  hath  to  do 
*'  with  ?  Does  it  not  feem  to  reprefent  the  bleffed  God,  as  a 
*'  Being  of  vaft  Underftanding,  as  well  as  Power  and  Effi- 
•■*  ciency,  but  ftill  to  leave  Him  without  a  Will  to  chufe  among 
"  all  the  Obieifls  within  his  View  ?  In  (hort,  it  feems  to  make 
"  the  blefled  God  a  Sort  of  almighty  Minifter  of  Fate,  under 
"  its  univerfal  and  fupreme  Influence  ;  as  it  was  the  profefs'd 
*'  Sentiment  of  fome  of  the  Amients,  that  Fate  was  above  the 
«  Gods." 

This  is  declaiming,  rather  than  arguing;  and  an  Applica- 
tion to  Men's  Imaginations  and  Prejudices,  rather  than  to  mere 
Reafon. — • — But  I  would  calmly  endeavour  to  confider  whether 

there  be  any  Reafon  in  this  frightful  Reprefentation. But 

before  I  enter  upon  a  particular  Confideration  of  the  Matter,  I 
would  obferve  this  :  That  'tis  reafonable  to  fuppofe,  it  fhould" 
be  much,  more  difficult  to  exprefs  or  conceive  Things  accord- 
ing to  exaft  metaphyseal  Truth,  relating  to  the  Nature  and 
Manner  of  the  Exiftence  of  Things  in  the  divine  Underftand- 
ing and  Will,  and  the  Operation  of  thefe  Faculties  (if  I  may 

{o 


Scd.  Vil.  of  iheT)W\n^  Volition,  231 

fo  call  them)  of  the  Divine  Mind,  than  in  the  human  Mind  ; 
which  is  infinitely  more  within  our  View,  and  nearer  to  ji 
Proportion  to  the  Meafure  of  oui  Comprehenfion,  and  more 
commenfuratc  to  the  Ufe  and  Import  of  human  Speech. 
Language  is  indeed  very  deficient,  in  Regard  of  Terms  tQ 
exprefs  precife  Truth  concerning  our  own  Minds,  and  their 
Faculties  and  Operations.  Words  were  firft  formed  to  exprefs 
external  Things ;  and  thofe  that  arc  applied  to  exprefs  Things 
internal  and  fpirirual,  are  almoft  all  borrowed,  and  ufed  in  a  5:-ort 
of  figurative  Senfe.  Whence  they  are  mofl  of  them  attended 
with  a  great  Deal  of  Ambiguity  and  Unfixednefs  in  their  Signi- 
fication, occafioning  innumerable  Doubts,  Difficulties  and  Con- 
fufions  in  Inquiries  and  Controverfies  about  Things  of  this  Na- 
ture. But  Language  is  much  lefs  adapted  to  exprefs  Things 
in  the  Mind  of  the  incomprehenfible  Deity,  precifely  as  they  are« 

We  find  a  great  Deal  of  Difficulty  in  conceiving  exactly  of 
the  Nature  of  our  own  Souls.  And  notwithftanding  ^11  the 
Progrefs  which  has  been  made  in  paft  and  prefent  Ages,  in, 
this  Kind  of  Knowledge,  whereby  our  Metaph3'ficks,  as  it 
relates  to  thefe  Things,  is  brought  to  greater  Perfection  than 
once  it  was ;  yet  here  is  llill  Work,  enough  left  for  future  In- 
quiries and  Refearches,  and  Room  for  Progrefs  ftill  to  be  made, 
for  many  Ages  and  Generations.  But  we  had  need  to  be  infi- 
ilitely  able  Metaphyficians,  to  conceive  with  Clearnefs,  accord- 
ing to  ftrict,  proper  and  perfect  Truth,  concerning  the  Nature 
of  the  Divine  Eflence,  and  the  Modes  of  the  Action  and  Ope- 
ration of  the  Powers  of  the  divine  Mind. 

And  it  may  be  noted  particularly,  that  tho'  we  are  obliged 
to  conceive  of  fome  Things  in  God  a&  confequent  and  depen- 
dent on  others,  and  of  fome  Things  pertaining  to  the  divine 
Nature  and  Will  as  the  Foundation  of  .others,  and  fo  before 
Others  in  the  Order  of  Nature  :  As,  we  muft  conceive  of  the 
Knowledge  and  Holinefs  of  God  as  prior  in  the  Order  of  Na- 
ture to  his  Happinefs;  the  Perfedion  of  his  Underftanding,  as 
the  Foundation  of  his  wife  Purpofes  and  Decrees ;  the  Holi- 
nefs of  his  Nature,  as  the  Caufe  and  Reafon  of  his  holy  De- 
terminations. And  yet  when  we  fpeak  of  Caufe  and  Effeft, 
Antecedent  and  Confequent,  fundamental  and  dependent,  de- 
termining and  determined,  in  the  firfl  Being,  who  is  felf- 
exiltent,  independent,  of  perfedf  and  abfolute  Simplicity  and 
Immutability,  and  the  firft  Caufe  of  all  Things ;  doubtlefs 
there  muft  be  lefs  Propriety  in  fuch  Reprefentations,  than  when 
G  g  ^  WQ 


i^2        Necejfity  of  aBing  ntcjl  wifely.        Part  IV. 

we  fpcak  of  derived  dependent  Beings,    who  are  contpounded^ 
and  liable  to  perpetual  Mutation  and  bucceirion. . 

Having  premifed  this,  I  proceed  to  obferve  concerning  the 
foremention'd  Author's  Exclamation,  about  the  ntajfary  Deter- 
mination af  God's  Will,  in  all  Things,  by  what  l^e  fees  to  be 
fitteji  and  beji. 

That  all  the  feeming  Force  of  fuch  Objedlions  and  Excla- 
mations muft  arife  from  an  Imagination,  that  there  is  fome 
Sort  of  Priviledge  or  Dignity  in  being  without  fuch  a  moral 
Neceffity,  as  will  make  it  impofTible  to  do  any  other,  than 
always  chufe  what  is  wifeft  and  beft  ;  as  tho'  there  were  fome 
Difadvantage,  Meannefs  and  Subjedion,  in  fuch  a  Neceflity  ; 
a  Thing  by  which  the  Will  was  confined,  kept  under,  and 
held  in  Servitude  by  fomething,  which,  as  it  were,  maintained 
a  ffrong  and  invincible  Power  and  Dominion  over  it,  by  Bonds 
that  hel^  him  faft,  and  that  he  could  by  no  Means  deliver 
himfelf  from.  Whereas,  this  muft  be  all  mere  Imagination 
and  Delufion.  'Tis  no  Difadvjntage  or  Difhonour  to  a  Being, 
necefTarily  to  aft  in  the  moic  excellent  and  happy  Manner, 
from  the  neceffary  Perfeftion  of  his  own  Nature.  This  argues 
no  Imperfeftion,  Inferiority  or  Dependance,  nor  any  Want  of 
Dignity,   Privilege  or  Afcendency.  *  'Tis  not  incopfiftent  with 

the 

*  "  It  might  have  been  objedled  with  much  inore  Plaufiblenefs,  that 
*•  the  fupreme  Caufe  cannot  be  free,  becaule  he  muft  needs  do 
*'  always  what  is  beft  in  the  Whole.  But  this  would  not  at  all 
*'  ferve  Spinoza's  Purpofe :  For  this  is  a  Neceflity,  not  of  Nature 
*'  and  Fate,  but  of  Fitnefs  and  Wifdom  ;  a  Neceflity  confiftent 
"  with  the  greateft  Freedom,  and  moft  perfeft  Choice.  For  the 
•*  only  Foundation  of  this  Neceflity  is  fuch  an  unalterable  Redti- 
*'  tude  of  Will,  and  Perfeftion  of  Wifdom,  as  makes  it  impoflible 
*'  for  a  wife  Being  to  a£l;  foolifhly."  Clark's  Dem.  of  the  Being 
"  ^d    Attributes   of  God.   Edit.  6.  P.  64. 

"  Tho'  God  is  a  moft  perfeAIy  free  Agent,  yet  he  cannot  but  do 
*'  always  what  is  beft  and  wifeft  in  the  Whole.  The  Reafon  is 
*'  evident;  becaufe  perfe<fl  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  are  as  fteady 
"  and  certain  Principles  of  Adtion,  as  Neceflity  itfelf;  and  ai^ 
*'  infinitely  wife  and  good  Being,  indued  vvith  the  moft  perfeft 
*'  Liberty,  can  no  more  chufe  to  aft  in  Contradidlion  to  Wifdom^ 
**  and  Goodnefs,  than  a  neceflTary  Agent  can  adl  contrary  to  the 
•'  Neceflity  by  which  it  is  afted  ;  it  being  as  great  an  Abfurdity  and 
"  impoffibility  in  Choice,  for  infinite  Wifdom  to  chufe  to  aft  un- 
*••  wifely,   or  infinite  Goodnefs  to  chufe  what  is  not  good,   as  it  would 

♦•  bt 


■Scd.VIL  agreeable  to  rnoft  perftB  Liberty.         233 

the  abfolute,  and  moft  perfect  Sovereignty  of  God.  The 
Sovereignty  of  God  is  his  Ability  and  Authority  to  do  what- 
ever pleafes  Him  ;  wliereby  He  doth  according  to  his  Will  171  the 
Armies  oj  Heaven,  and  amongjl  the  Inhabitants  of  the  Earthy  anil 
none  canjlay  his  Hand,  orfnj  unto  him.  What  d'.ji  thou  r—r- — The 
following  Things  belong  to  the  So-uereignty  of  God  ;  Wz. 
(i.)  Supreme,  univerfal,  and  infinite  Ptt^fr;  vi'hereby  he  is 
able  to  do  what  he  pleafes,  without  Controul,  without  any 
Confinement  of  that  Power,  without  any  Subjeftion  in  the  kaft 
Meafure  to  any  other  Power ;  and  fo  without  any  Hindrance 
or  Reltraint,  that  it  Ihould  be  either  impoffible,  or  at  all 
(difficult,    for  him  to  accomplifh  his  Will  j    and  without  any 

Dependance 

"  be  in  Nature,  for  abfolute  Neceffity  to  fail  of  producing  its  ne- 
"  ceffary  Effedl.  There  was  indeed  no  Neceffity  in  Nature,  that 
"  God  (hould  at  firft  cre2te  fuch  Beings  as  he  has  created,  or  indeed  any 
**  Being  at  all  ;  becaufe  he  is  in  himfelf  infinitely  happy  and  All-fuffi- 
"  cient.  There  was  alfo  no  Neceffity  in  Nature,  that  he  fhould  preferve 
"  and  continue  Things  in  Being,  after  they  were  created  ;  becaufe  he 
*'  would  be  felf-fufficient  without  their  Continuance,  as  he  was  before 
"  their  Creation.  But  it  was  fit  and  wife  and  good,  that  infinite  Wif- 
"  dom  fhould  manifcft,  and  infinite  Goodnefs  communicate  itfelf ;  and 
•'  therefore  it  was  neceffary,  in  the  Senfe  of  Neceffity  I  am  now  fpeak- 
"  ing  of,  that  Things  fhould  be  made  at  fuch  u  Time,  and  continuedycj 
*.'  lo)ig,  and  indeed  with  various  PerfeiSions  in  fuch  Degrees,  as  infinite 
"  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  faw  it  vvifeil  and  beft  that  they  ffiould."  Ibid. 
P-   112,   113. 

*'  'Tis     not    a    Fault,    but   a    Perfedlion   of  our    Nature,     to     de- 
*'  fire,    will    and  aft,   according  to  the  laft  Refult  of  a  fair  Examination. 

V — ^ This  is  fo  far  fron>  being  a  Reftraint  or  Diminution  of  Freedom, 

•'  that  it  is  the  very  Improvement  and  Benefit  of  it :  'Tis  liot  an  Abridg- 
♦'  ment,  'tis  the  End  and  Ufe  of  our  Liberty  ;  and  the  further  we  are 
"  removed  from  fuch  a  Determination,  the  nearer  we  are  to  Mifery  and 
'*  Slavery.  A  perfeft  Indifference  in  the  Mind,  not  determinable  by 
*'  its  laft  Judgment  of  the  Good  or  Evil  that  is  thought  to  attend  its 
*'  Choice,  would  be  fo  far  from  being  an  Advantage  and  Excellency  of 
"  any  intelledtual  Nature,  that  it  would  be  as  great  an  Imperfcdlion,  as 
♦*  the  Want  of  Indifferency  to  afl,  or  not  to  ad,  till  determined  by  the 

"  Will,  would  be  an   Imperfedlion    on  the  other  Side. 'Tis  as 

"  much  a  Perfedlion,  that  Defire  or  the  Power  of  preferring  Ifiouid  be 
"  determined  b'y  Good,  as  that  the  Power  of  afting  (hould  be  determined 
"  by  the  Will  :  And  the  certainer  fuch  Determination  is,  the  greater 
"  the  Perfeftion.  Nay,  were  we  determined  by  any  Thing  but  the  lafr 
"  Refult  of  our  own  Minds,  judging  of  the  Good  or  Evil  of  any  Aftlon, 
**  we  were  not  free.  The  very  End  of  our  Freedom  being,  that  we  might 
"  attain  the  Good  we  chufe  ;  and  therefore  every  Man  is  brought  under 
"  a  Neceffity  by  his  Conftitution,  as  an  intelligent  Being,  to  be 
"  determin'd  in  willing  by  his  own  Thought  and  Judgment,  what 
"  is  beft  for  him  to  do;  elfe  he  would  be  under  the  Determination 
"  of  fome  other  than  himfelf,  which  is  Want  of  Liberfy.  And  to 
"  deny   that  a  Man's  Will,  in  every  Determrnation,  follows  his  own 

•'  Judgment, 


234  Necejfity  of  aBing  mofi  wifely.       Part  IV, 

Dependance  of  his  Power  an  any  other  Power,  from  whence 
it  rfiould  be  derived,  or  which  it  Ihoula  ftand  in  any  Need  of  : 
So  far  from  this,  that  all  other  Power  is  derived  from  Him, 
and  is  abfolutelv^  dependent  on  Him.  (2.)  '^I  hat  He  has  fu- 
preme  Authority ;  abfolute  and  moft  perfeft  Right  to  do  what 
He  wills,  without  Subjeftion  to  any  fuperiour  Authority,  oc 
any  Derivation  of  Authority  from  any  other,  or  Limitation  by 
any  diftinft  independent  Authority,  either  fuperiour,  equal,  or 
inieriour  ;  he  being  the  Head  of  all  Dominion,  and  Fountaiu 
of  all  Authority  ;  and  alfo  without  Reftraint  by  any  Obliga- 
tion, implying  either  Subjeftion,  Derivation,  or  Dependance, 
or  proper  Limitation.  (3.)  That  his  Will  is  fupreme,  unde- 
rived,  and  independent  on  any  Thing  without  Himfclf  j  being 

in 

"  Judgment,  is  to  fay,  that  a  Man  wills  and  a£ls  for  an  End  that 
•'  he  would  not  have,  at  the  fame  Time  that  he  wills  and  adts  for  it. 
"  For  if  he  prefers  it  in  his  prefent  Thoughts,  betore  any  other, 
"  'tis  plain  he  then  thinks  better  of  it,  and  would  have  it  before  any 
"  other;  unlefs   he  can  have,    and  nothaNC  it;     will,  and  not  will  it, 

"  at  the  fajne  Time  :   A  Contradiftion  too  manifeft  to  be  admitted. 

f  If  we  look  upon  thofe  fuperiour  Beings  above  us,  who  enjoy  per- 
"  fe<fl  Happinefs,  we  fhall  have  Reafon  to  judge,  that  they  are  more 
*'  fteadily  determined  in  their  Choice  of  Good,  than  we ;  and  yet 
•'  we  have  ro  Reafon  to  think  they  are  lefs  happy,  or  lefs  free,  than 
•'  we  arc.  And  if  it  were  fit  for  fuch  poor  finite  Creatures  as  we 
•'  are,  to  pronounce  what  infinite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  could  do, 
"  I  think  we  might  fay,  that  God  himfelf  connot  chufe  what  is  not 
"  Good.      The  Freedom  cf  the  Almighty  hinders  xot  his   being  determined 

*'  hyivhat  is  6eji. But    to   give    a   right  View  of  this  miftaken 

"  Part  of  Liberty,  let  me  afk.  Would  any  one  be  a  Changeling, 
•'  becaufe  he  is  lefs  determined  by  wife  Determinations,  than  a  wife 
*'  Man?  Is  it  worth  the  Name  of  Freedom,  to  be  at  Liberty  to  play 
"  the  Fool,  and  draw  Shame  and  Mifery  upon  a  Man's  felf?  If  to 
"  break  loofe  from  the  Conduft  of  Reafon,  and  to  want  that 
"  Reftraint  of  Examination  and  Judgment,  that  keeps  us_  from 
*'  doing  or  chufing  the  worfe,  be  Liberty,  true  Liberty  ;  Mad-men 
"  and  Fools  are  the  only  free  Men.  Yet  I  think  no  Body  would 
*'  chufe  to  be  mad,  for  the  fake  of  fuch  Liberty,  but  he  that  is  mad  al- 
**  ready.  Locke,  Hum.  Und.  Vol.  I.  Edit.   7.   P.  215,   21,6." 

«'  This  Being  having  all  Things  always  neceflarily  in  View,  muft  al- 
"  ways,  and  eternally  will,  according  to  his  infinite  Comprehenfion  of 
"  Things  ;  that  is,  muft  will  all  Things  that  are  v/ifefl  and  beft  to 
«'  be  done.  There  is  no  getting  free  of  this  Confequence.  If  it 
"  can  will  at  all,  it  muft  will  this  Way.  To  be  capable  of  know- 
"  ing,  and  not  capable  of  willing,  is  not  to  be  underftood.  And 
"  to  be  capable  of  willing  otherwife  than  what  is  wifeft  and  beft, 
'*  contradicts  that  Knowledge  which  is  infinite.  Infinite  Knowledge 
"  muft  direft   the  Will   without   Error.     Here  then    is    the    Origin  of 

•'  moral  Necejfiy  ;  and  that  is    really,    of  Freedom. Perhaps  it 

«♦  may  be  faid,  when  the  divine  Will  is  determined,  from  the  Con- 

<<  (ideratiei^ 


Sc(ft.Vn.  no  Meannefs  or  Dilad vantage.         23  c; 

in  every  Thing  determin'd  by  his  own  Counfe!,  having  no 
other  Rule  but  his  oV/n  Wifdom  ;  his  Will  not  being  fubjed: 
to,  or  reftrain'd  by  the  Will  of  any  other,  and  others  Wills 
being  perteiitly  fubjeft  to  his.  (4.)  That  his  W.Jdom,  which  de- 
termines his  Will,  is  fupreme,  perfeft,  underived,  felf-fufficient< 
and  independent ;  fo  that  it  may  be  faid  as  in  Ifai.  xl,  i  ^ ,  With 
(whom  took  He  Comifel?  And  ijjho  inJiruSied  Him  and  taught  Him 
in  the  Path  of  ytidgmcnt,  and  taught  Him  Knoavledge,.  atid  Jheiv- 

ed  Him  the  Way  of  Underftaiiding? There  is  no  other  div'inc 

Sovereignty  but  this :  And  this  is  properly  ahfolute  Sonjereignty  : 
No  other  is  defirable  ;  nor  would  any  other  be  honourable,  or 
happy  :  And  indeed  there  is  no  other  canceivable  or  poffible. 
"Tis  the  Glory  and  Greatnefs  of  the  divine  Sovereignty,  that 
God's  Will  is  determin'd  by  his  own  infinite  all-fufficient  Wif- 
dom in  every  Thing  ;  and  in  nothing  at  all  is  either  direfted  by 
any  inferiour  Wifdom,  or  by  no  Wifdom;  whereby  it  would 
become  fenfelefs  Arbitrarinefs,  determining  and  atling  without 
Reafon,  Defign  or  End. 

If  God's  Will  is  fteadily  and  furely  determined  in  every 
Thing  hy  fiipreme  Wifdom,  then  it  is  in  every  Thing  neceflarilj/- 
determined  to  that  which  is  mnji  wife.  And  certainly  it  would 
be  a  Difadvantage  and  Indignity,  to  be  otherwife.  For  if  the 
divine  Will  was  not  neceflarily  determin'd  to  that  which  in 
every  Cafe  is  wifeft  and  beft,  it  muft  be  fubjeft  to  feme  Deo-ree 
of  undefigning  Contingence  ;  and  fo  in  the  fame  Degree 
liable  to  Evil.  To  fuppofe  the  divine  Will  liable  to  be  carried 
hither  and  thither  at  Random,  by  the  uncertain  Wind  of  blind 
Contingence,  which  is  guided  by  no  Wifdom,  no  Motive,  no 

intelligent 

"  fideration  of  the  eternal  Aptitudes  of  Things,  it  is  as  neceffarily 
"  determined,  as  if  it  were  phyfically  impell'd,  if  that  were  poffible. 
*'  But  it  is  Unflcilfutnefs,  to  fuppofe  this  an  Objection.  The  great 
"  Principle  is  once  eftabliffied,  ijix..  That  the  divine  Will  is  deter- 
*'  mined  by  the  eternal  Reafon  and  Aptitudes  of  Things,  inftead  of 
"  being  phyfically  impelled  ;  and  after  that,  the  more  ftrong  and 
'<  neceffary  this  Determination  is,  the  more  perfeft  the  Deity  mufl: 
•<  be  allowed  to  be:  It  is  this  that  makes  him  an  amiable  and 
"  adorable  Being,  whofe  Will  and  Power  are  conftantly,  immutably 
"  determined,  by  the  Conlideration  of  what  is  wifeft  and  beft ;  in- 
•♦  ftead  of  a  furd  Being,  with  Power,  hut  without  Difcerning  and 
"   Reafon.     It   is   the  Beauty  of  this  NecfJ/ity,  that  it  is Jirong  as  Fate 

*'   itfelft  ivitb  all  the  Advantage  of  Reafon  and  Goodnefs. It   is 

"  ftrange,  to  fee  Men  contend,  that  the  Deity  is  not  Free,  becaufe  he 
"  is  neceffarily  rational,  immutably  good  and  wife  ;  when  a  Man 
*'  is  allowed  ftill  the  perfedler  Being,  the  more  fixedly  and  conftantly 
"  his  Will  is  determined  by  Reafon  and  Truth."  Inquiry  into  the 
Mature  of  the  Hum,  Soul,    Edit.  3.  Vol,  II.  P,  403,  404. 


236        NeceJJily  of  a&ing  moji  wifely,        Fart  IV, 

intelligent  Diftate  whatfoever,  (if  any  fuch  Thing  were  poffible) 
woyld   certainly  argue  a   great  Degree  of  Imperfeftion   and 

Meannefs,  inlinitely  unworthy  of  the  Deity. If  it  be  a  Dif- 

advantage,  for  the  divine  Will  to  be  attended  with  this  moral 
Neceflity,  then  the  more  free  from  it,  and  the  more  left  at 
Random,  the  greater  Dignity  and  Advantage.  And  confe- 
quently  to  be  perfeftly  free  from  the  Diredion  of  Underlland- 
ing,  and  univerfally  and  entirely  left  to  fenfelefs  unmeaning 
Contingence,  to  ^ft  abfolutely  at  Random,  would  be  the 
Tupreme  Glory, 

It  no  more  argues  any  Dependance  of  God's  Will,  that  his 
fupremely  wife  Volition  is  neceffary,  than  it  argues  a  Depend- 
ance of  his  Being,  that  his  Exiftence  is  necefiary.  If  it  be 
fomething  too  low,  for  the  fupreme  Being  to  have  his  Will  de- 
termined by  moral  Neceffity,  fo  as  necellarily,  in  every  Cafe, 
to  will  in  the  higheft  Degree  holily  and  happily  ;  then  why 
is  it  not  alfo  fomething  too  low,  for  him  to  have  his  Exiftence, 
and  the  infinite  Perfeftion  of  his  Nature,  and  his  infinite 
Happinefs  determined  by  Neceffity  ?  It  is  no  more  to  God's 
Dilhonour,  to  be  neceflarily  wife,  than  to  be  neceffarily  holy. 
And  if  neither  of  them  be  to  his  Diftionour,  then  it  is  not  to  his 
Difaonour  neceffarily  to  ad  holily  and  wifely.  And  if  it  be 
not  dilhonourabie,  to  be  neceflarily  holy  and  wife,  in  the 
higheft  poffible  Degree,  no  more  is  it  mean  or  diftionourable, 
tieceftarily  to  aft  hohly  ?.nd  wifely  in  the  higheft  poflible  Degree ; 
or  (which  is  the  fame  Tiling)  to  do  that,  in  every  Cafe^  which 
above  all  other  Things  is  wifeft  and  beft. 

The  Reafon  why  it  is  not  diflionourable,  to  be  neceflarily 
fnyfi  holy,  is,  becaufe  Holinefs  in  itfelf  is  an  excellent  and 
honourable  Thing.  For  the  fame  Reafon,  it  is  no  Diflionour 
to  be  neceflarily  nojl  wife,  and  in  every  Cafe  to  aft  moft  wifely, 
or  do  the  Thing  which  is  the  wifeft  of  all ;  for  Wifdom  is  alfo 
in  itfelf  excellent  and  honourable. 

The  foremcntioned  Author  of  the  EJ/hy  on  the  Freedom,  of  Will, 
Sec.  as  has  been  obferved,  reprefents  that  Doftrine  of  the 
divme  Will's  being  in  every  Thing  neceflarily  determined  by 
fuperiour  Fitnefs,  as  making  the  blefled  God  a  Kind  of  al- 
mighty Minifter  and  mechanical  Medium  of  Fate  :  And  he 
infifts,  P.  93,  94.  that  this  moral  Neceffity  and  Impoffibility  is 
in  Efleft  the  fame  Thing  with  phyfical  and  natural  Neceffity 
and  Impoffibility  :  And  in  P.  5^,  55.  he  fays,  **  The  Scheme 
**  which  deterniines  the  Will  always  and  certainly  by  the 

•'  Underftandiogf 


Sc6l.VIL     w^;  Meahnefs  o;^- Difadvantagc.         23^ 

*'  Underftandihg,  and  the  Underftanding  by  the  Appearance 
"■  of  Things,  feems  to  take  away  the  true  Nature  of  Vice 
"  and  Virtue.  For  the  fublimeft  of  Virtues,  and  the  vileft 
"  of  Vices,  feem  rather  to  be  Matters  of  Fate  and  Neceffity, 
♦«  flowing  naturally  and  neceffarily  from  the  Exiftence,  the 
*♦  Circumltances,  and  prefent  Situation  of  Perfons  and  Things  : 
"  For  this  Exiftence  and  Situation  neceffarily  makes  fuch  an 
"  Appearance  to  the  Mind ;  from  this  Appearance  flows  a 
"  neceflary  Perception  and  Judgment,  concerning  thefe  Things; 
"  this  Judgment  neceffarily  determines  the  Will:  And  thus 
♦*  by  this  Chain  of  neceffary  Cauks,  Virtue  and  Vice  would 
'•  lofe  their  Nature,  and  become  natural  Ideas,  and  neceflary 
"  Things,  inllead  of  moral  and  free  Adlions." 

And  yet  this  fame  Author  allows,  P.  30,  31.  That  a  per- 
fectly wife  Being  will  conffantly  and  certainly  chufe  what  is 
moft  fit ;  and  fays,  P.  102,  103.  "  I  grant,  antl  always  have 
"  granted,  that  wherefoever  there  is  fuch  an  antecedent  fupe- 
"  riour  Fitnefs  of  Things,  God  ads  according  to  it,  fo  as  never 
"  to  contradift  it ;  and  particularly,  in  all  his  judicial  Pro- 
"  ccedings,  as  a  Governor,  and  Diftributer  of  Rewards  and 
*'  Punilhments."  Yea,  he  fays  exprefly,  P.  42.  "  That  it  is 
"  not  poffible  for  God  to  aft  otherwife,  than  according  to  " 
*♦  this  Fitnefs  and  Goodnefs  in  Things." 

So  that  according  to  this  Author,  putting  thefe  feveral  Paffagea 
of  his  Effay  together,  there  is  no  Virtue,  nor  any  Thing  of  a  moral 
Nature,  in  the  mofl:  fublime  and  glorious  Afts  and  Exercifes  of 
God's  Hoiinefs,  Juftice,  and  Faithfulnefs  ;  and  He  never  does 
any  Thing  which  is  in  itfelf  fupremely  worthy,  and  above  all 
other  Things  fit  and  excellent,  but  only  as  a  Kind  of  mecha- 
nical Medium  of  Fate  ;  and  in  njuhat  he  does  as  the  fudge,  and 
moral  Go'-vernor  of  the  World,  He  exercifes  no  moral  Excellency  ; 
exercifing  no  Freedom  in  thefe  Things,  becaufe  He  afts  by 
moral  Neceffity,  which  is  in  Effed  the  fame  with  phyfical  or 
natural  Neceffity  ;  and  therefore  he  only  afts  by  an  Hobbijiical 
Fatality;  as  a  Being  indeed  of 'vafl  Underjlanding,  as  luellas  Poi/jer 
and  Efficiency,  (as  He  faid  before)  but  luithout  a  Will  to  chufe,  being 
a  Ki'id  of  almighty  Mi7iijier  of  Fate,  ailing  under  its  fupr erne  In~ 
fiuence.  FojT  He  allows,  that  in  all  thefe  Things  God's  Will 
is  determined  conftantly  and  certainly  by  a  fuperiour  Fitnefs, 
and  that  it  is  not  poffible  for  Him  to  aft  otherwife.  And  if 
thefe  Things  are  fo,  what  Glory  or  Praife  belongs  to  God 
for  doing  holily  and  juftly,  or  taking  the  moft  fit,  holy,  wife 
aad  excellent  Courfe,  ia  any  one  Inftance  ?  Whereas,  accord- 
H  h  '  ins 


I 

ing  to  the  Scriptures,  and  alfo  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind, 
it  don't  in  the  leaft  derogate  from  the  Honour  of  any  Being, 
that  through  the  moral  Perfeftion  of  his  Nature,  he  necefi'arily 
acts  with  iuprerae  Wifdom  and  Holinefs  :  But  on  the  con- 
trary, his  Praife  is  the  greater  :  Herein  coufifts  the  Height  of 
his  Glory. 

The  fame  Author,.  P.  56.  fuppofes,  that  herein  appears  the 
excellent  CharaSer  of  a  nvij'e  and  good  Man,  that  tha'  he  can  ch:;fc 
cojttrary  to  the  Fiinefs  of  Things,  yet  he  does  not ;  hutfuffers  himjelf 
to  be  diredt.d  by  I'ltnefs;  and  that  in  this  Conduft  He  imitates 
the  blejfed  God.  And  yet  He  fuppofes  'tis  contrariwife  with  the 
Meffed  God  ;  not  that  he  fufFers  Himfelf  to  be  direded  by 
Fitnefs,  when  He  can  chufe  contrary  to  the  Fitncfs  of  Things,  but 
that  he  cannot  chufe  contrary  to  the  Fitnefs  of  Things ;  as  he  fays, 
P.  42. — That  it  is  net  pojfble  for  God  to  aif  other^wife,  than, 
according  to  this  Fitnefs,  ^uahere  there  is  any  Fitnefs  or  Goodnefs  in 
Things:  Yea,  he  fuppofes,  P.  31,  That  if  a  Man  iv^-r^  per- 
fedly  ^fe  nnd  good,  he  could  not  do  othewoife  than  be  confiantly 
and  certainly  determined  by  the  Fitnefs  of  Things. 

One  Thing  more  I  would  obferve,  before  I  conclude  this 
Sedlicn ;  and  that  is.  That  if  it  derogates  nothing  from  the 
Glory  of  God,  to  be  neceffarily  determined  by  fuperiour  Fitnefs 
in  fome  Things,  then  neither  does  it  to  be  thus  determined  in  , 
all  Things ;  from  any  Thing  in  the  Nature  of  fuch  Neceflity, 
as  at  all  detrafting  from  God's  Freedom,  Independence,  abfo- 
lute  Supremacy,  or  any  Dignity  or  Glory  of  his  Nature,  State, 
or  Manner  of  a(51:ing  ;  or  as  implying  any  Infirmity,  Reftraint, 
or'  Subjeftion.  And  if  the  Thing  be  fuch  as  well  confifts  with 
God's  Glory,  and  has  nothing  tending  at  all  to  detrafl  from 
it ;  then  we  need  not  be  afraid  of  afcribing  it  to  God  in  too 
many  Things,  left  thereby  we  ihould  detraft  frpm  God's 
Glory  too  much. 


U\/\/'w'\/\  A  A  A.  A  A/'  \/  \  f  v  \f'  ■••.*'  \/\/  \/  \  A  A..'  \  A  / 


Section 


(    239    ) 

Section     VIII. 

Some  further  Objections  again  ft  the  moral  Neceflity 
of  God's  Volitions  confidered. 

THE  Author  laft  cited,  as  has  been  obferved,  owns  that 
Gpd,  being  pertedly  wife,  will  conftantly  and  certainly 
chufe  what  appears  moft  fit,  where  there  is  a  fuperiour 
Fitnefs  and  Goodnefs  in  Things ;  and  that  it  is  not  poffible 
for  him  to  do  otherwife.  So  tliat  it  is  in  Efleft  confefs'd,  that 
in  thofe  Things  where  there  is  any  real  Preferablenefg, 
'tis  no  Difhononr,  nothing  in  aay  Refpefi:  unworthy  of  God, 
for  him  to  aft  from  Neceflity  j  notwithftanding  all  that  can 
be  objeded  from  the  Agistment  of  fuch  a  Neceliity,  with  the 
Fate  of  the  Siokks,  and  the  NecelTity  maintain'd  by  Mr.  Hohhes. 
From  which  it  will  follow,  that  if  it  were  fo,  that  in  all  the 
different  Things,  among  which  God  chufes,  there  were  ever- 
more a  fuperiour  Fitnefs  or  Preferablenefs  on  one  Side,  then  it 
would  be  no  Diftionour,  or  any  Thing.,  ia  any  Refpeft,  un- 
worthy, or  unbecoming  of  God,  for  his  Will  to  be  neceflarily 
determined  in  every  Thing,  And  if  this  be  allowed,  it  is  a 
giving  up  entirely  the  Argument,  from  the  Unfuitablenefs  of 
fuch  a  Neceflity  to  the  Liberty,  Supremacy,  Independence  and 
Glory  of  the  divine  Being  ;  and  a  refting  the  whole  Weight  Qf 
the  Aifair  on  the  Decifion  of  another  Point  wholly  diverfe  ;  ws;. 
Whether  it  be  fo  indeed,  that  in  all  the  various  poiTible  Things 
which  are  in  God's  View,  and  may  be  confidered  as  capable 
Objefts  of  his  Choice,  there  is  not  evermore  a  Preferablenefs 
in  one  Thing  above  another.  This  is  denied  by  this  Author; 
who  fuppofes,  that  in  many  Inftances,  between  two  or  more 
poffible  Things,  which  come  within  the  View  of  the  divine 
Mind,  there  is  a  perfedf  Indifference  and  Equality  as  to  Fitnefs, 
nr  Tendency  to  attain  any  good  End  whicii  God  can  have  in 
View,  or  to  anfwer  any  of  his  Defigns,  Now  therefore  I 
would  confider  whether  this  be  evident. 

The  Arguments  brought  to  prove  tliis,    are  of  two  Kinds. 

(i.)  It   is   urged,    that   in   many  Inftances   we   muif   fuppofe 

there  is  abfolutely  no  Difference  between  various  poffible  Ob- 

jeds  of  Chgice,   which  God  has  in  View  ;    And  (2.)  that  the 

H  K  3  Difference 


240       Q/"  God's  creating  iW  JVorld,        Part  W. 

Difference  between  many  Things  is  fo  inconfiderable,  or  of 
fuch  a  Nature,-  that  it  would  be  unreafonable  to  fuppofe  it  to 
be  of  any  Confequence  ;  or  to  fuppofe  that  any  of  God's  wife 
Defigns  would  not  be  anfwered  in  one  Way  as  well  as  the  other. 

Therefore, 
L  The  firft  Thing  to  be  confidered  is.   Whether  there  ai« 
any  Inftancc;    \ -herein   there   is   a   perfed  Likenefs,    and   ab- 
iblutely  no  ii-.r 'erencd,    between   different  Objefts  of  Choice, 
that  are  propcfea  to  the  divine  Underftanding  ? 

And  here  in  the  frji  Place,  it  may  be  worthy  to  be  confi- 
clered,  whether  the  Contraclidion  there  is  in  the  Terms  of  the 
Queftion  propofed,  don't  give  K.eafon  to  fufpeft  that  there  is 
an  Inconfiltence  m  the  Thing  fuppofed.  'Tis  inquired,  whe- 
ther different  Objefts  of  Choice  mayn't  be  abfolutely  n.vithoUt 
Difference  ?  If  tliey  are  abfolutely  •without  Difference,  then  how 
are  they  different  Objefts  of  Choice  ?  If  there  be  abfolutely  nxi. 
Difference  in  any  Refped^s,  then  there  is  no  Variety  or  Dijlindion': 
'Sot  Diftinftion  is  only  by  forne  Difference.  And  if  there  be 
no  Variety  among  propofed  Ohjeds  of  Choice,  then  there  is  no 
Opportunity  for  Variety  oj  Choice,  or  Difference  of  Determina- 
tion. For  that  Determination  of  a  Thing  which  is  not  dif- 
ferent in  any  R«fped,  is  not  a  different  Determination,  but  thft 
fame.     That  this  is  no  Quibble,    may  appear  more  fully  anon: 

The  Arguments,  to  prove  that  the  moil  High,  in  fome  In- 
Ilances,  chufes  to  do  one  Thing  rather  than  another,  where 
the  Things  themfelves  are  perfeftly  without  Difference,  ar^ 
two. 

I.  That  the  various  Parts  of  infinite  Time  and  Space,  ab- 
solutely confidered,  are  perfeftly  alike,  and  don't  differ  at  all 
one  from  another  :  And  that  therefore,  when  God  determined 
to  create  the  World  in  fuch  a  Part  of  infinite  Duration  and 
Space,  rather  than  others,  he  determin'd  and  prefer'd  among 
various  Objefts,  between  which  there  was  no  Preferablenefs, 
and  abfolutely  no  Difference. 

AnJ'vo.  This  Objeftion  fuppofes  an  infinite  Length  of  Time 
betore  the  World  was  created,  diflingiiifhed  by  fucceflive  Part  J, 
properly  and  truly  fo  ;  or  a  Succeffion  of  limited  and  un- 
jmeafurable  Periods  of  Time,  following  one  another,  in  an  in- 
finitely long  Series :  which  muft  needs  be  a  groundlefs  Imagi- 
nation. The  eternal  Duration  which  was  before  the  World, 
lieing  only  the  Eternity  of  God's  Exiflence ;  which  is  nothing 
'  elfe 


Se6l.  VIIL         at  fuck  a  Time  and  Place.         1^41 

elfe  but  his  immediate,  perfed  and  invariable  PoiTefTion  of  the 
^Vhole  of  his  unlimited  3Jfe,  together  and  at  once  ;  Vitce  inter- 
runabilis,  tola,  Jimul^  perfeEa  i'ojfcffio^  Which  is  fo  generally 
allowed,  that  I  need  not  ftand  to  demonftrate  it.  + 

So  this  Objeftion  fuppofes  an  Extent  of  Space  beyond  the 
Limits  of  the  Creation,  of  an  infinite  Length,  Breadth  and 
Depth,  truly  a;id  properly  dillinguiihed  into  different  meafur- 
able  Parts,  limited  at  certain  Stages,  one  beyond  another,  in 
an  infinite  Series.  Which  Notion  of  abfolate  and  infinite  Space 
is  doubtlefs  as  unreafonable,    as  that  now  mention'd,   of  abfo- 

iute 


+  "  If  all  created  Beings  were  taken  avyay,  all  Poflibilitf  of  any  Mu- 
tation or  Succefiion  of  one  Thing  to  another  would  appear  t^ 
be  alfo  removed.  Abftra(£l  Succeilion  in  Eternity  is  fcarce  to  be 
underftood.  What  is  it  that  fucceeds  ?  One  Minute  to  another 
pe4-haps,  -velut  unJa  fupervenit  undam.  But  when  we  imagine 
this,  we  fancy  that  the  Minutes  are  Things  feparately  exifting. 
This  is  the  common  Notion ;  and  ye:  it  is  a  manifelt  Prejudic?. 
Time  is  nothing  but  the  Exiftence  of  created  fuceflive  Beings, 
and  Eternity  the  neceffary  Exiftence  of  the  Deity.  Therefore,  if 
this  neceffary  Being  hath  no  Change  or  Succeffion  in  his  Nature, 
his  Exiftence  mull  of  Courfe  be  unfucceflive.  We  feem  to  com- 
mit a  double  Overfight  in  this  Cafe ;  fiift',  we  find  Succedion  in 
the  neceffary  Nature  and  Exiftence  of  the  Deity,  himfelf :  Which 
is  wrong,  if  the  Reafoning  above  be  conclulive.  And  then 
we  afcribe  this  Succeffion  to  Eternity,  confidered  abftradledly 
from  the  eternal  Being  ;  and  fuppofe  it,  one  knows  not  what,  a 
Thing  lubfifting  by  iti'elf,  and  flowing,  one  Minute  after  another. 
This  is  the  Work  of  pure  Imagination,  and  contrary  to  the 
Reality  of  Things.  Hence  the  common  metaphorical  pxpreffions  ; 
Time  runs  a-pace,  let  us  lay  hold  on  the  frefcnt  Minute,  and 
the  like.  The  Philofophers  themfclves  miflead  us  by  their  lUuftrations  : 
They  compare  Eternity  to  the  Motion  of  a  Point  running  on 
forever,  and  making  a  tracelefs  infinite  Line.  Here  the  Point  is 
fuppofed  a  Thing  actually  fubfift.ing,  reprefenting  the  prefent  Mi- 
nute ;  and  then  they  afcribe  Motion  or  Succeffion  to  it  :  that  is, 
they   afcribe    Motion    to   a    mere  Non-entity,    to    illuftrate  to   us   a 

fucceffive    Eternity    made    up   of  finite    fucceffiv'e    Parts If  once 

we  allov»  an  all-perfeft  Mind,  which  hath  an  eternal,  immutable  and 
infinite  Comprehenfion  of  all  Things,  always  (and  allow  it  we  mult) 
the  Diftindlion  of  part    and  future    vanifties   with  Refpeift  to    fuch  a 

Mind. In   a  Word,     if    we    proceed   Step    by    Step,     as   above, 

the    Eternity   or    Exiftence   of   the  Deity    will     appear    to   be  P'ita 
interminabilis,  tola,    Jimul    fef  perfeEia   Pojfejfio ;  how    much    foevef 
this  may  have  been  a  Paradox  hitherto."      Enquiry  into  the  Nature 
^  the  Human  Soul.     Vol.  a.  P.  409,  410,  411.  Edit.  3. 


24^         Gf  God's  placing  di^Qv^ntly        Part  IV, 

lute  and  infinite  Duration.  'Tis  as  improper,  to  imaoine  that 
the  Immenfity  and  Omniprefence  of  God  is  diitinguiihed  by  a 
Series  of  Miles  and  Leagues,  one  beyond  another ;  as  that 
the  infinite  Duration  of  God  is  diflinguifhed  by  Months  and 
Years,  one  after  another.  A  Diverfity  and  Order  of  diftinct 
Parts,  limited  by  certain  Periods,  is  as  conceivable,  and  does 
as  naturally  obtrude  itfelf  on  our  Imagination,  in  one  Cafe  as 
the  other ;  and  there  is  equal  Reafon  in  each  Cafe,  to  fuppofe 
that  our  Imagination  deceives  us.  'Tis  equally  improper,  to 
talk  of  Months  and  Years  of  the  divine  Exigence,  and  Mile- 
fquares  of  Deity  :  And  we  equally  deceive  ourfelves,  when 
we  talk  of  the  World's  being  differently  fix'd  with  Refpect  to 
either  of  thefe  Sorts  of  Meafures.  I  think,  we  know  not  what 
we  mean,  if  we  fay,  the  World  might  have  been  differently 
placed  from  what  it  is,  in  the  broad  Kxpanfe  of  Infinity  ;  or, 
that  it  might  have  been  differently 'fix'd  in  the  long  Line  of 
Eternity  :  And  all  Arguments  and  Objections  which  are 
built  on  the  Imaginations  we  are  apt  to  have  of  infinite  Exten- 
fion  or  Duration,  are  Buildings  founded  on  Shadows,  or 
Cafcles  in  the  Air. 

2.  The  fecond  Argument,  to  prove  that  the  moft  High  wills 
one  Thing  rather  than  another,  without  any  fuperiour  Fitnefs  or 
Preferablenefs  in  the  Thing  prefer'd,  is  God's  actually  placing 
in  different  Parts  of  tlie  World,  Particles  or  Atoms  of  Matter 
that  are  perfectly  equal  and  alike.  The  forementioned  Author 
fays,  P.  7S,  i^c,  "  If  one  would  defcend  to  the  minute  fpeci- 
"  fie  Particles,  of  which  different  Bodies  are  compofed,  we 
''  fbould  fee  abundant  Reafon  to  believe  that  there  are  Thou- 
•*  fands  of  fuch  little  Particles  or  Atoms  of  Matter,  which 
"  are  perfectly  equal  and  alike,  and  could  give  no  diftinct  De- 
'f  termination  to  the  Will  of  God,  where  to  place  them."  He 
there  inftances  in  Particles  of  Water,  of  which  there  are  fuch 
immenfe  Numbers,  which  compofe  the  Rivers  and  Oceans  of 
this  World ;  and  the  infinite  Myriads  of  the  luminous  and  fiery 
Particles,  which  compofe  the  Body  of  the  Sun  ;  fo  iriany,  that 
it  would  be  very  unreafonable  to  fuppofe  no  two  of  them 
(hould  be  exactly  equal  and  alike. 

Atif^^v.  (i.)  To  this  I  anfwer :  That  as  we  muft  fuppofe 
Matter  to  be  infinitely  divifible,  'tis  very  unlikely  that  anj'  two 
of  all  thefe  Particles  are  exactly  equal  and  alike  ;  fo  unlikely, 
that  it  is  a  Thoufand  to  one,  yea,  an  infinite  Number  to  one, 
but  it  is  otherwife  :    And  that  altho'  we  ftiould  allow  a  great 

Similarity 


Sedl.VlII.  Umilar  Particles.  243' 

Similarity  between  the  different  Particles  of  Water  and  Fire, 
as  to  their  general  Nature  and  Figure  ;  and  however  fmall  we 
iuppofe  thofe  Particles  to  be,  'tis  intinitely  unlikely,  that  any  two 
of  them   fliould  be  exadly  equal  in  Bimenfions  and  Quantity 

of  Matter. If  we  fliould  fuppofe  a  great  many  Globes  of 

the  fame  Nature  with  the  Globe  of  the  Earth,  it  would  be  very 
■  ftrange,  if  there  were  any  two  of  them  that  had  exadly  the 
fame  Number  of  Particles  of  Duft  and  Water  in  them.  But 
infinitely  lefs  ftrange,  than  that  two  Particles  of  Light  fhould 
have  juft  the  fame  Quantity  of  Matter.  For  a  Particle  of 
Light  (according  to  the  Dortrine  of  the  infinite  Divifibility  of 
Matter)  is  compofed  of  infinitely  more  affignable  Parts,  than 
there  are  Particles  of  Dufl:  and  Water  in  the  Globe  of  the 
Earth.  And  as  it  is  infinitely  unlikely,  that  any  two  ot  thefe 
Particles  (hould  be  equal ;  fo  it  is,  that  they  fhould  be  alike  in 
other  Refpedts :  To  inllance  in  the  Configuration  of  their 
Surfaces.  If  there  were  very  many  Globes,  of  the  Nature  of 
the  Earth,  it  would  be  very  unlikely  that  any  two  fhould  have 
exaftly  the  fame  Number  of  Particles  of  Duft,  Water  and  Stone, 
in  their  Surfaces,  and  all  pofited  exaflly  alike,  one  with  Re- 
fpeift  to  another,  without  any  Difitnence,  in  any  Part  difcernable 
either  by  the  naked  Eye  or  Microfcope  ;  but  infinitely  lefs 
Itrange,  than  that  two  Particles  of  Light  fhould  be  perfectly 
of  the  fame  Figure.  For  there  are  infinitely  more  alFignable 
real  Parts  on  the  Surface  of  a  Particle  of  Light,  than  there  are 
Particles  of  Duft,  Water  and  Stone,  on  the  Surface  of  the 
terreftrial  Globe. 

Anf.  2.  But  then,  fup^ofing  that  there  are  two  Particles 
or  Atoms  of  Matter  perfectly  equal  and  alike,  which  God  has 
placed  in  different  Parts  of  the  Creation  ;  as  I  will  not  deny  it 
to  be  poffible  for  God  to  make  two  Bodies  perfectly  alike,  and 
put  them  in  different  Places ;  yet  It  will  not  follow,  that  twa 
different  or  diftindf:  Ads  or  Effefts  of  the  divine  Power  have 
cxaftly  the  fame  Fitnefs  for  the  fame  Ends.  .For  thefe  two 
different  Bodies  are  not  difterent  or  diftindf,  in  any  other 
Refped\s  than  thofe  wherein  they  i/z^^r;  They  are  two  in  no- 
other  Refpefls  than  thofe  wherein  there  is  a  Difference.  If 
they  are  perfeflly  equal  and  alike  hi  them/elves,  then  they  can  be 
diftinguifhed,  or  be  diflinift,  only  in  thofe  Things  which  are 
called  CircHinJuinccs ;  as,  Place,  Time,  Reft,  Motion,  or  fome 
other  prefent  or  paft  Circumftances  or  Relations.  For  'tis 
Difference  only,  that  conltitutes  Diftinction.  If  God  makes 
two  Bodies  /.v  themfelvss  every  Way  equal  and  alike,  and  agreeing; 

perfeftly 


i'^4  Of  God's  placing  difCtr^ntly       Part  IVi 

perfesjlly  in  all  other  Circumftances  and  Relations,  but  only 
their  place  ;  then  in  this  only  is  there  any  Diftindion  or  Du- 
plicity. The  Figure  is  the  fame,  ..the  Meafure  is  the  fame,  the 
Solidity  and  Reliftance  are  the  fame,  and  every  Thing  the 
fame,  but  only  the  Place.  Therefore  what  the  Will  ot  God 
determines,  is  this,  namely,  that  there  Ihouid  be  the  fame 
Kgure,  the  fame  Extenfion,  the  fame  Refiftance,  &rc.  in  tv/o 
different  Places.  And  for  this  Determinaition  he  has  fome 
Reafon.  There  is  fome, End,  for  which  fuch  a  Determination 
and  Aft  has  a  peculiar  Fitnefs,  above  all  other  Ads.  Here  is 
no  one  Thing  determined  without  an  End,  and  no  one  Thing 
without  a  Fitnefs  for  that  End,  fuperiour  to  any  Thing  elfe.  If 
it  be  the  Pieafure  of  God  to  caufe  the  fime  Refiftance,  and  the 
fame  Figure,  to  be  in  two  diflerent  Places  and  Situations,  we 
can  no  more  juiMy  argue  from  it,  that  here  mu ft  be  fome 
Determination  or  Aft  of  God's  Will,  that  is  wholly  without 
Motive  or  End,  then  we  can  argue  that  whenever,  in  any 
Cafe,  it  is  a  Man's  Will  to  fpeak  the  fame  Words,  or  make 
tKe.  fame  founds  at  two  different  Times ;  there  muft  be  fome 
Determination  or  Aft  of  his  Will,  without  any  Motive  or  End. 
The  DiiTerence  of  Place,  in  the  former  Cafe,  proves  no  more 
than  the  Difference  of  Time  does  in  the  other.  If  any  one 
fliould  fay  with  Regard  to  the  former  Cafe,  that  therg  muft  be 
fomething  determined  without  an  End,  viz.  That  of  thofe  two 
fimilar  Bodies,  this  in  particular  Ihould  be  made  in  this  Places 
and  the  other  in  the  other,  and  fhould  inquire  why  the  Creator 
did  not  make  them  inaTranfpofition,  when  both  are  alike,  and^ 
each  would  equally  have  fuited  either  Place  ?  The  Inquiry 
fuppofes  fomething  that  is  not  true ;  namely,  that  tlie  two 
Bodies  differ  and  are  diftinft  in  other  Refpefts  befides  thei/t 
Place.  So  that  with  this  Diftinftion,  inherent  in  them,  they 
might  in  their  firft  Creation  have  been  tranfpofed,  and  each 
ipight  have  begun  its  Exiftence  in  the  Place  of  the  other. 

Let  us  for  Clearnefs  fake  fuppofe,  that  God  had  at  the 
Beginning  made  two  Globes,  each  of  an  Inch  Diameter,  both 
perfeft  Spheres,  and  perfeftly  folid  without  Pores,  and  per- 
feftly  alike  in  every  Refpeft,  and  placed  them  near  one  to 
another,  one  towards  the  right  Hand,  and  the  other  towards 
the  left,  without  any  Difference  as  to  Time,  Motion  or  Reft; 
paft  or  prefent,  or  any  Circumftance,  but  only  their  Place  j 
and  the  Queftion  ftiould  be  afk'd.  Why  God  in  their  Creation 
placed  them  fo  ?  Why  that  which  is  made  on  the  right  Hand^ 
was  not  made  on  the  left,  and  vice  ver/a  ?    Let  it  be  well  cou- 

fidered;i 


ISed.Vni.  fimiiar  Fart  ides.  24^ 

fidered,  whether  tlxre  be  any  Senfe  in  fuch  a  Queftion ;  and 
whether  the  Inquiry  don't  fuppofe  fomething  falfe  and  abfurd. 
Let  it  be  conlidered,  what  the  Creator  muft  have  done  other- 
wife  than  he  did,  what  difFererlt  Aft  of"  Will  or  iPower  he  muft 
have  exerted,  in  carder  to  the  Thing  propofed.  All  that  could 
have  been  done,  would  have  been  to  have  made  two  Spheres, 
perfectly  alike,  in  the  fame  Places  where  he  has  made  them, 
without  any  Difference  of  the  Things  made,  either  in  them- 
ielves,  or  in  any  Circumftance  ;  fo  that  the  whole  EfFeft  would 
have  been  without  any  Difference,  and  therefore  juft  the  fame- 
By  the  Suppofition,  the  two  Spheres  are  different  in  no  other 
Reff)eft  but  their  Place  ;  and  therefore  in  other  Refpefts  they 
ate  the  fame.  Each  has  the  fame  Roundnefs :  It  is  not  a 
diftinft  Rotundity,  in  any  other  Rcfpeft  but  its  Situation. 
There  a'-e  alfo  the  fame  Dimenfions,  differing  in  nothing  hut 
rheir  Place.  And  fo  of  their  Refiftance,  and  every  Thing  elfe 
that  belongs  to  them. 

Here  if  any  chufeg  to  fay,  "  that  there  is  a  DifFerence  in 
another  Refped,  luz.  That  they  are  not  N  U  M  E  R I C  A  L  L  Y 
the  fame:  That  it  is  thus  with  all  the  Qualities  that  belong 
to  thein  :  That  it  is  confeffed  they  are  in  fome  Refpefts 
the  fan'ie  ;  that  i?,  they  are  both  exaftly  alike  ;  but  yet  mime- 
r-cally  they  differ.  Thus  the  Roundnefs  of  one  is  not  the 
fame  mtnicrkal,  indi'vidual  Roundnefs  with  that  of  the  other." 
Let  this  be  fuppofed  ;  then  the  Queftion  about  the  Determi- 
nation of  the  divine  Will  in  the  Affair,  is,  Why  did  God  will, 
that  this  indi'viduai  Roundnefs  fhould  be  at  the  right  Hand,  and 
the  other  individual  Roundnefs  at  the  left  ?  Why  did  not  he 
make  them  in  a  contrary  Pofition  ? — Let  any  rational  Perfon 
confider,  whether  fuch  Queftions  be  not  Words  without  a  Mean- 
ing ;  as  much  as  if  God  (hould  fee  fit  for  fome  Ends  to  caufe 
the  fame  Sounds  to  be  repeated,  or  made  at  two  different 
Times ;  the  Sounds  being  perfeftly  the  fame  in  every  other 
Refpeft,  but  only  one  was  a  Minute  after  the  other ;  and  it 
fliould  be  afk'd  upon  it,  why  God  caufed  thefe  Sounds,  nume- 
rically different,  to  fucceed  one  the  other  in  filch  a  Manner  ? 
why  he  did  not  make  that  individual  Sound  which  was  in  the 
firft  Minute,  to  be  in  the  fecond  ?  and  the  individual  Sound  of 
the  laft  Minute  to  be  in  the  firft  ? — Which  Inquiries  would  be 
even  ridiculous ;  as  I  think  every  Perfon  mufl  fee  at  once,  in 
the  Cafe  propofed  of  two  Sounds,  being  only  the  fame  repeat- 
ed, abfolutely  without  any  Difference,  but  that  one  Circum- 
flance  of  Time.     If  the  moft  High  fees  it  will  anfwer  fome 

I  i  good 


24^     Of  God's  chiifmg  among  like  Things,    P.  W^ 

good  End,  that  the  fame  Sound  (hould  be  made  by  Lightning 
at  two  diftind  Times,  and  therefore  wills  that  it  lliould  be  fo, 
muft  it  needs  therefore  be,  that  herein  there  is  fome  Aft  of 
God's  Will  without  any  Motive  or  End  ?  God  faw  fit  often,  at 
diftinft  Times,  and  on  diiferent  Occafions,  to  fay  the  very 
fame  Words  to  Mo/es ;  namely  thofe,  /  am  Je/po-vah,  And 
would  it  not  be  unreafonable,  to  infer  as  a  certain  Confequence 
from  this,  that  here  muft  be  fome  Aft  or  Afts  of  the  divine 
Will,  in  determining  and  difpofing  thefe  Words  exaftly  alike 
at  different  Times,  wholly  without  Aim  or  Inducement  f  But 
it  would  be  no  more  unreafonable  than  to  fay,  that  there  muft 
be  an  Aft  of  God's  without  any  Inducement,  if  he  fees  it  beft, 
and  for  fome  Reafons,  determines  that  there  ihall  be  the  fame 
Refiftance,  the  fame  Dimenlions,  and  the  fame  Figure,  in 
feveral  diftinft  Places. 

If  iri  the  Inftance  of  the  two  Spheres,  perfeftly  alike.  It  be 
fuppofed  poffible  that  God  might  have  made  them  in  a  contrary 
Pofition  ;  that  which  is  made  at  the  right  Hand,  being  made  at 
the  Left ;  then  I  alk.  Whether  it  is  not  evidently  equally  poffi- 
ble, if  God  had  made  but  one  of  them,  and  that  in  the  Place 
of  the  right-hand  Globe,  that"  he  might  have  made  that  nume- 
rically diiferent  from  what  it  is,  and  numerically  different  from 
what  he  did  make  it ;  tho'  perfeftly  alike,  and  in  the  fame 
Place ;  and  at  the  fame  Time,  and  in  every  Refpeft,  in  the 
fame  Circumftances  and  Relations  ?  Namely,  Whether  he 
might  not  have  made  it  numerically  the  fame  with  that  which 
he  has  now  made  at  the  left  Hand ;  and  fo  have  left  that 
which  is  now  created  at  the  right  Hand,  in  a  State  of  Non- 
exiftence  ?  And  if  fo,  whether  it  would  not  have  been  poffible 
to  have  made  one  in  that  Place,  perfeftly  like  thefe,  aad  yet 
numerically  differing  from  both  ?  And  let  it  be  confidered^ 
whether  from  this  Notion  of  a  numerical  Difference  m  Bodies, 
perfeftly  equal'  and  alike,  which  numerical  Difference  is  fome- 
thing  inherent  in  the  Bodies  themfelves,  and  diverfe  from  the 
Difference  of  Place  or  Time,  or  any  Circumftance  whatfoever  ; 
it  will  not  follow,  that  there  is  an  infinite  Number  of  numeri- 
cally different  poffible  Bodies,  perfeftly  alike,  among  which 
God  chufes,  by  a  felf-determining  Power,  when  he  goes  about 
to  create  Bodies. 

Therefore,  let  us  put  the  Cafe  thus :  Suppofing  that  God  In 
the  Beginning  had  created  but  one  perfeftly  folid  Sphere,  in  a 
sextain  Place ;  and  it  Ihould  be  inquired,  Why  God  created  that 

iadividual 


Sedl.  VIII.      and  Things  of  trivial  Dlffereme.     247 

individual  Sphere,  in  that  Place,  at  that  Time  ?  And  why  he 
did  not  create  another  Sphere  perfectly  like  it,  but  numerically 
different,  in  the  fame  Place,  at  the  fame  Time  ?  Or  why  he 
chofe  to  bring  into  Being  there,  that  very  Body,  rather  than 
any  of  the  infinite  Number  of  other  Bodies,  perfectly  like  it ; 
either  of  which  he  could  have  made  there  as  well,  and  would 
have  anfwered  his  End  as  well  ?  Why  he  caufed  to  exift,  at 
that  Place  and  Time,  that  individual  Roundnefs,  rather  than 
any  other  of  the  infinite  Number  of  individual  Rotundities,  juft 
like  it  ?  Why  that  individual  Refiftance,  rather  than  any  other 
of  the  infinite  Number  of  poffible  Refiftances  juft  like  it  ?  And 
it  might  as  reafonably  be  alked.  Why,  when  God  firft  caufed 
it  to  Thunder,  he  caufed  that  individual  Sound  then  to  be  made, 
and  not  another  juft  like  it  ?  Why  did  he  make  Choice  of  this 
very  Sound,  and  reject  all  the  infinite  Number  of  other  poflible 
Sounds  juft  like  it,  but  numerically  differing  from  it,  and  all 
differing  one  from  another  ?  I  think,  every  Body  muft  be  fen- 
fible  of  the  Abfurdity  and  Nonfenfe  of  what  is  fuppofed  in  fuch 
Inquiries.  And  if  we  calmly  attend  to  the  Matter,  we  fhall  be 
convinced,  that  all  fuch  Kind  of  Objections  as  I  am  anfwer- 
ing,  are  founded  on  nothing  but  the  Imperfection  of  our  Man- 
'ner  of  conceiving  of  Things,  and  the  Obfcurenefs  of  Language;" 
and  great  Want  of  Clearnefs  and  Precifion  in  the  Signification 
of  Terms. 

If  any  fhall  find  Fault  with  this  Reafoning,  that  it  Is  going 
a  great  Length  into  metaphyfical  Niceties  and  Subtilties ;  I 
anfwer.  The  Objection  which  they  are  in  Reply  to,  is  a  me- 
taphyfical Subtilty,  and  muft  be  treated  according  to  the  Na- 
ture of  it.* 

II.  Another  Thing  alledged  is.  That  innumerable  Things 
whiph  are  determined  by  the  divine  Will,  and  chofen  and  done 
by  God  rather  than  others,  differ  from  thofe  that  are  not 
chofen  in  fo  inconfiderable  a  Manner,  that  it  would  be  unrea- 
fonable  to  fuppofe  the  Difference  to  be  of  any  Confequence, 
or  that  there  is  any  fuperiour  Fitnefs  or  Goodnefs,  that  God 
can  have  Rcfpect  to  in  the  Determination. 

I  i  3  To 

*  "  For  Men  to  have  Recourfe  to  Subtilties,  in  raifing  Difficulties, 
«»  and  then  complain,  that  they  (hould  be  taken  off  by  minutelv 
''  examining  thel'e  Subtilties,  is  a  ftrange  Kind  of  Procedure.'" 
l^ature  of  the  Human  Soul.     V.  2.  P.  33  i. 


248  Of  God's  chufing  among  fmall  MMters.    P.  IV, 

To  which  I  anfwer ;  it  is  impoffible  for  us  to  determine 
with  any  Certainty  or  Evidence,  that  becaafe  the  Difference  i^ 
very  fmall,  and  appears  to  us  of  no  Confideration,  there- 
fore there  is  abfolutely  no  fuperiour  Goodnefs,  and  no  valuable} 
End  which  can  be  propofed  by  the  Creator  and  Governor  of 
the  World,  in  ordering  fuch  a  Difference.  The  foreinention'd 
Author  mentions  many  Inilances.  One  is,  there  being  one 
Atom  in  the  whole  Univerfe  more,  or  lefs.  But  I  think  it 
would  be  unreafonable  to  fuppvofe,  that  God  made  one  Atom  ia 
vain,  or  without  any  End  or  Motive.  He  made  not  one  Atom 
but  what  was  a  Work  of  his  almighty  Power,  as  much  as  the 
whole  Globe  of  the  Earth,  and  requires  as  much  of  a  conftant 
Exertion  of  almighty  Power  to  uphold  it;  and  was  made  and 
is  upheld  underftandingly,  and  on  Delign,  as  much  as  if  np 
other  had  been  made  but  that.  And  it  would  be  as  unreafon- 
able to  fuppofe,  that  he  made  it  without  any  Thing  really 
^imed  at  in  fo  doing,  as  much  as  to  fupppfc  that  he  made  the 
Planet  Jupter  without  Aim  or  Defign. 

'Tis  poffible,  that  the  mcff  minute  Effe.dls  of  the  Creator's 
Power,  the  fmalleft  affignable  Differences  between  the  Things 
whiqh  God  has  made,  may  be  attended,  in  the  whole  Serie? 
of  Events,  and  the  whole  Compafs  and  Extent  of  their  Influ- 
ence, with  very  great  and  important  Confequences.  If  the 
X.aws  of  Motion  and  Gravitation,  laid  down  by  Sir  I/aac  Neiv- 
ion,  hold  univerfally,  there  is  not  one  Atom,  nor  the  kaft  affign- 
able Part  of  an  Atom,  but  what  has  Influence,  every  Moment, 
througliout  the  whole  material  Univerfe,  to  caufe  every  Part 
to  be  otherwife  than  it  would  be,  if  it  were  not  for  that  parti- 
cular corporeal  Exiftence.  And  however  the  Effed;  is  infen- 
fible  for  the  prefent,  yet  it  may  in  Length  of  Time  becomo. 
great  and  important. 

To  illuilrate  this.  Let  us  fuppofe  two  Bodies  moving  the 
fame  Way,  in  ftrait  Lines,  perfedly  parallel  one  to  another  j 
but  to  be  diverted  from  this  parallel  Courfe,  and  drawn  one 
from  another,  as  much  as  might  be  by  the  Attradion  of  an 
Atom,  at  the  Diftance  of  one  of  the  furtheft  of  the  fix'd  Stars 
from  the  Earth  ;  thefe  Bodies  being  turned  out  of  the  Lines 
of  their  parallel  Motion,  will,  by  Degrees,  get  further  and 
further  diftant,  one  from  the  other ;  and  tho'  the  Diftance  may 
be  imperceptible  for  a  long  Time,  yet  at  Length  it  may  become 
very  great.  So  ths  Revolution  of  a  Planet  round  the  Sun  be- 
ing retarded  or  accelerated^   and  the  Orbit  of  its  Revolutioi\ 

made. 


^ed.VlII.  Necefllty  coyijiflent  'with  free  Grace.     249 

jnade  greater  or  lefs,  and  more  or  lefs  elliptical,  and  fo  its 
periodical  Time  longer  or  fhorter,  no  more  than  may  be  by 
the  Influence  of  the  leult  Atom,  might  in  Length  of  Time  per- 
form a  whole  Revolution  fooner  or  later  than  otherwife  it 
would  have  done  ;  which  mighf  make  a  vaft  Alteration 
with  Regard  to  Millions  of  important  Events.  So  the  Influence 
of  the  leaft  Particle  may,  for  ought  we  know,  have  fuch  EfFeft 
on  fomething  in  the  ConlHtution  of  fome  human  Body,  as  t9 
caufe  another  Thought  to  arife  in  the  Mind  at  a  certain  Time, 
tl)an  otherwife  would  have  been;  v/hich  in  Length  of  Time 
(yea,  and  that  not  very  great)  might  occaiion  a  vaft  Akeratioi) 
through  the  whole  World  of  Mankind.  And  {o  innumera- 
ble other  Ways  niight  be  mention'd,  wherein  the  leaft  affign- 
able  Alteration  may  poffibly  be  attended  with  great  Confc- 
quences. 

Another  Argument,  which  the  foremention'd  Author  brings 
againft  a  neceiTary  Determination  of  the  divine  Will  by  a  fupe- 
riour  Fitnefs,  is,  that  fuch  Doftrine  derogates  from  the  Freemfs 
of  God's  Grace  and  GoodneJ's,  in  chufing  the  Objeds  of  his 
Favour  and  Bounty,  and  from  the  Obligation  upon  Men  to 
Thankfulnejs  for  fpecial  Benefits.  P.  89,  ^c. 

In  anfwer  to  this  Objeftion^  I  would  obferve, 

1.  That  it  derogates  no  more  from  the  Goodnefs  of  God, 
to  fuppofe  the  Exercife  of  the  Benevolence  of  his  Nature  to 
be  determin'd  by  Wifdom,  than  to  fuppofe  it  determined  by 
Chance,  and  that  his  Favours  are  beftowed  altogether  at  Ran- 
dom, his  Will  being  determin'd  by  nothing  but  perfedt  Acci- 
dent, without  any  End  or  Defign  whatfoever  ;  which  muft  be 
the  Cafe,  as  has  been  demonftrated,  if  Volition  be  not  deter- 
mined by  a  prevailing  Motive.  That  which  is  owing  to  per- 
feft  Contingence,  wherein  neither  previous  Inducement,  nor 
antecedent  Choice  has  any  Hand,  is  not  owing  more  to  Good- 
nefs or  Benevolence,  than  that  which  is  owing  to  the  Influence 
of  a  wife  End, 

2.  'Tis  acknowledged,  that  if  the  Motive  that  determines  the 
Will  of  God,  in  the  Choice  of  the  Objeds  of  his  Favour,  be 
any  moral  Quality  in  tl^e  Objeft,  recommending  that  Objeft 
to  his  Benevolence  above  others,  his  chufing  that  Objeft  is 
not  fo  great  a  Manifeftation  of  the  Freenefs  and  Sovereignty  of 
his  Grace,  as  if  it  were  otherwife.  But  there  is  no  Neceflity 
pf  fiippofing  this,  in  order  to  our  fuppofing  that  he  has  fome 

wifs 


250     Neceflity  confifient  with  free  Grace.  Part  IV. 

wife  End  in  View,  in  determining  to  bellow  his  Favours  on 
one  Perfon  rather  than  another.  We  are  to  diftinguiftl  be- 
tween the  M<?r/V  of  the  ObjeSi  of  God's  Pwvoiir,  or  a  moral  Qua- 
lification of  th^  Obje£i  attrafting  that  Favour  and  recommend- 
ing to  it,  and  the  nalural  Fitnefs  of  fuch  a  Determination  of 
the  Ail  of  God's  Goodnefs^  to  aijfwer  fome  wife   Defign  of  his 

own,  fome  End  in  the  View  of  God's  Omuifcience. 'Tis 

God's  own  Aft,  that  is  the  proper  and  immediate  Objedl  of 
his  Volition. 

3.  I  fuppofe  that  none  will  deny,  but  that  in  fome  Inftances, 
Gpd  afts  from  wife  Defign  in  determining  the  particular  Sub- 
je(^s  of  his  Favour  :  None  will  fay,  I  prefume,  that  when 
(Jod  diftinguifhes  by  his  Bounty  particular  Societies  or  Perfons, 
He  never,  in  any  Inftance,  exercifes  any  Wifdom  in  fo  doing, 
aiming  at  fome  happy  Confequence.  And  if  it  be  not  denied 
to  be  fo  in  fome  Inftances,  then  I  would  inquire,  whether  in 
thefe  Inftances  God's  Goodnefs  is  lefs  manifefted,  than  in 
thofe  wherein  God  has  no  Aim  or  End  at  all  ?  And  whether 
the  Subjefts  have  lefs  Caufe  of  Thankfulnefs  ?  And  if  fo,  who 
Ihall  be  thankful  for  the  Beftowment  of  diftinguiftiing  Mercy, 
with  that  enhancing  Circumftance  of  the  Diftinftion's  being 
made  without  an  End  ?  How  ftiall  it  be  known  when  God  is 
influenced  by  fome  wife  Aim,  and  when  not  ?  It  is  very  mani-> 
feft  with  Refpeft  to  the  Apoftle  ?aul,  that  God  had  wife  Ends 
in  chufing  him  to  be  a  Chriftian  and  an  Apoftle,  who  had  been 
a  Perfecutor,  &c.  The  Apoftle  himfelf  mentions  one  End, 
I  Tim.  i,  i^,  16.  Chriji  fefus  came  into  the  World  to  fa-ve  Sinners  y 
Dfnvhom  I  amchief.  Hoiubeityfor  this  Caufe  I  obtained  Mercy ,  that 
in  me  firji,  fefus  Chriji  mightjhenv  forth  all  Long-fuffering,  for  a 
Tattern  to  them  avho  Jhould  hereafter  believe  on  Him  to  Life  e'ver- 
lafting.  But  yet  the  Apoftle  never  look'd  on  it  as  a  Diminution 
of  the  Freedom  and  Riches  of  divine  Grace  in  his  Eleftioni 
which  He  fo  often  and  fo  greatly  magnifies.  This  brings  mc 
to  obferve, 

4.  Our  fuppofing  fuch  a  moral  Neceflity  in  the  Afts  of  God'si 
Will  as  has  been  fpoken  of,  is  fo  far  from  neceffarily  derogat- 
ing from  the  Riches  of  God's  Grace  to  fuch  as  are  the  chofea 
Pbjefts  of  his  Favour,  that  in  many  Inftances,  this  moral  Ne- 
ceflity may  arife  from  Goodnefs,  and  from  the  great  Degree  of 
it.  God  may  chufe  this  Objedl  rather  than  another,  as  having 
a  fuperiour  Fitnefs  to  anfwer  the  Ends,  Defigns  and  Inclina- 
tions of  his  Goodnefs  j  being  more  finfulj  and  fo  more  mife- 

rable 


Std.  VIII.  Of  Arminian  Fatality.  25! 

rable  and  neceffitous  than  others ;  the  Inclinations  of  infinite 
Mercy  and  Benevolence  may  be  more  gratified,  and  the  gra- 
cious Defign  of  God's  fending  his  Son  into  the  World  may  be 
more  abundantly  anfwtred,  in  the  Exercifes  of  Mercy  towards 
fuch  an  Objeci,  rather  than  another. 

One  Thing  more  I  would  obferve,    before  I  finifti  what  I 
have  to  fay  on  the  Head  of  the  Neceffity  of  the  Afts  of  God's 
Will ;    and  that  is,    that  fomething  much   more  like  a  fervilc 
Subjeftion  of  the  divine  Being    to  Fatal  Neceffity,   will  follow 
from  Arminian  Principles,  than  from  the  Doctrines  which  they 
oppofe.     For  they  (at  leaft  moft  of  them)  fuppofe,  with   Re- 
fped  to  all  Events  that  happen  in  the  moral  World  depending  on 
the  Volitions  of  moial  Agents,    which  are  the  moft  important 
Events  of  the  Univerfe,    to  which  all  others  are  fubordinatej 
1  fay,    they  fuppofe  with  refpeft  to  thefe,    that  God  has  a  cer- 
tain Foreknowledge  of  them,    antecedent  to   any  Purpofes  or 
Decrees  of  his  about  them.     And  if  fo,  they  have  a  fix'd  cer- 
tain Futurity,  prior  to  any  Defigns  or  Volitions  of  his,  and  in- 
dependent cm  them,  and  to  which  his  Volitions  muft  be  fubjeft, 
as  He  would   wifely  accommodate   his  Affairs   to   this   fix'd 
Futurity  of  the  State  of  Things  in  the  moral  World.     So  that 
here,  inftead  of  a  moral  Neceffity  of  God's  Will,  arifing  from 
or  confifting  in  the  infinite  Perfeftion   and  Bleflednefs  of  the 
divine  Being,    we  have  a  fix'd  unalterable  State  of  Things, 
properly  diftinft  from  the  pcrfeft  Nature  of  the  divine  Mind, 
and  the  State  of  the  divirve  Will  and  Defign,    and  entirely  in- 
dependent on  thefe  Things,    arni  which  they  have  no  Hand  in, 
becaufe  they  are  prior  to  them  ;  and  which  God's  Will  is  truly 
fubjeft  to,    being  obliged  to  conform  or  accommodate  himfelf 
to  it,  in  all  his  Purpofes  and  Decrees,    and  in  every  Thing  He 
does   in   his  Difpofals   and  Government   of  the  World ;    the 
moral  World  being  the  End  of  the  natural ;    fo  that  all  is  in 
vain,    that  is  not  accommodated  to   that  State  of  the  moral 
World,    which  confifts  in,    or  depends  upon  the  Ads  and  State 
of  the  Wills   of  moral  Agents,    which  had  a  fix'd  Futurition 
from  Eternity.     Such  a  Subjection  to  Neceffity  as  this,    would 
truly  argue  an  Inferiority  and  Servitude,  that  would  be  unwor- 
thy of  the  fupreme  Being  ;  and  is  much  more  agreeable  to  the 
Notion  which  many  of  the  Heathen  had  of  Fate,  as  above  the 
Gods,  than  that  moral  Neceffity  of  Fitnefs  and  Wifdom  which 
has  been  fpoken  of;   and  is  truly  repugnant  to  the  abfolute 
Sovereignty  of  God,  and  inconfiftent  with  the  Supremacy  of  his 
Will ;  and  really  fubjects  the  Will  of  the  moft  High  to  the  Will 
of  his  Creatures,  arid  brings  him  into  Dependence  upon  them. 

Se  C  TIOI* 


25,^  Of  the  Objcdlion  alcut  Part  IV; 

•fedo9b(ftbedb&oobooooooo»ocx)oeoooooooo»'a««»gooeoo98oooco«dcoo3e3S3e(»w 
.■ril    (!0''    y]\\  ■<?■'■'   ■■•.""• 

S    EC    Tib    N      IX. 

Concerning     that  ,  Ohje^kn     c.ga'mfi    the    DoBrine 
which   has  been   mdintdindi    that  it  makes  God 
,:.the  Author  of  Sin. 

TT^  I  S;  urged  by  Armimam;  that  the  Doftrine  of,  the  Nccefii- 
jL  iy  ot  Men's  Volitions,  or  their  neceffary  Conneftion 
with  antecedent  Events  and  Circumftances,  makes  the  firft 
Caufe,  and  fapreme  Orderer  of  all  Things,  the  Author  of  Sin; 
in  that  he  has  fo  conilituted  the  State  and  Courfe  of  Things, 
that  finful  Volitions  become  neceffary,  in  Confequence  of  his 
Difpofal.  Dr.  Wtiithy,  in  his  Difcourfe  on  the  Freedom  of  the 
Will,  *  cites  one  of  the  Antients,  as  on  his  Side,  declaring  that 
this  Opinion  of  the  Neceffity  of  the  Will  "  abfolves  Sinners,  a? 
"  doing  nothing  of  their  own  Accord  which  was  Evil,  and 
*'  would  caft  all  the  Blame  of  all  the  Wickednefs  committed  in 
"  the  World,  upon  God,  and  upon  his  Providence,  if  that 
*'  were  admitted  by  the  Affertors  of  this  Fate  ;  whether  he  him- 
*'  felf  did  neceffitate  them  to  do  thefe  Things,  or  ordered  Mat- 
"  ters  fo  that  they  ftiould  be  conftrain'd  to  do  them  by  fome  o- 
"  ther  Caufe."  And  the  Doftor  fays  in  another  Place,  §  "In 
**  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  and  in  the  Opinion  of  Philofophers, 
**  Caufa  deficieiis,  in  rebus  necejfariis ,  ad  Caufam  per  fe  efficien- 
*'  tern  reducenda  efi.  In  Things  neceffary,  the  deficient  Caufe 
"  muft  be  reduced  to  the  efficient.  And  in  this  Cafe  the  Reafort 
*'  is  evident ;  becaufe  the  not  doing  what  is  required,  or  not 
*'  avoiding  what  is  forbidden,  being  a  Defedt,  muft  follow 
"  from  the  Pofition  of  the  neceffary  Caufe  of  that  Deficiency." 

Concerning  this,  I  would  obferve  the  following  Things. 

I.  If  there  be  any  Difficulty  in  this  Matter,  'tis  nothing  pe- 
culiar to  this  Scheme ;  'tis  no  Difficulty  or  Difadvantage 
wherein  it  is  diftingulfhed  from  the  Scheme  of  Arminians  ;  and 
therefore  not  reafonably  objefted  by  them. 

Dr.  Whitby  fuppofes,  that  if  Sin  necefTarily  follows  from 
God's  withholding  Affiftance,  or  if  that  Affiftance  be  not  given 

which 

*  On  the  five  Points.     P.  361.         ^  IhidT.  486. 


Sed.  IX.       making  Cod  the  Author  of  Sin.       253 

which  is  abfolutely  neceffary  to  the  avoiding  of  Evil ;  then  in 
the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  God  muft  be  as  properly  the  Author 
cf  that  Evil,  as  if  he  were  the  etFicient  Caufe  of  it.  From 
whence,  according  to  what  he  himfelf  fays  of  the  Devils  and 
damned  Spirit'^,  God  mull  be  ihe  proper  Author  of  their  perfect 
unreftrained  Wickednef: :  He  mult  be  the  efncient  Caufe  of 
the  great  Pride  ot  the  Devils,  and  of  their  perfed  Malignity 
againll  God,  Chrilt,  his  Saints,  and  all  that  is  Good,  and  of 
the  infariable  Cruelty  of  their  Difpofition.  For  he  allows,  that 
God  has  fo  forfaken  them,  and  does  fo  withhold  his  Affiftance 
from  them,  that  they  are  incapacitated  from  doing  Good,  and 
iietermined  only  to  Evil.  || — Our  Doftrine,  in  its  Confequence, 
make:  God  the  Author  of  Men's  Sin  in  this  World,  no  more, 
and  in  no  other  Senfe,  than  his  Doftrine,  in  its  Confequence, 
makes  God  the  Author  of  the  helliili  Pride  and  Malice  of  the 
Devils.  And  doiibtlefs  the  latter  is  as  odious  an  EfFeifl  as 
tlie  former. 

Again,  if  it  w\\]  follo'rjj  at  all,  that  God  is  the  Author  of  Sin, 
from  what  has  been  fuppofed  of  a  fure  and  infallible  Connedlion 
betv/een  Antecedents  and  Confequents,  it  will  follonju  becanft- 
(if  this,  <viz.  That  for  God  to  be  the  Author  or  Orderer  cf 
thofc  Things  which  he  knows  before-hand,  will  infallibly  be 
attended  with  fuch  a  Confequence,  is  the  fame  Thing  in  Effeft, 
as  for  him  to  be  the  Author  of  that  Confequence.  But  if  this 
be  fo,  this  is  a  Difficulty  which  equally  attends  the  Dodrine 
of  Arminians  themfelves ;  at  leaft,  of  thofe  of  them  who  allow 
God's  certain  Fcre-knowledge  of  all  Events.  For  on  the 
Suppofition  of  fuch  a  Fore-knowledge,  this  is  the  Cafe  with 
Refpeft  to  every  Sin  that  is  committed  :  God  knew,  that  if  he 
ordered  and  brought  to  pafs  fuch  and  fuch  Events,  fuch  Sins 
would  infallibly  follow.  As  for  Inftance,  God  certainly  fore- 
knew, long  before  Judas  was  born,  that  if  he  ordered  Things 
fo,  that  there  Ihould  be  fuch  a  Man  born,  at  fuch  a  Time; 
and  at  fuch  a  Place,  and  that  his  Life  fliould  be  preferved,  and 
that  he  Ihould,  in  divine  Providence,  be  led  into  Acquaintance 
with  Jefus  ;  and  that  his  Heart  (hould  be  fo  influenced  by 
God's  Spirit  or  Providence,  as  to  be  inclined  to  be  a  Follower 
of  Chrift  ;  and  that  he  fhould  be  One  of  thofe  Twelve,  which 
ihould  be  chofen  conftantly  to  attend  him  as  his  Family  ;  and 
that  his  Health  (hould  be  preferved  fo  that  he  fhould  go  up  to 
Jerufalem,  at  the  laft  Paflbver  in  Chrift's  Life ;  and  it  (hould  be 
lb  ordered  that  Judas  Ihould  fee  Chrift's  Kind  Treatment  of 

K  k  the 

\  Uld?.  304.  305. 


254  ■^'5'^<^'  GOD  is  cGHcern'd  Part  IV.. 

the  Woman  which  anointed  him  at  Bethany,  and  have  that 
Reproof  from  Chrift,  which  he  had  at  that  Time,  and  fee  and 
bear  other  Things,  which  ex^cited  his  Enmity  againft  liis 
Mafter,  and  other  Circumftances  fhould  be  ordered,  as  they 
were  ordered  ;  it  would  be  what  would  moft  certainly  and  in- 
fallibly follow,  that  Judas  would  betray  his  Lord,  and  would 
foon  after  hang  himfclf,  and  die  impenitent,  and  be  fent  to 
Hell,  for  his  horrid  Wickednefs. 

Therefore  this  fuppofed  Difficulty  ought  not  to  be  brought 
as  an  Objection  againft  the  Scheme  which  has  been  maintain  d, 
as  difagreeing  with  the  Arminian  Scheme,  feeing  'tis  no  Diffi- 
culty owing  to  fuch  a  Z)//^ff/-f(fwfA'/';  but  a  Difficulty  wherein 
the  Arminians  fliare  with  us.  That  muft  be  unreafonably  made 
aft  Objeftion  againft  our  Differing  from  them,  which  we  fhould 
not  cfcape  or  avoid  at  all  by  agreeing  with  them. 

And  therefore  I  would  obferve, 

II.  They  who  objedl,  that  this  Doiftrine  makes  God  the 
Author  of  Sin,  ought  diftindly  to  explain  what  they  mean  by 
that  Phrafe,  The  Author  of  Sin.  I  know,  the  Phrafe,  as  it  is 
commonly  ufed,.  fignifies  fomething  very  111.  If  by  the  Author 
of  Si/I,  be  meant  the  Sinner,  the  Agent,  or  dBor  of  Sin,  or  the 
Doer  of  a  n.vicked  Thing ;  fo  it  v/ould  be  a  Reproach  and  Blaf- 
phemy  to  fuppofe  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Siru  In  this 
Senfe,  I  utterly  deny  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Sinj  rejecling 
fuch  an  Imputation  on  the  moft  High,  as  what  is  infinitely  to 
be  abhor 'd  ;.  and  deny  any  fuch  Thing  ta  be  the  Confequence 
of  what  I  have  laid  down.  But  if  by  the  Author  of  Sin,  is  meant 
the  Permitter.  or  not  a  Hinderer  of  Sin ;  and  at  the  fame 
Time,  a  Difpofer  of  the  State  of  Events,  in  fuch  a  Manner, 
for  wife,  holy  and  moft  excellent  Ends  and  Purpofes,  that  Sin,,, 
if  it  be  permitted  or  not  hindered,  will  moft  certainly  and  in- 
fallibly follow  :  I  fay,  if  this  be  all  that  is  meant,  by  being  the 
Author  of  Sin,  I  don't  deny  that  God  is  the  Author  of  Sin,, 
(tho'  I  diflike  and  rejeft  the  Phrafe,  as  that  which  by  Ufe  and 
Cuftora  is  apt  to  carry  another  Senfe)  it  is  no  Reproach  for  the 
moft  High  to  be  thus  the  Author  of  Sin.  This  is  not  to  be- 
the  Ador  of  Sin,  but  on  the  contrary,  of  Holinefs.  What  God 
doth  herein,  is  holy ;  and  a  glorious  Exercife  of  the  infinite. 
Excellency  of  his  Nature.  And  I  don't  deny,  that  God's  be- 
ing thus  the  Author  of  Sin,  follows  from  what  I  have  laid  down  j 
and  I  aflert,  that  it  equally  follows  from  the  Do(^rine  which  i» 
m^ntain'd  bv  moft  of  the  Arminian  Divines, 

That. 


Sc^.  IX.        in  the  Exigence  of  Sin.  255 

That  it  is  moft  certainly  fo,  that  God  is  in  fuch  a  Manner 
the  Difpofer  and  Orderer  of  Sin,  is  evident,  if  any  Credit  is  to 
be  given  to  the  Scripture ;  as  well  as  becaufe  it  is  impoffible  in 
the  Nature  of  Things  to  be  otherwife.  In  fuch  a  Manner  God 
ordered  the  Obftinacy  oi Pharaoh,  in  his  refufing  to  obey  God's 
Commands,  to  let  the  People  go.     Exod.  iv.  21.  I  ijoill  hardeti 

his  Heart,  and  he  Jhall  7iot  let  the  People  go.   Chap.  yii.   2 ^. 

Aaron  thy  Brother  Jhall  /peak  unto  Pharaoh,  that  he  fend  the  Chil- 
dren of  Ifrael  out  of  his  Land.  And  I  luill  harden  Pharaoh 'j  Heart, 
and  multiply  tny  Signs  and  my  Wonders  in  the  LandofY^gy^t :  But 
Vhixzoh  Jhall  not  harken  unto  you;  that  I  may  lay  mine  Handupo?: 
Egypt,  hy  great  Judgments ,  kc.  Chap.  ix.  12.  And  the  Lord 
harden  d  the  Heart  of  Phflraoh,  and  he  hearken  d  npt  unto  them,  as 
the  Lord  had fpoken  unto  Mo{q%.  Clrap.  x.  i.  2.  And  the  Lord 
J-aid  unto  Mofes,  Go  in  unto  Pharaoh  ;  for  I  hai^e  harden' d  his  Heart, 
and  the  Heart  of  his  Ser'vants,  that  I  might  fheiv  thfe  my  Signs 
before  Him,  and  that  thou  mayji  tell  it  in  the  Ears  of  thy  Son,  and 
thy  Son's  Son,  ivhat  Things  I  ha've  "nxroughtin  Egypt,  and ?7iy  Signs 
ivhich  I  haz'e  dorie  amongll  them,  that  ye  may  knoiv  that  I  am  the  Lord. 
Chap.  xiv.  4.  And  I  "Mill  l>arden^\\^X2.d\\s  Heart,  that  he  Jhall 
folloiu  after  them;  and  I  n.vill be  honoured np^n  Pharaoh,  ar:d upon 
all  his  Hoji,  V.  8.  And  the  Lord  harden' d  the  Heart  of  Pharaoh 
King  of  Egypt,  and  he  pnrfued  after  the  Children  o/'Ifrael.  And  it 
is  certain  that  in  fuch  a  Manner,  God  for  wife  and  good  Ends, 
ordered  that  Event,  Jofeph's  being  fold  into  Egypt  by  his  Bre- 
thren. Gen.  xlv.  5.  No^v  therefore  be  not  grie'Ved,  tior  angiy 
ivithyourfehoes ,  thatyefoldme  hither  ;  forGod  didj'endme  before  yon 
toprefer've  Life.  Ver.  7,  8.  God  did  fend  me  before  you  to  preferue  a 
Pojierity  in  the  Earth,  and  to  Jd've  yortr  Li've  s  by  a  great  Deliverance  ; 
Jo  that  noiv  it  ivas  not  yon,  thatfcnt  me  hither,  but  God.  Pfal.  c:'ii. 
l-y.  He  fen  t  a  Man  before  them,  e'ven  Jofeph,  ijoho  ivas  fold  for  a 
Servant.  'Tis  certain,  that  thus  God  ordered  the  Sin  and  Folly 
of  Sihon  King  of  the  Amoritcs,  in  refufing  to  let  the  People  of 
Ifrael  pafs  by  him  peaceably.  Dent.  ii.  30.  But  Sihon  King  of 
Heihbon  "cvould  not  let  us  pafs  by  him ;  for  the  Lord  thy  God  harden' d 
his  Spirit,  and  made  his  Heart  objiinate,  that  he  might  deliver  H/;n 
into  thine  Hand.  'Tis  certain,  that  God  thus  ordered  the  ''in 
and  Folly  of  the  Kings  of  Canaan,  that  tliey  attempted  not  to 
make  Peace  with  IJracl,  but  with  a  ftupid  Boldnefs  and  Obfti- 
nacy, fet  themfelves  violently  to  oppofe  them  and  their  God. 
Jo(h.  xi.  2o.  For  it  <was  of  the  Lord,  to  harden  their  Hearts,  that 
they  Jhould  come  againJiKriic]  in  Battle,  that  he  inight  dejlrcy  them 
zftterly,  and  that  they  might  have  no  Favour;  but  thai  he  might 
dejiroy  the??:,  as  the  Lord  cotnma/ided  Mofes.  'Tis  evident,  that 
K  k  3  thus 


256  How  GOD  is  concerned         Part IV. 

thus  God  ordered  the  treacherous  Rebellion  o£  Zedckiah,  againft 
the  King  oiBabylo7i.  Jer.  Hi.  3.    For  thro'  the  Anger  of  the  Lord 
it  came  to pajs  in  Jerufalem,  a}id  Judah,  '////  He  had  caji  them  cut 
from  his  Vrefcnce,  that  Zedekiah  rebelled  againft  the  King  of  Ba- 
bylon. So  2  Kings  xxiv.  20.   And  'tis  exceeding  manifeft,  that 
God  thus  ordered  the  Rapine  and  unrighteous  Ravages  of  Nebu- 
chadnezzar,  in  fpoiling  and  ruining  the  Nations  round  about. 
Jer.  XXV.  g.    Behold,  I  ijuill  fend  and  take  all  the  Families  of  the 
North,  faith  the  Lord,  and  Nebuchadnezzar  my  Servant,  and  njuill 
bring  them  againft  this  Land,  and  againft  all  the  Nations  round  a~ 
bout;  and  njjill utterly  deftroy  them,  and  make  them  an  Aftonifhmetit,. 
and  an  Hifting,  and  perpetual  Deflations .  Ch.  xliii.  10.  II.  Invill 
fend  and  take  Nebuchadnezzar  the  King  of  Babylon,  my  Ser^uant; 
and  I  nvill fet  his  Throne  upon  thefe  Stones  that  I  harje  hid,  and  he 
fhall fpread  his  royal  Pavilion  onjev  them.  Andnvhcn  he  cometh,  he 
fhall  fmite  the  Land  (?/"  Egypt,  and  delinjer  fuch  as  are  for  Death  to 
Death,  andfuch  as  are  for  Capti'vity  to  Capti'vity,  andfuch  as  are 
for  the  S'word  to  the  Snvord.     Thus  God  reprefents  himfelf  as 
fending  for  Nebuchadnezzar,  and  taking  of  him  and  his  Armies » 
and  bringing  him  againft  the  Nations  which  were  to  be  deftroy- 
ed  by  him,  to  that  very  End,  that  he  might  utterly  deftroy 
them,  and  make  them  defolate ;  and  as  appointing  the  Work 
that  he  fhould  do,  fo  particularly,  that  the  very  Perfons  were 
defigned  that  he  fhould  kill  with  the  Sword  ;  and  thofe  that 
ihould   be  kill'd  with  Famine  and  Peftilence,  and  thofe  that 
jQiouId  be  carried  into  Captivity  j  and  that  in   doing  all  thefe 
Things,  he  ihould  aft  as  his  Servant :  By  which,  lefs  can't  be 
intended,  than  that  he  fhould  ferve  his  Purpofes  and  Defigns. 
And  in  Jer.  xxvii.  4,  5,  6.  God  declares  how  he  would  caufe 
him  thus  to  ferve  his  Deligns,  <v'iz.    by  bringing  this  to  pafs  in 
his  fovereign  Difpofals,  as  the  great  PofTefTor  and  Governor  of 
the   Univerfe,    that   difpofes  all  Things  juft  as  pleafes  him. 
*Thus  faith  the  Lord  of  Hofts ,  the  God  of  Ifrael  ;  /  ha-ve  made  the 
'Earth,  the  Man  and  the  Beaft  that  are  upon  the  Ground,  by  my  great 
Ponjjer,  and  my  ftretched  out  Arm ,  and  ha<ve  gi'ven  it  unto  njohomit 
feemed  meet  unto  me :    And  nonx)  I  ha've  given  all  thefe  Lands  into 
the  Hands  0/ Nebuchadnezzar  MY  SERVANT,  and  the  Beafts 
cfthe  Field  have  I  given  alfo  to  ferve  him.   And  Nebuchadnezzar  is 
fpoken  of  as  doing  thefe  Things,  \)y\\?iV\T\^\i\'i  Arms  ft.rengthened 
by  God,  and  having  God's  Svoord  put  into  his  Hands,  for  this 
End.  Ezek.  xxx.  24,  25,  26.   Yea,  God  fpeaks  of  his  terribly 
ravaging  and  wafting  the  Nations,  and  cruelly  deftroying  all 
Sorts,  without  Diftinftion  of  Sex  or  Age,  as  the  Weapon  in 
God's  Hand,  and  the  Inftrument  of  his  Indignation,  which 

God 


Sedl.  IX.         /;/  the  Exigence  of  Sm.  257 

God  makes  ufe  of  to  fulfil  his  own  Purpofcs,  and  execute  his  own. 
Vengeance.  Jer.  li.  20,  &c.  Thou  art  my  Uatlle-Axe,  and  If  ca- 
pons of  War :  For  'with  thee  nxjill  I  break  inPieces  the  1'^  at  ions,  and 
nuith  thee  I  njoill  dejiroy  Kingdoms,  and  ivilh  thee  I  'will  break  in 
Pieces  the  Horfe  and  his  Rider,  and  nvith  thee  I  •vuill  break  in 
Pieces  the  Chariot  and  his  Rider  ;  n-vith  thee  alj'o  ivi'l  I  break  in 
Pieces  Man  and  VVomein ;  andnvith  theeiuill  I  break  in  Pieces  Old_ 
andYoung;  andnviththeenvilll  break  in  Pieces  the  young  Man  and 
the  Maid,  &c.  'Tis  reprefented,  that  the  Defigns  ot  Nebuchadnez- 
z,ar,  and  thofe  that  dellroyed  "Jeru/a/em,  never  could  have  been 
accomplilhed,  had  not  God  determined  them,  as  well  as  they  ; 
Lam.  iii.  37.  ff^ho  is  he  that  faith,  and  i  cotneth  to  pafs ,  and  the 
Lord  commandeth  it  not?  And  yet  the  King  of  ^a/y/o^/'s  thus 
deftroying  the  Nations,  and  efpecially  the  Jeavs,  is  fpoken  of 
as  his  great  Wickednefs,  for  which  God  fmally  deftroyed  him. 

Ifai.  xiv.  4,  5,  6,  12.  Hab.  ii.  5, 12.  and  Jer.  Chap.  1.  &  li. 

"Tis  moft  manifeft,  that  God,  to  ferve  his  own  Defigns,  provi- 
dentially ordered  Shimei's  curfing  DaojiJ,    2  Sam.  xvi.  jo,  11. 

I^he  Lord  hath  faid  unto  him,  Curje  David. Let  him  curfe,for 

the  Lord  hath  bidden  him. 

'Tis  certain,  that  God  thus,  for  excellent,  holy,  gracious 
and  glorious  Ends,  ordered  the  Faft  which  they  committed, 
who  were  concerned  in  Chrift's  Death  ;  and  that  therein  they 
did  but  fulfil  God's  Defigns.  As,  I  truft,  no  Chriltian  will  deny 
it  was  the  Defign  of  God,  that  Chrift  fliould  be  crucified,  and 
that  for  this  End,  he  came  into  the  World.  'Tis  very  manifeft 
by  many  Scriptures,  that  the  whole  Affair  of  Chrift's  Cruci- 
fixion, with  its  Circumftances,  and  the  Treachery  oi  Judas, 
that  made  Way  for  it,  was  ordered  in  God's  Providence,  in 
Purfuance  of  his  Purpofe ;  notwithftanding  the  Violence  that 
is  ufed  with  thofe  plain  Scriptures,  to  obfcure  and  pervert  the 
Senfe  of  them.  Aft.  ii.  23.  Him  being  delivered,  by  the  determinate 
CounfelandForekno^vledgeofGod,  \ ye ha^e taken,  andivithnjuickcd 
Hands,  ha've  crucified  and flain.  Luk.  xxii.  21,  22.  ||  But  behold  the 
Hand  of  him  that  betray  eth  me,  is  nvith  me  on  the  Table:  And  truly 

the 

+  "  Grotius,  as  well  as  Bex.a,  obferves,  that  Prognojis  muft  here 
"  fignify  Decree  ;  and  Elfner  has  fhewn  that  it  has  that  Signification, 
"  in  approved  Greek  Writers.  And  it  is  certain  EgJota  figniSes  one 
*'  given  up  into  the  Hands  of  an  Enemy."  Doddridge  in  Loc. 

II  "  As  this  Paffage  is  not  liable  to  the  Arnbiguitie?,  which  fomc 
•'  have  apprehended  in  A£l.  ii.  23.  and  iv.  28.  (which  yet  feerrj 
<'  on   the   Whole  to   be  par^lel  to  it,   in  their  moft  natural  Conftruc- 

"  tio* 


258  How  GOD  is  concerned        Part  IV. 

the  Son  of  Man  goeth,  as  it  nvas  deterpiined.  AvS.  iv.  27,28.  For 
of  a  Truth,  againfi  thy  holy  Child  fefus,  nuhom  thou  hafi  anointed, 
both  Herod,  and  Pontius  Pilate,  <with  the  Gentiles,  and  the  People 
ef\{xzt\,<were  gathered  together,  for  to  doiuhatfoi-uer  thy  Hand  and 
thy  Caunfel  determined  before  to  be  done.  Aft,  iii.  17,  18.  And 
Jtoiv  Brethren,  I  ivot  that  through  Ignorance  ye  did  it,  as  did 
alfo your  Rulers :  But  thefe  Things,  nvhich  God  before  hadjhenvtd 
by  the  Mouth  of  all  his  Prophets,  that  Chriji  fhouldfuffer,  he  hath 
fo  fulfilled.  So  that  what  thefe  Murderers  of  Chrift  did,  isfpo- 
ken  of  as  what  God  brought  to  pafs  or  ordered,  and  that  by 
which  he  fulfilled  his  own  Word. 

In  Rev.  xvii.  17.  The  agreeing  of  the  Kings  of  the  Earth  t9 
vive  their  Kingdom  to  the  Beaji,  tho'  it  was  a  very  wicked  Thing 
jn  them,  is  fpoken  of  as  a  fulfilling  God's  Will,  and  what  God 
had  put  it  into  their  Hearts  to  do,  'Tis  manifeft,  that  God  fome- 
times  permits  Sin  to  be  committed,  and  at  the  fame  Time  or- 
ders Things  fo,  that  if  he  permit^  the  Faft,  it  will  come  to  pafs, 
becaufc  on  fome  Accounts  he  fees  it  needful  and  of  Importance 
that  it  fhould  come  to  pafs.  Matt,  xviii.  7.  //  nn/ft  needs  be, 
that  Offences  come  ;  but  Wo  to  that  Man  by  ivhom  the  Offence  com-; 
eth.  With  I  Cor.  xi.  ig.  For  there  muji  alfo  be  Herefies  amdng 
you,  that  they  ivhich  are  appronjcd,  may  he  made  manifeft  amongyou. 

Thus  it  is  certain  and  demonftrable,  from  the  holy  Scrip- 
tures, as  well  as  the  Nature  of  Things,  and  the  Principles  of 
Arminians,  that  God  permits  Sin  ;  and  at  the  fame  Time,  fo 
orders  Things,  in  his  Providence,  that  it  certainly  and  infalli- 
bly will  come  to  pafs,  in  Confequence  of  his  Permiflion. 

I  proceed  to  obferve  in  the  next  Place, 
III.  That  there  is  a  great  Difference  between  God's 
being  concerned  thus,  by  his  Permifjion,  in  an  Event  and  Aft, 
which  in  the  inherent  Subjeft  and  Agent  of  it,  is  Sin,  (tho'  the 
Event  will  certainly  follow  on  his  Permiflion,)  and  his  being 
concerned  in  it  by  producing  it  and  exerting  the  Aft  of  Sin ; 
or  between  his  being  the  Orderer  of  its  certain  Exiftence,  by 
not  hindering  it,  under  certain  Circumftances,  and  his  being  the 

proper 

•'  tion)  I  look  upon  it  as  an  evident  Proof,  that  thefe  Things  arc, 
*'  in  the  Language  of  Scripture,  faid  to  be  determined  or  decreed, 
"  (or  exaftly  bounded  and  mark'd  out  by  God,  as  the  Word, 
"  Orlx.0,  mod  naturally  fignifies)  which  he  fees  in  Fadt  will  hap- 
"  pen,  in  Confequence  of  his  Volitions,  without  any  neceflitating 
"  Agency ;  as  well  as  thofe  EventSj  of  which  he  is  properly  the 
'•  Author."    Dedd.  in  Lee. 


Sedl,  IX.  in  the  Exiftence  of  Sm.  259 

proper  AJIar  or  Author  of  it,  by  a  pajiti've  Agency  or  Efficiency. 
And  this,  notwithrtanding  what  Dr  V/hithy  offers  about  a  Saving 
of  Philofophers,  that  Can/a  deficiens,  in  Rebus  neceJJ'ariis y  adCau- 
Jaui  perfe  cfficitntem  rediicenda  eji.  As  there  is  a  vaft  Difference 
between  the  Sun's  being  the  Caufe  of  the  Lightforaenefs  and 
Warmth  of  the  Atmofphere,  and  Brightnefs  of  Gold  and 
Diamonds,  by  its  Prefence  and  pofitlve  Influence  ;  and  its  be- 
ing the  Occafion  of  Darknefs  and  Froit,  in  the  Night,  by  its 
Motion,  whereby  it  defcends  below  the  Horizon,  "^i  he  Motion 
of  the  Sun  is  the  Occafion  of  the  latter  Kind  of  Events ;  but 
it  is  not  the  proper  Caufe,  Efficient  or  Producer  of  them  ;  tho* 
they  are  neceffarily  confequent  on  that  Motion,  under  fuch 
Circumftances  :  No  more  is  any  Adlion  of  the  divine  Being 
the  Caufe  of  the  Evil  of  Men's  Wills.  If  the  Sun  were  the 
proper  Caufe  of  Cold  and  Darknefs,  it  would  be  the  Fountain 
of  thefe  Things,  as  it  is  the  Fountain  of  Light  and  Heat :  And 
then  fomething  might  be  argued  from  the  Nature  of  Cold  and 
Darknefs,  to  a  Likenefs  of  Nature  in  the  Sun  ;  and  it  might 
be  juftly  infer'd,  that  the  Sun  itfelf  is  dark  and  cold,  and  that 
his  Beams  are  black  and  frofty.  But  from  its  being  the  Caufe 
no  otherwife  than  by  its  Departure,  no  fuch  Thing  can  be 
infer'd,  but  the  contrary;  it  may  juftly  be  argued,  that  the 
Sun  is  a  bright  and  hot  Body,  if  Cold  and  Darknefs  are  found 
to  be  the  Confequence  of  its  Withdrawment ;  and  the  more 
conftantly  and  neceiTarily  thefe  Effed^s  are  conneded  with,  and 
confined  to  its  Abfence,  the  more  ftrongly  does  it  argue  the 
Sun  to  be  the  Fountain  of  Light  and  Heat.  So,  inafmuch  as 
Sin  is  not  the  Fruit  of  any  pofitive  Agency  or  Influence  of  the 
moft  High,  but  on  the  contrary,  arifes  from  the  withholding  of 
his  Aftion  and  Energy,  and  under  certain  Circumftances,  ne- 
ceffarily follows  on  the  Want  of  his  Influence  ;  this  is  no  Ar- 
gument that  he  is  finful,  or  his  Operation  Evil,  or  has  any 
Thing  of  the  Nature  of  Evil ;  but  on  the  contrary,  that  He, 
and  his  Agency,  are  altogether  good  and  holy,  and  that  he  is 
the  Fountam  of  all  Holinefs.  It  would  be  ftrange  arguing  in- 
deed, becaufe  Mem  never  commit  Sin,  but  only  when  God 
leaves  them  to  them/el<ves,  and  neceffarily  fin,  when  he  does 
lo,  that  therefore  their  Sin  is  not  from  themfel'ves ,  but  fronv- 
God  ;  and  fo,  that  God  muft  be  a  finful  Being  :  As  ftrange  as 
it  would  be  to  argue,  becaufe  it  is  always  dark  when  the  Sun  is 
gone,  and  never  dark  when  the  Sun  is  prefent,  that  therefore 
all  Darknefs  is  from  the  Sun,  and  that  his  Dijk  and  Beam* 
muft  needs  be  black» 

IV.  IC 


2bQ  How  GOD  is  con-erned  Part  IV. 

IV.  It  properly  belongs  to  the  fupreme  and  absolute  Gover- 
nor of  the  Univerfe,  to  order  all  important  Events  within  his 
Dominion,  by  his  Wifdoin  :  But  the  Events  in  the  moral 
World  are  of  the  mofl:  important  Kind;  fuch  as  the  moral  Ac- 
tions of  intelligent  Creatures,  and  their  Confequences. 

Thefe  Events  will  be  ordered  hy  fomething.  They  will 
cither  be  difpofcd  bv-  Wifdom,  or  they  will  be  difpofed  by 
Chance  ;  that  is,  they  will  be  difpofed  by  blind  and  undefign- 
ing  Caufes,  if  that  were  poffible,  and  could  be  called  a  Difpo- 
fai.  Is  it  not  better,  that  the  Good  and  Evil  which  happens 
in  God's  World,  fhould  be  ordered,  regulated,  bounded  and 
determin'd  by  the  good  Pleafure  of  an  infinitely  wife  Being, 
who  perfef.'^ly  comprehends  within  his  Undcrftauding  and  con^ 
ftant  View,  the  Univerf^lity  of  Things,  in  all  their  Extent  and 
Duration,  and  fees  all  the  Influence  of  every  Event,  with 
Refpeft  to  every  individual  Thing  and  Circumftance,  through- 
out the  grand  Syftem,  and  the  Vvliole  of  the  eternal  Series  of 
Confequences ;  than  to  leave  thefe  Things  to  fall  out  by 
Chance,  and  to  be  determined  by  thofe  Caufes  which  have  no 
Underilanding  or  Aim  ?  Doubtlefs,  in  thefe  important  Events, 
there  is  a  better  and  a  worfe,  as  to  the  Time,  Subjeft,  Place, 
Manner  and  Circumllances  of  their  coming  to  pafs,  with  Re- 
gard to  their  Influence  on  the  State  and  Courfe  of  Things. 
And  if  there  be,  'tis  certaihly  beft  that  they  Ihould  be  deter- 
mined to  that  Time,  Place,  &c.  which  is  beft.  And  therefore 
■'tis  in  its  own  Nature  fit,  that  Wifdom,  and  not  Chance,  fhould 
order  thefe  Things.  So  that  it  belongs  to  the  Being,  who  is 
the  Poffeflbr  of  infinite  Wifdom,  and  is  the  Creator  and  Owner 
cf  the  whole  Svftem  of  created  Exiftences,  and  has  the  Care  of 
all:  I  fay,  it  belongs  to  him,  to  take  Care  of  this  Matter ;  and 
he  would  not  do  what  is  proper  for  him,  if  he  ftiould  negled  it* 
And  it  is  fo  far  from  being  unholy  in  him,  to  undertake  this 
Affair,  that  it  vv^ould  rather  have  been  unholy  to  negleft  it ;  as 
it  would  have  been  a  neglefling  what  fitly  appertains  to  him  ; 
and  fo  it  would  have  been  a  very  unfit  and  unfuitable  Negleft. 

Therefore  the  Sovereignty  of  God  doubtlefs  extends  to  this 
Matter  :  efpecially  confidering,  that  if  it  fliould  be  fuppofed 
to  be  otherwife,  and  God  fhould  leave  Men's  Volitions,  and 
all  moral  Events,  to  the  Determination  and  Difpofition  of 
blind  and  unmeaning  Caufes,  or  they  fhould  be  left  to  happen 
perfectly  without  a  Caufe ;  this  would  be  no  more  confiftent 
with  Liberty,  in  any  Notion  of  it,    and  particularly  not  in  the 

Arminiau 


Sed.  IX.         in  the  Exiftence  of  Sin.  261 

Arminian  Notion  of  it,  than  if  thefe  Eveitts  were  fubjeiTt  to  the 
Difpofal  of  divine  Providence,  and  the  Will  of  Man  were  de- 
termined by  Circumftances  which  are  ordered  and  difpofed  by- 
divine  WilTdom  ;  as  appears  by  what  has  been  already  obferved. 
But  'tis  evident,  that  fuch  a  providential  difpofing  and  deter- 
mining Men's  moral  Adions,  tho'  it  infers  a  moral  Neceflity 
of  thofe  Actions,  yet  it  does  not  in  the  leaft  infringe  the  real 
Liberty  of  Mankind  ;  the  only  Liberty  that  common  Senfe 
teaches  to  be  neceflary  to  moral  Agency,  which,  as  has  been 
demonftrated,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  fuch  NeceiTity. 

On  the  Whole,  it  is  manifefl,  that  God  may  be.  in  the  Manner 
which  lias  been  defcribed,  the  Orderer  and  Difpofer  of  that 
Event,  which  in  the  inherent  Subjeft  and  Agent  is  moral  Evil  ; 
and  yet  His  fo  doing  may  be  no  moral  Evil.  He  may  will  the 
Difpofal  of  fuch  an  Event,  and  its  coming  to  pafs  for  good 
Ends,  and  his  Will  not  be  an  immoral  or  finful  Will,  but  a  per- 
fedly  holy  WiJl.  And  he  may  actually  in  his  Providence  {o 
difpofe  and  permit  Things,  that  the  Event  may  be  certainly  and 
infallibly  conneified  with  fuch  Difpofal  and  Permifiion,  and  his  Aft 
therein  not  be  an  immoral  or  uniioly,  but  a  perfeftly  holy  Aft. 
Sin  may  be  an  evil  Thing,  and  yet  that  there  fhould  be  fuch  a 
Difpofal  and  Permiffion,  as  that  it  fhould  come  to  pafs,  may  be 
a  good  Thing.  This  is  no  Contradiftion,  or  Inconfiftence- 
yo/eph'%  Brethren's  felling  him  into  Egypt,  confider  it  only  as  it 
was  afted  by  them,  and  with  Refpeft  to  their  Views  and  Aims 
which  were  evil,  was  a  very  bad  Thing  ;  but  it  was  a  good 
Thing,  as  it  was  an  Event  of  God's  ordering,  and  conlider'd 
with  Refpeft  to  his  Views  and  Aims  which  were  good.  Gen. 
J.  20.  As  f'jr  you,ye  thought  E'uil  againji  me;  but  God  meant  it  un~ 
to  Good.  So  the  Crucifixion  of  Chrift,  if  we  confider  only  thofe 
Things  which  belong  to  tlie  Event  as  it  proceeded  from  his 
Murderers,  and  are  comprehended  within  the  Compafs  of  the 
Affair  confidered  as  their  Aft,  their  Principles,  Difpofitions, 
Views  and  Aims  ;  fo  it  was  one  of  the  moft  heinous  Things 
that  ever  was  done ;  in  many  Refpefts  the  moft  horrid  of  all 
Afts :  But  confider  it,  as  it  was  will'd  and  ordered  of  God, 
in  the  Extent  of  his  Defigns  and  Views,  it  was  the  moft  ad- 
mirable and  glorious  of  all  Events ;  and  God's  willing  the 
Event  was  the  moft  holy  Volition  of  God,  that  ever  was  made 
known  to  Men  ;  and  God's  Aft  in  ordering  it,  was  a  divine 
Aft,  which  above  all  others,  manifefts  the  moral  Excellency  of 
the  diviae  Being. 

L  1  The 


i€±  -iif  GOD'S  fecrct  Fart  iV. 

The  Confideration  of  thefe  Things  rmy  help  us  to  a  fufficient 
Anfwer  to  the  Cavils  of  Arm'uiians  concerning  what  has  been 
fuppofed  by  many  Calviiiljh,  of  a  Diftinflion  between  a  fecret 
and  r^x-^^j/f^/  Will  of  Gcd,  and  their  Diverfity  one  from  the 
other ;  fuppofing,  that  the  Cnl-rji?iijls  herein  afcribe  inconfiftent 
Wills  to  the  moft  High  :  Which  is  without  any  Foundation. 
Go^'s/ecret  and  re'ueaLd  Will,,  or  in  other  Words,  his  difpofitig 
and  preceptl-ue  Will  may  be  diverfe,  and  exercifed  in  diflirnilar 
Afts,  the  one  in  difapproving  and  oppofing,^  the  other  in 
willing  and  d-^termining,  without  a»y  Inconfiilence.  Befaufe,' 
altho'  thefe  diffimilar  Exercifes  of  the  divine  Will  may  in 
feme  Refpeds  relate  to  the  fame  Things,  yet  in  Striftnefs  they 
have  different  and  contrary  Objefts,  the  one  Evil  and  the 
other  Good.  Thus  for  Inftance,  the  Chrucifixion  of  Chrift 
v^'as  a  Thing  contrary  to  the  re\'ealed  or  preceptive  Will  of 
God ;  becaufe,  as  it  was  view'd  and  done  by  his  malignant 
Murderers,,  it  was  a  Thing  infinitely  contrary  to  the  holy  Na- 
ture of  God,  and  fo  neceffarily  contrary  to  the  holy  Inclina- 
tion of  his  Heart  revealed  in  his  Law.  Yet  this  don't  at 
ail  hinder  but  that  the  Crucifixion  of  Chrift,  confidered  with 
all  thofe  glorious  Confequences,  which  were  within  the  View 
of  the  divine  Omnifcience,  might  be  indeed,  and  therefore 
might  appear  to  God  to  be,  a  glorious  Event ;  and  confe- 
quently  be  agreeable  to  his  Will,  tho'  this  Will  may  be  fecret, 
/.  e.  not  revealed  in  God's  Law.  And  thus  confidered.  the 
Crucifixion  of  Chrift  was  not  evil,  but  good.  If  the  fecret 
Exercifes  of  God's  Will  were  of  a  Kind  that  is  diffimilar  and 
contrary  t^  his  revealed  Will,,  refpefting  the  fame,  or  like 
Objefts  \  if  the  Objefts  of  both  were  good,  or  both  evil  j 
then  indeed  to  afcribe  contrary  Kinds  of  Volition  or  Inclina- 
tion to  God,  rcfpefting  thefe  Objefts,  would  be  to  afcribe  an 
inconfiftent  Will  to  God  :  Bat  to  afcribe  to  Him  different  and 
oppolite  Exercifes  of  Heart,  refpec^ing  different  Objefts,  and 
Objefts  contrary  one  to  another,  is  fo  far  from  fuppofing  God's 
Will  to  be  inconfefient  with  itfelf,  that  it  can't  be  fuppofed 
conjifiejit  with  itfelf  any  other  Way.  For  any  Being  to  have 
a  Will  of  Choice  refpefting  Good,  and  at  the  fame  Time  a 
Will  of  Rejedion  and  Refufal  refpefling  Evil,  is  to  be  very 
confiftent :  But  the  contrary,  -t'/z.  to  have  the  fame  Will  to- 
wards thefe  contrary  Objefts,  and  to  chufe  atid  love  both  Good 
and  Evil  at  the  fame  Time,  is  to  be  very  inconfiftent. 

There  is  no  Inconfiftence  in  fuppofing,  that  God  may  hate 
7.  Thing  as  it  is  in  itfelf,  and  confidered  fimply  as  EviJ,  and 

yet 


Sect.  IX.  and  revealed  PFill,  ^3 

yet  that  it  may  be  his  Will  it  fliould  come  to  pafs,  con- 
fidering  all  Confequences.  I  believe,  there  is  no  Perfon  of 
o-ood  Underftanding,  who  will  venture  to  fay,  he  is  certain 
that  it  is  impoffible  it  fhould  be  belt,  taking  in  the  whole 
Compafs  and  Extent  of  Exiftence,  and  all  Confequences  in 
the  endlefs  Series  of  Events,  that  there  fhould  be  fuch  a  Thing 
as  ojoral  Evil  in  the  World.  *  And  if  fo,  it  vviil  certainly  fol- 
low, that  an  infinitely  wife  Being,  who  always  chufes  what  is 
beftj    mull  chufe  that  ther^   Ihould  be  fuch  a  Thing.      And  if 

L  1  3  fo, 

*  Here  are  worthy  to  be  obferved  feme  Paflages  «f  a  late  noted 
Writer,  of  our  Nation,  that  no  Body  who  is  acquainted  with  Kira 
will  fufpedt  to  be  very  favourable'  to  Calvinifm.  "  It  is  difficult 
"  (fays  he)  to  handle  the  Nece£ity  of  Evil  in  fuch  a  Manner,  as 
"  not  to  ftumble  fuch  as  are  not  above  being  alarmed  at  Propo- 
■"  fitions  which  have  an  uncommon  Sound.  But  if  Philofophers 
"  will  but  refleft  calnily  on  the  Matter,  they  will  find,  that  confiftently 
*'  with  the  unlimited  Power  of  the  fupreme  Caufe,  it  may  be  faid,  that 
^*  in  the  beft  ordered  Syftem,  Evils  muft  have  Place, "^ Turn- 
hull' i  Principles  of  rnqral  Philofophy.  Page.  337,  328.  He 
is  there  fpeaking  of  moral  Evils,  as  may  be  feen. 

Again,  the  fame  Author,  in  his  feconJ  P^olume entitled,  Chrijlian  Phi' 
hfophy.  Page.  35.  has  thefe  Words :  "  If  the  Author  and  Governor  of 
»'  all  Things  be  infinitely  ferfeEl,  then  whatever  is,  is  right  ;  of  all 
*'  poffible  Syftems  he  hath  chofen  the  beji  :  And  confequently  there  is  no 

**  abfolute  E-vil  in    the  Univerfe . This  being  the  Cafe,    all  the 

*'  feeming  hnferfcBions  or  Evils  in  it  are   fuch  only  in  z  partiul  Wew  ^ 
♦*  and  with  Refpedl  to  the  iphole  Syftem,  they  are  Goods." 

Ibid.  Page.  37.  "  Whence  then  comes  E-vilf  is  the  Queftion  that  hath 
"  in  all  Ages  been  reckon 'd  the  Gordian  Knot  in  Philofophy.  And  in.- 
*'  deed,  if  we  own  the  Exillenqe  of  Evil  in  the  World  in  an  ahfclute 
"  Senfe,  we  diametrically  contradidl  what  hath  been  juft  now  prov'd  of 
**  God.  For  if  there  be  any  Evil  in  the  Syftem,  that  is  not  good  with 
*♦  Refpedt  to  the  Whole,  then  is  the  Whole  not  good,  but  evil ;  or  at  beft, 
•'  very  imperfeft  :  And  an  Author  muft  be  as  his  Workmatrjhip  is  ;  as  is 
«'  the  Etfeft,  fuch  is  the  Caufe.  But  the  Solution  of  this  Difficulty  is 
»'  at  Hand  ;  That  there  is  no  Evil  in  the  Uni-verfe.  What  !  Are  there 
♦'  no  Pains,  no  Imperfcdions  ?  Is  there  no  Mifery,  no  Vice  in  the 
*«  World?  Or  are  not  thefe  ffwVj  ?  Evils  indeed  they  are  ^  that  is,  thofe 
f*  of  one  Sort  are  hurtful,  gnd  thofe  of  the  other  Sort  are  equally  hurtful 
"  and  abominable  :  But  they  are  not  evil  or  mifchievous  with  Refpedl  to 
<*  the  Wholf." 

Ibid.  Pige.  42.  <'  But  He  is  at  the  fame  Time  fajd  to  create  Evil, 
<'  Darknefs,  Confufion  ;  and  yet  to  do  no  Evil,  but  to  be  the  Author  of 
»'  Good  only.  \^e\s  aWe^  ihe  Father  of  Lights,  the  Author  of  e"j<?>-); 
♦  '  perfcSi  and  good  Gift,  ivith  lubom  there  is  no  Variablenef.  nor  Shadoiu 
**  of  Turning,    who  tanpteth  na  M^n-,,    but  givcth  to  all  Men  liberally, 

4ni 


Of  GOD'S  {tcrct  Part  IV, 

fo,  then  fuch  a  Choice  is  not  an  Evil,  but  a  wife  and  holy 
Choice.  And  if  fo,  then  that  Providence  which  is  agreeable 
to  fuch  a  Choice,  is  a  wife  and  holy  Providence.  Men  do  ivill 
Sin  as  Sin,  and  fo  are  the  Authors  and  Adors  of  it :  They 
love  it  as  Sin,  and  for  evil  Ends  and  Purpofes.  God  don't 
will  Sin  as  Sin,  or  for  the  Sake  of  any  Thing  evil ;  tho'  it  be 
his  Pleafure  fo  to  order  Things,  that  He  permitting.  Sin  will 
come  to  pafs ;  for  the  Sake  of  the  great  Good  that  by  his 
Dif^ofal  fhall  be  the  Confequence.  His  willing  to  order 
Things  fo  that  Evil  ftiould  come  to  pafs,  for  the  Sake  of  the 
contrary  Good,  is  no  Argument  that  He  don't  hate  Evil,  as 
Evil :  And  if  fo,  then  it  is  no  Reafon  why  he  mayn't  reafona- 
bly  forbid  Evil  as  Evil,  and  punilh  it  as  fuch. 

The  Arminians  themfelves  muft  be  obliged,  whether  they 
will  or  no,  to  allow  a  Diftinftion  of  God's  Will,  amounting 
to  juft  the  fame  Thing  that  Calvinifis  intend  by  their  Dillinc- 
lion  of  z/ecret  and  re-uealed  Will.  They  muft  allow  a  Diftinc- 
tion  of  thofe  Things  which  God  thinks  beft  Ihould  be,  eonfider- 
ing  all  Circumftances  and  Confequences,  and  fo  are  agreeable 
to  his  difpofmg  Will,  and  thofe  Things  which  he  loves,  and  are 
agreeable  to  his  Nature,  in  themfelves  confidered.  Who  is 
there  that  will  dare  to  fay,  that  the  hellifh  Pride,  Malice  and 
Cruelty  of  Devils,  are  agreeable  to  God,  and  what  He  likes 
and  approves  ?  And  yet,  I  truft,  there  is  no  Chriftian  Divine 
but  what  will  allow,  that  'tis  agreeable  to  God's  Will  fo  to 
order  and  difpofe  Things  concerning  them,  fo  to  leave  them 
to  themfelves,  and  give  them  up  to  their  own  Wickednefs, 
that  this  perfeft  Wickednefs  {hould  be  a  neceffary  Confe- 
quence. Befure  Dr.  Whitby's  Words  do  plainly  fuppofe  and 
allow  it.  j 

Thefe 


"  and  uphra'iSith  not.  And  yet  by  the  Prophet  Jfa'ias  He  is  introduced 
*'  faying  of  Himfelf,  I  form  Light,  and  create  Darknefs  ;  I  make  Peace^ 
*♦  and  create  Evil :  I  the  Lord  do  all  thefe  Things.  What  is  ^he 
**  Meaning,  the  plain  Language  of  all  this,  but  that  the  Lord  de- 
"  lighteth  in  Goodnefs,  and  (as  the  Scripture  fpeaks)  Evil  is  hit 
*'  firange  Work  ?  He  intends  and  parfues  the  univerfal  Good  of  his 
**  Creation  :  and  the  Ewl  which  happens,  is  not  permitted  for  its 
"  own  fake,  or  thro'  any  Pleafure  in  Evil,  but  becaufc  it  is  rec[uiJ^t6 
"  to  the  greater  Good  purfued." 

X  Whitby  on  the  five  Points,  Edit.  3.  P.  300,  305,  309. 


Sed.  IX.  and  revealed  IVill.  265 

Thefe  following  Things  may  be  laid  down  as  Maxims  of 
plain  Truth,  and  indifputable  Evidence. 

1.  That  God  is  zperfeSllj  happy  Being,  in  the  moft  abfolute 
?ind  highsll  Senfe  polfibk. 

2.  That  it  will  follow  from  hence,  that  God  is  free  from 
every  Thing  that  is  co7itrarj  to  Happinefs  ,•  and  fo,  that  in  ftrift 
Propriety  of  Speech,  there  is  no  fugh  Thing  as  any  Pain,  Grief 
or  Trouble  in  God, 

3.  When  any  intelligent  Being  is  really  crofs'd  and  difap- 
pointed,  and  Things  are  contrary  to  what  He  truly  defires.  He 
is  the  lefs  pleajed,  or  has  le/s  Flenjure  ;  his  Pleafiire  and  Happi- 
nefs IS  diminified,  and  he  fuffers  what  is  difagreeable  to  him,  or 
is  the  Subjedt  of  fomething  that  is  of  a  Nature  contrary  to  Joy 
and  Happinefs,  even  Pain  and  Grief.  § 

From  this  laft  Axiom  it  follows,  that  if  no  Diftinftion  is 
to  be  admitted  between  God's  Hatred  of  Sin,  and  his  Will 
with  Refpeft  to  the  Event  and  the  Exiftence  of  Sin,  as  the 
all-wife  Determiner  of  all  Events,  under  the  View  of  all  Con- 
fequences  through  the  whole  Compafs  and  Series  of  Things ; 
I  fay,  then  it  certainly  follows,  that  the  coming  to  pafs  of 
every  individual  Aft  of  Sin  is  truly,  all  Things  confidered, 
contrary  to  his  Will,  and  that  his  W'ill  is  really  crofs'd  in  it  ; 
and  this  in  Proportion  as  He  hates  it.  And  as  God's  Hatred 
of  Sin  is  infinite,  by  Reafon  of  the  infinite  Contrariety  of  his 
holy  Nature  to  Sin  ;  fo  his  Will  is  infinitely  crofs'd,  in  every 
Aft  of  Sin  that  happens.  Which  is  as  much  as  to  fay.  He 
,  endures  that  which  is  infinitely  difagreeable  to  Him,  by  Means 
of  every  Aft  of  Sin  that  He  fees  committed  :  And  therefore, 
as  appears  by  the  preceding  Pofitions,  He  endures  truly  and 
really,  infinite  Grief  or  Pain  from  Every  Sin.  And  fo  He  muft 
be  infinitely  crofs'd,  and  fuffer  infinite  Pain,  every  Day,  in 
Millions  of  Millions  of  Inftances  :  He  muft  continually  be  the 
Subjeft  of  an  immenfe  Number  of  real,  and  truly  infinitely 
great  Croffes  and  Vexations.  Which  would  be  to  make  him 
infinitely  the  moft  miferable  of  all  Beings. 

If 

^  Certainly  'tis  not  lefs  abfurd  and  unreafonabio^  to  talk  of  God's 
Will  and  Defire's  being  truly  and  properly  crofs'd,  without  his  fuffering 
any  Uneafinefs,  or  any  Thing  grievous  or  difagreeable,  than  it  is  t(j 
talk  of  fomething  that  may  be  called  a  revealed  IViU,  which  m-ay  in 
fome  Refpedl  be  different  from  zfecnt  Purpofej  which  Purpofe  may  be 
fulfilled,  when  the  other  is  oppofei. 


-66  Of  GO  JD's  fecret  Part IV. 

If  any  Objcflor  flvould  fay ;  All  that  thefe  Things  amount 
to,  is,  that  God  may  do  Ei'il  that  Good  may  come ;  which 
is  juftly  efteem'd  immoral  and  finful  in  Men ;  and  therefore 
may  be  juftly  efteem'd  inconfiftent  with  the  moral  Perfedions 
of  God.  I  anfwer.  That  for  God  to  difpofe  and  peripit  Evil, 
in  the  Manner  that  has  been  fpoken  of,  is  not  to  do  Evil  that 

Good  may  come ;  for  it  is  not  to  do  Evil  at  all. In  Order 

to  a  Thing's  being  morally  Evil,  there  muft  be  one  of  thefe 
Things  belonging  to  it :  Either  it  muft  be  a  Thing  unfit  and 
unfuitahle  in  its  own  Nature  ;  or  it  muft  have  a  bad  "^Fendency  ; 
or  it  muft  proceed  from  an  e'vil  Difpofition,  and  be  done  for  au 
evil  End.  But  neither  of  thefe  I'hings  can  be  attributed  tq 
God's  ordering  and  permitting  fuch  Events,  as  the  immoral 
Afts  of  Creatures,  for  good  Ends,  (i.)  It  \s  not  ztnfit  in  its 
onun  Nature,  that  He  Ihould  do  fo.  For  it  is  in  its  own  Nature 
fit,  that  infinite  Wijdom,  and  not  blind  Chance,  Inould  difpofe 
moral  Good  and  Evil  in  the  World,  And  'tis  fit,  that  the 
Being  who  has  infinite  Wijdom,  and  is  the  Maker,  Owner,  and 
fupreme  Governor  of  the  Woxld,  ft;ould  take  Care  of  that 
Matter.  And  therefore  there  is  no  Unfitnefs,  or  Unfuitablenefs 
in  his  doing  it.  It  may  be  unfit,  and  fo  immoral,  for  any 
other  Beings  to  go  about  to  order  this  Affair ;  becaufe  they 
are  not  pofTefs'd  of  a  Wifdom,  that  in  any  Manner  fits  them 
for  it ;  and  in  other  Refpefts  they  are  not  fit  to  be  trufted  with 
this  Affair ;  nor  does  it  belong  to  them,  they  not  being  the 
Owners  and  Lords  of  the  Univerfe, 

We  need  not  be  afraid  to  Affirm,  that  if  a  wife  and  good 
Man  knew  with  gbfolute  Certainty,  it  would  be  beft,  2\\ 
Things  confidered,  that  there  Ihould  be  fuch  a  Thing  as  mora^ 
Evil  in  the  World,  it  would  not  be  contrary  to  his  Wifdom 
and  Goodne/s,  for  him  to  chufe  that  it  Ihould  be  fo.  'Tis  no  * 
evil  Defire,  to  defire  Good,  and  todefire  that  which,  all  Things 
confidered,  is  beft.  And  it  is  no  unwife  Choice,  to  chufe  that 
That  fhould  be,  which  it  is  beft  fhould  be ;  and  to  chufe  the 
Exiftence  of  that  Thing  concerning  which  this  is  known,  njiz, 
that  it  is  beft  it  fhould  be,  and  fo  is  known  in  the  Whole 
to  be  moft  worthy  to  be  chofen.  On  the  contrary,  it  would 
be  a  plain  Defed  in  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  for  him  not  to 
chufe  it.  And  the  Reafon  why  he  might  not  order  it,  if  he 
were  able,  would  not  be  becaufe  he  might  not  defire  it,  but  only 
the  ordering  of  that  Matter  don't  belong  to  him.  But  it 
is  no  Harm  for  Him  who  is  by  Right,  and  m  the  greateft  Pro- 
priety, the  fupreme  Orderer  of  all  Things,  to  order  every 
*  Thine 


Sec^.  1%.  And  revealed  PVill  26) 

Thing  in  fuch  a  Manner,  as  it  would  be  a  Point  of  Wifdom  in 
Him  to  chufe  that  they  fhould  be  ordered.  If  it  would  be  a 
plain  Defeft  of  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  in  a  Being,  not  to  chufe 
that  That  fhould  be,  which  He  certainly  knows  it  would,  all 
Things  confidered,  be  beft  fhould  be,  (as  was  but  now  ob- 
ferved)  then  it  mnft  be  impoffible  for  a  Being  who  has  no 
Defed  of  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  to  do  otherwife  than  chufe 
it  fhould  be ;  and  that,  for  this  very  Reafon,  becaufe  He 
is  perfeftly  wife  and  good.  And  if  it  be  agreeable  to  perfeft 
Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  for  him  to  chufe  that  it  fhould  be, 
and  the  ordering  of  all  Things  fupremely  and  perfedily  belongs 
to  him,  it  muft  be  agreeable  to  infinite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs, 
to  order  that  it  fliould  be.  If  the  Choice  is  good,  the  order- 
ing and  difpofing  Things  according  to  that  Choice  muft  alfo 
be  good.  It  cdn  be  no  Harm  in  one  to  whom  it  belongs  /o  /* 
his  fVill  in  the  Armies  of  Heaaieti,  and  among fi  the  Inhabitants  of 
the  Earth,  to  execute  a  good  Volition.  If  his  Will  be  good, 
and  the  Objeft  of  his  Will  be,  all  Things  confidered,  good 
and  beft,  then  the  chufing  or  willing  it  is  not  njuilling  E'vil  that 
Good  may  come.  And  if  fo,  then  his  ordering  according  to 
that  Will  is  not  doing  Evil,  that  Good  may  come. 

2.  'Tis  not  of  a  bad  Tendency,  for  the  fupreme  Being  thus  to 
order  and  permit  that  moral  Evil  to  be^  which  it  is  beft  fhould 
come  to  pafs.    -  For  that  it  is  of  good  Tendency,    is  the  very 

Thing  fuppofed  in  the  Point  now  in  Queftion.- Chrift's 

Crucifixion,  tho'  a  moft  horrid  Faft  in  them  that  perpetrated 
it,  was  of  moft-  glorious  Tendency  as  permitted  and  ordered  of 
God. 

3.  Nor  is  there  any  Need  of  fuppofing,  it  proceeds  from  any 
evil  Difpofttion  or  Aim  :  For  by  the  Suppofition,  what  is  aim'd 
at  is  Good,  and  Good  is  the  aftual  lilue,  in  the  final  Refult  of 

Thines. 


^0<0<»00«0<»0<D'k©-^kS><>0'>09<Sh»o<»<2>'>0'>0'^ 


Sec  Tioi!f 


^ht  Q/::^^^s  firfl  Entrance  Part  IV; 


Sec  t  I  ON     X. 

Concerning  Sin's    firfl   Entrance    into   the   JVorld. 

THE  Things  which  have  alreaidy-- been ••  offered;  rtiay 
ferve  to  obviate  or  clear  lijarty  of"  the  Objeftions  which 
might  be  raifed  eoncerning  Sin's  firit  coming  into  the  World  ; 
as  tho'  it  would  follow  irom  the  Doftrine  maintain'd,  that 
God  muft  be  the  Author  of  the  firft  Sin,  thro'  his  fo  difpofing 
Things,  that  it  fhould  necefTarily  follow  from  his  Permiffi'on, 
that  }the  finful  Adl  ftioald  be  committed,  &c,  I  need  not 
therefore  (tand  to  repeat  what  has  been  faid  already,  about  fuch 
a  Neceffity's  not  proving  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Sin,  in 
any  ill  Senfe,  or  in  any  i'uch  Senfe  as  to  infringe  any  Liberty  of 
Man,  concerned  in  his  moral  Agency,  or  Capacity  of  Blame, 
Guilt  and  Puniihment. 

But  if  it  (hould  nevertbelefs  be  faid,  SuppofiAg  the  Cafe  (o, 
that  God,  when  he  had  made  Man,  might  fo  order  his  Cir- 
eumftancesj  that  from  thefe  Circumftances,  together  with  his 
withholding  further  Affiftance  and  divine  Influence,  his  Sin 
would  infallibly  follow.  Why  might  not  God  as  well  have  firft 
made  Man  with  a  fixed  prevailing  Principle  of  Sin  in  his  Heart  ? 

I  anfwer,  i.  It  was  meet,  if  Sin  did  cortie  irlto  Exiftence, 
and  appear  in  tlie  World,  it  fhould  arife  from  the  Imperfeftion 
which  properly  belongs  to  a  Creature,  as  fuch,  and  (hould  ap- 
pear fo  to  do,  that  it  might  appear  not  to  be  from  God  as 
the  Efficient  or  Fountain.  But  this  could  not  have  been,  if 
Man  had  been  made  at  firft  with  Sin  in  his  Heart ;  nor  nnlefs 
the  abiding  Principle  and  Habit  of  Sin  were  firft  introduced 
by  art  Evil  Aft  of  the  Creature.  If  Sin  had  not  arofe  from  the 
Imperfeftion  of  the  Creature,  it  would  not  have  been  fo  vifible, 
that  it  did  not  arife  from  God,  as  the  pofitive  Caufe,  and  real 

Source  of  iv But  it  would  require  Room  that  can't  be  here  ■ 

allowed,  fully  to  confider  all  the  Difficulties  which  have 
been  flatted,  concerning  the  firft  Entrance  of  Sin  into  the 
World. 

Arid 


Sed.  X.  into  the  World,  269 

And  therefore, 
2.  I  would  obferve,  that  Objeftions  againft  the  Doftrine 
t^at  has  been  laid  do\vn,  in  Oppofition  to  the  Armin'tan  Notion 
of  Liberty,  from  thefe  Dimcuities,  are  altogether  impertinent ; 
becaufe  no  additional  DiScu'lty  is  incurred^  by  adhering  to  a 
Scheme  in  this  Manner  difterent  from  theirs,  and  none  would 
be  removed  or  avoided,  by  agreeing  with,  and  maintaining 
theirs.  Nothing  that  the  Arminians  fay,  about  the  Contingence, 
or  felf-determining  Power  of  Man's  Will,  can  ferve  to  explain 
with  lefs  Difficulty ,  how  the  firll  finful  Volition  of  Mankind  could 
Jake  Place,  and  Man  be  juftly  charged  with  the  Blame  of  it. 
To  fay,  the  Will  was  felf-determined,  or  determined  by  free 
Choice,  in  that  finful  Volition  ;  which  is  to  fay,  that  the  firft: 
fmful  Volition  was  determined  by  a  foregoing  finful  Volition ;  is 
no  Solution  of  the  Difficulty.  It  is  an  odd  Way  of  folving 
Difficulties,  to  advance  greater,  in  order  to  it.  To  fay.  Two 
and  Two  makes  Nine;  or,  that  a  Child  begat  his  Father, 
folves  no  Difficulty  :  No  more  does  it,  to  fay.  The  firft  finful 
Ad  of  Choice  was  before  the  firft  finful  Act  of  Choice,  and 
chofe  and  determined  it,  and  brought  it  to  pafs.  Nor  is  it  any- 
better  Solution,  to  fay.  The  firlHinful  Volition  chofe,  determined 
and  produced  itfelf;  which  is  to  fay.  It  was  before  it  was. 
Nor  will  it  go  any  further  towards  helping  us  over  the  Diffi- 
culty, to  fay.  The  firft  finful  Volition  arofe  accidentally, 
without  any  Caufe  at  all  ;  any  more  than  it  will  folve  that 
difficult  Queftlon,  Hon.v  the  World  coiAd  be  made  cut  of  Nothing  ? 
to  fay.  It  came  into  Being  out  of  Nothing,  without  any 
Caufe  ;  as  has  been  already  obferved.  And  if  we  Ihould  allow- 
that  That  could  be,  that  the  firft  evil  Voli|ion  fhould  arife  by 
perfeft  Accident,  without  any  Caufe,  it  would  relieve  no  Diffi- 
culty, about  God's  laying  the  Blame  of  it  to  Man.  For  how 
was  Man  to  Blame  for  perfetl  Accident,  which  had  no  Caufe, 
and  which  therefore,  he  (to  be  fure)  was  not  the  Caufe  of,  any 
more  than  if  it  came  by  fome  external  Caufe  ? — Such  Kind  of 
Solutions  are  no  better,  than  if  fome  Perfon,  going  about  to 
folve  fome  of  the  ftrange  matiiematical  Paradoxes,  about  infi- 
nitely great  and  fmall  Quantities  ;  as,  that  fome  infinitely  great 
Quantities  are  infinitely  greater  than  fome  other  infinitely 
great  Quautities;  and  alfo  that  fome  infinitely  fmall  Quantities 
are  infinitely  lefs  than  others,  which  yet  are  infinitely  little ; 
in  order  to  a  Solution,  (hould  fay.  That  Mankind  have  been 
under  a  Miftake,  in  fuppofing  a  greater  Quantity  to  exceed  a 
fmaller ;  and  that  a  Hundred  multiplied  by  Ten,  makes  but 
a  fingle  Unit. 

M  m  Sectiok 


T]o  Of  the  Objedlion  Fart  IV'.- 

•S>aoos300oa«of  0331  oMcoooroccc  3000  Gococoso<S;«30oc<aoacaoocacccgceo3ooBaoeosoocoooeaooo'S*' 

Section     XI. 

Of  a  fuppofed  Inmififience  of  ihefe  Principles  with 
G  0  £)'s  moral  Charader. 

TH  E  Things  winch  have  hztn  already  obferved,  may  be' 
fufficient  to  anfwer  inoft  of  the  Objedions,  and  filence 
the  great  Exclamations  of  Arminians  againft  the  Cahinijisy 
from  the  fuppofed  Inconfiilence  of  Cfi/T.7A7/?/i:  Principles  with 
the  mural  Perfeftions  of  God,  as  exercifed  in  his  Government 
of  Mankiad.  The  Confillence  of  fuch  a  Doftrine  of  Neceility 
as  has  been  maintained,  with  the  Fitnefs  and'Rt'afonablenefs- 
of  God's  Commands,  Promifes  and  Threatenings,  Rewards 
and  Punifliments,  has  been  particularly  conlidered  :  The  Cavils 
of  our  Opponents,  as  tho'  our  Dodrine  of  Neceffity  made 
God  the  Author  of  Sin,  have  been  anfwered  ;  and  alfo  their 
Objedion  againft  thefe  Principles,  as  inconiiftent  with  God's 
Sincerity,  in  his  Counfels,  Invitations  and  Perfuafions,  has 
bpen  alrcc^dy  obviated,  in  what  has  been  obferved,  refpefting 
the  Confidence  of  what  CrJvinlJis  fuppofe  concerning  the  fecret 
and  revealed  Will  of  God:  By  that  it  appears,  there  is  no 
Repugnance  in  fuppofing  it  may  be  the  fecret  Will  of  God, 
that  his  Ordination  and  Permiffion  of  Events  {hould  be  fuch 
that  it  fhall  be  a  certain  Confequence,  that  a  Thing  never  will 
come  to  pafs  :  which  yet  it  is  Man's  Duty  to  do,  and  fo  God's 
preceptive  Wiil,  that  he  fhould  do ;  and  this  is  the  fame 
Thing  as  to  fay,  God  may  fincerely  command  and  require  him 
to  do  it.  And  if  he  may  be  fmcere  in  commanding  him,  he 
may  for  the  fame  Reafon  be  fmcere  in  counfelling,  inviting; 
and  ufmg  Perfuations  with  him  to  do  it.  Counfels  and  Invi- 
tations are  Manifeftations  of  God's  preceptive  Will,  or  of  what 
God  loves,  and  what  is  in  itfelf,  and  as  Man's  Aft,  agreeable  to 
his  Heart ;  and  not  of  his  difpofing  Will,  and  what  he  chufes 
as  a  Part  of  his  own  infinite  Scheme  of  Things.  It  has  been- 
particularly  fnewn.  Part  III.  Sedion  IV.  that  fuch  a  Neceffity 
as  has,  been  maintained,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  the  Propriety 
and  Fitnefs  of  divine  Commands ;  and  for  the  fame  Reafon, 
not  inconfiftent  with  the  Sincerity  of  Invitations  and  Counfels, 
in  the  Corollary  at  the  End  of  that  Sedion.  Yea,  it  hath  been 
ihcwiv  Par:  III.  Sed,  7.  Ccrol,  i,  that  this  Objedion  oi  Ar^ 

viiniatUy 


Seel.  XI.       from  God's  moral  Chara(5ler.        27$ 

mitiiansy  concerning  the  Sincerity  and  Ufe  of  divine  Exhortati- 
ons, Invitations  and  Coiinfels,  is  demonftrably  againft  them- 
felves. 

Notwithftanding,  I  would  further  obferve,  that  the  Diffi- 
culty of  reconciling  the  Sincerity  of  Counfels,  Invitations  and 
Perfuafions,  with  fuch  an  antecedent  known  Fixednefs  of 
f;ll  Events,  as  has  been  fuppofed,  is  not  peculiar  to  this  Scheme^ 
as  diitinguilhed  from  that  of  the  Generality  g{  Arjuhiians^ 
v/hich  acknowledge  the  abfointe  Foreknowledge  of  God  :  And 
therefore,  it  would  be  unreafanably  brought  as  an  Objection  a- 
gainft  my  differing  from  them.  Tlie  main  ieeming  DiiHculty  in 
the  Cafe  is  this  :  That  God  in  counfelling,  inviting  and  per- 
fuading,  makes  a  Shew  of  aiming  at,  feeking  and  ufing  En- 
deavours for  the  Thing  exhorted  and  perfuaded  to;  whereas, 
^tis  impoffible  for  any  intelligent  Being  truly  to  feek,  or  ufe  En- 
deavours for  a  Thing,  which  he  at  the  fame  Time  know:,  mofl: 
perfetftly  will  not  come  to  pafs;  and  that  it  is  abfurd  to  fup- 
pofe,  he  makes  the  obtaining  of  a  Thing  his  End,  in  his 
Calls  and  Counfels,  which  he  at  the  fame  Time  infallibly 
knows  will  not  be  obtain'd  by  thefe  Means.  Now,  if  God 
knows  this,  in  the  utmoft  Certainty  and  Perfection,  the  Way 
by  which  he  comes  by  this  Knowledge  makes  no  Difference, 
If  he  knows  it  by  the  Neceffity  which  he  fees  in  Things,  or 
by  fome  other  Means ;  it  alters  not  the  Cafe.  But  it  is  in 
EiFed  allowed  by  Arminians  themfelves,  that  God's  inviting 
and  perfuading  Men  to  do  Things,  which  he  at  the  fame  Time 
certainly  knows  will  not  be  done,  is  no  Evidence  of  Infincerity  ; 
becaufe  they  allow,  that  God  has  a  certain  Foreknowledge  of 
all  Men's  finful  Aftions  and  Omiflions.  And  as  this  is  thus 
implicitly  allowed  by  moft  Arm'aiians,  fo  ail  that  pretend  to 
own  the  Scriptures  to  be  the  Word  of  God,  muft  be  conftrained 

to  allow  it. God  commanded  and  counfel'd  Pharaoh  to  let 

his  People  go,  and  ufed  Arguments  and  Pcrfuafions  to  induce 
him  to  it;  he  laid  before  him  Arguments  taken  from  his  infi- 
nite Greatnefs  and  almighty  Power,  [Exod.  vii.  i6.)  and  fore- 
warned him  of  the  fatal  Confequences  of  his  Refufal,  from 
Time  to  Time  ;  [Chap.  viii.  i,  2,  20,  21.  Chap.  ix.  i— 7-5. 
13 — 17.  and  X.  3,  6.)  He  commanded  Afo,/?!,  and  tiie  Elders 
of  Ifrael,  to  go  and  befeech  Pharaoh  to  let  the  People  go  ;  and 
at  the  fame  Time  told  them,  he  knew  furely  that  he  would  not 
comply  to  it.  Exod.  iii.  1  8,  19.  And thnujhalt come,  thou a7id the 
Rulers  of  Ifrael ,  utito  the  King  of  Egypt,  andyoujhallfay  unto  him  ; 
^he  Lord  God  of  the}l^hvtv^?,  hathmetn.vithus^  andnoivletusgo., 
M  HI   2  fWC 


272  OfOhjeciionfromGod'^vaordX  Gharadler.  P.IV; 

rwe  befeech  thee,  three  Days  'Journey  into  the  V/ildernefsy  that  <xve  ?/wy 
Sacrifice  unto  the  Lord  our  God :  And,  I  atn/ure  that  the  King  of 
Egypt  nxjill  not  let  you  go.  So  our  bleffed  baviour,  the  Evening 
wheiein  he  was  betrayed,  knew  that  Peter  would  Ihaiucioliy 
deny  him,  before  the  Morning ;  for  he  declares  it  to  him  witii 
Alfeverations,  to  Ihew  the  Certainty  of  it ;  and  tells  the  Difci- 
ples,  that  all  of  them  fhould  be  offended  becaufe  of  Lira  that 
Night;  Matt. xxvi.  3 1 , — 55.  Jok.  xiii.  38.  Luk.  xxii.  3 1 , — 34. 
Joh.  xvi.  32.  And  yet  it  was  their  Duty  to  avoid  lliefe  I'hmgs ; 
they  were  very  finful  Things,  which  God  had  forbidden,  and 
whicji  it  was  their  Duty  to  watch  and  pray  againlt ;  and  they, 
were  obliged  to  do  fo  from  the  Counfels  and  i'erjuajions  Chrilt 
ufed  with  them,  at  that  very  Time,  io  to  do  j  Matt.  xxvi.  41. 
TVatch  and  pray,  that  ye  enter  not  into  Temptation.  So  that  what- 
ever Difficulty  there  can  be  in  this  Matter,  it  can  be  no  Objec- 
tion againit  any  Principles  which  have  been  maintained  inOppo- 
iition  to  the  Principles  oi  Arminians  ,•  nor  does  it  any  more  con- 
cern me  to  remove  the  Difficulty,  than  it  does  them,  or  indeed 
all  that  call  themfelves  Chriitians,  and  acknowledge  the  divine 

Authority  of  the  Scriptures Neverthelefs,  this  Matter  may 

pollibly  (God  allowing)  be  more  particularly  and  largely  con- 
iidered,  in  fome  future  Difcourfe,  on  the  Doftrine  ot  Predejii- 
Jiation. 

But  I  would  here  obferve,  that  however  the  Defenders  of 
that  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will,  which  I  have  oppofed,  exclaim 
againft  theDoftrine  of  Calvinijis,  as  tending  to  bring  Men  into 
j5oubts,  concerning  the  moral  Perfeftions  of  God ;  it  is  their 
Scheme,  and  not  the  bcheme  of  Calvinijis,  that  indeed  is  juitly 
chargeable  with  this.  For  'tis  one  ot  the  moft  fundamental 
Points  of  their  Scheme  of  Things,  that  a  Freedom  of  Will, 
confining  in  felf-determination,  without  all  Neceffity,  is  effen- 
tial  to  Mural  Agency,  I'his  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  that 
fuch  a  Determination  of  the  Will  without  all  Neceffity,  mufi; 
be  in  all  intelligent  Beings,  in  thofe  Things,  wherein  they  are 
moral  Agents,  or  in  their  moral  Ads :  And  from  this  it  will  fol- 
low, that  God's  Will  is  not  neceffarily  determined,  in  any 
Thing  he  does,  as  a  rnoral  Agent,  or  in  any  of  his  AEs  that  are 
of  a  moral  Nature.  So  that  in  all  Things,  wherein  he  afts 
holily,  jufily  and  truly,  he  don't  aft  necefiarily ;  or  his  Will  is 
rot  neceffarily  determined  to  aft  holily  and  juftly  ;  becaufe  if 
it  were  necefiarily  determined,  he  would  not  be  a  moral  Agent 
in  thus  afting  :  fiis  Will  would  be  attended  with  Neceflity  ; 
which  they  fay  is  inconfiftent  with  moral  Agency  :  *•  He  can  aft 

**  no. 


Secft.XI.  Of  \ni\\n.  Arguments  from  ^cn^VdYQ.  273 

"  no  otherwife ;  He  is  at  no  Liberty  in  the  Afiair  ;  He  is 
"  determined  by  unavoidable  invincible  Neceffity  :  Therefore 
"  fuch  Agency  is  no  moral  Agency  ;  yea,  no  Agency  at  all, 
"  properly  fpeaking :  A  neceli'ary  Agent  is  no  Agent :  He 
*'  being  paiiive,  ana  fabjeft  to  Necefiicy,  what  hC'  does  is  no 
*♦  Aft  of  his,  but  an  Effeft  of  a  Neceliity  prior  to  any  Ad  of 
••  his."  Tfiis  is  agreeable  to  their  Manner  of  arguing.  Now 
then,  what  is  become  of  all  our  Proof  of  the  moral  Ferfec'iions 
of  God?  How  can  we  prove,  that  God  certainly  will  in  any- 
one Inftance  do  that  which  is  juft  and  holy  ;  feeing  his  Will  is 
determin'd  in  the  Matter  by  no  Neceffity  ?  We  have  no  other 
Way  of  proving  that  any  Thing  certahdj  will  be,  but  only  by 
the  Neceffity  ot  the  Event.  Where  we  can  fee  no  Neceffity^ 
but  that  the  Thing  may  be,  or  may  not  be,  there  we  are  un- 
avoidably left  at  a  Lofs.  We  have  no  other  Way  properly 
and  truly  to  demonftrate  the  moral  Perfedions  of  God,  but 
the  Way  that  Mr.  C'/6«^(^  proves  them,  in  P.  252,  261,  262, 
263.  ofhislVads,  'viz.  Vhat  God  muft  neceli'arily  perfectly 
know  what  is  moil  wortliy  and  valuable  in  itfelt,  which  in  the 
Nature  of  Things  is  bed:  and  fitteft  to  be  done.  And  as  this 
is  mod  eligible  in  itfelf.  He  being  omnifcient,  mull  fee  it  to 
be  fo ;  and  being  both  omnifcient  and  felf-lufficient,  cannot 
have  any  T  emptation  to  rejcd  it ;  and  fo  muft  neceOarily  will 
that  which  is  belt.  And  thus,  by  this  Neceffity  of  the  De- 
termination of  God's  Will  to  what  is  good  and  belt,  we  de- 
ijionftrably  eftablifli  God's  nioi;al  Charafter. 

Carol.  From  Things  which  have  been  obferved,  it  appears, 
that  moft  of  the  Arguments  from  Scripture,  which  Arminians 
make  ufe  of  to  fiipport  their  Scheme,  are  no  other  than  begging 
the  ^lefiion.  For  in  thefe  their  Arguments  they  determine  in 
the  firlt  Place,  that  without  fuch  a  Freedom  of  Will  as 
they  hold.  Men  can't  be  proper  moral  Agents,  nor  the  Sub- 
jeds  of  Command,  Counfel,  Perfuafion,  Invitation,  Promifes, 
Threatenings,  Expoftulations,  Rewards  and  Punilhments ;  and 
that  without  fuch  a  Freedom  'tis  to  no  Purpofe  for  Men  to 
take  any  Care,  or  ufe  any  Diligence,  Endeavours  or  Means,  in 
order  to  their  avoiding  Sin,  or  becoming  holy, efcaping  Punifh- 
ment  or  obtaining  Happinefs  :  And  having  fuppofed  thefe 
Things,  which  are  grand  Things  in  Queftion  in  the  Debate, 
then  they  heap  up  Scriptures  containing  Commands,  Counfels, 
Calls,  Warnings,  Perfuafions,  Expoltulations,  Promifes  and 
Threatenings;  (as  doubtlefs  they  may  find  enough  fuch;  the 
Pible  is  confeffedly  full  of  them,  from  the  Beginning  to  the 

»  End) 


s.j^  Whether  theje  Principles  Part  IV^ 

^nd)  and  then  they  glory,  how  full  the  Scripture  is  on  their 
Side,  how  many  more  Texts  there  are  that  evidejitly  favour 
their  Scheme,  than  fuch  as  feem  to  favour  the  contrary.  But  let 
them  firft  make  manifeft  the  Things  in  Queftion,  which  they 
Aippofe  and  take  for  granted,  and  (hew  them  to  be  confiflent 
with  themfelves,  and  produce  clear  Evidence  of  their  Truth  ; 
and  they  have  gain'd  their  Point,  as  all  will  confiefs,  without 
bringing  one  Scripture.  For  none  denies,  that  there  are  Com- 
mands, Counfels,  Promifes,  Threatenings,  &c.  in  the  Bible. 
But  unlefs  they  do  thefe  Things,  their  multiplying  fuch  Texts 
of  Scripture  is  infignificant  and  vain. 

It  may  further  be  obferved,  that  fuch  Scriptures  as  they 
bring,  are  really  againft  them,  and  not  for  them.  As  it  has  been 
demonftrated,  that  'tis  their  Scheme,  and  not  ours,  that  is  in- 
confiftent  with  the  Ufa  of  Motives  and  Perfuafives,  or  any 
moral  Means  whatfoever,  to  iiiduce  Men  to  the  Praftice  of 
Virtue,  or  abftaining  from  Wickednefs :  Their  Principles,  and 
not  ours,  are  repugnant  to  moral  Agency,  and  inconfiftent  with 
moral  Government,  with  Law  or  Precept,  with  the  Nature  of 
Virtue  or  Vice,  Reward  or  Punilhment,  and  with  every 
Thing  whatfoever  of  a  moral  'Nature,  either  on  the  Part  of 
the  moral  Governor,  or  in  the  State,  Aftions  or  Cpnduft  of 
the  Subjedt. 


^asocooooss9oMOogocoaooooo9oaoooao<x>aeoo.&»i90CQPOooeoo«oocowcooocMOo«ooecoceoooo«ai> 

Section     XII. 

Of  a  fuppofed  Tendency  of   thefe  Principles  i% 
Atheifm  and  Licentioufnefs. 

IF  any  objeft  againft  what  has  been  maintain'd,  that  it 
tends  to  Atheijm  ;  I  know  not  on  what  Grounds  fuch  an 
Objeftion  can  be  raifed,  unlefs  it  be  that  fome  Atheifts 
have  held  a  DoArine  of  Necefllty  which  they  fuppofe  to  be  like 
this.  But  if  it  be  fo,  I  am  perfuaded  the  Arminians  would  riot 
look  upon  it  juft,  that  their  Notion  of  Freedom  ajid  Contin- 
gence  fhould  be  charged  with  a  Tendency  to  all  the  Errors 
that  ever  any  embraced,  who  have  held  fuch  Opinions.    The 

Stoick 


Sedl.  XII.  f ehd  fo  AtheiCm.  ij^ 

Stoick  Philofophers,  whom  the  Calvmijis  are  charged  with  agree- 
ing with,  were  no  Atheifts,  but  the  greateft  Theiits,  and  near- 
eft  a-kin  to  Chriftians  in  their  Opinions  concerning  the  Unity 
and  the  Perfedions  of  the  Godhead,  of  all  the  Heathen  Philo- 
fophers.  And  Epicurus,  that  chief  Father  of  Atheifm,  maia- 
tain'd  no  fuch  Dodrine  of  Neceffity,  but  was  the  greateft- 
Maintainer  of  Contingence. 

The  Doftrine  of  Neceffity,  which  fuppofes  a  neceflary  Con- 
nexion of  all  Events,  on  fame  antecedent  Ground  and  Reafon 
of  their  Exiftence,  is  the  only  Medium  we  have  to  prove  the 
Being  of  God.  And  the  contrary  Doftrine  of  Contingence, 
even  as  maintain'd  by  Arminians,  (which  certainly  implies  or 
infers,  that  Events  may  come  into  Exiftence,  or  begin  to  be, 
without  Dependence  on  any  Thing  foregoing,  as  their  Caufe,- 
Ground  or  Reafon)  takes  away  all  Proof  of  the  Being  of  God  ; 
which  Proof  is  fummarily  exprefs'd  by  the  Apoftle,  \wRom.  i.  20. 
And  this  is  a  Tendency  to  Atheifm  with  a  Witnefs.  So  that  in- 
deed it  is  the  Dottrine  of  Arminians,  and  not  of  the  Cal'vinfis, 
that  is  juftly  charged  with  a  Tendency  io  Atheifm ;  it  being, 
built  on  a  Foundation  that  is  the  utter  Subverfion  of  every  de- 
monftrative  Argument  for  the  Proof  of  a  Deity  ;  as  has  been 
fhovvn.  Part  II.  Sed.  3d. 

And  whereas  it  has  often  been  faid,  that  the  Cal-vitiifiic  Doc 
trine  of  Neceffity,  faps  the  Foundations  of  all  Pvcligion  and 
Virtue,  and  tends  to  the  greateft  Licentioufnefs  of  Praftice ; 
This  Objection  is  built  on  the  Pretence,  that  our  Dodtrine  ren- 
ders vain  all  Means  and  Endeavours,  in  order  to  be  virtuous 
and  religious.  Which  Pretence  has  been  already  particularly 
confidercd  in  the  ;th  6'd'<f?/(:/«  of  this  P«r/ ,-  where  it  has  been- 
demonftrated,  that  this  Doftrine  has  no  fuch  Tendency  ;  but 
that  fuch  a  Tendency  is  truly  to  be  charged  on  the  contrary 
Doftrine :  Inafmuch  as  the  Notion  of  Contingence,  v/hicli 
their  Doftrlne  implies,  in  its  certain  Confequences,  overthrows 
all  Conneftion,  in  every  Degree,  between  Endeavour  and 
Event,  Means  and  End. 

And  befides,  if  many  other  Things  which  have  been  ob- 
ferved  to  belong  to  the  Arminian  Dodrine,  or  to  be  plain  ConT- 
fequences  of  it,  be  confidered,  there  will  appear  juft  Reafon 
to  fuppofe  that  it  is  that,  which  muft  rather  tend  to  Licenti- 
oufnefs. Their  Dodrine  excufes  all  evil  Inclinations,  which 
Men  find  to  be   natural  y  becaufe  in  Aich  Inchnations,   they 


276  Wheiher  theje  Principles  Part  IV* 

are  not  felf-determined,  as  fuch  Inclinations  are  not  owing  to 
any  Choice  or  Determination  of  their  own  Wills.  Which  leads 
Mea  wholly  to  jiiilify  thfemfelves  in  all  their  wicked  Adions, 
ib  far  as  natural  Inclination  lias  had  a  Hand  in  determining  their 
"Wills,  to  the  CdmmiiTion  of  them.  Yea,  thefe  Notions  which 
Juppofe  moral  Neceffity  and  Inability  to  be  inconlilleiit  with 
Blame  or  moral  Obligation,  will  direftly  lead  Men  to  juftify 
the  vileft  Ads  and  Practices,  from  the  Strength  of  their  wicked 
Inclinations  of  all  Sorts ;  llrong  Inclinations  inducing  a  moral 
Neceffity  ;  yea,  to  excufe  every  Derree  of  evil  Inclinations,  fo 
i'iir  as  this  has  evidently  prevailed,  and  been  the  Thing  which 
has  determined  their  Wills :  Becaufe,  fo  far  as  anteced'cnc 
Inclination  determined  the  Will,  fo  far  the  Will  was  without 
Liberty  of  IndifFerencfe  and  Self-determination.  Which  at  lall 
v/ill  come  to  this,  that  Men  will  juiiify  themfelves  in  all  the 
Wickednefs  they  commit.  It  has  been  obferved  already,  that 
this  Scheme  of  Things  does  exceedingly  diminifh  the  Guilt  of 
Sin,  and  the  DilFerence  between  the  greateft  and  fmalleft  Of- 
fences :  *  And  if  it  be  purfued  in  its  real  Confequences,  it 
leaves  F-oom  for  no  fuch  Thing,  as  either  Virtue  or  Vice, 
Blame  or  Praife  in  the  World.  §  And  then  againi  how  natu- 
rally does  this  Notion  of  the  fovereign  felf-determinihg  Power 
of  the  Will,  in  all  Things,  virtuous  or  vicious,  and  whatfocver 
deferves  either  Reward  or  Punifhment,  tend  to  encourage  Meii 
to  put  off  the  Work  of  Religion  and  Virtue,  and  turning  from 
Sin  to  God  ;  it  being  that  which  they  have  a  fovereign  Power 
to  determine  themfelves  to,  jull  when  they  pleafe;  or  if  not, 
they  are  wholly  excufeable  in  going  on  in  Sin,  becaufe  of  their 
Inability  to  do  any  other. 

If  it  fhould  be  faid,  that  the  Tendency  of  this  Dodrine  of 
Neceflity,  to  Licentioufnefs,  appears  by  the  Improvement  many 
at  this  Day  adually  make  of  it,  to  juftify  themfelves  in  their 
diffolute  Courfes ;  I  will  not  deny  that  fome  Men  do  unrea- 
fonably  abufe  this  Dodrine,  as  they  do  many  other  Things 
which  are  true  and  excellent  in  their  own  Nature  :  But  I  deny 
that  this  proves,  the  Dodrine  itfelf  has  any  Tendency  to 
Licentioufnefs.  I  think,  the  Tendency  of  Dodrines,  by  what 
now  appears  in  the  World,  and  in  our  Nation  in  particular, 
may  much  more  juftly  be  argued  from  the  general  Effed  which 

has 

*  Part  III.   Sea.   6. 

\  Part  III.  Seft.  6.      Ibid.   Seft.  7.      Part  IV,  Seft.  \.      PartlH. 
Sed.  3.  Corol.  i.  after  the  firft  Head. 


"Sed.  XII.         teni  to  Licentioufnefs.  277 

has  been  feen  to  attend  the  prevailing  of  the  Principles  of  Ar^ 
miituuis,  and  the  contrary  Principles ;  as  both  have  had  their 
Turn  of  general  Prevalence  in  our  Nation.  If  it  be  indeed, 
"as  is  pretended,  that  Calv'piijik  Dodrines  undermine  the  very 
Foundation  of  all  Religion  and  Morality,  and  enervate  and 
djfannul  ail  rational  IViotives,  to  holy  and  virtuous  Prafticej 
and  that  the  contrary  Dodrines  give  the  Inducements  to  Vir- 
tue and  Goodnefs  their  proper  Force,  and  exhibit  Religion  in 
a  rational  Light,  tending  to  recommend  it  to  the  Reafon  of 
Mankind,  and  enforce  it  in  a  Manner  that  is  agreeable  to  their 
natural  Notions  of  Things  :  I  fay,  if  it  be  thus,  'tis  remarkable, 
that  Virtue  and  religious  Praftice  Ihould  prevail  moft,  when 
the  former  Dodtrines,  fo  inconfiftent  with  it,  prevailed  almoft 
univerfally  :  And  that  ever  fince  the  latter  Doftrines,  fo  hap- 
pily agreeing  with  it,  and  of  fo  proper  and  excellent  a  Tendency 
to  promote  it,  have  been  gradually  prevailing.  Vice,  Prophane- 
nefs,  Luxu-ry  and  Wickednefs  of  all  Sorts,  and  Contempt  of 
all  Religion,  and  of  every  Kind  of  Serioufnefs  and  Stridnefss 
of  Converfation,  iliould  proportionably  prevail ;  and  that  thefe 
Things  Ihould  thus  accompany  one  another,  and  rife  and  pre- 
vail one  with  another,  now  for  a  whole  Age  together.  'Tis 
remarkable,  that  this  happy  Remedy  (difcover'd  by  the  free 
Inquiries,  and  fuperiour  Senfe  and  Wifdom  of  this  Age)  againft 
the  pernicious  Eifefts  of  Cahinifm,  fo  inconfiftent  with  Reli- 
gion, and  tending  fo  much  to  banilh  all  Virtue  from  the  Earth, 
fhould  on  fo  long  a  Trial,  be  attended  with  no  good  Effeft  ; 
but  that  the  Confequence  fhould  be  the  Reverfe  of  Amendment  j 
that  in  Proportion,  as  the  Remedy  takes  Place,  and  is  tho- 
roughly applied,  fo  the  Difeafe  fhould  prevail ;  and  the  very 
fame  difmal  Effect  take  Place,  to  the  higheft  Degree,  which 
Cal'viniliic  Doftrines  are  fuppofed  to  have  fo  great  a  Tendency 
to ;  even  the  banifhing  of  Religion  and  Virtue,  and  the  pre- 
vailing of  unbounded  Licentioufnefs  of  Manners.  If  thefe 
Things  are  truly  fo,  they  are  very  remarkable,  and  Matter  of 
very  curious  Speculation ! 


M 


No  ;3ECTioii 


2/8'  Of  Metaphyfical  i'art  IV, 

Section     XIIL 

Concerning  that  Ohje^lion  againjl  the  Reafoning, 
hy  which  the  Calviniftic  DoBrine  is  Jupported, 
that  it  is  Metaphyfical  and  Abfoufe. 

IT  has  often  been  objefled  againft  the  Defenders  of  Cahin- 
ijlic  Principles,  that  in  their  Realonings,  they  run  into 
nice  Scholaftic  Diftindions,  andabftrufe  metaphyseal  Subtikies, 
and  fet  thefe  in  Oppoiition  to  common  Senfe.  And  'tis  poffible, 
that  after  the  former  Manner  it  may  be  alledged  againft  the 
Reafoning  by  which  I  have  endeavoured  to  confute  the  Armi- 
■nian  Scheme  of  Liberty  and  moral  Agency,  that  it  is  very  ab- 

ftraded  and  metaphyfical. Concerning  this,  I  would  obferve 

the  following  Things. 

I.  If  that  be  made  an  Objeftion  againft  the  foregoing  Rea- 
foning,  that  it  is  metaphyfical,  or  may  properly  be  reduced  to  the 
Science  of  Mctcpkyfxks ,  it  is  a  very  impertinent  Objefticn ; 
whether  it  be  fo  or  no,  is  not  worthy  of  any  Difpute  or  Con- 
troverfy.  If  the  P.eafoning  be  good,  'tis  as  frivolous  to  in- 
quire wh2,t  Science  it  is  properly  reduc'd  to,  as  what  Language 
it  is  delivered  in  :  And  for  a  Man  to  go  about  to  confute  the 
Arguments  of  his  Opponent,  by  telling  him,  his  Arguments 
are  Metaphyfical,  would  be  as  weak  as  to  tell  him,  his  Arguments 
could  not  be  fubftantial,  becaiife  they  were  written  in  trench  or 
Latin.  The  Queftion  is  not.  Whether  what  is  faid  be  Meta- 
phyficks,  Phyiicks,  Logick,  or  Mathematicks,  Latin,  French, 
Englifh,  or  Mohawk?  But,  Whether  the  Reafoning  be  good, 
and  the  Arguments  truly  conclufive?' The  foregoing  AfgumeAts 
are  no  more  metaphyfical,  than  thofe  which  we  ufe  againft  the 
Papifts,  to  difprove  their  Doftrine  of  Tranfubftantiation ;  al- 
ledging,  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Notion  of  corporeal 
Identity,  that  it  fhould  be  in  ten  Thoufand  Places  at  the  fame 
Time.  'Tis  by  metaphyseal  Arguments  only  we  dre 
able  to  prove,  that  the  rational  Soul  is  not  corporeal;  that  Lead 
or  Sand  can't  think  ;  that  Thoughts  are  not  fquare  or  round, 
©r  don't  weigh  a  Pound.     The  Arguments  by  which  we  prove 

th© 


Se6t.  XlII.       and  abflrufe  Reafoning.  -279 

the  Being  of  God,  if  handled  clofely  and  diliinflly,  fo  as  to 
•fhew  their  clear  and  deraonitrative  Evidence,  muft  be  meta- 
phyfically  treated.  'Tis  by  Metaphydcks  only,  that  we  can 
demonftrate,  that  God  is  not  limited  to  a  Place,  or  is  not 
mutable  ;  that  he  is  not  ignorant,  or  forgetful  ;  that  it  is  im- 
poffible  for  him  to  lie,  or  be  unjuft ;  and  that  there  is  one  God 
only,  and  not  Hundreds  or  Ihoufands.  'And  indeed  we  have 
no  ftrift  Demonllratlon  of  any  Thing,  excepting  mathematical 
Truths,  but  by  Metaphyficks.  We  can  have  no  Proof,  that  is 
properly  demonftrative,  of  any  one  Propofition,  relating  to  the 
Being  and  Nature  of  God,  his  Creation  of  the  World,  the 
Dependence  of  all  Things  on  him,  the  Nature  of  Bodies  or 
Spirits,  the  Nature  of  our  own  Souls,  or  any  of  the  great  Truths 
of  Morality  and  natural  Religion,  but  what  is  metaphyfical. 
I  am  willing,  my  Arguments  fhould  be  brought  to  the  Teft  of 
the  ftrifleft  and  jufttft  Reafon,  and  that  a  clear,  diftinft  and 
determinate  Meaning  of  the  Terms  I  ufe,  fhould  be  infifted  on; 
but  let  not  the  Whole  be  rejected,  as  if  all  were  confuted,  by 
iixing  on  it  the  Epithet  Mctaphjjical. 

II.  If  the  Reafoning  which  has  been  made  ufe  of,  be  in 
fome  Senfe  Metaphyfical,  it  will  not  follow,  that  therefore  it 
muft  needs  be  abftrufe,  unintelligible,  and  a-kin  to  the  jargon 
of  the  Schools.  I  humbly  conceive,  the  foregoing  Reafoning, 
at  leatt  as  to  thofe  Things  which  are  moft  material  belongiKg 
to  it,  depends  on  no  abftrufe  Definitions  or  Diflinftions,  or 
Terms  without  a  Meaning,  or  of  very  ambiguous  and  unde- 
termined Signification,  or  any  Points  of  luch  AbflraiTtion  and 
Siibtilty,  as  tends  to  involve  the  attentive  Underftanding  in 
Clouds  and  Darknefs.  There  is  no  high  Degree  of  Refine- 
ment and  abftrufe  Speculation,  in  determining,  that  a  Thing  is 
jiot  before  it  is,  and  fo  can't  be  the  Caufe  of  itfelf ;  or  that  the 
firft  Act  of  free  Choice,  has  not  another  k&.  of  free  Choice 
going  before  that,  to  excite  or  direft  it ;  or  in  determining,  that 
no  Choice  is  made,  while  the  Mind  remains  in  a  State  of 
abfolute  Indifference  ;  that  Preference  and  Equilibrium  never 
co-exift ;  and  that  therefore  no  Choice  is  made  in  a  State  of 
Liberty,  confifting  in  Indifference  :  And  that  fo  far  as  the  Will 
is  determined  by  Motives,  exhibited  and  operating  previous  to 
the  Aft  of  the  Will,  fo  far  it  is  not  determined  by  the  Ad  of 
the  Will  itfelf;  that  nothing  can  begin  to  be,  which  before 
was  not,  without  a  Caufe,  or  fome  antecedent  Ground  or  Rea- 
fon, why  it  then  begins  to  be ;  that  Effeds  depend  on  their 
■^aufes,  and  are  connefted  wifti  them ;  that  Virtue  is  not  the 
N  n  3  worfe^ 


StSo  Of  Metaphyficar  Part  IV. 

worfe,  nor  Sin  the  better,  for  the  Strength  of  Inclination,  with 
which  it  is  pradifed,  and  the  Difficulty  which  thence  anfes  o£ 
doing  otherwife  ;  that  when  it  is  already  infallibly  known,  that 
a  Thing  will  be,  it  is  not  a  Thing  contingent  whether  it  will 
ever  be  or  no  ;  or  that  it  can  be  truly  faid,  notwithftanding, 
that  it  is  not  necefiary  it  fhould  be,  but  it  eitiier  may  be,  or 
^ay  not  be.  And  the  like  might  be  obferved  of  many  other 
.Things  which  belong  to  the  foregoing  Reafoning. 

If  any  Ihall  ftill  ftand  to  it,  ^hat  the  foregoing  Reafoning  is, 
Tiothing  but  metaphyfical  Sophiltry  ;  and  that  it  muft  be  fo, 
that  the  feeming  Force  of  the  Arguments  all  depends  on  fome 
Fallacy  and  Wile  that  is  hid  in  the  Obfcurity,  which  always- 
attends  a  great  Degree  of  metaphyfical  Abflradioa  and  Re- 
finement ;  and  fhall  be  ready  to  fay,  "  Here  is  indeed  fome- 
"  thing  that  tends  to  confound  the  Mind,  but  not  to  fatisfy  it: 
*♦  For  who  can  ever  be  truly  fatisfied  in  it,  that  ivlen  are  fitly 
**  blamed  or  commended,  punillied  or  rewarded,  for  thofe 
*'  Volitions  which  are  not  from  themfelves,  and  of  whofe  Ex- 
**  iftence  they  are  not  the  Caufes.  Men  may  refine,  as  much 
*'  as  they  pleafe,  and  advance  their  abftraft  Notions,  and  make 
*'  out  a  Thoufand  feeming  Contradiftions,  to  puzzle  our  Un- 
"  derftandings ;  yet  there  can  be  no  Satisfaction  in  fuch  Doctrine. 
**  as  this,:  llic  natural  Senfe  of  the  Mind  of  Man  will  always 
**  refill  it."  *    I  humbly  conceive,  that  fuch  an  Objector,  if  he 

has 

*  A  certain  noted  Author,  of  the  prefent  Age,  fays.  The  Arguments 
for    NeceJJity  are  nothing  but  Quibbling-,   or  I.ogorr.achy.,  or  ufing  Words 

ivithout  a  Meaning,  or  Begging  the  lih/ejiiofi. 1    don't   know  what 

Kind  ot  Necefiity  any  Authors  He  may  have  Reference  to,  are 
Advocates  for  ;  or  whether  they  have  managed  their  Arguments 
well,  or  ill.  As  to'  the  Arguments  1  have  made  ufe  of,  if  they  are 
Siuibb'iei,  they  may  be  ihewn  to  be  fo :  Such  Knots  are  capable  of 
being  untied,  and  the  Trick  and  Cheat  may  be  detected  and  plainly, 
laid  open.  If  this  be  fairly  done,  with  Refpeift  to  the  Grounds  and. 
Reafons  I  have  relied  upon,  _  I  fliall  have  juft  Occafion  for  the 
'future  to  be  filent,  if  not  to  be  afhamed  of  my  Argumentations. 
I  am  willing,  my  Proofs  fhould  be  thoroughly  examined ;  and  if  there 
be  nothing  but  Begging  the  Quejlion,  or  mere  Logomachy,  or  Difpute  of 
Words,  let  it  be  made  manifell,  and  (hewn  how  the  feeming  Strength 
of  the  Argument  depends  on  my  vfing  Words  ivithout  a  Meaning,  or 
anfes  hom  the  Ambiguity  of  Terms,  or  my  making  ufe  of  Words  ia 
an  indeterminate  and  unfteady  Manner ;  and  that  the  Weight  of 
my,  Reafons  reft  mainly  on  fuch  a  Foundation  :  And  then,  1  (hall 
cither  be  ready  to   letiaft  what    I  have   urged,    and  thank  the  Man 

#  than" 


Sedl.  XIII.  ^;?i  abftrufe  Reafonirvg.  281 

has  Capacity  and  Humility  and  Calmnefs  of  Spirit,    fufEcient 
impartially  and  thoroughly  to  examine  himfelf,    will  find  that ; 
he  knows  not  really  what  he  would  be  at;    and  that  indeed, 
his  Difficulty  is  nothing  but  a  mere  Prejudice,    from  an  inad- 
vertent cufliomary  Ufe  of  Words,    in   a  Meaning  that  is   not 

clearly  underftood,   nor  carefully  refleded  upon. Let  the 

Objedor  refleft  again,    if  he  has  Candor  and  Patience  enough, 
and  don't  fcorn  to  be  at  the  Trouble  of  clofe  Attention  in  the 

Affair. He  would  have   a  Man's  Volition  be  from  him/elf. 

Let  it  he,  from  himfelf  molt  primarily  and  origina^y  of  any  Way 

conceivable  ; 


that  has  done  the  kind  Part,    or  (hall  bfc    juftly  cxpofed  for  my  Ob- 
ftinacy. 

The  fame  Author  is  abundant  in  appealing,  in  this  Affair,  from  what 
htcdWs  Logomachy  and  Sophijfry,  to  Experience. A  Perfon  can  ex- 
perience only,  what  palles  in  his  own  Mind.  But  yet,  as  we  may 
well  fuppofe,  that  all  Men  have  the  fame  human  Faculties;  fo  a 
Man  may  well  argue  from  his  own  Experience  to  that  of  others,  in 
Things  that  Ihew  the  Nature  of  thofe  Faeuities,  and  the  Manner  of 
their  Operation.  But  then  one  has  as  good  Right  to  alledge  his  Ex- 
perience, as  another.  As  to  my  own  Experience,  I  fmd,  that  in  in- 
numerable Things  I  can  do  as  I  will ;  that  the  Motions  of  my  Body, 
in  many  Refpedls,  inftantaneoudy  follow  the  Ads  of  my  Will  concern- 
ing thofe  Motions  ;  and  that  my  Will  has  fome  Command  of  my  Thoushts  ; 
and  that  the  Ads  of  my  Will  are  my  own,  /.  e.  that  they  are.  Ads  of 
my  Will,  the  Volitions  of  my  own  Mind  ;  or  in  other  Words,  that 
what  I  will,  I  will.  Which,  I  prefume,  is  the  Sum  of  what  others 
experience  in  this  AfFair.  But  as  to  finding  by  Experience,  that  my 
Will  is  originally  determin'd  by  itfelf ;  or  that  my  Will  fiift  chufing' 
what  Volition  there  ftall  be,  the  chofen  Volition  accordingly  follows  : 
and  that  this  is  the  firft  Rife  of  the  Determination  of  my  Will  in  any 
Affair;  or  that  any  Volition  arifes  in  my  Mind  contingently;  I  declare, 
I  know  nothing  in  myfelf,  by  Experience,  of  this  Nature ;  and  no- 
thing that  ever  I  experienced,  carries  the  leaft  Appearance  or  Shadow 
of  any  fuch  Thing,  or  gives  me  any  more  Reafon  to  fuppofe  or  fufpcd' 
any  fuch  Thing,  than  to  fuppofe  that  my  Volitions  exifted  twenty 
Years  before  they  exjlted.  'Tis  true,  I  find  myfelf  poffefs'd  of  my> 
Volitions  before  I  can  fee  the  effedual  Power  of  any  Caufe  to  producs 
them,  (for  the  Power  and  Efficacy  of  the  Caufe  is  not  feen  but  by  the 
Effed)  and  this,  for  ought  I  know,  may  make  fome  imagine,  that 
Volition  has  no  Caufe,  or  tiiat  it  produces  itfelf.  But  I  have  no  more 
Reafon  from  hence  to  determine  any  fuch  Thing,  than  I  have  to  de- 
termine that  I  gave  myfelf  my  own  Being,  or  that  I  C3m^  into  Being 
accidentally  without  a  Caufe,  bpcaufe  I  firft  found  myfelf  pclTeffed  of 
Being,   before  I  had.  Knowledge  of  a  Caufe  of  my  Being. 


^t2         Of  Metaphyfical  Reqfonlng.         Part  IV, 

conceivable;  that  is,  from  his  own  Choice  :  How  will  that 
help  the  Matter,  as  to  his  being  juftly  blamed  or  praifed,  un- 
iefs  that  Choice  itfelf  be  Blame  or  Praife-worthy  ?  And  how  is 
the  Choice  itfelf  (an  ill  Choice,  for  Inftance)  Blame-worthy, 
according  to  thefe  Principles,  unlefs  that  be  from  himfelf  too, 
in  the  fame  Manner;  that  is,  from  his  own  Choice  ?  But  the 
original  and  firft  determining  Choice  in  the  Affair  is  not 
from  his  Choice  :  His  Choice  is  not  the  Caufe  of  it. — And  if 
it  be  from  himfelf  fome  other  Way,  and  not  from  his  Choice, 
furely  that  will  not  help  the  Matter  :  If  it  be^ot  from  himfelf 
of  Choice,  then  it  is  not  from  himfelf  voluntarily  ;  and  if  fo, 
he  is  furely  no  more  to  Blame,  than  if  it  were  not  from  him.- 
felf  at  all.  It  is  a  Vanity,  tp  jjretend  it  is  a  fufficient  Arj- 
fwer  to  this,  to  fay,  that  it  is  nothing  but  metaphyfical  Refine- 
ment and  Subtilty,  and  fo  attended  with  Obfcurity  and  Uncer- 
tainty. 

If  it  be  the  natural  Senfe  of  our  Mipds,  that  what  is  blame- 
worthy in  a  Man  mull  be  from  himfelf,  then  it  doubtlefs  is  alfoj 
that  it  muft  be  trom  fome^hing  hadm  himfelf,  a  bad  Choice,  or 
bad  Difpofition,  But  then  our  natural  Senfe  is,  that  this  bad 
Choice  or  Difpofition  is  evil  in  itfelf,  and  the  Man  blame- 
worthy for  it.,  on  its  cwn  Account,  without  taking  into  our  No- 
tion of  its  Blame- worthinefs,  another  bad  Choice,  or  Difpofi- 
tion going  before  this,  from  whence  this  arifes :  For  that  is  a 
ridiculous  Abfurdity,  running  us  into  an  immediate  Contradic- 
tion, which  our  natural  Senfe  of  Blame-worthinefs  has  nothing 
to  do  with,  and  never  comes  into  the  Mind,  nor  i$  fupppfed  in 
the  Judgment  we  naturally  make  of  the  Affair.  As  was  de- 
monftrated  before,  natural  Senfe  don't  place  the  moral  Evil  of 
Volitions  and  Difpofitions  in  the  Caufe  of  them,  but  the  Na- 
ture of  them.  An  Evil  Thing's  being  F  R  O  M  a  Man,  or 
from  fomething  antecedent  in  him,  is  not  effential  to  tlie 
original  Notion  we  have  of  Blame-worthinefs :  But  'tis  its 
being  the  Choice  of  the  Heart ;  as  appears  by  this,  that  if  a 
Thing  htfrom  us.  and  not  from  our  Choice,  it  has  not  the 
Nature  of  Blame-worthinefs  or  lU-defert,  according  to  our 
natural  Senfe.  When  a  Thing  \%from  a  Man,  in  that  Senfe, 
that  it  is  from  his  Will  or  Choice,  he  is  to  Blame  for  it,  be- 
caufe  his  Will  is  I N  IT  :  So  far  as  the  Will  is  in  it.  Blame  is 
in  it,  and  no  further.  Neither  do  we  go  any  further  in  oqr 
Notion  of  Blame,  to  inquire  whether  the  bad  Will  be  FRO  M 
a  bad  Will  :  There  is  no  Confideration  of  the  Original  of 
fhat  bad  Will ;  becaufe  according  to  our  natural  Apprehenfion, 

Blame 


Se6l.  XIII.     A  Vault  of  Arminian  Writers.        283 

Blar.'i^  originally  conjijis  in  it.  Therefore  a  Thing's  \it\Ti'gfrom  a" 
Man,  is  a  fecondary  Confideration,  in  the  Notion  of  iilame  of 
lU-defert.  Becaufe  thofe  Things  in  our  external  Actions,  ars 
moft  properly  faid  to  htfi-om  us,  which  2^xtfrom  our  Choice  ; 
and  no  other  external  Actions  but  thofe  that  are  from  us  in  this 
Senfe,  have  the  Nature  of  Blame  ;  and  they  indeed,  not  fo 
properly  becaufe  they  are  from  us,  as  becaufe  we  are  ///  thenif 
i.  e.  our  Wills  are  in  them  ;  not  fo  much  becaufe  they  arc 
from  fome  Property  of  ours,  as  becaufe  they  are  our  Properties, 
However,  all  thefe  external  Actions  being  X.i\x\y  from  us,  zs 
tlieir  Caufe ;  and  we  being  fo  ufed,  in  ordinary  Speech,  and 
in  the  common  Affairs  of  Life,  to  fpeak  of  Men's  Aiflions  and 
Condutft  that  we  fee,  and  that  afreft  human  Society,  as  deferve- 
ing  111  or  Well,  as  worthy  of  Blame  or  Praife ;  hence  it  is  come 
to  pafs,  that  Philofophers  have  incautioufly  taken  all  their 
Meafures  of  Good  and  Evil,  Praife  and  Blame,  from  tlie 
Diftates  of  common  Senfe,  about  thefe  o'vert  ABs  of  Men  ;  to 
the  runnino;  of  every  Thing  into  the  moft  lamentable  and  dread- 
ful Confuuon.     And  therefore  I  obferve, 

III.  'Tis  {o  far  from  being  true  (whatever  may  be  pretended) 
that  the  Proof  of  the  Doi?frine  which  has  been  maintain'd, 
depends  on  certain  abftrufe,  unintelligible,  metaphyfical  Terms 
and  Notions  ;  and  that  the  Arminian  bcheme,  without  needing 
fuch  Clouds  and  Darknefs,  for  its  Defence,  is  fupported  by 
the  plain  Didates  of  common  Senfe  ;  that  the  very  Reverfe  is 
moft  certainly  true,  '^nd  that  to  a  great  Degree.  'Tis  faft  that 
they,  and  not  we,  have  confounded  Things  with  metaphyfical, 
iinintelligible  Notions  and  Phrafes,  and  have  drawn  them  from 
the  Light  of  plain  Truth,  into  the  grofs  Darknefs  of  abftrafe 
metaphyfical  Propofitions,  and  Words  without  a  Meaning. 
Their  pretended  Demonftrations  depend  very  much  on  fuch 
unintelligible,  metaphyfical  Phrafes,  as  Self-determination  and 
Scnjereignfy  of  the  fP'ill ;  and  the  metaphyfical  Senfe  they  put-  on 
fuch  Terms,  as  Neccfjity,  Contingency ,  Anion,  Agency,  &c.  quite' 
diverfe  from  their  Meaning  as  ufed  in  common  Speech  ;  and 
which,  as  they  trfettiem,  are  without  any  confiftent  Meanings 
or  any  Manner  of  diftind  confiftent  Ideas ;  as  far  from  it  as 
any  of  the  abftrufe  Terms  and  perplexed  Phrafes  of  the  Peri- 
patetick  Philofophers,  or  the  moft  unintelligible  Jargon  of  the 
Schools,  or  the  Cant  of  the  wildeft  Fanaticks.  Yea,  we  may 
be  bold  to  fay,  thefe  metaphyfical  Terms,  on  which  they  build 
fo  much,  are  what  they  ufe  without  knowing  what  they  mean 
themfeiyes ;  they  are  pure  metaphyfical  Sounds,  without  any 

Ideas 


2^4         Arminiahs  too  metaphyfical.         Part  IVj 

Ideas  whatfoever  in  their  Minds  to  aiifwer  them ;  inafmuch 
as  it  has  been  demonltrated,  that  there  cannot  be  any  Notion 
iri  the  Mind  cohfiftent  with  thefe  Expreiiions,  as  they  pretend 
to  explain  them  ;  becSufe  their  Explanations  deftroy  them- 
■felves.  No  fuch  Notions  as  imply  oelt-contradiftion,  and 
Self-abolition,  and  this  a  great  many  Ways,  can  fubfift  in  the 
'  Mind  ;  as  there  can  be  no  Idea  of  a  Whole  which  is  lefs  than 
any  of  its  Parts,  or  of  folid  Extenfion  without  Dimenfions,  or 

t'f  an  Eifeft  which  is  bbfore  its  Caufe Arminia?is  improve 

thefe  Terras,  as  Terms  of  Art,  and  in  their  metaphylical 
Meaning,  to  advance  and  eftabiifh  thofe  Things  which  are 
'  contrary  to  common  Senfe,  in  a  high  Degree.  Thus,  inftead 
"of  the  plain  vulgar  Notion  of  Liberty,  which  all  Mankind,  in 
every  Part  of  the  Face  of  the  Earth,  and  in  all  Ages,  have  ; 
confining  in  Opportunity  to  do  as  one  pleafes ;  they  have  in- 
troduced a  new  ftrange  Liberty,  confifting  in  Indifference, 
Contingence,  and  Self-determination  ;  by  which  they  involve 
themfelves  and  others  in  great  Obfcurity,  and  manifold  grofs 
Inconfiftence.  So,  inftead  of  placing  Virtue  and  Vice,  as 
common  Senfe  places  them  very  much,  in  fix'd  Bias  and  In- 
clination, and  greater  Virtue  and  Vice  in  ftronger  and  more 
eflablifh'd  Inclination  ;  thefe,  thro'  their  Refinings  and  abftrufe 
Notions,  fuppofe  a  Liberty  confifting  in  Indifference,  to  be 
eflential  to  all  Virtue  and  Vice.  So  they  have  reafoned  them- 
felves, not  by  metaphylical  Diftinftions,  but  metaphylical 
Confufion,  into  many  Principles  about  moral  Agency,  Blame, 
Praife,  Rew'ard  and  Punifhment,  which  are,  as  has  been  fhewn, 
exceeding  contrary  to  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind  ;  and 
perhaps  to  their  own  Senfe,  which  governs  them  in  common 
Life. 


4^^oooo<|^^aoo6<|<,l|»o^9e<|^^aooo«oe<|^■>|><wo4i>|^o«eo<|^ 


THE 


(     285     ) 

*jita)oo.^oooo.;!j-iooo.-5^.-jooo^-oooo-:^"00oor^.jow-^'Oecio-^^        SS-aooo-^QOOo-n- 

T    H    E 


CONCLUSIO 


WK  E  T  H  E  R  the  Things  which  have  been  alledged,  are 
liable  to  any  tolerable  Anfwer  in  the  Ways  of  calm, 
intelligible  and  Itrid  Reafoning,  I  muft  leave  others  to  judge  : 
But  I  am  fenfihle  they  are  liable  to  one  Sort  of  Anfwer.  'Tis 
not  unlikely,  that  fome  who  value  themfelves  on  the  fup- 
pofed  rational  and  generous  Principles  of  the  modem  ta« 
Ihionable  Divinity,  will  have  their  Indignation  and  Difdainraif- 
ed  at  the  Sight  of  this  Difcourfe,  and  on  perceiving  what: 
Things  are  pretended  to  be  proved  in  it.  And  if  they  think 
it  worthy  of  being  read^  or  of  fo  much  Notice  as  to  fay  much 
about  it,  they  may  probably  renew  the  ufual  Exclahiations, 
"with  additional  Vehemxnce  and  Contempt,  about  the  Fate  of 
'the  Heathen,  WQ\h^?,' s  NecrJJity,  zndi  making  Me7i  mere  Machines; 
accumulating  the  terrible  Epithets  oi  fatal,  unfrufrable,  iu" 
editable,  irrefjftable.  Sec.  and  it  may  be,  with  the  Addition  of 
horrid  and  blafphemous ;  and  perhaps  much  Skill  may  be  ufed  to 
fet  forth  Things,  which  have  been  faid,  in  Colours  which  fhall 
be  Ihocking  to  the  Imaginations,  and  moving  to  the  Paffions  of 
thofe  who  have  either  too  little  Capacity,  or  too  much  Con- 
fidence of  the  Opinions  they  have  imbibed,  and  Contempt  of 
the  contrary,  to  try  the  Matter  by  any  ferious  and  circumfpeft 
Examination.  *  Or  Difficulties  may  be  ftarted  and  infilled  on 
O  o  which 

*  A  Writer,  ef  the  prefent  Age,  whom  I  have  feveral  Times  haci 
Occafion  to  mention,  fpeaks  once  and  again  of  thofe  who  hold  the 
Doftriue    of  Necejfity,     as    fcarcely    worthy    of  the    Name    of  Philofo- 

phers. 1   don't  know,  whether  he  has  refpedt  to  any  particulac 

Notion    of  Necefuty,      that  fome    may    have    maintain 'd  ;     knd   if  fo, 

what  DoArine   of  Neceflity    it   is  that   He  means. Whether   I    an» 

worthy  of  the  Name  of  a  Philofopher,  or  not,  would  be  a  Queftioa 
little  to  the  prefent  Purpofe.  If  any,  and  ever  fo  many,  (hould 
deny  it,  I  (hould  not  think  it  worth  the  while  to  enter  into  a  Dif- 
f ute   on  that  Queftjon  j     thg*    at  the  fame   Time   I    might  expeft, 

(90n 


236        r/j^  C  O  M  C  L  u  s  r  O  K 

which  don't  belong  to  the  Controverfy  ;  becaufe,  let  them  be 
more  or  lefs  real,  and  hard  to  be  refolved,  they  are  not  what 
are  owing  to  any  Thing  diitinguifriing  of  this  Scheme  from 
that  of  the  Arminians,  and  would  not  be  removed  nor  dimi- 
nilhed  by  renouncing  the  former,  and  adhering  to  the  latter. 
Or  fome  particular  Things  may  be  pick'd  out,  which  they 
may  think  will  found  horlhelt  in  the  Ears  of  the  Generality  ; 
and  thefe  may  be  glofs'd  and  defcanted  on,  with  tart  and  con- 
temptuous Words  J  and  Irom  thence,  the  V/hole  treated  with 
Triumph  and  Infuk. 

'Tis  eafy  to  fee  how  the  Decifion  of  moft  of  the  Points  in 
Controverfy,  between  Cal-uhiijis  and  Arminians,  depends  on  the 
Determination  of  this  grand  Article  concerning  the  Freedom  of 
the  Will  requtjiie  to  moral  Agency  ;  and  that  by  clearing  and  eftab- 
lifhing  the  Cfl'/^w//;?/f  J'octrine  in  this  Point,  the  chief  Argu- 
ments are  obviated,  by  which  Arminian  Dodtrines-  in  general 
are  fupported,  and  the  contrary  Dodrines  demonftratively 
confirmed;  Hereby  it  becomes  manifell,  that  God's  moral- 
Government  over  Mankind,  his  treating  them  as  moral  Agents, 
making  them  the  Objefts  of  his  Commands,.  Counfek  Calls, 
Warnings,  Expoftulations,  Promifes,  Threatenings,  Rewards 
and  Punidiments,  is  not  inconfiitent  with  a  determining  Difpojal 
of  ail  Events,  of  every  Kind,  throughout  the  Univerfe,  in  his 
Proindence;  either  by  pofitive  Efficiency,  or  PermilTion.  Indeed- 
fach  an  uni-cerjal,  determijiing  Pro'vidence,  infers  fome  Kind  of 
NeceiF.ty  of  all  Events  ;  fuch  a  Neceflity  as  implies  an  infallible 
previous  Fixednefb  of  the  Futurity  of  the  Event :  But  no  other 
Neceflity  of  moral  Events,  or  Volitions  of  intelligent  Agents, 
is  needful  in  order  to  this,  than  moral  Nec(ffity  ;  which  does  as 
much  afcertain  the  Futurity  of  the  Event,  as-  any  other 
Neceflity^  But,  as  has  been  demonftrated,  futh  a  Neceffity  is 
not  at  all  repugnant  to  moral  Agency,  and  the  reafonable  Ufa 
of  Commands,  Calls,  Rewards,  Punifiiments,  &c.  Yea,  not 
only  are  Objeftions,  of  this  Kind,  againft  the  Dodrine  of  art' 
univerfal  determining  Providefice,  removed  by  what  has  been 
faid  ;   but  the  Truth  of  fuch  a  Doftrine  is  demonftrated.     As- 

it 

fome'  better  Anfwer  fhould  be  eS^tn  to  the  Arguments  brought  for 
the  Truth  of  the  Doftrine  I  maintain  ;  and  I  might  further  reafon- 
ably  deflre,  that  it  might  be  confidered,  whether  it  don't  become 
thofe  who  are  truly  ivorthy  of  the  Name  of  Philofophers,  to  be 
fenfible,  that  there  is  a  Difference  between  Argument  and  Contempt ;  ■ 
yea,  and  a  Difference  between  the  Contemptiblenefs  of  the  Perfo» 
jh^t  argues,   and  the  Inconeluiivenefs  of  the  Aigutnents  he  offers. 


r/7^  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N.        ^S7 

'•^t  has  heen  deraonftrated,  that  th^futurity  of  all  future  Events 
is  eltablifhed  by  previous  Necefuty,  either  natural  or  moral ; 
'{o  'tis  manifeft,  that  the  fovereign  Creator  and  Difpofer  of  the 
World  has  ordered  this  Necefiity,  by  ordering  his  own  Con- 
dud,  either  in  defignedly  afting,  or  forbearing  to  ad.  For,  as 
the  Being  of  the  World  is  from  God,  -fo  the  Circumftances  in 
which  it  had  its  Being  at  flrft,  both  negative  and  pofitive,  muft 
be  ordered  by  him,  in  one  of  thefe  Ways ;  and  all  the  necef- 
ffary  Confequences  of  thefe  Circumftances,  muft  be  ordered  by 
him.  And  God's  adive  and  pofitive  Interpofitions,  after  the 
World  vi'as  created,  and  the  Confequences  of  thefe  Inttrpoliti- 
-ons  ;  alfo  every  Inftance  of  his  forbearing  to  interpofe,  and  the 
•iure  Confequences  of  this  Forbear3nce,  muft  all  be  determined 
according  to  his  Pleafure.  And  therefore  every  Event  which 
is  the  Confequence  of  any  Thing  whatfoever,  or  that  is  con- 
neded  with  any  foregoing  Thing  or  Circumftance,  either  po- 
fitive or  negative,  as  the  Ground  or  R.eafonof  its  Exiftence, 
imuft  be  ordered  of  God  ;  either  by  a  defigned  Efiiciency  and 
-Interpofition,  or  a  defigned  forbearing  to  operate  or  interpofe. 
But,  as  has  been  proved,  ail  Events  whatfoever  are  neceflarily 
conneded  with  fomething  foregoing,  either  pofitive  or  negative, 
which  is  the  Ground  of  its  Exiftence.  It  follows  therefore,  that 
•the  whole  Series  of  Events  is  thus  conneded  with  fomething 
in  the  State  of  Things,  either  pofitive  or  negative,  which  is 
ori^hial  in  the  Series ;  /.  e.  fomething  whi<:h  is  conneded  with 
•nothing  preceding  that,  but  God's  own  immediate  Condud, 
either  his  ading  or  forbearing  to  ad.  From  whence  it  follows, 
4:hat  as  God  defignedly  order's  his  own  Condud,  and  its  con- 
neded Confequences,  it  muft  ^ecefi!arily  be,  that  he  defignedly 
-orders  all  Things. 

The  Things  which  have  been  faid,  obviate  fome  of  the  chief 
•Objedions  of  ^r;w/W<7/>//  againft  the  Cc/tv^^/c  Dodrine  of  the 
total  Deprat'ify  and  Corruption  of  Man's  Nature,  wheieby  his 
Heart  is  wholly  under  the  Power  of  Sin,  and  he  is  utterly  un- 
able, without  the  Interpofition  of /overeign  Grace,  favingly  to 
love  God,  believe  in  Chrift,  or  do  any  Thing  that  is  truly 
■good  and  acceptable  in  God's  Sight.  For  the  main  Objedion 
againft  this  Dodrine  is,  that  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Freedom 
of  Man's  Will,  confifting  in  Indifference  and  felf-determining 
Power  ;  becaufe  it  fuppofes  Man  to  be  under  a  Necefiity  of 
Sinning,  and  that  God  requires  Thin ^is  of  him,  in  order  to 
ills  avoiding  eternal  Damnation,  which  he  is  unable  to  do  ; 
«nd  tliat  tiiis  Dodrine  is  wholly  inconfiltent  with  the  Sincerity 
O  o  3  of 


288        r-^e-  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  R 

of  Counfels,  Invitations,  &c.  Now  this  Dodrine  fuppofes  no 
other  NeceJ/tty  of  Sinning,  tffiin  a  moral  Neceflity  ;  which,  as 
has  been  Ihewn,  don't  at  all  excufe  Sin  ;  and  fuppofes  no  other 
Inability  to  obey  any  Command,  or  perform  any  Duty,  ev^n  the 
jnoft  fpiritual  and  exalted,  but  a  moral  Inability,  which,  as  has, 
been  proved,  don't  excufe  Ferfons  in  the  Non-perfoimance  ot 
any  good  Thing,  or  make  them  not  to  be  the  proper  Objefts  of 
Commands,  Counfels  and  Invitations.  And  moreover,  it 
has  been  (hewn,  that  there  is  not,  and  never  can  be,  either  in 
Exiftence,  or  fo  much  as  in  Idea,  any  fuch  Freedom  of  Will, 
confiding  in  Indifference  and  Self-determmation,  for  the  Sake 
of  which,  this  Dodrine  of  original  Sin  is  caft  out ;  and  that  no 
fuch  Freedom  is  neceffary,  in  order  to  the  iSiature  of  Sin,  and 
a  juft  Defert  of  Punilhment. 

The  Things  which  have  been  obferved,  do  alfo  take  ofF- 
the  main  Objeftions  of  Arminians  againft  the  Doctrine  of  effica- 
cious Grace;  and  at  the  fame  Time,  prove  the  Grace  of  God 
in  a  Sinner's  Converfion  (if  there  be  any  Grace  or  divine  In- 
fluence in  the  Affair)  to  be  efficacious,  yea,  and  irrcjijiible  too, 
if  by  irrefiftible  is  meant,  that  which  is  attended  with  a  moral 
Neceffity,  which  it  is  impoffible  fhould  ever  be  violated  by  any 
Refiftence.  The  main  Objeftion  of  Arminians  againft  this 
Dodlrine  is,  that  it  is  inconfiftent  with  their  felf-determining 
"Freedom  of  Will;  and  that  it  is  repugnant  to  the  Nature  of 
Virtue,  that  it  Ihould  be  wrought  in  the  Heart  by  the  deter- 
mining Efficacy  and  Power  ot  another,  inftead  of  its  being 
owing  to  a  felf-moving  Power  ;  that  in  that  Cafe,  the  Good 
■which  is  wrought,  would  not  be  our  Virtue,  but  rather  God's 
Virtue ;  becaufe  it  is  not  the  Perfon  in  w  horn  it  is  wrought, 
that  is  the  determining  Author  of  it,  but  God  that  wrought  it 

in  him. 'But  the  Things  which  are  the  Foundation  ot  thefe 

Objeftions,  have  been  confidered ;  and  it  has  been  demon- 
ftrated,  that  the  Liberty  of  moral  Agents  docs  not  confill  in 
felf-determining  Power  ;  and  that  there  is  no  Need  of  any  fuch 
Liberty,  in  order  to  the  Nature  of  Virtue ;  nor  does  it  at  all 
hinder,  but  that  the  State  or  Ad  of  the  Will  may  be  the 
Virtue  of  the  Subjeft,  though  it  be  not  from  Self-determina- 
tion, but  the  Determination  of  an  extrinficCaufe  ;  even  fo  as 
to  caufe  the  Event  to  be  morally  neceffary  to  the  Subjeft  of  it. 
And  as  it  has  been  proved,  that  nothing  in  the  State  or  Afts 
of  the  Will  of  Man  i:i  contingent ;  but  that  on  the  contrary, 
every  Event  of  this  Kind  is  neceffary,  by  a  moral  Neceffity  ; 
and  has  alfo  been  noff  demonftrated,  that  the  Doftrine  of  an 

univerfal 


T/;^  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N.  28^ 

oniverfal  deterntining  Providence,  follows  from  that  Doftrine 
of  Necelfity,  which  was  proved  before  :  And  fo,  that  God  does 
decifively,  in  his  Providence,  order  all  the  Volitions  of  moral 
Agents,  either  by  pofitive  Influence  or  Permilfion  :  And  it 
being  allowed  on  all  Hands,  that  what  God  does  in  the  Affair  of 
Man's  virtuous  Volitions,  whether  it  be  more  or  lefs,  is  by  fome 
pofitive  Influence,  and  not  by  mere  Perniiffion,  as  in  the  Affair 
pf  a  fmful  Volition  :  If  we  put  thefe  Things  together,  it  will 
follow,  that  God's  Aflifiance  or  Influence,  mult  be  determin- 
ing and  decifive,  or  mutt  be  attended  ,  with  a  moral  Neceliity 
of  the  Event ;  and  fo,  that  God  gives  Virtue,  Holinefs  and 
Converfion  to  Sinners,  by  an  Influence  which  determines  the 
Effeft,  in  fuch  a  Manner,  that  the  EfFed  will  infallibly  follow- 
by  a  moral  Neceflity  ;  which  is  what  Caivinifs  mean  by  effica- 
cious and  irrefillible  Grace. 

The  Things  which  have  been  faid,  do  likewife  anfwer  the 
chief  Objedions  againft  the  Doftrine  of  God's  v.ni'verjal  and 
ab/olute  Decree,  and  aiFord  infallible  Proof  of  that  Dodrine ; 
and  of  the  Doftrlne  ol  abfolitte ,  eternal,  perfov.al  Ele8ioH  in  par- 
ticular. The  main  Objedions  againfl:  thefe  Dodrines  are,  that 
they  infer  a  Neceffiiy  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  and  of 
the  future  moral  State  and  A.ds  of  Men  ;  and  fo  are  not  con- 
fiftent  with  thofe  eternal  Rewards  and  Punifhments,  which  are 
conneded  with  Converfion  and  Impenitence;  nor  can  be  made 
to  agree  with  the  Reafonablenefs  and  Sincerity  of  the  Precepts, 
Calls,  Courfels,  Warnings  and  Expoftulations  of  the  Word  of 
God  ;  or  with  the  various  Methods  and  Means  of  Grace,  which 
God  ufes  with  Sinners,  to  bring  them  to  PvCpcntance  ;  and  the 
Whole  of  that  moral  Government,  which  God  exercifes  towards 
Mankind  :    And  that  they  infer  an  Inconfulence  between  tlie 

fecrct  and  reveaLd  Will  of  God;  and  make  God  the  Auv'nor  of 
Sin.     But  all  thefe  Things  have  been  obviated   in  the  preced- 

"  ing  Difcourfe.  And  the  certain  Truth  of  ihefe  Dodrines, 
concerning  God's  eternal  Purpofes,  will  follow  from  what  was 
juft  now  obferved,  concerning  God's  univerfal  Providence ;  how 
it  infallibly  follows  from  what  has  been  proved,  that  God 
orders  all  Events,  and  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  amongft 
others,  by  fuch  a  decifive  Difpofal,  that  the  Events  are  infal- 
libly conneded  with  his  Difpofal.  For  if  God  difpofes  all 
Events,  fo  that  the  infallible  Exiftence  of  the  Events  is  decided 
by  his  Providence,  then  he  doubtlefs  thus  orders  and  decides 
Things  knoivinglj,  znAon  Def.gn,  God  don't  do  what  he  does, 
per  order  what  he  orders,   accider.tally  and  unawares ;    either 

'wiihout 


iyo  ri^^  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N. 

^without,  or  hejtde  his  Intention.  And  if  there  be  a  foregoing 
De/ign  of  doing  and  ordering  as  he  does,  tliis  is  the  fame  with 
a  Fiirpofe  or  Decree.  And  as  it  has  been  ftiewn,  that  nothing 
js  new  to  God,  in  any  Refped,  but  all  Things  are  perfeftly 
and  equally  in  his  View  from  Eternity  ;  hence  it  will  follow, 
that  his  Defigns  or  Purpofes  are .  not  Things  formed  anew, 
founded  on  any  new  Views  or  Appearances,  but  are  all  eternal 
Purpofes.  And  as  it  has  been  now  ftiewn,  how  the  Doftrine 
of  determining  efficacious  Grace  certainly  follows  from 
Things  proved  in  the  foregoing  Difcourfe ;  hence  will  necef- 
farily  follow  the  Doctrine  of  ]>arlicular,  eternal,  ahfolnte  Elec- 
tion. For  if  Men  are  made  true  Saints,  no  otherwife  than  as 
God  makes  them  ib,  and  dillinguilhes  them  from  others,  by  an 
efficacious  Power  and  Intiuence  of  his,  that  decides  and  lixes  the 
Event ;  and  God  thus  makes  fome  faints,  ana  not  others,  on 
Defign  or  Purpofe,  and  las  has  been  now  obferved)  no  Defigns 
of  God  are  new  \  it  follows,  that  God  thus  diftinguifhed  from 
others,  all  that  ever  become  true  Saints,  by  his  eternal  Defign 
or  Decree. — I  might  alfo  fhew,  how  God's  certain  Foreknow- 
ledge mutt  fuppcie  an  atl'olute  Decree,  and  how  fuch  a  Decree 
can  be  proved  to  a  Demcnftration  from  it :  But  that  this  Dif- 
courfe  may  not  be  lengthen'd  out  too  much,  that  mutt  be  omit- 
ted for  the  prefent. 

From  thefe  Things  it  will  inevitably  follow,  that  however 
Chrift  in  fome  Senfe  may  be  faid  to  die  for  all,  and  to  redeem 
all  vifible  Chnftians,  yea  the  whole  World  by  his  Death  ;  yet 
there  mutt  be  fomething  particular  in  the  Defign  of  his  Death, 
with  Refpeft  to  fuch  as  He  intended  (hould  adually  be  fave4 
thereby.  As  appears  by  what  has  been  now  fhewn,  God  has 
the  aftual  Salvation  or  Redemption  of  a  certain  Number  in 
his  proper  abfolute  Defign,  and  of  a  certain  Number  only;, 
and  therefore  fuch  a  Defign  only  can  be  profecuted  in  any 
Thing  God  does,  in  order  to  the  Salvation  of  Men.  God 
purfues  a  proper  Defign  of  the  Salvation  of  the  Eled  in  giving 
Chrift  to  die,  and  profecutes  fuch  a  Defign  with  Refpeft  to  no 
other,  moft  ftriftly  fpeaking  ;  for  'tis  impoffible,  that  God 
{hould  profecute  any  other  Defign  than  only  fuch  as  He  has : 
He  certainly  don't,  in  the  higheft  Propriety  and  Striftnefs  of 
Speech,  purfue  a  Defign  that  He  has  not. —  And  indeed  fuch 
a  Particularity  and  Limitation  of  Redemption  will  as  infallibly 
follow  from  the  Doftrine  of  God's  Foreknowledge,  as  from 
that  of  the  Decree.  For  'tis  as  impoffible,  in  Striftnefs  of 
Speech,    that  God  ftioiild  profecute  a  Defign  or  Aim  at  « 

Things. 


N. 


?1?^  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N.  2gi- 

"thing,  which  He  at  the  fame  Time  molt  perfeflly  knows  v/ili 
not  be  accompl:fhed,  as  that  he  ftiould  ufe  Endeavours  for  that 
which  is  befide  bis  Decree. 

By  the  Things  which  have  been  proved,  are  obviated  fome 
of  the  main  Obje(flions  againft  the  Dodrine  of  the  infallible  and 
neceflary  Fetfit'erance  of  Saints,  and  fome  of  the  main  Founda- 
tions of  this  Dodftrine  arc  eitabliflied.  The  main  Prejudices 
oi  Armi7}ia?is  againft  this  Doftrine  feem  to  be  thefe ;  they  fup- 
pofe  fuch  a  neceffary,  infallible  Perfeverance  to  be  repugnant 
to  the  Freedom  of  rlie  Will  ;  that  it  muft  be  owing  to  Man's 
own  felf-determing  Power,  that  he  fiiji  becomes  virtuous  and 
holy  ;  and  fo  in  like  Manner,  it  muft  be  left  a  Thing  contin- 
gent, to  be  determin'd  by  the  fame  Freedom  of  Will,  whether 
he  will  perjcvere  in  Virtue  and  Hohnefj ;  and  that  otherwif© 
his  continuing  ftedlait  in  Faith  and  Obedience  would  not  be 
his  Virtue,  or  at  all  Praife- worthy  and  Rewardable  ;  nor  could 
his  Perfeverance  be  properly  the  Matter  of  divine  Commands, 
Counfels  and  Promifes,  nor  his  Apoltacy  be  properly  threaten'd, 
and  Men  warned  againft  it.  W'hereas  we  find  all  thefe  Things 
in  Scripture  :  There  we  find  Stedfaftnefs  and  Perfeverance  iii 
true  Chriftianity,  reprefented  as  the  Virtue  of  the  Saints, 
fpoken  of  as  Praife-worthy  in  them,  and  glorious  Rewards 
promifed  to  it ;  and  alfo  find,  that  God  makes  it  the  Subjeft  of 
his  Commands,  Counftls  and  Promifes ;  and  the  contrary,  of 
Threatenings  and  Warnings.  But  the  Foundation  of  thefe 
Objections  has  been  removed,  in  its  being  Ihewn  that  moral 
Neceffity  and  infallible  Certainty  of  Events  is  not  inconfiftent 
with  thefe  Things  ;  and  that,  as  to  Freedom  of  Will  lying  in 
the  Power  of  the  Will  to  determine  itfelf,  there  neither  is  any 
fuch  Thing,  nor  any  Need  of  it,  in  order  to  Virtue,  Reward, 
Commands,  Counfels,  &c. 

And  as  the  Doftrines  of  efficacious  Grace  and  abfolute 
Eleftion  do  certainly  follow  from  Things  which  have  been 
proved  in  the  preceding  Difcourfe ;  fo  fome  of  the  main 
Foundations  of  the  Dodrine  of  Perfeverance  are  thereby  efta- 
bliftied.  If  the  Beginning  of  true  Faith  and  Hohnefs,  and  a 
Man's  becoming  a  true  Saint  at  firft,  don't  depend  on  the 
felf- determining  Power  of  the  Will,  but  on  the  deter- 
mining efficacious  Grace  of  God  ;  it  may  well  be  argued, 
that  it  is  fo  alfo  with  Refpedt  to  Men's  being  continued  Saints, 
or  perfevering  in  Faith  and  Holinefs.  The  Converfion  of  a 
Sinner  being  not  owing  to  a  Man's  Self-determination,  but 
to  God's  Determination,  and  eternal  Elediouj  which  is  abfo- 
lute^ 


h^2 


The  CONCLUSION. 


lute,  and  depending  on  the  fovereign  V/ill  of  God,  and  riol 
on  the  free  Will  of  Man;  as  is  evident  from  what  has  beeni 
faid :  And  it  being  very  evident  from  the  ociptures,  that  the 
eternal  Election  which  there  is  of  faints  to  Faith  and  Holinefs, 
is  alio  an  Eledion  of  them  to  eternal  Salvation ;  hence  their 
Appointment  to  Salvation  muft  alfo  be  abfolute,  and  not  de- 
pending on  their  contingent,  felf-determining  Will.  From 
all  which  it  follows,  that  it  is  abfolutely  fix'd  in  God's  Decree, 
that  all  true  Saints  fliall  perfevere  to  adual  eternal  Salvation. 

But    I  mufl   leave  all  thefe  Things  to  the  Confideration  of 
the  fair  and  impartial    Reader ;    and   when  he  has  maturely 
weigh'd  them,  I  would  propofe  it  to  his  Confideration,  whe- 
ther many  of  the    firil:    Reformers,    and  others  that  fucceeded 
them,  whom  Gcd  in  their  Day  made  the   chief  Pillars  of  his 
Church,  and  greateit   Initrunients  of  their  Deliverance    front 
Error  and  Darlcncfs,    and   of  the   Support  of  the  Caufe  of 
Piety   among   thern,    have   not  been  injured,  in  the  Contempt 
with  which  they  ha\e  been  treated  by  many  late  Writers,  for 
their   teaching   and   maintaining   fuch  Dodtrines  as  are  com-  • 
monly  called  Cal-uinrjik.     Indeed  foir.e  of  thefe  new  Writers^ 
at  the  fame  Time  that  they  have  reprefented  the  Doftrines  of 
thefe   antient   and   eminent   Divines,  as  in  the  higheft  Degree 
ridiculous,  and  contrary  to  common  Senfe,   in  an  Oftentation 
of  a  very  generous  Charity,  have  allowed  that  they  were  honell 
well-meaning  Men  :   Yea,  it  may  be  fome  of  them,  as  tho'  it 
were  in   great   Condefccnlion  and  Compaflion  to   them,  have 
allowed  that  they  did  pretty  well  for  the  Day  which  they  lived 
in,  and  confidering  the  great  Difadvantages  they  laboured  un- 
der :  When  at    the   fame  Time,  their  Manner  of  Speaking  has 
naturally  and  plainly  fuggeiled  to  the  Minds  of  their  Readers, 
that  they  were    Perfons,  who   through  the  Lownefs   of  their 
Genius,  and  G.-eatnefs  of  the  Bigotry,  with  which  their  Minds 
were  Ihackled,  and  Thoughts  confined,  living  ifl  the  gloomy 
Caves  of  Superllition,  fondly  embraced,  and  demurely  andzea- 
Joufly  taught  the  moft  abfurd,  filly  and  monftrous  Opinions, 
worthy  of  the  greateft   Contempt   of  Gentlemen  pofieffed  of 
that  noble  and  generous  Freedom  of  Thought,  which  happily 
prevails  in  this  Age  of  Light  and  Inquiry.     When  indeed  fuch 
is  the  Cafe,  that  we  might,  if  {o  difpofed,  fpeak  as  big  Words 
as  they,  and  on  far  better  Grounds.     And  really  all  the  Ar- 
minians  on  Earth  might  be  challenged  without  Arrogance  or 
Vanity,  to  make  thefe  Principles  of  theirs  wherein  they  mainly 
differ  from  their  Fathers,    v/hom  they  fo  much  difpife,  con- 

fiftenir 


'?y6^  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  N.  293 

fiftent  vv  ith  common  Senfe  ;  yea,  and  perhaps  to  produce  any 
Doctrine  ever  embraced  by  the  biindeft  Bigot  of  the  Church  of 
Rome,  or  the  moft  ignorant  Mnjj'ulman,  or  extravagant  Enthu^ 
iiaft,  that  might  be  reduced  to  more,  and  more  demonftrable 
Inconliftenciesj  and  Repugnancies  to  common  Senfe,  and  to 
themfelves ;  tho'  their  Inconfiftencies  indeed  may  not  lie  fo  deep, 
or  be  fo  artfully  vail'd  by  a  deceitful  Ambiguity  of  Words,  and 

an  indeterminate  Signification  of  Phrafes. 1  will  not  deny, 

that  thefe  Gentlemen,  many  of  them,  are  Men  of  great  Abili- 
ties, and  have  been  helped  to  higher  Attainments,  in  Philofophy, 
than  thofe  antient  Divines,  and  have  done  great  Service  to  the 
Church  of  God  in  fome  Refpefts :  But  I  humbly  conceive, 
that  their  differing  from  their  Fathers  with  fuch  magifterial 
AfTurance,  in  thefe  Points  in  Divinity,  mull  be  owing  to  fome 
other  Caufe  than  fuperiour  Wifdom. 

It  may  alfo  be  worthy  of  Consideration,  whether  the  great 
Alteration  which  has  been  made  in  the  State  of  Things  in  ouc 
Nation,  and  fome  other  Parts  of  the  Proteftant  World,  in 
this  and  the  paft  Age,  by  the  exploding  fo  generally  Cal'vinijiic 
Dodlrines,  that  is  fo  often  fpoken  of  as  worthy  to  be  greatly- 
rejoiced  in  by  the  Friends  of  Truth,  Learning  and  Virtue,  as 
an  Inftance  of  the  great  Increafe  of  Light  in  the  Chriftian 
Church  ;  I  fay,  it  may  be  worthy  to  be  confidered,  whether 
this  be  indeed  a  happy  Change,  owing  to  any  fuch  Caufe  as 
an  Increafe  of  true  Knowledge  and  Underftanfting  in  Things 
of  Religion  ;  or  whether  there  is  not  Reafon  to  Year,  that  it 
may  be  owing  to  fome  worfe  Caufe. 

And  I  defire  it  may  be  confidered,  whether  the  Boldnefs 
of  fome  Writers  may  not  be  worthy  to  be  reflefted  on,  who 
have  not  fcrupled  to  fay,  that  if  thefe  and  thofe  Things  are 
true  (which  yet  appear  to  be  the  demonftrable  Diftates  o£ 
Reafon,  as  well  as  the  certain  Diftates  of  the  Mouth  of  the 
moft  High)  then  God  is  unjuft  and  cruel,  and  guilty  of  m.ani- 
feft  Deceit  and  double-dealing,  and  the  like.  Yea,  fome  have 
gone  fo  far,  as  confidently  to  aflert.  That  if  any  Book  which 
pretends  to  be  Scripture,  teaches  fuch  Doftrines,  that  alone  is 
fufficient  Warrant  for  Mankind  to  rejeft  it,  as  what  cannot  be 
the  Word  of  God.  Some  who  have  not  gone  fo  far,  have 
faid.  That  if  the  Scripture  feems  to  teach  any  fuch  Doftrines, 
fo  contrary  to  Reafon,  we  are  obliged  to  find  out  fome  other  In- 
terpretation of  thofe  Texts,  where  fuch  Dodlrines  feem  to  be 
exhibited.  Others  exprefs  themfelves  yet  more  modeftly  :  They 
exprefs  a  Tendernefs  and  religious  Fear,  left  they  ftiould  re- 
ceive and  teach  any  Thing  that  (hould  feem  to  refleft  on  God'» 

P  p  moral 


^94'        77:^^  C  O  N  C  L  U  S  I  O  1^. 

moral  Cliarafter,  or  be  a  Difparagement  to  his  Methods  of 
Adminiftration,  in  his  moral  Government  j  and  therefore  ex- 
prefs  themfelves  as  not  daring  to  embrace  fome  Dodrinesy 
though  they  feem  to  be  delivered  in  Scripture,  according  to 
the  more  obvious  and  natural  Conflrudtion  of  the  Words. 
But  indeed  it  would  Ihew  a  truer  Modefty  and  Humility, 
if  they  would  more  entirely  rely  on  God's  Wifdom  and  Dif- 
cerning,  who  knows  infinitely  better  than  we,  what  is  agreeable 
to  his  own  Perfeftions,  and  never  intended  to  leave  thefe  Mat- 
ters to  the  Decifion  of  the  Wifdom  and  Difcerning  of  Men  ; 
but  by  his  own  unerring  Inltruftion,  to  determine  for  us  what 
the  Truth  is ;  knowing  how  little  our  Judgment  is  to  be  de- 
pended on,  and  how  extremely  prone,  vain  and  blind  Men  are, 
to  err  in  fach  Matters. 

The  Truth  of  the  Cafe  is,  that  if  the  Scripture  plainly 
taught  the  oppofite  Dodrines,  to  thofe  that  are  fo  much  ftum- 
bled  at,  'z.v'z,  the  Jrminian  Dodrine  of  Free-Will,  and  others 
depending  thereon,  it  would  be  the  greateft  of  all  Difficulties 
that  attend  the  Scriptures,  incomparably  greater  than  its  con- 
tainmg  any,  even  the  moll:  myfterious  of  thofe  Doftrines  of  the 
firft  Reformers,  which   our  late  Free-thinkers  have  fo  fuperci- 

lioufly  exploded. Indeed  it  is  a  glorious  Argument  of  the 

Divinity  of  the  holy  Scriptures,  that  they  teach  fuch  Doctrines, 
which  in  one  Age  and  another,  thro'  the  Blindnefs  of  Men's 
Minds,  and  ftrong  Prejudices  of  their  Hearts,  are  reje(Sed,  as 
moft  abfurd  and  unreafonable,  by  the  wife  and  great  Men  of 
the  World  ;  which  yet,  when  they  are  moft  carefully  and. 
flridly  examined,  appear  to  be  exaftly  agreeable  to  the  moft 
demonftrable,  certain,  and  natural  dictates  of  Reafon.  By  fuch 
Things  it  appears,  that  the  Foolijhttejs  of  God  is  'wiftr  than  Meiii 
and  God  does  as  is  faid  in  i  Cor.  i.  19,  20  ;  For  it  is  ivrittetiy 
J  ijoill  dejiroy  the  Wifdom  of  the  Wife;  I  nvill  bring  to  nothing  the 
Underfanding  of  the  Prudent.  Where  is  the  Wife  !  Where  is  the 
Scribe  !  Where  is  the  Difpiiter  of  this  World  !  Hath  not  God  made 
foolijh  the  Wifdom  of  this  World?  And  as  it  ufed  to  be  in  Time 
paft,  fo  it  is  probable  it  will  be  in  Time  to  come,  as  it  is  there 
written,  in  ver.  27,  28,  29:  But  God  hath  chofen  the  foolifh 
Things  of  the  World,  to  confoimd  the  Wife  :  And  God  hath  chofett 
the  nueak  Things  of  the  World,  to  confound  the  Things  that  are 
mighty  :  And  hafe  Things  of  the  World,  and  Things  ivhich  are 
defpifed,  hath  God  chofen  :  Tea,  and  Things  'which  are  not,  lo 
bring  to  nought  Things  that  are  ;  that  no  Flefh  fhoidd  glorj  in  hti 
Prefence,     Amen. 

FINIS,  \ 


[    295     ] 

r"»«  i^*^ -iif  "s£  2ir^  xr*"^  ?jr"5ie  sr"4s  ^  "^  5<r"5if  SIT"*' s<r"$j 
stftMi     »>!^     »**«     »it™     *\|         *'li'*     rrf^f^     **^3Mt         if^     ;W;**     3t^ 


I    N    D    E 


[N.  B.  Tlie  Capital  P.  fignines  the  Prtr/;  this  Mark,  §,  the 
Se£iion  ;  Concl.  \}as.  Conclttjton  ;  and  the  fm all  /.  the  Page  ; 
where  the  Things  here  fpecified,  are  to  be  found.] 


ABfiraaed  or  Ahfirufe  Rea- 

foning,      whether     juftly 

objected  againft  Cal-vinijis,  P. 

4-  §•  '3-  P-  278. 

ABion,  Inconfiftence  of  the 
Arminian'^Qtioxs.  of  it, P.  4.  §.  2. 
p.  J  99.  and  whence  this  arofe, 
p.  204.  what  it  is  in  the  com- 
mon Notion  of  it.  Ibid.  p.  201. 
— and  how  diiiinguifli'd  from 
FaJJton,  Ibid.  p.  203. 

ABi'vitj  cf  the  Nature  of  the 
Soul,  whether  thro'  this.  Voli- 
tion can  arife  without  a  Caufe, 
P.  2.  §.  4.  p.^47. 

Apparent  Good,  the  greateft, 
in  what  Senfe  it  determines  the 
Will,  P.  i.§.  2.p.  7. 

Arininians,  obliged  to  talk 
jnconfiftently,  P.  2.  §.  5.  p.  '^1. 
Ibid.  §.  7.  p.  70.  \.  9.  p.  77. 
where  the  main  Strength  of 
their  pretended  Demonftrations 
lies,  P.  4.  §.  4.  p.  219.  Their 
Objeftion  from  God's  moral 
Charader,  confuler'd  and  re- 
torted. Ibid.  ^.  II.  p.  271.  2. 

^yminiaii  Doilritie,  its  Ten- 


dency to  fuperfede  ail  Ufe  of 
Means,  and  make  Endeavours 
vain,  P.  4.  §.  5,  p.  222.  and  in 
Efteft,  to  exclude  all  Virtue 
and  Vice  out  of  the  World,  P, 
3.  §.  4.  p.  161,  167.  Ibid.  §. 
6.  p.  184.  and  §.  7.  p.  190. 
P.  4.  §.  I.  p.  196,7.  Ibid.  §. 
12.  p.  276. 

Atheijm,  the  fuppofed  Ten- 
dency of  Calvmijiic  Principles 
to  it,  P.  4.  §.  12.  p.  274. 
How  Arminian  Principles  tend 
to  it.  Ibid.  p.  275;. 

Attending  t-)  Moti-'ucs,  of  Li- 
l-ierty's  being  fuppofed  to  con- 
fill  in  an  Ability  for  it,  P.  2. 
§  9.  p.  80. 

Atonement.     See  Christ. 

Author  of  Sin,  whether  it 
would  follow  from  the  Doc- 
trine here  maintain'd,  that  God 

is  fo,  P.  4.  §  9.  p.  2)2. 

"pLame-nuorthtnefs,  wherein  it 
confifts,  according  to  com- 
mon oenfe,  P.  4.  §  4.  p.  2 1 2. 

Cal'vinifrn^ 


2^6 


INDEX. 


/^Alvlmfm,     confiftent    with 
common  Senfe,  P,  4.  §  3. 
p.  206. 

Cau/ey  how  the  Word  is  uf- 
ed  ifl  this  Difcourfe,  P.  2.  § 
3.  p.  41.      No  Event  njoithout 

one,  P.  2.  §  3.  p.  42. and 

Iffed,  a  neceffary  Comieilion 
between  them,  P.  2.  §  8..p,  73. 
This  refpeds  moral,  as  well  as 
natural Caufes,  P.  2.  §  3.  p.  41 . 

Chriji,  his  Obedience  necef- 
fary, yet  virtuous  and  Praife- 
ivorthy,  P.  3.  §  i.  p.  139.  His 
Atonement  excluded  in  Con- 
fequence  of  Arminian  Princi- 
ples, P.  3.  §  3.p.  158. 

Chubb  (Mr.)  the  Inconfift- 
ence  of  his  Scheme  of  Liberty  ^ 

&c.  P.  2.  §  9.  p.  85, 98. 

Commands yCon^v^.Q.vA  with  mo- 
ral Neceflity  and  Inability,  P. 
3.  §4.  p.  159.  P.  4.  §  II.  p. 
270.  Inconfiftent  with  Arminian 
Principles,  P.  3.  §  4.  p.  161. 

Commofz  Senje,  why  the  Prin- 
ciples maintain'd  in  this  Dif- 
courfe,  appear  to  fome  contrary 
toit,  P.4.  §  3.  p.  206.  Necef- 
fary Virtue  and  Vice  agreeable 

to  it  P.  4.  §  4.  p.  212. Ar- 

mnian  Tenets  oppofite  to  it, 
P.  3.  §  6.  p.  178.  Ibid.  §  7.  p. 
187. 

Contingenee,  P.  i.  §3.  p.  20. 
thelnconfiftenceof  the  Notion, 
P.  2.  §  3.  p.  45.  Whether  ne- 
ceffary in  order  to  Liberty,  P. 

2.  §  8.  p.  73. '■ — implied  in 

Arminian  Liberty,  and  yet  in- 
confiftent with  it.  P.  2.  §  13. 
p.  132.  Epicurus  the  greateft 
Maintainer  of  it,  P.  4.  ^  6.  p. 
228.  Ibid.  §  12  p.  275. 


Corruption  of  Man's  Nature^ 

CoNCL.  p.  287. 

Creation  of  the  World,  at  fuch 
a  particulay  '•7'/»7e'  and  Place,  P. 
4.  §  8.  p.  240. 

T\Ecree  ahjolute,  not  inferring 
Neceflity,  any  more  than 
certain  Foreknowledge  does, 
P.  2.  §  12.  p.  122.  How  it  fol- 
lows  from  Things  proved   iii 
this  Difcourfe.  CoNCL.p.  289. 
Determination.   See  Will. 
Didates,  See  Underjlanding. 

pFfea.  See  Caufe. 

Efficacious  Grace.  Co.  p.  2  8  8. 

Eicdion  perjonal.  See  Decree, 

Endea'vours ,  what  it  is  for 
them  to  be  in  vain,  P.  4.  §  5. 

p.  220. Render'd  vain  by 

Arminian  Principles,  Ibid.  p. 
222.  But  not  fo  by  Cal'vinifm,, 
Ibid.  p.  224. See  Sincerity, 

Entrance  of  Sin  into  the 
World,  P.  4.  §  19.  p.  268. 

Equilibrium.  See  Indifference. 

Exhortation.  See  Invitation, 

JpAllen  Man.  See   Inability. 

Fatejioical,  P.  4.  v^  6.  p.  228. 

Fatality,  the  Principles  of 
Arminians  inferring  that  which 
ifi  moft  fhocking,  P.  4.  §  8.  p. 
251. 

Foreknoivledge  of  God,  of  Vo- 
litions of  moral  Agents,  proved, 
P.  2.  §  II.  p.  98.- — Inconfift- 
ent with  Contingence,  P.  2. 
§  12.  p.  117.  Proves  Neceffity, 
as  much  as  a  Decree,  Ibid.  p. 
1 22.  The  feeming  Difficulty  of 
reconciling  it  with  the  Since- 
rity of  his  Precepts,  Counfels, 
&c. 


INDEX. 


Sec.  not  peculiar  to  the  Cal'vin- 
ijiic  Scheme,  P.  4.  ^  1 1 .  p.  27 1 . 

Y^OD,  his  Being  how  known, 
P.  2.  ^3.  p.  43  .P.  4.^  12. 
p.  275.  His  moral  Excellencies 
neceffary,  yet  virtuoqs  and 
praife-worthy, P.  3.^  I.  p.  135. 
P.  4.  S  4.  p,  219.  The  Ne- 
ceffity  of  his  Volitions,  P.  4.  \ 
7.  p.  230.  Whether  the  Prin- 
ciples maintain'd  in  this  Dif- 
courfe  are  inconfiftent  with  his 
moral  Charafter,  P.  4.  ^11. 
p.  270.  How  Arminianifm  de- 
ftroys  the  Evidence  of  his  mo- 
ral Perfedions.  Ibid.  p.  272. 

Grace  of  the  Spirit  y  excluded 
by  Arminian  Principles,  P.  3.  § 

3-P-  15?- 

Grace,  its  Freenefs  confiftent 
•with  the  moral  Neceffity  of 
God's  Will,  P.  4.  S  8.  p.  249. 

TJAbits,  virtuous  and  vicious, 
inconfiftent  with  Arminian 
Principles,  P.  3.  §  6.  p.  181. 

Heathen,  of  their  Salvation, 
P.  3.  ^  5.  p._i77. 

Hobbes,  his  Doftrine  of  Ne- 
ceffity, P.  4.  ^  6,  p.  229. 

TMpoJJibility ,  the  fame  as  ne- 
gative Neceffity,P.  i  .^3.p.  1 9. 
Inability,  how  the  Word  is 
yfed  in  common  Speech,  and 
how  by  MctaphyficiLins  and  Ar- 
minians,  P.  i.  ^  4.  p.  14,  17. 
P.  4.  ^  3.  p.  207.  Natural  and 
moral,  P.  i .  ^  4.  p.  20.  Moral, 
the  feveral  Kinds  of  it,  P.  i.  § 
4.  p.  29.  P.  3.  S  4.  p.  165. 

of  fallen  Man  to  perform 

perfedl  Obedience,  P.  3,  S  3« 


297 

p.  157.  What  does,  and  what 
does  not  excufe  Men,  P.  3.  ^ 

3.  p.  155.  Ibid.  ^4.  p.  167.  P. 

4.  §  3.  p.  206. 
Inclinations;  fee  Habits,- 
Indifference,  whether  Liberty 

confills  in  it,  P.  2.  S  1'  p.  ^'i* 
— Not  neceffary  to  Virtue,  but 
inconfiftent  with  it,  P.  3.  ^  6, 
p.  178. 

Indifferent  Things,  thofe 
which  appear  fo,  never  the  Ob- 
jects of  Volition,  P.  1.^2, 
p.  7.  P.  2.  ^  6.  p.  56.  Whether 
the  Will  can  determine  itfelf  in 
chufing  among  fuch  Things, 
P.  2.  s  6.  p.  57. 

Inn)itations ,  confiftent  with 
moral  Neceffity  and  Inability. 
P.  3.  S  4.  p>  169.  P.  4.  ^  II. 
p.  270.  But  not  confiftent  with 
Arminian  Principles,  P.  2.  \  9. 
p.  81.  P.  3.  S  7.  p.  188.  P.  4. 
^  II.  p.  272. 

T  Anus,  the  End  whereof  is  to 
bind  to  one  Side,  render 'd 
ufelefs  by  Arminian  Principles, 
P.  3.  §4.  p.  162. 

Z/^^r/j-jthe  Natureof  it,  P.  i. 
^  5.  p.  27.  The  Arminian  No- 
tion of  it.  Ibid.  p.  28.  This 
inconfiftent  with  other  Armi- 
nian Notions,  P.  2.  ^  9.  p.  77, 

Licentioufne/s ,  whether  the 
Cal<vinifiic  Dodrine  tends  to  it, 
P.  4.  ^  12.  p.  275. See  En- 
deavours. 

"^/TAchines,  Vf^xt^txCal-oinifm 
makes  Men  fuch.   P.  4. 
S  5.  p.  226. 

Means y  fee  Endeanjours. 

Metaphyseal 


298 


INDEX. 


Metaphyseal  Reafoning  ;   fee 

AhftraBed. To  be  jultly  ob- 

jeiJted  againft  the  Arminian 
Scheme,  F.  4.  S  13.  p.  283. 

Moral  Agency,  its  Nature, 
P.  I.  S  5- p.  29- 

Moti'ves,  what  they  are,  P.  i . 
^  2.  p.  5,  6.  The  itrongeft 
determining  the  Will,  Ibid. 
p.  6,  P.  2.  §  10.  p.  88.  Arr 
miniati  Principles  inconfiftent 
with  their  Influence  and  Ufe 
in  moral  Adions,  P.  3.  ^  -y.  p. 
185.    P.  4,^  II.  p.  273. 

JVrAtural  Notions  ;  fee  common 

Scnfe. 

NeceJJity,   hovv    the  Term  is 

ufed  in  common  Speech,  and 

how  by   Philofophers,    P.    i. 

S  3-P-  1 3-     P:4-  SZ'  P-  207, 

■ Philofophical,   of  various 

Kinds,  Ibid.  p.  210.  Natural 
and  moral,  P.  i.  S  4'  P-  20. 
P.  A.  \  4.  p.  217. — No  Liberty 
witnout  moral  Neceffity,  P.  2. 
S  8.  p.  73.  Neceffity  and  Con- 
tingcnce,  both  inconfiftent  with 
Arminian  Liberty,   P.  2.  ^  13. 

p.  1 3 1 . Neceffity  of  God's 

Volition,  P.  3.  \  I.  p.  13^. 
P.  4.  ^  7.  p.  230.  This  con- 
fiftent  with  the  Freenefs  of  his 
Grace,  Ibid,  §  8.  p.  249.— Ne- 
ceffity, of  Chrift's  Obedience, 
i^c.  P.  3.  ^  2.  p.  140 — of  the 
Sin  of  fuch  as  are  given  up  to 

Sin,  P.  3.  §  3.  p.  153. of 

fallen  Man,  in  general,  P.  3.  § 
3.  p.  157.  What  Neceffity 
wholly  excufes  Men,  P.  3.  ^  4. 
p.  168.  P.  4.  S  3.  p.  206.  and 
§4-P-2i5- 


r\Bedience;  fee  Chrifi,    Gom^ 
mands,  NeceJJity. 

p  Articles  perfealy  alike,  of  thp 
Creator's  placing  fuch  dif- 
ferently, P.  4.  ^  8.  p.  242. 

Perje'verance  of  Saints,  CoN- 
CLUs.  p.  291. 

Promijes,  whether  any  are 
ma<le  to  the  Endeavours  of 
unregenerate  Sinners,  P.  3.  ^ 
5.  p.  176. 

Fro'vtdence,  univerfal  and  de- 
cifive.  CoNCL.  p.  286. 
"DEdemption  particular,   CoNr 
CLUB.  p.  290. 

Reformers  the  firji,  how  treat- 
ed by  many  late  Writers.  Con- 
CLus.  p.  292. 

QAints  in  Hea'ven,    their  Lir 
berty,  P.  4.  ^  4.  p.  219. 

Scripture,  of  the  Arminians 
Arguments  from  thence,  P.  4, 
^  ii.p.  173. 

Self-determining  Ponver  of  the 
Will,  its  Inconfiilence,  P.  2. 
S  I .  p.  3 1 .  E'uafions  of  the  Ar- 
guments againlt  it  confider'd, 
P.  2  ^  2.  p.  35'.  ftiewn  to  be 
impertinent.   Ibid.    ^  5.  p.  ^i. 

Sin;    fee    Author,    Entrance, 

Sincerity  of  Defres  and  En- 
dea<vours,  what  is  no  juft  Excufe, 
P.  3.  S  5-  p«  170.  The  different 
Sorts  oi  Sincerity,  Ibid.  p.  175,, 

Sloth,  not  encouraged  by 
Calvinij'm,  P.  4.  ^  ^.  p.   224. 

Stoic  Philojophers,  great  The- 
ifts,  P.  4.  §  i2.p.  274.-Seei^<7/,?. 

Sujpending  Volition,  of  the 
Liberty  of  the  Will  fuppofed 
to  confift  in  an  Ability  for  it, 
P.  2.  S  7.  p.  70.  P.  3.  S  4- 
p..  164.  Ibid.  ^  7.  p.  186. 

Tendency 


n^Endency  of  the  Principles 
here  maintain'd,  to  Atheifm 
and  Licentioufnefs,  the  Ob- 
jection ccnfider'd  and  retortedj 
P.  4.  §.  12.  p.  274. 

TTlrtue  ajii  Vice,  the  Being 
of  neither  of  them  confift- 
ent  with  Arminian  Principles  ; 
See  Arminian  Dodrine.  Their 
Effence,  not  lying  in  their 
Caufe,  but  their  Nature,  P.  4. 
§  I.  p.  192. 

Underjla7iding,  how  it  deter- 
mines the  Will,  P.  I,  §  2.  p, 
12.  P.  2.  §9.  p.  76.  Didates 
of  the  Underftanding  and  Will, 
as  fuppofed  by  fome,  the  fame, 
P.  2.  §  9.  p.  8i. 

Uneajinefsy    as  fuppofed   to 


INDEX.  299 

determine  the  Will,  P.  i.  §  2. 


p.  7. 

Volition,  not  without  a  Caufcj 
P.  2.  §3.  p.  46.  P.  2.  §  4.  p.  50. 

TJ/^ILL,  its  Nature,  P.  i. 
§  I .  p.  1 ,  k£c.  Its  Deter- 
mination, P.  I.  <$  2.  p.  5.  ^c. 
The  very  Being  of  fuch  a  Fa- 
culty inconfiftent  with  Armi- 
ftian    Principles,    P.   3.  ^  7.  p. 

190. Of  God,  fecret   and 

re<vealed,  P.  4.  ^  9.  p.  262.  Ar- 
minians  themfelves  oblig'd  to 
allow  fuch  a  Diftinflion.  Ibid, 
p.  264. 

Willingnefs  to  Duty,  what  is 
no  Excufe  for  the  Negled  of 
it.     See  Sincerity^ 


^x2>»0»0'0<-'OoO<-0<x2>'^'<2xx2x»0<»0<'OxS>^>0»<£>'^ 


^.0<>0<»0<k2><00<0'x2>'^'0»0<0*0«S>«0<'0<»0'^ 


REMARKS 

ON         THE 

ESSAYS  on  tlie  Principles  of 
Morality  and  Natural 
Religion, 

In  a  L  E  T  T  E  R  to  a  Minifter  of  the 
Church  of  Scotland  :      .- 

V 

By  the  Reverend  Mr.  JONATHAN  ED- 
WARDS, Prefident  of  the  College  of  New- 
Jersey,  and  Author  of  the  late  I  n  qjj  i  r  y  in- 
to the  ModernNotions  of  the  Freedom 
of  Will, 

Re'v.  SIR, 

ii^OCXXXw  ^^  •''"'•''^^^^^"^  you  have  given  me  of  the  Ufe 
^  y^l  which  has,    by  fome,    been  made  of  what  I  have 

X  T'  X  written  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  &c.  to  vin- 
X  X  t^icate  what  is  faid  on  the  Subjed  of  Liberty  and 

V^XX.XX  Neceflity  by  the  Author  of  the  Ejfaji  on  the  PrifZ'^ 
ciples  of  Morality  atid  Natural  Religion,  has  occafioned  my  read-i 
ing  this  Author's  Effay  on  that  Subjefi:,  with  particular  Care 
and  Attention.  And  I  think  it  muft  be  evident  to  every  one, 
that  has  read  both  his  E^ay  and  my  Inquiry,  that  our  Schemes 
are  exceeding  reverfe  from  each  other.  The  wide  Difference 
appears  particularly  in  the  following  Things. 

This  Author  fuppofes,  that  fuch  a  Neceffity  takes  place  with 

fefped  to  all  Mens  Adioris,    as  is  inconfiftent  with  Liberty  «, 

Q^q  and 

a  P.  1 60,  161,  164,  165,  aiii  map-/  oUier  Places. 


(  =  ) 

and  plainly  denies  that  Men  have  any  Liberty  in  afting.  ThuS' 
in  p.  1 68.  after  he  had  been  fpeaking  of  the  Neceffity  of  our 
Determinations,  as  connefted  with  Motives,  he  concludes  wiih 
faying,  "  In  fhort,  if  Motives  are  not  under  our  Power  or 
Direction,  which  is  confeffediy  the  Faft,  we  can  at  Bottom  have 

. NO  LIBERT  Y."     Whereas  I  have  abundantly  expreffed 

it  as  my  Mind,  that  Man,  in  his  moral  Adions,  has  true  Li- 
berty; and  that  the  moral  Neceffity  which  univerfally  takes 
Place,  is  not  in  the  leaft  inconfiftent  with  any  thing  that  is  pro- 
perly called  Liberty,  and  with  the  utnioft  Liberty  that  can  be 
defired,  or  that  can  poflibly  exift  or  be  conceived  of  a. 

I  find  that  fome  are  apt  to  think,  that  in  that  Kind  of  mo- 
ral Neceffity  of  Mens  Volitions,  which  I  fuppofe  to  be  univer- 
fal,  at  leaft  fome  Degree  of  Liberty  is  denied ;  that  though  it 
be  true  I  allow  a  Sort  of  Liberty,  yet  thofe  who  maintain  a 
felf-determining  Power  in  the  Will,  and  a  Liberty  of  Contin- 
gence  and  Indiuerence,  hold  an  higher  Sort  of  Freedom  than 
1  do ;  but  I  think  this  is  certainly  a  great  Miftake. 

Liberty,  as  I  have  explained  it,  in  p.  38.  and  other  Places, 
is  the  Po^ixer,  Opportiiniiy ,  or  Ad<vantage  that  any  one  has  to  d<> 
as  he  pleafes,  or  conducing,  in  any  respect,  according  to 
his  Pleafure;  without  conlidering  how  his  Pleafure  comes  to  be 
as  it  is.  It  is  demonftrable,  and  I  think  has  been  demonftrat- 
ed,  that  no  Neceffity  of  Mens  Volitions  that  I  maintain,  is  in- 
confiftent with  this  Liberty  :  And  I  think  it  is  impoflible  for  a- 
ny  one  to  rife  higher  in  his  Conceptions  of  Liberty  than  this  : 
If  any  imagine  they  defire  higher,  and  that  they  conceive  of  a. 
higher  and  greafer  Liberty  than  this,  they  are  deceived,  and  de- 
lude themfelves  with  coniufed  ambiguous  Words,  inftead  of  I- 
deas.  If  any  one  ftiould  here  fay,  "  Yes,  I  conceive  of  a 
Freedom  above  and  beyond  the  Liberty  a  Man  has  of  conduc- 
ing in  any  Refpeft  as  he  pleafes,  'vi%.  a  Liberty  of  chtijing  as 
he  pleafes."  Such  an  one,  if  he  reflefted,  would  either  Lluih 
or  laugh  at  his  own  Inftance.  For,  is  not  chufing  as  he  pleafesj^ 
Gondurtinp-,  in  some  respect,  according  to  his  Plea- 
fure, and  ftill  without  determining  how  he  came  by  that  Plea- 
fure ?  If  he  fays,  "  Yes,  I  came  by  that  Pleafure  by  my  own 
Choice."  If  he  be  a  Man  of  common  Senfe,  by  this  Time  he 
will  fee  his  own  Abfurdity  :  For  he  muft  needs  fee  that  his  No- 
tion or  Conception,  even  of  this  Liberty,  don't  contain  any 
Judgment  or  Conception  how  he  comes  by  that  Choice,  which 
iirft  determines  his  Pleafure,  or  which  originally  fixed  his  own 
Will  refpeding  the  Affair.     Or  if  any  fhall  fay,  "  That  a  Man 

exercifea 

a   Inquiry^  P.  37 30,    133,    J34,    I()8,-w— ao6,   214,   %l^i  %lt 

339- 


(    3     ) 

f  xerclfes  Liberty  In  this,  even  in  determining  his  own  Choice, 
but  not  as  he  pleafes,  or  not  in  Confequencc  of  any  Choice, 
Preference,  or  IncHnation  of  his  own,  but  by  a  determination 
arifi'ng  contingently  out  of  a  State  of  abfolute  Indifference  ;  " 
this  is  not  rifing  higher  in  his  Conception  of  Liberty  ;  as  fuch  a 
Determination  of  the  Will  would  not  be  a  voluntary  Determi- 
nation of  it.  Surely  he  that  places  Liberty  in  a  Power  of  do- 
ing fomething  not  accor^ling  to  his  own  Choice,  or  from  his 
Choice,  has  not  a  higher  Notion  of  it,  than  he  that  places  it 
in  doing  as  he  pleafes,  or  afting  from  his  own  Eledion.  If 
there  were  a  Power  in  the  Mind  to  determine  itfclf,  but  not  by  its 
Choice  or  according  to  its  Pleal'ure,  what  Advantage  would  it 
give  ?  and  what  Liberty,  worth  contending  for,  would  be  exer- 
cifed  in  it  ?  Therefore  no  Arminian,  Peiagian,  or  Epicurion, 
can  rife  higljer  in  his  Conceptions  of  Liberty,  than  the  Notion 
of  it  which  1  have  explained:  Which  Notion  is,  apparently, 
perfeftly  confiftent  with  the  Whole  of  that  NecefTity  of  Mens 
Adions,  which  I  fuppofe  talces  Place.  And  I  fcruple  not  to 
fay  'tis  beyond  all  their  Wits  to  invent  a  higher  Notion,  or  form 
a  higher  Imagination  of  Liberty  ;  let  them  talk  of  So^jereig?i!j> 
of  the  Will,  felf-determiniiig  Fonver,  Self-motio-n,  Self-direiiion^ 
urbitrary  Decijion,  Liberty  ad  utrumvis,  Ponver  of  chajtng  diffe- 
re7itly  in  gh-ven  Cafes,  ^'c.  &c.  as  long  as  they  will.  'Tis  ap- 
parent that  thefe  Men,  in  their  ftrenuous  Affirmation,  and 
Difpute  about  thefe  Things,  aim  at  they  know  not  what,  fijdit- 
jng  for  fomething  they  have  no  Conception  of.  fubftitutino-  a 
Number  of  confufed  unmeaning  Words,  inftead  of  Things, 
and  inftead  of  Thoughts,  They  may  be  challenged  clearly '^to 
explain  what  they  would  have  :  They  never  can  anfwer  the 
Challenge. 

The  Author  of  the  EJfays,  through  his  whole  Eir;>y  on  Li- 
berty and  Neceffity,  goes  on  that  Suppofition,  that,  in  order 
to  the  Being  of  real  Liberty,  a  Man  rauft  have  a  Freedom  that 
is  oppofed  to  moral  Neceffity  :  And  yet  he  fuppofes,  P.  lyr, 
that/wf^  a  Liberty  miift  fignify  a  Poijoer  in  the  M-hid  of  aSling 
'without  and  againft  Motives,  a  Poniuer  of  a^ing  njoilhout  any. 
Vieiu,  Purpoje  or  Dcfiga,  and  even  of  aHiiig  in  ContradiSlion  to 
our  onjjn  Dejires  and  A<veifons,  and  to  all  our  Principles  of  Adi- 
on  ;  and  is  an  Abjurdity  altogether  inconffient  nvith  a  rational  Na- 
ture. Now,  whoever  imagined  fuch  a  Liberty  as  this,  a  high- 
er Sort  or  Degree  of  Freedom,  than  a  Liberty  of  following- 
one's  own  Views  and  Purpofes,  and  afting  agreeable  to  his  own 
Inclinations  and  Paffions  ?  Who  will  ever  reafonably  fuppofe 
^hat  Liberty,  which  is  an  Abfurdity  altogether  inconfiftent  with  a 
Q^q  3  rational 


C    4     ) 

rational  Nature,  to  be  a  Kind  of  Liberty  above  that  which, 
is  coiififtent  with  the  Nature  of  a  rational  intelligent  defigning 
Agent. 

The  Author  of  the  Ej/hjs  feems  to  fuppofe  fuch  a  Neceffity 
to  take  Place,  as  is  inconiillent  with  fome  fuppofable  Power 
ofarbitraryChoicect;  or  that  there  is  fc-me  Liber- 
ty conceivable,  whereby  Mens  own  Adions  might  be  more 
PROPERLY  IN  THEIR  PowER  h,  and  b)^which  Events  might 
be  more  dependent  on  ourselves  c  :  Contrary  to  what  I 
fuppofe  to  be  evident  in  my  hiqidrj  d.  What  Way  can  be  ima- 
gined, of  our  Actions  being  more  in  our  Fotver,  from  ourfc-hes, 
or  dependent  on  ourf elves,  than  their  being  from  our  Power  to 
fuliil  our  own  Choices  to  ad  from  our  own  Liclination,  piirfue 
our  own  Views,  and  execute  cur  own  Deftgns  ?  Certainly,  to 
be  able  to  aft  thus,  is  as  properly  having  our  A(!^tions  in  our 
Power,  and  dependent  on  ourfeh'es,  as  a  Being  liable  to  be  the 
Subjeds  of  Ads  and  Events,  contingently  and  fortuitoufly, 
nvithoitt  Dejire,  Vie^jj,  Purpofe  or  Dejign,  or  atiy  Principle  of  Ac- 
iion  within  ouvfelves ;  as  we  muil  be,  according  to  this  Author's 
own  declared  Senfe,  if  our  Adions  are  performed  with  that  Li- 
berty that  is  oppofed  to  moral  Necelfity. 

This  Author Teems  every  where  to  fuppofe,  that  Necefilty,  mofl: 
properly  fo  called,  attends  all  Mens  Adions ;  and  that  the 
Terms  necejfary,  unan^oidable ,  impojjihle,  &:c.  are  equally  appli- 
cable to  the  Cafe  of  moral  and  natural  Neceffity.  In  P.  173, 
be  fays,  T/^e  Idea  of  neceffary  ^//^  unavoidable  equally  agrees, 
hot h  to  moral  and  phyjical  Necej/ity.  And  in  P.  184.  All  Things 
that  fall  out  in  the  natural  and  moral  World  are  alike  necejfary, 
P.  174  This  Inclination  and  Choice  is  unavoidably  caujed  or  oc- 
cajioned  hy  the  pre^cailing  Mot  I've.  In  this  lies  the  NeceJ/jty  of  our 
ASlions,  that  in  fuch  Circumfiances  it  nvas  impoffible  mie  could  aSi. 
ctherivife.  He  often  exprefles  himfelf  in  like  Manner  elfewhere, 
fpeaking  in  (Irong  Terms  of  Mens  Adions  as  mianjoidable ,  what 
they  cannot  forbear,  having  710  Po'-wer  over  their  own  Adions, 
the  Order  of  them  being  unalterably  fixed,  and  infeparahly  link- 
ed together,  l^c.  e. 

On  the  contrary,  I  have  largely  declared,  that  the  Connec- 
tion between  antecedent  Things  and  confequent  Ones,  which 
takes  Place  with  regard  to  the  Ads  of  Mens  Wills,  which  is 
called  moral  Neceffity,  is  called  by  the  Name  of  Neccfjjty  im- 
properly ;  and  that  all  fuch  Terms  as  nuft,  cannot,  impnjjible, 
finable,  irrefjiable,  una^voidable ,  inuincible,  l^c.  when  applied 
here,  are  not  applied  in  their  proper  Signification,  and  are  ei- 
ther 

a  P.  169.    b  P.  191,  185,  197,  206.      c  P.  183.    d  P.  28a,  283. 
e  p.  180,  1,88,  193,  194,  J95,  197,  198,  199,  205,  206. 


(    5    ) 

ther  ufed  nonfenfically,  and  with  perfed  Infignificance,  or  in  3 
Senfe  quite  diveiTe  from  tlieir  original  and  proper  Meaning,  and 
their  Ufe  in  common  Speech  a  ;  And  that  fuch  a  Kecelfity  as 
attends  the  Afts  of  Mens  Wills,  is  more  properly  called  Cer- 
laitiiy,  than  Neceffity  ;  it  being  no  other  than  the  certain  Con- 
nexion between  the  Subject  and  Predicate  of  t!ie  Propofition 
which  affirms  their  Exillence  0. 

Agreeable  to  what  is  obferved  in  my  Inquiry  c,  I  think  it  is 
evidently  owing  to  a  ftrong  Prejudice  in  Perfons  Minds,  ariiing 
from  an  infenfible  habitual  Pcrverfion  and  Mifapplication  of 
fuch  like  Terms,  as  necejfary,  impoj/tble,  T.nable,  unn-coidable, 
in'vincihle ,  &c.  that  they  are  ready  to  think,  that  to  fuppofe  a 
certain  Conneftion  of  Mens  Volitions  without  any  foregoing 
Motives  or  Inclinations,  or  any  preceding  mor:.il  Influence 
whatfoever,  is  truly  and  properly  to  fuppofe  fuch  a  ftrong  irre-. 
fragable  Chain  of  Caufes  and  Effects,  as  flands  in  the  Way  of, 
and  makes  utterly  vain,  oppofite  Defires  and  Endeavours,  like 
immovable  and  impenetrable  Mountains  of  Brafs ;  and  impedes 
our  Liberty  like  Walls  of  Adamant,  Gates  of  Brafs,  and  Bars 
of  Iron  :  Whereas  all  fuch  Pvcprefentations  fuggeft  Ideas  as  far 
from  the  Truth,  as  the  Eaft  is  from  the  Weft.  Nothing  that  I 
maintain,  fuppofes  that  Men  are  at  all  hindered  by  any  fatal 
Neceffity,  from  doing,  and  even  willing  ar.J  chufing  as  they 
pleafe,  with  full  Freedom  ;  yea  with  the  liigheil  Degree  of  Li- 
berty that  ever  was  thought  of,  or  that  ever  could  poffibly  enter 
into  the  Heart  of  any  Man  to  conceive.  I  know  it  is  in  vain 
to  endeavour  to  make  fome  Perfons  believe  this,  or  at  leaft  ful- 
ly and  fteadily  to  believe  it :  For  if  it  be  demonftrated  to  them, 
ftill  the  old  Prejudice  remains,  which  has  been  long  fixed  by 
the  Ufe  of  the  Terms //^r^i/j,  ?n7ifi,  catinot,  impojjible.  Sec,  the 
Aflbciation  with  thefe  Terms  of  certain  Ideas  inconfiftent  with 
Liberty,  is  not  broken  ;  and  the  Judgment  is  powerfully  warp- 
ed by  it ;  as  a  Thing  that  has  been  long  bent  and  guown  ftiif, 
if  it  be  ftraitened,  will  return  to  its  former  Curvity  again  and  a- 
gain. 

The  Author  of  the  Ejp/ys  moft  manifeftly  fuppofes,  that  if 
Men  had  the  Truth  concerning  the  real  Neceffity  of  all  their 
Aftions  clearly  in  View,  they  would  not  appear  to  themfelves, 
pr  one  another,  as  at  all  Praife -worthy  or  culpable,  or  under 
any  moral  Obligation,  or  accountable  for  their  Aftions^; 
Which  fuppofes,  that  Men  are  not  to  be  blamed  or  praifed  for 
any  of  their  Aftions,    and  are  not  under  any  Obligations,    nor 


a    Inquiry,     P.     13 20,   22,   Z'J,     24,    2;,   26,     166,   20 209, 

211,   217 ^219,     283,   284.       b   inquiry,   P.    15, 17.        c   P.   206, 

——209.     </  p.  207,  209,   and  Other  Places. 


(    6    ) 

are  truly  accountable  for  any  thing  they  do,  by  Reafon  of  thU 
Neceffity ;  which  is  very  contrary  to  what  I  have  endeavoured 
to  prove,  throughout  the  third  Part  of  my  htqiiiry.  I  humbly 
conceive  it  is  there  Ihevvn,  that  this  is  fo  far  from  the  Truth, 
that  the  moral  Necelfity  of  Mens  Adtions,  which  truly  take 
Place,  is  requifite  to  the  Being  of  Virtue  and  Vice,  or  any 
thing  Praife-worthy  or  culpable  :  That  the  Liberty  of  Indiffe- 
rence and  Contingence,  wh'ch  is  advanced  in  Oppofition  to  that 
Neceffity,  is  inconfiftent  wilh  the  Being  of  thefe  ;  as  it  would 
fuppofe  that  Men  are  not  determined  in  what  they  do,  by  any 
virtuous  or  vicious  Principles,  nor  aft  from  any  Motives,  In- 
tentions or  Aims  whatfoever  ;  or  have  any  End,  either  good  or 
bad,  in  afting.  And  is  it  not  remarkable,  that  this  y\uthor 
fhould  fuppofe,  that,  in  order  to  Mens  Aftions  truly  having 
any  Defert,  they  muft  be  performed  'without  a:;j  Vienv,  Pitrpojey 
DeJigM,  or  Dejire,  or  a7iy  Principle  of  ABion,  or  anv  thing  a~ 
greeable  to  a  rational  "Nature  ?  As  it  will  appear  th?t  he  does,  if 
we  compare,  P.  206,  207,  with  P.   175. 

The  Author  of  the  EJfays  fuppofes,  that  God  has  deeply  im- 
planted in  Man's  Nature,  a  ftrong  and  invincible  Apprehenfion^ 
or  Feeling,  as  he  calls  it,  ot  a  Liberty,  and  Contingence  of  his 
own  Aftions,  oppofite  to  that  Neceflity  which  truly  attends 
them  ;  and  which  in  Truth  don't  agree  with  real  Faftc,  is  not 
agreeable  to  ftrid  philofophic  Truth  b,  is  contradidfory  to  the 
Truth  of  Things  c,  and  which  Truth  contradifts  dy  not  tally- 
ing with  the  real  Plan  e  :  And  that  therefore  fuch  Feelings  are 
deceitfuly,  are  in  Reality  of  the  delufive  Kind^.  He  fpeaks 
of  them  as  a  wife  Delufion  />,  as  nice  artificial  Feelings,  mere- 
ly that  Confcience  may  have  a  commanding  Power  i  :  Meaning 
plainly,  that  thefe  Feelings  are  a  cunning  Artifice  of  the  Au- 
thor of  Nature,  to  make  Men  believe  they  are  free,  when  they 
are  not  k.  He  fuppofes  that  by  thefe  Feelings  the  moral  World 
has  a  difguifed  Appearance  /.  And  other  Things  of  this  Kind 
he  fays.  He  fuppofes  that  all  Self-approbation,  and  all  Re- 
morfe  of  Confcience,  all  Commendation  or  Condemnation  of 
ourfelves  or  others,  all  Senfe  of  Defert,  and  all  that  is  connect- 
ed with  this  Way  of  thinking,  all  tlie  Ideas,  which  at  prefent 
are  fuggelled  by  the  Words  ought,  Jhould,  arife  from  this  Delu- 
fion, and  would  entirely  vanilh  without  it  m. 

All  which  is  very  contrary  to  what  I  have  abundantly  infilled 
on  and  endeavoured  to  deraonftrate  in  my  Liquirj  ;  v/here  I  have 

largely 

a  P.  200.  h  P.  152.  c  P.  J83.  d  P.  186.  e  P.  205.  /P. 
403,  204,  211.  g  P.  183.  h  P.  209.  /■  P.  211.  k  P.  153  \ 
/  P.  214.      m¥.    160,    194,199,205,    206,   207,    209. 


(    7     ) 

largely  ftiewn,  that  it  is  agreeable  to  the  natural  Senfe  of  Mait- 
kind,  that  the  moral  Neceffity  or  Certainty  that  attends  Mens 
Aftions,  is  confident  with  Praife  and  Blame,  Reward  and  Pu- 
nifhment ;  ?/  and  that  it  is  agreeable  to  our  natural  Notions, 
that  moral  Evil,  with  its  Delert  of  Diflike  and  Abhorrence, 
and  all  its  other  Ill-defsrvings,  confifts  in  a  certain  Deformity 
in  the  Nature  of  the  Difpofitions  and  Afts  of  the  Heart,  and 
not  in  the  Evil  of  fomething  elfe,  diverfe  from  thefe,  fuppofed 
to  be  their  Caufe  or  Occafion  o. 

I  might  well  afic  here,  whether  any  one  is  to  be  found  in  the 
World  of  Mankind,  who  is  confcious  to  a  Senfe  or  Feeling,  na- 
turally and  deeply  rooted  in  his  Mind,  that,  in  order  to  a  Man's 
performing  any  Adion  that  is  Praife  or  Blame-worthy,  he  muft 
exercife  a  Liberty  that  implies  and  fignifies  a  Power  of  atfting 
without  any  Motive,  View,  Defign,  Defire,  or  Principle  of 
Aftion  ?  For  fuch  a  Liberty  this  Author  fuppofes  That  muft  be 
which  is  oppofed  to  moral  Neceffity,  as  I  have  already  obferved 
once  and  again.  Suppollng  a  Man  ftiould  adtually  do  Good, 
independent  of  Defire,  Aim,  Inducement,  Principle  or  End, 
is  it  a  Diftate  of  invincible  natural  Senfe,  that  his  Aft  is  more 
meritorious  or  Praife-worthy  than  if  he  had  performed  it  for 
fome  good  End,  and  had  been  governed  in  it  by  good  Principles 
and  Moti'ves  ?  And  fo  I  might  aik,  on  the  contrary,  with  Re- 
fpedt  to  evil  Aftions/. 

The  Author  of  the  Ejfays  fuppofes  that  the  Liberty  without 
Neceffity  which  we  have  a  natural  Feeling  of,  ipiplies  Cotitin- 
gence  :  And  fpeaking  of  this  Contingence,  he  fometimes  calk 
it  by  the  Name  of  Chance.  And  'tis  evident,  that  his  Notion 
of  it,  or  rather  what  he  fays  about  it,  implies  Things  happen- 
ing loofely,  fortuitoiijly,  by  Accident ^  and  ^without  a  Caufe  q» 
Now  I  conceive  the  flighteft  Refleftion  may  be  fufficient  to  fa- 
tisfy  any  one,  that  fuch  a  Condngence  of  Mens  Adions,  ac- 
cording to  our  natural  Senfe,  is  fo  far  from  being  eflential  to 
the  Morality  or  Merit  of  thofe  Aftions,  that  it  would  deftroy 
it ;  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  Dependence  of  our  Aftions 
on  fuch  Caufes,  as  inward  Inclinations,  Incitements  and  Ends^ 
is  eflential  to  the  Being  of  it.  Natural  Senfe  teaches  Men, 
when  they  fee  any  thing  done  by  others  of  a  good  or  evil  Ten- 
dency, to  inquire  what  their  Intention  was ;  what  Principles 
and  Views  they  were  moved  by,  in  order  to  judge  how  far  they 
are  to  be  juftified  or  condemned ;    and  not  to  determine,    that. 


n  Inquiry  Part  IV.  Sed.  4.  throughout,      0  Idem,  Part  IV.  Seft.  r , 

throughout,  and  P.  282 283.      p  See  this  Matter  illuftrated  in  my 

/;ij«/ry,.  Part  IV.  Seft.  4.  efpeciilly,   P.  215 317.     q  P,  ij6,    157, 

J53>    J59>  1771  ^781  iSi,  183,  184,   185. 


(     8     ) 

ih  order  to  their  being  approved  or  blamed  at  all,  the  Aftiort 
iTsuft  be  performed  altogether  fortuitoufly,  proceeding  from  no- 
thing, arifing  from  no  Caufe.  Concerning  this  Matter,  I  have 
fully  exprelTed  my  Mind  in  the  Inquiry  r. 

If  the  Liberty  which  we  have  a  natural  Senfe  of  as  neceffary 
to  Defert,  conlifts  in  the  Mind's  Self-determination,  without 
being  determined  by  previous  Inclination  or  Motive,  then  In^ 
difference  is  ellential  to  it,  yea  abfohite  Indifference  ;  as  is  ob- 
ferved  in  my  Inquiry  s.  Eut  Men  naturally  have  no  Notion  of 
any  fuch  Liberty  as  this,  as  effential  to  the  Morality  or  Deme- 
rit of  their  Adions ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  fuch  a  Liberty,  if 
it  were  poffible,  would  be  inconfiftent  with  our  natural  Notions 
of  Defert,  as  is  largely  fnown  in  the  Inquiry  t.  If  it  be  agree- 
able to  natural  Senfe,  that  Men  mufl  be  indifferent  irt  determine 
ing  their  own  Adtions  ;  then,  according  to  the  fame,  the  more 
they  are  determined  by  Inclination,  either  good  or  bad,  the 
lefs  they  have  of  Defert :  The  more  good  Aftions  are  performed 
from  good  Difpofitions,  the  lefs  Praife-worthy  ;  and  the  more 
evil  Deeds  are  from  evil  Difpofitions,  the  lefs  culpable  ;  and  in 
general,  the  more  Mens  Actions  are  from  their  Hearts,  the  lefs 
they  are  to  be  commended  or  condemned  :  Which  all  muft  know 
is  very  contrary  to  natural  Senfe. 

Moral  Neceiiity  is  owing  to  the  Power  and  Government  of  the 
Inclination  of  the  Heart,  either  habitual  or  occafional,  excited  by 
Motive :  But,  according  to  natural  and  common  Senfe,  the 
more  a  Man  does  any  Thing  with  full  Inclination  of  Heart,  the 
more  is  it  to  be  charged  to  his  Account  for  his  Condemnation, 
if  it  be  an  ill  Adion,  and  the  more  to  be  afcribed  to  him  for  his 
Praife,  if  it  be  good. 

If  the  Mind  were  determined  to  evil  Adions  by  Contingence, 
from  a  State  of  Indifference,  then  either  there  v/ould  be  one 
Fault  in  them,  or  elfe  the  Fault  would  be  in  being  fo  perfectly 
indifferent,  that  the  Mind  was  equally  liable  to  a  bad  or  good 
Determination.  And  if  this  Indifference  be  Liberty,  then  the 
very  EfTence  of  the  Blame  or  Fault  would  lie  in  the  Liberty  it- 
felf,  or  the  Wickednefs  would,  primarily  and  fummarily,  lie 
in  being  a  free  Agent.  If  there  were  no  Fault  in  being  indif- 
ferent, then  there  would  be  no  Fault  in  the  Determination's  be- 
ing agreeable  to  fuch  a  State  of  Indifference  :  That  is,  there 
could  no  Fault  be  reafonably  found  with  this,  wz.  that  oppo- 
fite  Determinations  actually  happen  to  take  Place  indifferently y 
fometimes  good  and  fometimes  bad,  as  Contingence  governs 
and  decides.     And  if  it   be  a  Fault  to  be  indifferent  to  Good 

and 

r  p  184 — 186,  rgo,  215,  216,  and  other  Places.    •!  64—65, 
r  EfpechllyinPartm.  Seft.  6.  and  7. 


(    9    ) 

and  Evil,  then  fucli  IndifFerence  is  no  Indifference  to  Good  and 
Evil,  but  is  a  Determination  to  Evil,  or  to  a  Fault  ;  and  fuch 
an  indifferent  Difpofition  would  be  an  evil,  faulty  Difpofition, 
Tendency  or  Determination  of  Mind.  So  inconfiftent  are  thefe 
Notions  of  Liberty,  as  effential  to  Praife  or  Blame. 

The  Author  of  the  Ejfays  fuppofes  Mens  natural  delulive 
Senfe  of  a  Liberty  of  Contingencej  to  be,  in  Truth,  the  Foun- 
dation of  all  the  Labour,  Care  and  Induftry  of  Mankind  u ;  and 
that  if  Mens  praflkal  Ideas  had  bee?i  formed  on  the  Plafi  ofti7ii~ 
n)erfal  NeceJ/ity,  the  ignava  Ratio,  the  inaSii've  Doilrine  of  the 
Stoicks,  <Tvould  ha'vefolloijjed  ;  mid  that  there  •would  have  been  no 
RooMy&r  Forethought  about  Futurity,  or  any  Sort  of  Indujiry  and 
Care  <w  :  plainly  implying,  that,  in  this  Cafe,  Men  would  fee 
and  know  that  all  their  Induftry  and  Care  fignified  nothing, 
was  in  vain,  and  to  no  Purpofe,  or  of  no  Benefit ;  Events  be- 
ing fixed  in  an  irrefragable  Chain,  and  not  at  all  depending- 
on  their  Care  and  Endeavour;  as  he  explains  himfelf,  particu- 
larly, in  the  Inftance  of  Mens  Ufe  of  Means  to  prolong  Life  x  : 
Not  only  very  contrary  to  what  I  largely  maintain  in  my  In- 
quiryy,  but  a!fo  very  inconfiftently  with  his  own  Scheme,  in 
what  he  fuppofes  of  the  Ends  for  which  God  has  fo  deeply  im- 
planted this  deceitful  Feeling  in  Mans  Nature  ;  in  which  he 
manifeftly  fuppofes  Mens  Care  and  Induflry  not  to  be  in  vain 
and  of  no  Benefit,  but  of  great  Ufe,  yea  of  abfolute  Neceflity, 
in  order  to  the  obtaining  the  mofl  important  Ends  and  neceffary 
Purpofes  of  human  Life,  and  to  fulfil  the  Etids  of  Adion  to  the 
BEST  Advantage;  as  he  largely  declares  z.  Now, 
how  fhall  thefe  Things  be  reconciled  ?  That,  if  Men  had  a 
clear  Vienx'  of  the  real  'Truth,  they  would  fee  that  there  was  no 
Room  for  their  Care  and  Induftry,  becaufe  they  would  fee  it 
to  be  in  vain,  and  of  no  Benefit ;  and  yet  that  God,  by  having 
a  clear  View  of  real  Truth,  fees  that  their  being  excited  to  Care 
and  Induftry,  will  be  of  excellent  Ufe  to  Mankind,  and  great- 
ly for  the  Benefit  of  the  World,  yea  abfolutely  neceffary  in  or- 
der to  it :  And  that  therefore  the  great  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs 
of  God  to  Men  appears,  in  artfully  contriving  to  put  them  on 
Care  and  Induftry  for  their  Good,  which  Good  could  not  be 
obtained  without  them  ;  and  yet  both  thefe  Things  are  main- 
tained at  once,  and  in  the  fame  Sentences  and  Words  by  this 
Author.  The  very  Reafon  he  gives,  why  God  has  put  this 
deceitful  Feeling  into  Men,  contradids  and  deftroys  itfelf ;  that 
God  in  his  great  Goodnefs  to  Men  gave  them  fuch  a  deceitful 
R   r  Feeling, 

a  P.  184.       w  P.    189.      X   P.  184,   185.      y  Efpecially   Part  IV. 
Seft.  5.      X   P.  188. -19a.    and  ui  fliany  other  Places, 


(      .0      ) 

Feellrtg,  becaufe  it  was  very  ufefiil  and  neceiTary  for  them,  arid 
greatly  for  their  Benefit,  or  excites  them  to  Care  and  Induftry 
for  their  own  Good,  which  Care  and  Induftry  is  ufeful  and  ne- 
ceffary  to  that  End  :  And  yet  the  very  Thing  that  this  great 
Benefit  of  Care  and  Induftry  is  given  as  a  Reafon  for,  is  God's 
deceiving  Men  in  this  very  Point,  in  making  them  think  their 
Care  and  Induftry  to  be  of  great  Benefit  to  them,  when  indeed 
it  is  of  none  at  all ;  and  if  they  faw  the  real  Truth,  they  would  fee 
all  their  Endeavours  to  be  wholly  ufelefs,  that  there  was  no 
Room  for  them,  and  that  the  Event  don't  at  all  depend  upon 
them  a. 

And  befides,  what  this  Author  fays,  plainly  implies,  (as  ap- 
pears by  what  has  been  already  obferved;  that  it  is  neceffary 
Men  fhould  be  deceived,  by  being  made  to  believe  that  future 
Events  are  contingent,  and  their  own  future  Aflions  free,  with 
luch  a  Freedom,  as  fignifies  that  their  Actions  are  not  the  Fruit 
of  their  own  Defires,  or  Deiigns,  but  altogether  contingent, 
fortuitous  and  without  a  Caufe.  But  how  fhould  a  Notion  of 
Liberty,  confifting  in  Accident  or  loofe  Chance,  encourage 
Care  and  Induftry  ?  I  fhould  think  it  would  rather  entirely  dif- 
courage  every  Thing  of  this  Nature.  For  furely,  if  our  Ani- 
ons don't  depend  on  our  Defires  and  Defigns,  then  they  don't 
depend  on  our  Endeavours,  flowing  from  our  Defires  and  De- 
figns. This  Author  himfelf  feems  to  fuppofe,  that  if  Men  had 
indeed  fuch  a  Liberty  of  Contingence,  it  would  render  all  En- 
deavours to  determine  or  move  Mens  future  Volitions,  in  vain  : 
He  fays,  that,  in  this  Cafe,  to  exhort,  to  inJiruSl,  to  promjje,  or 
to  threaten^  would  be  to  no  Purpofe  b.  Why  ?  Becaufe  (as  he 
himfelf  gives  the  Reafon)  then  our  Will  nuould  be  capricious  and 
arbitrary,  and  tve  Jhould  be  thro'wn  loofe  altogether,  and  cur  ar- 
bitrary Po^Mer  could  do  us  Good  or  III  only  by  Accident.  But  if 
fuch  a  loofe  fortuitous  State  would  render  vain  others  Endea- 
vours upon  us,  for  the  fame  Reafon  would  it  make  ufelefs  our 
Endeavours  on  ourfelves :  For  Events  that  are  truly  con- 
tingent and  accidental,  and  altogether  loofe  from  and  indepen- 
dent of  all  foregoing  Caufes,  are  independent  on  every  fore- 
going Caufe  within  ourfelves,  as  well  as  in  others. 

I  fuppofe  that  it  is  fo  far  from  being  true,  that  our  Minds 
are  naturally  poffefled  with  a  Notion  of  fuch  Liberty  as  this, 
fo  ftrongly,  that  it  is  impoffible  to  root  it  out,  that  indeed  Merr 
have  no  fuch  Notion  of  Liberty  at  all,  and  that  it  is  utterly 
impoiTible,  by  any  Means  whatfoever,   to  implant  or  introduce 

fuch 

«  P.  i88,    189,  &c.        1/  P.  178,  213,  414. 


(  "  ) 

fuch  a  Notion  into  the  Mind.  As  no  fuch  Notions  as  imply 
Self-contradidion  and  Self-abolition  can  fubfift  in  the  Mind,  as 
I  have  fhewn  in  my  Inquiry  c  ;  I  think  a  mature  fenfible  Conii- 
deration  of  the  Matter,  fufficient  to  fatisfy  any  one,  that  even 
the  greateft  and  moll  learned  Advocates  themlelves  for  Liberty 
of  Indifference  and  Self-determination,  have  no  fuch  Notion  ; 
and  that  indeed  they  mean  fomething  wholly  inconfiftent  with, 
and  dired^ly  fubverfive  of  what  they  ftrenuoufly  affirm,  and 
earneftly  contend  for.  By  a  Mans  having  a  Power  of  deter- 
mining his  own  Will,  they  plainly  mean  a  Power  of  detennininf>- 
his  Will,  as  he  pleafes,  or  as  he  chufes  ;  which  fuppofes  that 
the  Mind  has  a  Choice,  prior  to  its  going  about  to  conform 
any  Adion  or  Determination  to  it.  And  if  they  mean  that 
they  determine  even  the  original  or  prime  Choice,  by  their  own 
Pleafure  or  Choice,  as  the  Thing  that  caufes  and  direfts  it ;  I 
fcruple  not  moft'  boldly  to  affirm,  that  they  fpcak  they  know 
not  what,  and  that  of  which  they  have  no  Manner  of  Idea  ; 
becaufe  no  fuch  contradidfory  Notion  can  come  into,  or  have 
a  Moment's  Subfiflence  in  the  Mmd  of  any  Man  living,  as  an 
original  or  firft  Choice  being  caufed,  or  brought  into  Being,  by 
Choice.  After  all  they  fay,  they  have  no  higher  or  other 
Conception  of  Liberty,  than  that  vulgar  Notion  of  it,  which  I 
contend  for,  'viz..  a  Mans  having  Power  or  Opportunity  to  do 
as  he  chufes :  Or  if  they  had  a  Notion  that  every  Aft  of  Choice 
was  determined  by  Choice,  yet  it  would  deftroy  their  Notion  of 
the  Contingence  of  Choice ;  for  then  no  one  kdi  of  Choice 
would  arife  contingently,  or  from  a  State  of  Indifterence,  but 
every  individual  Aft,  in  all  the  Series,  would  arife  from  fore- 
going Bias  or  Preference,  and  from  a  Caufe  predetermining 
and  fixing  its  Exiftence,  which  introduces  at  once  fuch  a  Chain 
of  Caufes  and  EfFefts,  each  preceding  Link  decifively  fixing  the 
following,  as  they  would  by  all  Means  avoid. 

And  fuch  Kind  of  Delufion  and  Self-contradiftion  as  this. 
don't  arife  in  Mens  Minds  by  Nature  :  It  is  not  owing  to  any 
natural  Feeling  which  God  has  ftrongly  fixed  in  the  Mind  and 
Nature  of  Man  ;  but  to  falfe  Philofcphy,  and  ftrong  Prejudice, 
from  a  deceitful  Abufe  of  Words.  It  \^  artificial ;  not  in  the 
Sfinfe  of  the  Author  of  the  Efays,  fuppofing  it  to  be  a  deceitful 
Artifice  of  God  ;  but  artificial  as  oppofed  to  natural,  and  as 
owing  To  an  artificial  deceitful  Management  of  Terms,  to. 
darken  and  confound  the  Mind.  Men  have  no  fuch  Thing 
when  they  firft  begin  to  exercife  Reafon  ;  but  muft  have  a  great 
deal  of  Time  to  blind  therafelves  with  metaphyfical  Confufion, 
before  they  can  embrace,  and  reft  in  fuch  Definitions  of  Liberty 
as  are  given,  and  imagine  they  underftand  them. 

R  r  3  On 

c  p.  183,  184.       See   alfa    P.    34,    39,    40,    52,  53,  56,  131,  134, 
aoo,  zoi,  212,  214. 


(  "  ) 

On  the  Whole,  I  humbly  conceive,  that  whofoever  will  give 
himfelf  the  Trouble  of  weighing,  what  I  have  offered  to  Con- 
iideration  in  vc\y  Inquiry,  muft  be  fenfjbie,  that  fuch  amoral 
Necelfity  of  Mens  Adions  as  I  maintain,  is  not  at  all  inconfift- 
ent  with  any  Liberty  that  any  Creature  has,  or  can  have,  as  a 
free,  accountable,  moral  Agent,  and  Subjeft  of  moral  Govern- 
ment ;  and  that  this  moral  Neceffity  is  fo  far  from  being  incon- 
fiilent  with  Praife  and  Blame,  and  the  Benefit  and  Ufe  of  Mens 
own  Care  and  Labour,  that  on  the  contrary  it  implies  the  very 
Ground  and  Reafon,  why  Mens  Adlions  are  to  be  afcribed  to 
them  as  their  own,  in  that  Manner  as  to  infer  Defert,  Praife 
and  Blame,  Approbation  and  Remorfe  of  Confcience,  Reward 
and  Punifhment ;  and  that  it  eftablifhes  the  moral  Syflem  of  the 
Univerfe,  and  God's  moral  Government,  in  every  Refpeft, 
with  the  proper  Ufe  of  Motives,  Exhortations,  Commands, 
Counfels,  Promifes,  and  Threatenings ;  and  the  Ufe  and  Be- 
nefit of  Endeavours,  Care  and  Induftry  :  And  that  therefore 
there  is  no  Need  that  the  flrift  philofophic  Truth  fhould  be  at 
all  concealed  from  Men  ;  no  Danger  in  Contemplation  and /ro- 
found  Di/covery  in  thefe  Things.  So  far  from  this,  that  the 
Truth  in  this  Matter  is  of  vaft  Importance,  and  extremely 
needful  to  be  known ;  and  that  the  more  clearly  and  perfeftly 
the  real  Faft  is  known,  and  the  more  conftantly  it  is  in  View, 
the  better  ;  and  particularly,  that  the  clear  and  full  Knowledge 
of  that  which  is  the  true  Syflem  of  the  Univerfe,  in  thefe  Re- 
fpeds,  would  greatly  eflablifh  the  Doftrines  which  teach  the 
true  Chriflian  Scheme  of  divine  Adminiflration  in  the  City  of 
God,  and  the  Gofpel  of  Jefus  Chrift,  in  its  mofl  important 
Articles ;  and  that  thefe  Things  never  can  be  well  cftablifhed, 
and  the  oppofire  Errors,  fo  fubverfive  of  the  whole  Gofpel, 
which  at  this  Day  fo  greatly  and  generally  prevail,  be  well 
confuted,  or  the  Arguments  by  which  they  are  maintained, 
anfwered,  till  thefe  Points  are  fettled  :  While  this  is  not  done. 
It  is,  to  me,  beyond  Doubt,  that  the  Friends  of  thofe  great: 
Gofpel  Truths,  will  but  poorly  maintain  their  Controverfy  with 
the  Adverfaries  of  thofe  Truths  :  They  will  be  obliged  often  to 
dodge,  fhufHe,  hide,  and  turn  their  Backs ;  and  the  latter  will 
have  a  flrong  Fort,  from  whence  they  never  can  be  driven,  and 
Weapons  to  ufe,  which  thofe  whom  they  oppofe  will  6nd  no 
Shield  to  fcreen  themfelves  from  ;  and  they  will  always  puzzle, 
confound,  and  keep  under  the  Friends  of  found  Doftrine ;  and 
glory,  and  vaunt  themfelves  in  their  Advantage  over  them  ;  and 
carry  their  Affairs  with  an  high  Hand,  as  they  have  done  al- 
ready for  a  long  Time  paft. 

I  conclude.  Sir,  with  alking  you:  Pardon  for  troubling  you 

with 


(     13    ) 

with  fo  much  faid  in  Vindication  of  myfelf  from  the  Imputation 
of  advancing  a  Scheme  of  Neceffity,  of  a  like  Nature  with  that 
of  the  Author  of  the  ^JJhys  on  the  Principles  of  Morality  and 
Natural  Religion.  Confidering  that  what  I  have  faid  is  not  on- 
ly in  Vindication  of  myfelf,  but,  as  I  think,  of  the  moft  im- 
portant Articles  of  moral  Philofophy  and  Religion  ;  I  truft,  in 
what  I  know  of  your  Candour,  that  you  will  excufe. 

Your  obliged  Friend  and  Brother ^ 


Stockbridgej  J.     EDWARD  Sa 

'  J^b  25,  1757° 


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